Battle of Tug Argan

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Battle of Tug Argan
Part of The East African Campaign of the Second World War
Somaliland Italian invasion.png
Map depicting the location of the Battle of Tug Agran and the British evacuation
Date11–15 August 1940
Location 09°57′30″N44°27′27″E / 9.95833°N 44.45750°E / 9.95833; 44.45750
Result Italian victory
Belligerents
Flag of the United Kingdom.svg  British Empire Flag of Italy (1861-1946) crowned.svg  Italy
Commanders and leaders
A. R. Godwin Austin
Arthur Chater
Carlo de Simone
Guglielmo Nasi
Strength
5,000 regular and colonial infantry 30,000 Italian troops
Somalis auxiliaries
Casualties and losses
38 killed
102 wounded
120 missing
7 aircraft destroyed
5 artillery pieces captured
5 mortars captured [1]
465 killed
1,530 wounded
34 missing [1]

The Battle of Tug Argan was fought between forces of the British Empire and Italy from 11 to 15 August 1940 in the Somaliland Protectorate (British Somaliland, Somali : Dhulka Maxmiyada Soomaalida ee Biritishka, now Somaliland). The battle determined the result of the Italian invasion of British Somaliland and the larger East African Campaign of the Second World War.

Contents

Italian invasion forces were advancing northwards on a north–south road toward the capital of Berbera through the Tug Argan gap (named after the dry riverbed tug running across it) in the Assa hills, when they encountered British units in fortified positions on widely distributed hills across its breadth. Italian infantry, after four days of battle, overran the undermanned British positions and were able to seize the gap, compelling the defenders to withdraw to Berbera.

The Italian victory made the position of British forces in Somaliland untenable and the British colonial authorities evacuated the garrison by sea. Italy was able quickly to secure the territory, an achievement whose propaganda value to a bellicose Fascist regime outweighed its lack of strategic importance.

Background

As Italy entered the war at the conclusion of the Battle of France, its Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini looked to Africa for easy conquests to justify his entrance into the conflict and to glorify Italy's role. The Somaliland Protectorate lacked resources, defenders and appeared vulnerable. Though Italy lacked the supply structure for a long war in the region, an expedition to Somaliland was authorised, set for late 1940. Italian forces in East Africa were relatively strong in numbers, if not in quality, with 29 colonial brigades, each comprising several infantry battalions and some light artillery, concentrated around the recently conquered Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. The Italians also possessed at least 60 light and medium tanks as well as 183 fighter aircraft, light and medium bombers. [2]

The British were outnumbered and their exiguous colonial forces were dispersed in North and East Africa. With Cyrenaica and the Sudan under threat as well as Somaliland, only token units were available to control what was considered a relatively unimportant possession, devoid of infrastructure, productive capacity or natural resources. Until December 1939 British policy had been to abandon Somaliland if there was an invasion. General Archibald Wavell, the new commander of British armies in Africa, persuaded the British Chiefs of Staff that Somaliland should be defended, for much the same motives as Italy drew upon in the attempt to seize it. A multiracial congregation of five battalions, the minimum force adjudged capable of defending the region, was assembled by the beginning of August. [3] [4] The defence force included two Sikh battalions and the 2nd King's African Rifles, which arrived by sea in from Aden. The Indian units, contrary to expectations, were composed of well-equipped and professional soldiers, a much-needed complement to the inexperienced Rhodesian troops already present. [5]

Berbera, the capital of British Somaliland and its only major city and port, was the obvious destination of any invasion. As plans took shape for the blocking of Italian passage to the city, it became apparent that the border with Ethiopia was too long and open to be defended. The rugged Somali countryside (as is pictured below) was impassable by vehicles, meaning that the British could defend bottlenecks on the two roads to Berbera, which wound through the desert via the towns of Hargeisa and Burao, respectively. The Hargeisa road, the most direct route to the capital, was most easily blocked at the Tug Argan gap in the Assa hills. The pass was flat and open; a small force could not hold out for long against superior numbers but despite this topographical disadvantage, three battalions of the five originally allocated and a light artillery battery were committed to the defence of Tug Argan. Another battalion was held in reserve. [6]

The strategic position of the British was undermined by the Battle of France and the French surrender on 22 June. British planners had anticipated fighting with the French, who controlled the western quarter of the Somali coast and had relinquished military control of the border regions adjoining the two protectorates. France had a larger garrison in Somaliland than Britain and could obtain reinforcements from Madagascar. Though the armistice had been signed at Compiègne, General Paul Le Gentilhomme, Commander-in-Chief of French East African forces, announced that he would not join Vichy France in neutrality, proposing instead to continue the struggle from Djibouti. Le Gentilehomme was relieved of command by his superiors on 22 July and he fled to Allied territory. His successor soon achieved détente with the Italians, leaving British Somaliland isolated. [7]

