WMD conjecture in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq

Last updated

A UN weapons inspector in Iraq. WeaponsInspector.JPG
A UN weapons inspector in Iraq.

WMD conjecture in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq concerns the immediate reactions and consequences to the failure by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the U.S.-led Iraq Survey Group (ISG) to find the alleged stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq during and after the invasion in 2003. [1] The United States effectively terminated the search effort for unconventional weaponry in 2005, and the Iraq Intelligence Commission concluded that the judgements of the U.S. intelligence community about the continued existence of weapons of mass destruction and an associated military program were wrong. The official findings by the CIA in 2004 were that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein "did not possess stockpiles of illicit weapons at the time of the U.S. invasion in March 2003 and had not begun any program to produce them." [2]

Contents

Immediately following and during these searches, many theories were put forward on how it could be possible for these WMDs to have suddenly disappeared (assuming they were, in fact, there at first). These theories included conspiracy theories, accusations against other governments and claims of successful deception efforts by Saddam Hussein.

After much criticism against the war over the years that followed, every figure that previously supported the claims of WMDs in Iraq (with the exception of Dick Cheney) acknowledged that they had been wrong. [3] A related debate concerned whether the figures that had built the case for the war had been inadvertently misled by intelligence or that they intentionally deceived the public. [4] [5]

No such stockpiles

Saddam knew there were no stockpiles

On 13 December 2003, Saddam Hussein was captured by U.S. forces during Operation Red Dawn. Time Online Edition reports that in his first interrogation he was asked whether Iraq had any WMD. According to an official, his reply was:

"No, of course not, the U.S. dreamed them up itself to have a reason to go to war with us." The interrogator continued along this line, said the official, asking: "if you had no weapons of mass destruction then why not let the U.N. inspectors into your facilities?" Saddam’s reply: "We didn’t want them to go into the presidential areas and intrude on our privacy." [6]

Later, through interrogations in US custody, Saddam revealed that, immediately prior to the start of the 2003 US invasion, he had announced to his generals that there were no WMD. One theory given currency by Charles Duelfer is that Saddam sent out different signals to different people in order to keep them confused and help stay in power. [7] Documents since captured inside Iraq by coalition forces are reported to reveal Saddam's frustration with weapon inspections. Meeting transcripts record him saying to senior aides: "We don't have anything hidden!" In another, he remarks: "When is this going to end?" And another: "Don't think for a minute that we still have WMD. We have nothing." [8]

Hans Blix from the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission said in his early 2004 book, Disarming Iraq, that Saddam had successfully been deterred from keeping WMD stockpiles by outside pressure. In regards to why he appeared so unsuccessful in convincing others that Iraq had no stockpiles (allowing for sanctions that crippled Iraq's economy), Blix pointed out several reasons: [9]

Saddam did not know there were no stockpiles

According to The Guardian in late 2003, British officials in Whitehall began circulating a theory that Saddam Hussein and his senior advisers "may have been hoodwinked" by lower-ranking officers "into believing that Iraq really did possess weapons of mass destruction." And as most of the informers for British intelligence were the same high-level advisers close to Saddam, the British were also fooled. The paper adds that this hypothesis "is open to the interpretation that the government is searching for an excuse, however implausible, for failure to discover any WMD in Iraq." [10] Commenting on the findings of the Butler intelligence review six months later, USA Today reported that Britain's Secret Intelligence Service had "shockingly few reliable human sources inside Saddam's regime." [11]

Stockpiles transported to another country

Rumors abounded of possible transportation of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to foreign countries, namely Syria, Lebanon and Iran. This was particularly prevalent in the weeks before Operation Iraqi Freedom began.

Possibility of Russian involvement

Romanian intelligence defector Ion Mihai Pacepa alleged that an operation for the removal of chemical weapons was prepared by the Soviet Union for Libya, and that he was told over thirty years ago by Romanian President Nicolae Ceauşescu, KGB chairman Yury Andropov, and later, Yevgeny Primakov, about the existence of a similar plan for Iraq. It is "perfectly obvious", wrote Pacepa, that the Russian GRU agency helped Saddam Hussein to destroy, hide, or transfer his chemical weapons prior to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. "After all, Russia helped Saddam get his hands on them in the first place." [12]

Syria

Map of Syria, showing its location west of Iraq Sy-map.png
Map of Syria, showing its location west of Iraq

Former Iraqi general Georges Sada claimed that in late 2002, Saddam had ordered all of his stockpiles to be moved to Syria. He appeared on Fox News' Hannity & Colmes in January 2006 to discuss his book, Saddam's Secrets: How an Iraqi General Defied and Survived Saddam Hussein. Anticipating the arrival of weapon inspectors on November 1, Sada said Saddam took advantage of the June 4 Zeyzoun Dam disaster in Syria by forming an "air bridge", loading them onto cargo aircraft and flying them out of the country.

