Corruption in Syria

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Corruption in Syria follows the familiar patterns of state-based corruption, namely government officials abusing their political powers for private gain in the country of Syria.

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According to Transparency International's 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Syria scored a 13 on the CPI on a scale from 0 ("highly corrupt") to 100 ("very clean"). When ranked by score, Syria ranked 177th among the 180 countries in the Index, on a scale where the country ranked first is perceived to have the most honest public sector. [1] For comparison with worldwide scores, the average score was 43, the best score was 90 (ranked 1), and the worst score was 11 (ranked 180). [2] For comparison with regional scores, the average score among Middle Eastern and North African countries [Note 1] was 34. The highest score among Middle Eastern and North African countries was 68 and the lowest score was Syria's, 13. [3]

Researchers and journalists have identified corruption in the Syrian Armed Forces and allied militias as one of the major reasons for the eventual fall of the Assad regime in 2024. [4] [5] [6]

Transnational drug trade

Syria was labeled as a narco-state by the United States for nearly a decade until 1997, during the Syrian occupation of Lebanon when they controlled the cannabis cultivation in the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon, [7] and were the Middle East region's main source of hashish. [8] During the Syrian Civil War, mass production of drugs within Syria began, and officers fed their men fenethylline, which they called "Captain Courage." [8] Several shipments containing tonnes of amphetamines were seized in different countries smuggled from Syria, [9] those shipments had sometimes millions of pills of fenethylline, [10] which production in the country started since at least 2006. [11] In November 2020, two drug shipments of hashish coming from Syria were seized by Egyptian authorities, the first shipment which arrived to Alexandria, included 2 tonnes of hashish, [12] while the second shipment had 6 tonnes and was found at the Damietta port. [13] The port of Latakia became under scrutiny of European and American police, as being favored by smugglers. [14] In May 2021, Turkish security forces used UAVs to stop 1.5 tonnes of marijuana being smuggled out of Syria. [15] According to the Centre for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR), Syrian seized drugs in 2020 had the value of no less than $3.4bn. [8]

The New York Times reported in December 2021 that the 4th Armoured Division, commanded by Maher al-Assad, oversees much of the production and distribution of Captagon, among other drugs, reinforcing Syria's status as a narco-state on the Mediterranean sea. The unit controls manufacturing facilities, packing plants, and smuggling networks all across Syria (which have started to also move crystal meth). The division's security bureau, headed by Maj. Gen. Ghassan Bilal, provides protection for factories and along smuggling routes to the port city Latakia and to border crossings with Jordan and Lebanon. [16]

Notes

  1. Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen

Related Research Articles

The illegal drug trade, drug trafficking, or narcotrafficking is a global black market dedicated to the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of prohibited drugs. Most jurisdictions prohibit trade, except under license, of many types of drugs through the use of drug prohibition laws. The think tank Global Financial Integrity's Transnational Crime and the Developing World report estimates the size of the global illicit drug market between US$426 and US$652 billion in 2014 alone. With a world GDP of US$78 trillion in the same year, the illegal drug trade may be estimated as nearly 1% of total global trade. Consumption of illegal drugs is widespread globally, and it remains very difficult for local authorities to reduce the rates of drug consumption.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Narco-state</span> Political and economic term

Narco-state is a political and economic term applied to countries where all legitimate institutions become penetrated by the power and wealth of the illegal drug trade. The term was first used to describe Bolivia following the 1980 coup of Luis García Meza which was seen to be primarily financed with the help of narcotics traffickers.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Corruption Perceptions Index</span> Country ranking by public sector corruption

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is an index that scores and ranks countries by their perceived levels of public sector corruption, as assessed by experts and business executives. The CPI generally defines corruption as an "abuse of entrusted power for private gain". The index is published annually by the non-governmental organisation Transparency International since 1995.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fenethylline</span> Codrug of amphetamine and theophylline

Fenethylline or fenetylline (INN) is a codrug of amphetamine and theophylline and so a mutual prodrug of both. It is also spelled phenethylline; other names for it are amphetaminoethyltheophylline and amfetyline. The drug was marketed for use as a psychostimulant under the brand names Captagon, Biocapton, and Fitton. The name "Captagon" is often used generically to describe illicitly-produced fenetylline.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Corruption in Bahrain</span>

Bahrain became a party with United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2010 after signing it in 2005.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Corruption in Egypt</span>

Corruption laws exist in Egypt to criminalize extortion, embezzlement and bribery in business, but they are poorly enforced.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Corruption in Denmark</span>

Corruption in Denmark is amongst the lowest in the world.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Corruption in North Macedonia</span>

According to Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer 2013, corruption is a large concern in the public sector as more than half of the surveyed households consider Parliament, police, public officials, and particularly the judiciary and political parties very corrupt.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Corruption in Iceland</span>

Corruption in Iceland describes the prevention and occurrence of corruption in Iceland.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Corruption in the Netherlands</span>

Corruption in the Netherlands is minimal in all major areas—judiciary, police, business, politics—as the country is considered one of the least corrupt within the European Union.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Corruption in Morocco</span>

Petty and grand corruption is a growing problem within Morocco. A leaked report by a US diplomat stated in 2009 that corruption had become much more institutionalized under King Mohammed VI, and that the royal family had been using public institutions to coerce and solicit bribes.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Corruption in Kuwait</span>

Corruption in Kuwait is a problem resulting in political tensions in society.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Corruption in Jordan</span>

Corruption in Jordan is a social and economic issue.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Corruption in Ethiopia</span>