On 3 August, General Guglielmo Nasi led 35,000 Italian troops, the vast majority of them African conscripts, across the border from their staging point at Harar into British Somaliland. The invaders were organised into three columns: one on the left, which would advance north to the coast at Zeila, a route recently vacated by the Vichy French, before turning east to Berbera; one on the right, which would make the opposite motion on the Burao road and a main central column, led by Carlo de Simone, containing the bulk of his forces. Simone was to capture the British positions at Tug Argan and make straight for Berbera, ending the campaign with a decisive battle. [5] The Italians captured Hargeisa on 6 August, forcing British camel soldiers to withdraw completely. A few days of rest and rearmament ensued before the march was resumed on 8 August. The delay was extended by administrative inertia, as Italian officers complained of heavy rains and impassable roads. Following two days of probing, de Simone and his contingent reached the head of the Tug Argan gap and an initial assault was scheduled for 11 August. General Alfred Godwin-Austen arrived to take command of the British garrison from Arthur Chater, who would remain in local control of the Tug Argan front. [8] [9]

Battle

The Tug Argan Gap Tug Argan Gap.jpg
The Tug Argan Gap

Having realised that holding Tug Argan was essential to halting any invasion, British command poured all available resources—though diminished by French duplicity—into its defence. A unit of the Black Watch was rushed to the village of Laferug (to the rear of the gap) late on 10 August by truck, and a brigade headquarters was established at nearby Barkasan. Those battalions present entrenched themselves across the broad arc of the gap. [9] On the British right were three companies of the 3/15 Punjab Regiment, holding a group of southwest-facing strongpoints overlooking the rough wilderness beside the road. The British left was covered by another group of Indian troops, facing directly southward from atop the aptly named 'Punjab Ridge.' [1] The gap was manned by the more numerous Rhodesian line infantry. They sat upon a line of rocky knolls, named from north to south Black, Knobbly, Mill, Observation and Castle Hills, positioned in a ragged diagonal echelon with 2,000–2,500 yd (1.1–1.4 mi; 1.8–2.3 km) gaps between them across the mouth of the gap. Each was a miniature fortress, housing machine-gun nests surrounded by concentric rings of barbed wire. Given that the front was far too wide for the troops available and the gaps between the hills too large, maintaining this balance in the face of superior numbers was a difficult task. The linear arrangement of the mounds denied the British position depth, increasing its vulnerability to Italian penetrations. [10]

Late on 10 August, the first signs of Italian preparations became apparent to the defenders of Tug Argan. Through the day, the headlights of advancing Axis supply convoys were clearly visible and Somali refugees, fleeing before De Simone's column, crossed the Mirgo Pass on the British left. A K.A.R. patrol skirmished briefly with a quartet of Italian armoured cars but the exchange of fire terrified the British camels and forced their riders to flee. [11] After receiving word from other scouts that the Italian tanks and infantry were easily avoiding the crude minefields laid before the creek, all British forces still holding the forward trenches were withdrawn to the battle line. As this manoeuvre was nearing completion, Italian artillery and aircraft initiated a preliminary bombardment of the hills and parties of second-rate Ethiopian and Blackshirt troops made a series of futile sallies through the early evening. [12] De Simone deployed his main forces opposite the British positions; on the Italian left, the II Brigade prepared to advance through the wilderness towards the Punjabi troops in the north. In the centre, the XIV Brigade faced the Rhodesian hilltop positions within the pass and the XV Brigade looked north towards Punjab Ridge on the Italian right. Behind them were XIII Brigade and the armoured vehicles. [1]

The attack on the gap began at 7:30 a.m. on 11 August, as a flight of Savoia-Marchetti SM.81 medium bombers attacked British defenders on Punjab Ridge. This half-hour assault was followed by an artillery bombardment lasting until noon. At 12:30 p.m., the infantry attack began; the II Brigade began moving slowly towards the Indians through the trackless wilderness north of the road, XIV Brigade attacked Mill, Knobbly and Observation Hills and XV Brigade ascended Punjab Ridge, engaging its defenders. The attacks of XIV Brigade against the Rhodesians failed but XV Brigade managed to drive the Indian defenders off Punjab Ridge. Counter-attacks were mounted against the Italians but these failed. [1] [13] The Italian attack on the hills was renewed the next day (12 August). Black, Knobbly and Mill Hills endured repeated assaults by XIV Brigade and the defence of the weakest of them, Mill Hill, began to crumble. By 4:00 p.m., the British defences were being overrun and after nightfall the British retreated from the hill, spiking their guns as they left. [1]

Kenyan troops of the King's African Rifles, who played a prominent role on the British side at Tug Argan C coy 7th bn KAR.png

Kenyan troops of the King's African Rifles, who played a prominent role on the British side at Tug Argan