They were moved by air and by ground, 56 sorties by jumbo, 747, and 27 were moved, after they were converted to cargo aircraft, they were moved to Syria. [13]

In January 2004, Nizar Nayuf, a Syrian journalist who moved to Western Europe, said in a letter to the Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf that he knows the three sites where Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are kept inside Syria. According to Nayuf's witness, described as a senior source inside Syrian military intelligence he had known for two years, [14] Iraq's WMD are in tunnels dug under the town of al-Baida near the city of Hama in northern Syria, in the village of Tal Snan, north of the town of Salamija, where there is a big Syrian air force camp, and in the city of Sjinsjar on the Syrian border with the Lebanon, south of Homs city. Nayouf also wrote that the transfer of Iraqi WMD to Syria was organized by the commanders of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi Republican Guard, including General Shalish, with the help of Assef Shawkat, Bashar Assad's cousin. Shoakat is the CEO of Bhaha, an import/export company owned by the Assad family. [15] U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice responded to this accusation by saying "I don't think we are at the point that we can make a judgment on this issue. There hasn't been any hard evidence that such a thing happened. But obviously we're going to follow up every lead, and it would be a serious problem if that, in fact, did happen." [14]

A similar claim was made by Lieutenant General Moshe Ya'alon, a former Israeli officer who served as chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces from July 2002 to June 2005. In April 2004, he was quoted as saying that "perhaps they transferred them to another country, such as Syria." [16] General Ya'alon told the New York Sun more firmly in December 2005 that "He [Saddam] transferred the chemical agents from Iraq to Syria." [17] The Fall 2005 Middle East Quarterly also reported Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as having said in a December, 2002 appearance on Israel's Channel 2, "... chemical and biological weapons which Saddam is endeavoring to conceal have been moved from Iraq to Syria." [18]

In February 2006, Ali Ibrahim al-Tikriti, a former Iraqi general who defected shortly before the Gulf War in 1991, gave an interview to Ryan Mauro, in which he stated:

I know Saddam's weapons are in Syria due to certain military deals that were made going as far back as the late 1980s that dealt with the event that either capitals were threatened with being overrun by an enemy nation. Not to mention I have discussed this in-depth with various contacts of mine who have confirmed what I already knew. At this point Saddam knew that the United States were eventually going to come for his weapons and the United States wasn't going to just let this go like they did in the original Gulf War. He knew that he had lied for this many years and wanted to maintain legitimacy with the pan Arab nationalists. He also has wanted since he took power to embarrass the West and this was the perfect opportunity to do so. After Saddam denied he had such weapons why would he use them or leave them readily available to be found? That would only legitimize President Bush, whom he has a personal grudge against. What we are witnessing now is many who opposed the war to begin with are rallying around Saddam saying we overthrew a sovereign leader based on a lie about WMD. This is exactly what Saddam wanted and predicted. [19]

Al-Tikriti's interview was featured prominently on conservative web sites such as FrontPageMag and WorldNetDaily, but did not receive mainstream press attention. Salon magazine editor Alex Koppelman doubts both Sada's and al-Tikriti's story, arguing that Syria's decision to side with the coalition against Iraq in 1990 would have nullified any previous military deals. [20] [21]

The Iraq Survey Group was told that Saddam Hussein periodically removed guards from the Syrian border and replaced them with his intelligence agents who then supervised the movement of banned materials between Syria and Iraq, according to two unnamed defense sources that spoke with The Washington Times. They reported heavy traffic in large trucks on the border before the United States invasion. [22] Earlier, in a telephone interview with The Daily Telegraph , the former head of the Iraqi Survey Group, David Kay, said: "[W]e know from some of the interrogations of former Iraqi officials that a lot of material went to Syria before the war, including some components of Saddam's WMD program. Precisely what went to Syria, and what has happened to it, is a major issue that needs to be resolved." [23] Satellite imagery also picked up activity on the Iraq-Syria border before and during the invasion. James R. Clapper, who headed the National Imagery and Mapping Agency in 2003, has said U.S. intelligence tracked a large number of vehicles, mostly civilian trucks, moving from Iraq into Syria. Clapper suggested the trucks may have contained materiel related to Iraq's WMD programs. [24]

