Separating equilibrium

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In signaling games, a separating equilibrium is a type of perfect Bayesian equilibrium where agents with different characteristics choose different actions. [1] [2]

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References

  1. "separating equilibrium". Oxford Reference. Retrieved 3 January 2022.
  2. Lada, Akos (2012). "Section 12" (PDF). scholar.harvard.edu. Archived (PDF) from the original on 3 January 2022. Retrieved 19 June 2023.