There are several sectors in Ethiopia where businesses are particularly vulnerable to corruption. Land distribution and administration is a sector where corruption is institutionalized, and facilitation payments as well as bribes are often demanded from businesses when they deal with land-related issues.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Corruption in Guinea-Bissau</span>

Corruption in Guinea-Bissau occurs at among the highest levels in the world. In Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2023, Guinea-Bissau scored 22 on a scale from 0 to 100. When ranked by score, Guinea-Bissau ranked 158th among the 180 countries in the Index, where the country ranked first is perceived to have the most honest public sector. However, Guinea-Bissau's score has either improved or remained steady every year since its low point in 2018, when it scored 16. For comparison with worldwide scores, the best score in 2023 was 90, the average score was 43, and the worst score was 11. For comparison with regional scores, the average score among sub-Saharan African countries was 33. The highest score in sub-Saharan Africa was 71 and the lowest score was 11. In 2013, Guinea-Bissau scored below the averages for both Africa and West Africa on the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s Index of African Governance.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Corruption in Lebanon</span>

Corruption in Lebanon magnified after the end of the civil war in 1990. It has been described as a case of "post-conflict corruption." Once a taboo subject, now it is at the forefront of the public debate in Lebanon. Anti-corruption sentiment has been one of the driving forces behind many of the large scale Lebanese protests in recent history.

Transparency International defines corruption as "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain". Transparency International's 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index scored the United Kingdom at 71 on a scale from 0 to 100. When ranked by score, the United Kingdom ranked 20th among the 180 countries in the Index, where the country ranked first is perceived to have the most honest public sector. For comparison with worldwide scores, the best score was 90, the average score was 43, and the worst score was 11. For comparison with regional scores, the highest score among Western European and European Union countries was 90, the average score was 65 and the lowest score was 42. The United Kingdom's score has fallen six points over the last five years and is now at its lowest point in the twelve years that the current version of the Index has been published.

The drug economy in Lebanon refers to the expanding Lebanese involvement in both drug production and trade, a phenomenon substantiated by studies. The economic and political upheaval in Lebanon, as delineated in a study by the Euro-Gulf Information Center, has driven Hezbollah, wherein narcotics serve as a notable revenue stream, to intensify its involvement in the drug economy. Western intelligence agencies estimate that Lebanon produces over 4 million pounds of hashish and 20,000 pounds of heroin annually, generating profits exceeding US$4 billion. According to The Washington Post, Lebanon's drug industry contributes substantially to the country's economy, accounting for over half of its foreign-exchange earnings.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Syrian Captagon industry</span> Illicit drug manufacturing by Syria

The Syrian Captagon industry is responsible for about 80% of the global production of the Captagon drug. Syria exports the drug to various countries, mainly in the Middle East region, including Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Gulf states, and Egypt. The drug export was one of the main sources of income for the government of Bashar al-Assad, helping it to prop up the economy during the Syrian Civil War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nouh Zaiter</span> Lebanese drug lord

Nouh Zaiter is a Lebanese drug lord and a leader of an armed militia in the Beqaa Valey, involved in drug trafficking and arms dealing in Lebanon and the Middle East. He's often in the news due to his alleged connections with Hezbollah and the Syrian regime, and his involvement in the drug trade, particularly Captagon.

References

  1. "The ABCs of the CPI: How the Corruption Perceptions Index is calculated". Transparency.org. 20 December 2021. Retrieved 4 April 2024.
  2. "Corruption Perceptions Index 2023: Syria". Transparency.org. Retrieved 4 April 2024.
  3. "CPI 2023 for Middle East & North Africa: Dysfunctional approach to fighting corruption undermines progress". Transparency.org. Retrieved 4 April 2024.
  4. Lister, Charles (30 November 2024). "Syria's conflict is heating up once more". Spectator. Retrieved 30 November 2024.
  5. Liz Cookman (8 December 2024). "Why Syria's army collapsed so suddenly". Yahoo. The Telegraph. Retrieved 14 December 2024.
  6. ICG (5 December 2024). "Syria's North-western Front Erupts". reliefweb.int. Retrieved 13 December 2024.
  7. "Removing Syria from the Narcotics List: A Signal to Damascus?". The Washington Institution. 10 November 1997.
  8. 1 2 3 "Syria has become a narco-state". The Economist. 2021-07-19. ISSN   0013-0613 . Retrieved 2022-02-11.
  9. "Meet Captagon, the nightmare drug fuelling Syria's civil war". cbc.ca. 2 June 2017.
  10. "Italian police seize €1bn amphetamine haul from Syria". The Guardian. 1 July 2020.
  11. "World Drug Report 2009" (PDF). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2009. p. 127.
  12. "Egyptian customs seize large drug shipment from Syria in port of Alexandria". SyriacPress. 22 November 2020.
  13. "بـ30 مليون جنيه.. ضبط 6 أطنان حشيش داخل حاوية بميناء دمياط". elnabaa.net (in Arabic). 22 November 2020.
  14. "'A dirty business': how one drug is turning Syria into a narco-state". The Guardian. 7 May 2021.
  15. "Turkish UAV drone stops 1.5 tons of marijuana being smuggled out of Syria". The Jerusalem Post. 17 May 2021.
  16. Hubbard, Ben; Saad, Hwaida (5 December 2021). "On Syria's Ruins, a Drug Empire Flourishes". The New York Times. ISSN   0362-4331 . Retrieved 2021-12-29 via NYTimes.com.