ISG formed a special working group to investigate and consider these claims. Charles Duelfer, head of inspectorate at time of publication, summarized the group's conclusion: "Based on the evidence available at present, ISG judged that it was unlikely that an official transfer of WMD material from Iraq to Syria took place. However, ISG was unable to rule out unofficial movement of limited WMD-related materials." [25] [26] [27]

Jordan

In April 2004, Jordanian officials announced that they had thwarted a planned chemical attack on Jordan's intelligence headquarters by Al-Qaeda-linked terrorists that could have killed 20,000 people. [28] [29] Acting under the orders of Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi, self-professed leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, officials said the plotters entered Jordan from Syria with trucks filled with 20 tons of explosives. [30] Syrian officials denied the claims. [30] U.S. officials stated there was debate within the CIA and other U.S. agencies about whether the intent was to create a chemical weapon or conventional explosive bomb: a large quantity of sulfuric acid was seized, which can be used as a blister agent, but is more commonly used to increase the size of conventional explosions. [31] The Syrian government was strongly anti-Islamist, having previously defeated the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria in the Islamic uprising in Syria, and in the Syrian civil war Islamists (including al-Qaeda in Iraq) fought against the Syrian government. [32] [33]

In February 2006, a Jordanian military court sentenced nine men, including Iraq's al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, to death for plotting the attack. [34] Lawyers for the men had argued that confessions had been obtained during two weeks of torture. [35] Zarqawi admitted his group was behind the plot, but denied that chemical weapons were to be used. [34] Two men were jailed for up to 3 years, and two men were acquitted. [34]

Lebanon

A road through the Bekaa Valley Akkar 09.jpg
A road through the Bekaa Valley

American Internet newspaper World Tribune reported in August 2003 that Iraq's WMD may have been moved to Lebanon's heavily fortified Bekaa Valley. According to the story, United States intelligence identified "a stream of tractor-trailer trucks" moving from Iraq through Syria to Lebanon in the weeks before invasion. [36]

Former United States Deputy Undersecretary of Defense John A. Shaw also alleged that the Russians played an extensive role in transporting materials into both Syria and Lebanon, "to prevent the United States from discovering them." Shaw claimed trucks were transporting materials to Syria and returning empty. In addition, containers with warnings painted on them were moved to a Beirut hospital basement. "They were moved by Russian Spetsnaz (special forces) units out of uniform, that were specifically sent to Iraq to move the weaponry and eradicate any evidence of its existence". The People's Republic of China is also alleged to have helped remove WMD equipment. [37] Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Lawrence Di Rita called Shaw's charges "absurd and without any foundation." DiRita noted that Shaw "has been directed on several occasions to produce evidence of his wide-ranging and fantastic charges and provide it to the DoD inspector general. To my knowledge, he has not done so." [38] Former Russian Foreign Intelligence director Evgeny Primakov rejected the story, telling Kommersant that "all of Shaw's sensational revelations are complete nonsense." [39]

Iran

John Loftus saw information that led him to believe Iran had acquired illicit material. In a story on Dave Gaubatz, Melanie Phillips quoted Loftus as saying "Saddam had the last laugh and donated his secret stockpile to benefit Iran's nuclear weapons programme." [40] Phillips followed up her report by reproducing a letter from John Loftus calling for a congressional investigation of John Negroponte, whom he accused of concealing the information. [41] Salon magazine columnist Glenn Greenwald accused Philips of promoting a moronic and deranged conspiracy theory. [42]

Pakistan

Former head of the Indian counter-terrorism division and member of the National Security Advisory Board, B Raman, suggests A.Q. Khan may have assisted in shifting Iraq's WMD to Pakistan. Writing for the South Asia Analysis Group, he cites unnamed Pakistani sources claiming Khan agreed to aid Iraqi intelligence officials "who sought his help" in having some prohibited material airlifted from Syria to Pakistan to prevent it "falling into the hands of the UN inspectors." According to Raman, Pervez Musharraf has been working hard "to see that this is not played up in the Pakistani media." [43] [44]

Stockpiles still hidden in Iraq

The US had had positive intelligence of Iraqi chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war starting in July 1982 and continuing at least through 1988. There were confirmed uses of Sarin, mustard gas and Tabun nerve agent (also known as “GA”). The intelligence agencies relied on that data when they assumed Iraq still had the WMD in 2002, although they could not confirm the information. [45]

Appearing on MSNBC's Hardball in June 2004, Paul Wolfowitz insisted the weapons picture was without change, since Iraq "had a lot of time to move stuff, a lot of time to hide stuff." [46] Three weeks later, Lord Butler of Brockwell said upon conclusion of the Butler Review, "Iraq is a very big place, there is a lot of sand. ... It is impractical to dig up the whole of Iraq, but for somebody to say 'we are absolutely certain that there is nothing there' would be a very rash and unfounded thing to say, in our judgment." [47] [48]

