| Statement | Orig. | Sup. |
|---|
| His co-conspirators included four "private attorneys" (Co-Conspirators 1, 2, 3, and 5) and a "private political consultant" (Co-Conspirator 6). | 8 | 9 |
| Change: The word "private" was added in the superseding indictment. The original indictment also identified a "Justice Department official" as Co-Conspirator 4; this person was omitted from the superseding indictment. |
| As established in the Constitution and an 1887 federal law called the Electoral Count Act, the federal government collects, counts, and certifies the votes for president. "Until 2021," this process "had operated in a peaceful and orderly manner for more than 130 years." | 9 | 10 |
Trump and his co-conspirators: - Lied to pressure "state legislators and election officials" to change votes from Biden to Trump.
- Organized fake electors in seven states (Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) who sent their fake certificates "to the Vice President".
- "Attempted to use the power and authority of the Justice Department" to launch fake investigations, send warning letters to the seven states, promote the fake electors as valid, and pressure the states' legislatures to convene to formally choose the fake electors over the real ones.
- To enlist Mike Pence to change the election results. After Pence resisted their pressure, Trump and co-conspirators urged a mob to march to the Capitol to continue pressuring Pence.
- On January 6, the mob "violently attacked the Capitol and halted the proceeding." Trump and co-conspirators "exploited the disruption" by continuing to lie about election fraud and to pressure congressional leaders to delay the vote certification.
| 10 | 11 |
| Change: The superseding indictment adds that Pence's relevant role at the January 6 proceeding was as "President of the Senate," that is, his ceremonial role. It omits the statement about the Justice Department. The original indictment says that Trump and his co-conspirators wanted Pence "to use his ceremonial role" on January 6; the superseding indictment reiterates that Pence would be "in his ceremonial role as President of the Senate" that day. |
| False claims included that "large numbers of dead, non-resident, non-citizen, or otherwise ineligible voters had cast ballots, or that voting machines had changed votes for the Defendant [Trump] to votes for Biden." People who "repeatedly" told him these claims were false included the Vice President, Justice Department senior leaders, the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, senior White House attorneys, senior staffers on Trump's 2020 re-election campaign, state legislators and officials, and state and federal courts. Trump "deliberately disregarded the truth." | 11 | 12 |
| Change: The superseding indictment omits the list of people who advised Trump that the claims were false. It includes a new sentence: "These false claims were unsupported, objectively unreasonable, and ever-changing, and the Defendant and co-conspirators repeated them even after they were publicly disproven." |
| Among Trump's lies (the original indictment paraphrases them): "more than ten thousand dead voters had voted in Georgia", "there had been 205,000 more votes than voters in Pennsylvania", "there had been a suspicious vote dump in Detroit, Michigan", "there had been tens of thousands of double votes and other fraud in Nevada", "more than 30,000 non-citizens had voted in Arizona", "voting machines in various contested states had switched votes from the Defendant [Trump] to Biden." | 12 |  |
| Trump was advised that he had lost the election "by those most invested in his re-election, including his own running mate and his campaign staff." "Federal and state courts" rejected all his lawsuits, and "state officials" publicly rejected his claims. Further, "on November 12, the National Association of Secretaries of State, the National Association of State Election Directors, and other organizations" publicly stated that there had been no fraud. Trump tweeted lies. While he "sometimes used his Twitter account to communicate with the public, as President, about official actions and policies, he also regularly used it for personal purposes". Personal purposes here include lying about election fraud, encouraging his supporters to come to Washington on January 6, pressuring Pence "to misuse his ceremonial role", and attempting "to unlawfully retain power." On January 6, Trump "gave a Campaign speech at a privately-funded, privately-organized political rally held on the Ellipse in Washington, D.C.", repeating the "same unsupported, objectively unreasonable, and publicly disproven lies" to encourage his supporters to march to the Capitol. | | 13–15 |
| Trump and his co-conspirators committed one or more of the following acts. | | 16 |