On 13 August the XIV Brigade attacks on the Rhodesian hilltop positions failed after some intense fighting, while II Brigade continued their trek through the wilderness toward the northern hills. XV Brigade began to infiltrate behind British lines, ambushing and dispersing a supply convoy. [1] On 14 August, the XIV Brigade was relieved of its role in the battle after suffering many casualties and was replaced by XIII Brigade. The fresh troops attacked Observation Hill but failed again, even after continuous artillery bombardment throughout the day. The II Brigade had still failed to engage the Indians and XV Brigade made little progress before fending off a counter-attack from two companies of the 2nd King's African Rifles. [13]

By 14 August, Godwin-Austen had realised that the XV Brigade was encircling the position, his troops were exhausted and his artillery—some already abandoned to the Italians—were running low on ammunition. He informed General Henry Maitland Wilson, in command at Cairo while Wavell was absent in England, that retreat from Tug Argan and evacuation from British Somaliland was now a necessity. If his forces could be evacuated, perhaps 70 per cent of them might be removed. Otherwise, he would be forced either to fight to the death or to surrender his men and munitions. Wilson agreed to Godwin-Austen's request the next day and preparations were made to flee after dark on 15 August. [14] During that day, Observation Hill was attacked for the last time by De Simone's forces. De Simone had decided to continue the attack in the gap in lieu of completing the flanking manoeuvre and this final push proved successful. By 7:00 p.m., XIII Brigade had seized Observation Hill, from which the British retreated in disarray. After sundown, the defenders of the remaining hills were withdrawn, along with the Punjabis, who departed just as II Brigade was able to make inroads through their deserted positions. British resistance had collapsed and as Godwin-Austen and his forces fled towards Berbera, the Italians seized control of the Tug Argan Gap. [1]

Following the British withdrawal from Tug Argan, the Italians swiftly completed the investment of Berbera. To permit the main body of the colonial garrison to reach the coast, units of the Black Watch, 2nd Battalion King's African Rifles and the 1/2 Punjab Regiment formed a small rearguard at Barakasan, which fought into the night of 17 August. [15] The Royal Navy had already begun to evacuate military personnel from Berbera on 16 August, operations that few Italian aircraft flew against, possibly due to uncertainty about whether a peace treaty might be signed. By 19 August, all remaining British military forces, including the rearguard, the last of which had embarked late the previous day, had been evacuated by sea. [16] An estimated 5,300–5,700 troops reached Aden. [17] Italian forces, which had been held up by naval bombardment by HMS Ceres on 17 August, arrived in a Berbera on 19 August. [1]

Aftermath

Analysis

Archibald Wavell, whose reputation as one of Britain's finest officers suffered as a result of the retreat from Tug Argan Archibald Wavell2.jpg
Archibald Wavell, whose reputation as one of Britain's finest officers suffered as a result of the retreat from Tug Argan

The retreat from Somaliland, despite the prudent conduct of local commanders, infuriated the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. Irritated by Mussolini's boasting, Churchill excoriated Wavell via cable, labelling the low casualty numbers on the British side a mark of blatant cowardice and demanding that Godwin-Austen be subjected to a board of inquiry. Wavell replied that "a big butcher's bill is not necessarily evidence of good tactics", further enraging Churchill and beginning the decline of Wavell's reputation in London. [18] Despite the emotional attachments professed by Allied and Axis leaders to the rule of Somaliland, few spoils changed hands after Italian victory. Defeat was a blow to British prestige but the territory had little significance to imperial strategy. Britain gained financially after being relieved of the burden of providing a garrison. The impact could have been far greater if the Italians had managed to move faster after the battle. Heavy rains and difficulties supplying the troops hindered these efforts, removing any chance of a strategic victory. [19]

Casualties

The British suffered 38 dead, 102 wounded, and 120 missing; ten artillery pieces were left behind. Italian casualties were 465 dead, 1,530 wounded and 34 missing. [1]

See also

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References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Stone 1998.
  2. Playfair 1954, pp. 165–166.
  3. Playfair 1954, pp. 171–173.
  4. Mackenzie 1951, p. 22.
  5. 1 2 Mockler 2003, p. 243.
  6. Playfair 1954, p. 173.
  7. Moyse-Bartlett, p. 494.
  8. Playfair 1954, p. 174.
  9. 1 2 Mockler 2003, p. 245.
  10. Playfair 1954, p. 175.
  11. Moyse-Bartlett 2012, pp. 497–498.
  12. Stewart 2016, p. 78.
  13. 1 2 Playfair 1954, p. 176.
  14. Playfair 1954, pp. 176–177.
  15. Wavell 1946, p. 2,724.
  16. Stewart 2016, p. 87.
  17. Tucker 2005, p. 1,179.
  18. Pitt 2004, pp. 48–49.
  19. Stewart 2016, pp. 93–94.

Sources