Former Pentagon investigator Dave Gaubatz alleges he found hidden WMD sites in 2003, [49] but that his reports were ignored and then destroyed as part of a cover-up by the CIA, Department of Defense, and Bush administration. [50] This allowed a group of Russians, Iraqis and Syrians to dig up the WMDs and move them to Syria. This idea was dismissed by Wired , [51] and Salon , who pointed out that it required President Bush, military leaders, and Senate Democrats to have all colluded in a massive conspiracy theory. [52] The final report of the Iraq Survey Group, by Charles A. Duelfer, special adviser on Iraqi weapons to the C.I.A., concluded that any stockpiles had been destroyed long before the war and that transfers to Syria were "unlikely." [53]

Some remnant WMD were scattered at various locations throughout Iraq, but most were old and unusable. During the US occupation of Iraq, weapons were occasionally discovered and destroyed. On occasion, these would test positive for chemical weapons. Most of the chemical warheads were left over from the Iraq-Iran war, and none newer than 1991. The majority of chemical weapons were found near the Muthanna State Establishment not far from Bahgdad. US and Iraqi personnel sustained injuries on six documented cases during 2004-2011. However, most of the details remain classified. [54] [53]

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Weapon of mass destruction</span> Weapon that can kill many people or cause great damage

A weapon of mass destruction (WMD) is a biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear, or any other weapon that can kill or significantly harm many people or cause great damage to artificial structures, natural structures, or the biosphere. The scope and usage of the term has evolved and been disputed, often signifying more politically than technically. Originally coined in reference to aerial bombing with chemical explosives during World War II, it has later come to refer to large-scale weaponry of warfare-related technologies, such as biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear warfare.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441</span> 2002 UN Security Council resolution regarding Iraqi disarmament

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 is a United Nations Security Council resolution adopted unanimously by the United Nations Security Council on 8 November 2002, offering Iraq under Saddam Hussein "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" that had been set out in several previous resolutions. It provided a justification for the subsequent US invasion of Iraq.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Iraq and weapons of mass destruction</span> Research and development of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq

Iraq actively researched and later employed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from 1962 to 1991, when it destroyed its chemical weapons stockpile and halted its biological and nuclear weapon programs as required by the United Nations Security Council. The fifth president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, was internationally condemned for his use of chemical weapons during the 1980s campaign against Iranian and Kurdish civilians during and after the Iran–Iraq War. In the 1980s, Saddam pursued an extensive biological weapons program and a nuclear weapons program, though no nuclear bomb was built. After the Gulf War (1990–1991), the United Nations located and destroyed large quantities of Iraqi chemical weapons and related equipment and materials; Iraq ceased its chemical, biological and nuclear programs.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2003 invasion of Iraq</span> Military invasion led by the United States

The 2003 invasion of Iraq was a United States–led invasion of the Republic of Iraq and the first stage of the Iraq War. The invasion phase began on 19 March 2003 (air) and 20 March 2003 (ground) and lasted just over one month, including 26 days of major combat operations, in which a combined force of troops from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland invaded Iraq. Twenty-two days after the first day of the invasion, the capital city of Baghdad was captured by coalition forces on 9 April 2003 after the six-day-long Battle of Baghdad. This early stage of the war formally ended on 1 May 2003 when U.S. President George W. Bush declared the "end of major combat operations" in his Mission Accomplished speech, after which the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established as the first of several successive transitional governments leading up to the first Iraqi parliamentary election in January 2005. U.S. military forces later remained in Iraq until the withdrawal in 2011.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">1998 bombing of Iraq</span> U.S. and U.K. bombardment of Iraq in December 1998

The 1998 bombing of Iraq was a major four-day bombing campaign on Iraqi targets from 16 to 19 December 1998, by the United States and the United Kingdom. On 16 December 1998, Bill Clinton announced that he had ordered strikes against Iraq. The strikes were launched as a result of Iraq's failure to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions and its interference with United Nations Special Commission inspectors who were looking for weapons of mass destruction. The inspectors had been sent in 1997 and were repeatedly refused access to certain sites, thus compelling the U.S. to launch strikes.

<i>September Dossier</i> British government document about Iraq

Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, also known as the September Dossier, was a document published by the British government on 24 September 2002. Parliament was recalled on the same day to discuss the contents of the document. The paper was part of an ongoing investigation by the government into weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, which ultimately led to the invasion of Iraq six months later. It contained a number of allegations according to which Iraq also possessed WMD, including chemical weapons and biological weapons. The dossier even alleged that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons programme.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Iraq Survey Group</span>

The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was a fact-finding mission sent by the multinational force in Iraq to find the weapons of mass destruction alleged to be possessed by Iraq that had been the main ostensible reason for the invasion in 2003. Its final report, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq WMD, was submitted to Congress and the president in 2004. It consisted of a 1,400-member international team organized by the Pentagon and Central Intelligence Agency to hunt for the alleged stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological agents, and any supporting research programs and infrastructure that could be used to develop WMD. The report acknowledged that only small stockpiles of chemical WMDs were found, the numbers being inadequate to pose a militarily significant threat.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">David Kay</span> American weapons inspector (1940–2022)

David A. Kay was an American weapons expert, political commentator, and senior fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. He was best known for his time as United Nations Chief Weapons Inspector following the first Gulf War and for leading the Iraq Survey Group's search for weapons of mass destruction following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Upon presentation of the Group's finding that there had been significant errors in pre-war intelligence concerning Iraq's weapons programs, Kay resigned. The ensuing controversy served as impetus for the formation of the Iraq Intelligence Commission.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Hussein Kamel al-Majid</span> Iraqi politician (1954–1996)

Colonel General Hussein Kamel Hassan al-Majid was the son-in-law and second cousin of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. He defected to Jordan and assisted United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection teams assigned to look for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. He was killed the following year for betraying Saddam.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence</span> 2004 report by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

The Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence was the report by the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concerning the U.S. intelligence community's assessments of Iraq during the time leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The report, which was released on July 9, 2004, identified numerous failures in the intelligence-gathering and -analysis process. The report found that these failures led to the creation of inaccurate materials that misled both government policy makers and the American public.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Al Qa'qaa high explosives controversy</span>

The Al Qa'qaa high explosives controversy concerns the possible removal of about 377 tonnes of high explosives from the Al Qa'qaa facility by the Iraqi insurgency, after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Although Pentagon spokesman Lawrence Di Rita said that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not come forward with documentation that explains how it arrived at the figure of 377 tons of missing explosives. The IAEA so far only has verified in its paperwork that 219 tons of explosive materials were at Al Qaqaa and surrounding facilities.

The Salman Pak, or al-Salman, facility is an Iraqi military facility near Baghdad. It was falsely assessed by United States military intelligence to be a key center of Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons programs. The facility came under American control in early April 2003 when it was captured by U.S. Marines. The facility was then referred to as Forward Operating Base (FOB) Carpenter.

The Saddam–al-Qaeda conspiracy theory was based on false claims made by the United States government, alleging that a highly secretive relationship existed between Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and the Sunni pan-Islamist militant organization al-Qaeda between 1992 and 2003. The George W. Bush administration promoted it as a main rationale for invading Iraq.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Rationale for the Iraq War</span> U.S. claims and arguments for invading Iraq

The rationale for the Iraq War, both the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the subsequent hostilities, was controversial. The George W. Bush administration began actively pressing for military intervention in Iraq in late 2001. The primary rationalization for the Iraq War was articulated by a joint resolution of the United States Congress known as the Iraq Resolution. The US claimed the intent was to "disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Legitimacy of the 2003 invasion of Iraq</span>

A dispute exists over the legitimacy of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The debate centers around the question whether the invasion was an unprovoked assault on an independent country that may have breached international law, or if the United Nations Security Council authorized the invasion. Those arguing for its legitimacy often point to Congressional Joint Resolution 114 and UN Security Council resolutions, such as Resolution 1441 and Resolution 678. Those arguing against its legitimacy also cite some of the same sources, stating they do not actually permit war but instead lay out conditions that must be met before war can be declared. Furthermore, the Security Council may only authorise the use of force against an "aggressor" in the interests of preserving peace, whereas the 2003 invasion of Iraq was not provoked by any aggressive military action.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Naji Sabri</span> Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs

Naji Sabri Ahmad Al-Hadithi served as the Iraqi Foreign Minister under Saddam Hussein in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003 documents are some 48,000 boxes of documents, audiotapes and videotapes that were discovered by the U.S. military during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The documents date from the 1980s through the post-Saddam period. In March 2006, the U.S. government, at the urging of members of Congress, made them available online at its Foreign Military Studies Office website, requesting Arabic translators around the world to help in the translation.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Iraqi biological weapons program</span> Research and development of biological weapons in Iraq

Saddam Hussein (1937–2006) began an extensive biological weapons (BW) program in Iraq in the early 1980s, despite having signed the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972. Details of the BW program and a chemical weapons program surfaced after the Gulf War (1990–91) during the disarmament of Iraq under the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). By the end of the war, program scientists had investigated the BW potential of five bacterial strains, one fungal strain, five types of virus, and four toxins. Of these, three—anthrax, botulinum and aflatoxin—had proceeded to weaponization for deployment. Because of the UN disarmament program that followed the war, more is known today about the once-secret bioweapons program in Iraq than that of any other nation.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Interrogation of Saddam Hussein</span> Overview of interrogation, 2003–2004

The interrogation of Saddam Hussein began shortly after his December 2003 capture, while the deposed president of Iraq was held at the United States Camp Cropper detention facility at Baghdad International Airport. Beginning in February 2004, the interrogation program, codenamed Operation Desert Spider, was controlled by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents. Standard FBI FD-302 forms filed at the time were declassified and released in 2009 under a U.S. Freedom of Information Act request filed by the National Security Archive. Saddam, identified as "High Value Detainee #1" in the documents, was the subject of 20 "formal interviews" followed by five "casual conversations." Questioning covered the span of Saddam's political career, from 2003 when he was found hiding in a "spider hole" on a farm near his home town of Tikrit, back to his role in a failed 1959 coup attempt in Iraq, after which he had taken refuge in the very same place, one report noted.

References

  1. No WMD stockpiles in Iraq Archived December 17, 2007, at the Wayback Machine CNN. October 7, 2004.
  2. Report: No WMD stockpiles in Iraq Archived November 7, 2017, at the Wayback Machine , CNN
  3. At Least Trump Got One Thing Right. There Were No WMDs in Iraq Archived October 5, 2017, at the Wayback Machine , Huffington Post, "But the very leaders who sold them the goods on Iraq’s non-existent weapons program have (with the exception of Cheney) come out and acknowledged that there were no WMDs."
    • "In his memoir, Known and Unknown, Rumsfeld specifically mentioned the lack of WMD stockpiles in Iraq and said “Saddam Hussein didn’t have ready stockpiles of WMD our intelligence community believed we would uncover. The shift in emphasis suggested that Iraq’s intentions and capability for building WMD had somehow not been threatening. Many Americans and others around the world accordingly came to believe the war was unnecessary.”
    • "National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice similarly acknowledged, “What we have is evidence that there are differences between what we knew going in and what we found on the ground.”"
    • "Secretary of State Colin Powell would also state, “Of course I regret that a lot of it [the evidence] turned out be wrong.”"
  4. Mathur, Piyush (2006). "More Whitewash: The WMD Mirage". Third World Quarterly. 27 (8): 1495–1507. doi:10.1080/01436590601027347. JSTOR   4017692. S2CID   153614528.
  5. Dick Cheney's Biggest Lie Archived November 2, 2017, at the Wayback Machine , Newsweek
  6. Notes from Saddam in custody Archived June 14, 2006, at the Wayback Machine Time. December 14, 2003.
  7. Facing defeat, Saddam clung to his fantasies The Observer October 10, 2004.
  8. Transcripts Show Saddam Frustrated Over WMD Claims Archived May 30, 2007, at the Wayback Machine Fox News March 22, 2006.
  9. Pearson, Graham (2005). The search for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction : inspection, verification, and non-proliferation. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN   978-0-230-51258-0.
  10. New theory for Iraq's missing WMD The Guardian December 24, 2003.
  11. U.S., British probes reach similar findings Archived May 24, 2011, at the Wayback Machine USA Today July 14, 2004.
  12. "Operation Sarindar" (meaning "emergency exit") was an operating procedure designed by Soviet military intelligence to get rid of all traces of chemical weapons delivered or produced under Soviet guidance in Third World countries "if the Western imperialists ever got near them", writes Pacepa. Pacepa, Ion. Ex-spy fingers Russians on WMD Archived August 22, 2009, at the Wayback Machine , The Washington Times, October 2, 2003.
  13. Former Top Military Aide to Saddam Reveals Dictator's Secret Plans Archived June 18, 2006, at the Wayback Machine January 26, 2006.
  14. 1 2 Syria Role On Iraqi Arms Is Studied Archived September 25, 2018, at the Wayback Machine Washington Post January 10, 2004.
  15. A senior Syrian journalist reports Iraq WMD located in three Syrian sites Archived June 24, 2006, at the Wayback Machine 2LA.org January 2004.
  16. Israeli military chief says Iraq had chemical weapons Archived May 16, 2008, at the Wayback Machine The Sydney Morning Herald April 27, 2004.
  17. Saddam's WMD Moved to Syria, An Israeli Says Archived August 22, 2007, at the Wayback Machine New York Sun December 15, 2005.
  18. The Middle East Quarterly Archived June 14, 2006, at the Wayback Machine Fall 2005.
  19. Interview with Ali Ibrahim Al-Tikriti Global Politician February 15, 2006.
  20. "Missing WMDs?". Archived from the original on May 18, 2006. Retrieved October 6, 2016. Dragonfire.org Issue 14, 2006.
  21. "Lions, Tigers and WMD Conspiracies, Oh My!". Archived from the original on April 13, 2006. Retrieved October 6, 2016. Dragonfire.org Issue 16, 2006.
  22. "Saddam agents on Syria border helped move banned materials". The Washington Times. August 16, 2004. Archived from the original on March 27, 2014. Retrieved October 6, 2016.
  23. Saddam's WMD hidden in Syria, says Iraq survey chief Archived April 14, 2008, at the Wayback Machine . The Daily Telegraph January 24, 2004.
  24. Lauren Johnston (October 30, 2003). "WMD Hunt May Be Back-Burnered". CBS News . Archived from the original on July 23, 2012. Retrieved October 6, 2016.
  25. US team concludes Saddam had no WMD Financial Times April 27, 2005.
  26. No Basis For WMD Smuggling Claims Archived September 17, 2007, at the Wayback Machine . CBS News January 15, 2005.
  27. Comprehensive Revised Report with Addendums on Iraq's WMD Archived September 11, 2007, at the Wayback Machine (Duelfer Report).
  28. "Jordan 'was chemical bomb target'". BBC News. April 17, 2004. Archived from the original on September 13, 2018. Retrieved April 3, 2013. Al-Qaeda-linked terrorists planned a chemical attack on Jordan's spy headquarters that could have killed 20,000 people, officials have said.
  29. "Jordan says major al Qaeda plot disrupted". CNN. April 26, 2004. Archived from the original on March 28, 2013. Retrieved April 3, 2013.
  30. 1 2 "Jordan Airs Confessions of Suspected Terrorists". Fox News. April 27, 2004. Archived from the original on April 21, 2006. Retrieved June 11, 2006. Jordanian officials have said the plotters entered the country from neighboring Syria in at least three vehicles filled with explosives, detonators and raw material to be used in bomb-making. Syria has denied the claims. In the videotape, however, the militants said they acquired the vehicles in Jordan.
  31. "Jordan says major al Qaeda plot disrupted". CNN. April 26, 2004. Archived from the original on March 28, 2013. Retrieved April 3, 2013. U.S. intelligence officials expressed caution about whether the chemicals captured by Jordanian authorities were intended to create a "toxic cloud" chemical weapon, but they said the large quantities involved were at a minimum intended to create "massive explosions." Officials said there is debate within the CIA and other U.S. agencies over whether the plotters were planning to kill innocent people using toxic chemicals. At issue is the presence of a large quantity of sulfuric acid among the tons of chemicals seized by Jordanian authorities. Sulfuric acid can be used as a blister agent, but it more commonly can increase the size of conventional explosions, according to U.S. officials.
  32. Jonathan S. Landay (February 10, 2012). "U.S. officials: Al Qaida behind Syria bombings". Mcclatchydc.com. Archived from the original on April 20, 2012. Retrieved April 20, 2012.
  33. Jonathan S. Landay (February 16, 2012). "Top U.S. intelligence officials confirm al Qaida role in Syria". Mcclatchydc.com. Archived from the original on March 21, 2012. Retrieved April 20, 2012.
  34. 1 2 3 "Death for Jordanian bomb plotters". BBC News. February 15, 2006. Archived from the original on February 23, 2006. Retrieved April 3, 2013.
  35. "Death for Jordanian bomb plotters". BBC News. February 15, 2006. Archived from the original on February 23, 2006. Retrieved April 3, 2013. The defence argued that the men were caught with only a relatively small quantity of battery acid, not the ingredients for a massive chemical bomb. They said that Jayousi was tortured in prison for two weeks in order to produce a confession.
  36. "U.S. suspects Iraqi WMD in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley". August 26, 2003. Archived from the original on August 26, 2003. Retrieved October 6, 2016.
  37. "Russia tied to Iraq's missing arms". The Washington Times. October 28, 2004. Archived from the original on February 5, 2005. Retrieved April 3, 2006.
  38. "Pentagon ousts official who tied Russia, Iraq arms". The Washington Times. December 29, 2004. Archived from the original on February 9, 2013. Retrieved October 6, 2016.
  39. Evgeny Primakov Named in International Scandal Archived April 7, 2014, at the Wayback Machine Kommersant March 1, 2006.
  40. 'I found Saddam’s WMD bunkers' Archived July 4, 2007, at the Wayback Machine The Spectator April 21, 2007.
  41. The questions that need to be asked about those WMD Archived October 16, 2007, at the Wayback Machine April 19, 2007.
  42. Right-wing blogs discover massive conspiracy to hide WMDs in Iraq Archived October 8, 2007, at the Wayback Machine Salon magazine. April 21, 2007.
  43. A.Q. Khan Shifted Iraq's WMD To Pakistan? Archived July 6, 2007, at the Wayback Machine South Asia Analysis Group February 7, 2004.
  44. Pak cracked under hard US proof Archived September 4, 2005, at the Wayback Machine The Times of India February 8, 2004.
  45. Shane Harris and Matthew M Aid (August 26, 2013). "Exclusive: CIA Files Prove America Helped Saddam as He Gassed Iran". Foreign Policy Magazine. Retrieved July 18, 2020.
  46. 'Hardball with Chris Matthews' for June 23 NBC News. June 24, 2004.
  47. Tweedie, Neil. Report holds out the possibility that WMD may still be found ... one day Archived February 13, 2018, at the Wayback Machine The Daily Telegraph. July 14, 2004.
  48. "In the period immediately following hostilities ... much potential evidence about prohibited Iraqi weapons programmes may have been destroyed. The systematic destruction of computers and other forms of records at some sites suggested that it was not the work of looters but was part of a scheme of orchestrated destruction." Lord Butler's Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 97-98.
  49. Melanie Phillips. "'I found Saddam's WMD bunkers'". The Spectator. Archived from the original on January 12, 2013. Retrieved April 3, 2013. Dave Gaubatz, however, says you could not be more wrong. Saddam's WMD did exist. He should know, because he found the sites where he is certain they were stored. And the reason you don't know about this is that the American administration failed to act on his information, 'lost' his classified reports and is now doing everything it can to prevent disclosure of the terrible fact that, through its own incompetence, it allowed Saddam's WMD to end up in the hands of the very terrorist states against whom it is so controversially at war.
  50. Melanie Phillips. "'I found Saddam's WMD bunkers'". The Spectator. Archived from the original on January 12, 2013. Retrieved April 3, 2013. when they tried to access his classified intelligence reports they were told that all 60 of them —which, in the routine way, he had sent in 2003 to the computer clearing-house at a US air base in Saudi Arabia —had mysteriously gone missing. These written reports had never even been seen by the ISG. One theory is that they were inadvertently destroyed when the computer's data base was accidentally erased in the subsequent US evacuation of the air base. Mr Gaubatz, however, suspects dirty work at the crossroads. It is unlikely, he says, that no copies were made of his intelligence. And he says that all attempts by Messrs Hoekstra and Weldon to extract information from the Defence Department and CIA have been relentlessly stonewalled.
  51. Noah Shachtman (October 11, 2009). "WMD 'Finder,' Ray Gun Pusher Wants Anti-Muslim 'Backlash'". Wired. Archived from the original on November 4, 2012. Retrieved March 12, 2017.
  52. Glenn Greenwald (April 21, 2007). "Right-wing blogs discover massive conspiracy to hide WMDs in Iraq". Archived from the original on January 9, 2014. Retrieved April 3, 2013. But the leading Right-wing bloggers and other neoconservatives are actually receptive to — or are even actively promoting — the theory that everyone from the President to military leaders to Senate Democrats have all engineered a massive conspiracy to cover-up the fact that we really did find vast stockpiles of Saddam's WMDs in Iraq, that they were stolen by the Terrorists and Syria, that it's all part of a plot involving large numbers of nations and groups to destroy the West, and now everyone is hiding this because they are embarrassed that they allowed it to happen.
  53. 1 2 Scott Shane (June 23, 2006). "For Diehards, Search for Iraq's W.M.D. Isn't Over". New York Times . Archived from the original on November 11, 2017. Retrieved February 23, 2017. The final report of the group, by Charles A. Duelfer, special adviser on Iraqi weapons to the C.I.A., concluded that any stockpiles had been destroyed long before the war and that transfers to Syria were "unlikely."
  54. C. J. Chivers (October 14, 2014). "The Secret Casualties of Iraq's Abandoned Chemical Weapons". New York Times. Retrieved May 12, 2019. The cache that contaminated Sergeant Duling's team was not the first discovery of chemical weapons in the war. American troops had already found thousands of similar warheads and shells.