| On November 13, Trump's campaign attorneys conceded the election. That day (as clarified in the superseding indictment), Trump "turned to" Giuliani. The next day, Trump announced that Giuliani would lead a challenge of his election loss. | 13 | 17 |
| Change: The superseding indictment adds this context: "The Defendant had no official responsibilities related to any state's certification of the election results." |
| Arizona: On November 13, Trump's campaign manager advised him that a claim about Arizona voter fraud was false. On November 22, Trump and Giuliani lied to the Arizona House Speaker that there had been fraud, asked him to convene a hearing, then asked him to use the legislature to replace electors for Biden with electors for Trump. On December 1, Giuliani told the Arizona House Speaker: "We don't have the evidence, but we have lots of theories." On December 4, the Arizona House Speaker publicly stated that he would not illegally attempt "to change the outcome" of the election. On January 4, Eastman pressured him to decertify the election. On January 6, Trump publicly repeated his lie about election fraud in Arizona. | 14–19 | 18–23 |
| Georgia: On November 16, Trump's assistant sent a document to Powell containing criticism of a voting machine company. Trump tweeted to promote a forthcoming lawsuit. Powell sued Georgia on November 25, but the lawsuit was dismissed two weeks later. On December 3, Giuliani and Eastman urged a Georgia state senate subcommittee to decertify the election results (based in part on false claims about ballot counting at State Farm Arena), while Trump tweeted to promote their "blockbuster testimony" and amplify their lie about "ballot stuffing by Dems". On December 4 and 7, an official for the Georgia Secretary of State debunked the claims. On December 8, Trump called the Georgia Attorney General to pressure him to support another state's attorney general's lawsuit in the Supreme Court. The Georgia Attorney General refused. An unnamed senior campaign advisor said in an email: "our research and campaign legal team can't back up any of the claims [made by Giuliani]...it's tough to own any of this when it's all just conspiracy shit beamed down from the mothership." On December 10, Giuliani repeated the false claims to a Georgia state house committee and made allegations against a mother and daughter, Ruby Freeman and Wandrea' ArShaye Moss, who were election workers. The original indictment said that, on December 15 and 27, two Justice Department officials –the incoming acting attorney general and incoming acting deputy attorney general –told Trump that the State Farm Arena allegations were false. It also said that Trump's chief of staff told him that state election officials were "exemplary", but a day later, on December 23, Trump tweeted that they were "[t]errible people!" On December 31, Trump signed a statement of false election fraud claims to be filed in a lawsuit against Georgia; Eastman acknowledged that Trump knew it was false, and yet Eastman "caused [it] ... to be filed nonetheless." On January 2, Trump called the Georgia Secretary of State, who addressed Trump's claims of fraud with evidence to the contrary. Trump said he did not want to view the Secretary of State's evidence that the election was fair, threatened him with criminal prosecution, and demanded that he "find" 11,780 votes in his favor. The next day, Trump publicly lied that the Secretary of State had been "unwilling, or unable, to answer questions". On January 6, Trump publicly repeated his lie about election fraud in Georgia. | 20–33 | 24–35 |
| Change: The superseding indictment begins with new context: Trump's senior campaign advisor had warned Trump, "as early as mid-November," that his claims of voter fraud in Georgia were false. It clarifies that the purpose of a state attorney general's lawsuit in the Supreme Court was "to invalidate election results in certain targeted states like Pennsylvania." It adds that, on December 9, Trump "not as President but in his capacity as a candidate for office", represented by Eastman, moved to join the lawsuit, but the Supreme Court denied the lawsuit two days later. The superseding indictment omits the statements about the two Justice Department officials and Trump's chief of staff telling him there had been no fraud. It clarifies that the people who joined Trump on the January 2 call included Trump's chief of staff, "who sometimes handled private and Campaign-related logistics", and "private attorneys involved in the lawsuit against Georgia's Secretary of State". |
| Michigan: On November 20, Trump met with the Michigan House Speaker and the Michigan Senate Majority Leader. This followed outreach by RNC chair Ronna McDaniel, who briefly joined in by call. Giuliani called in too. The two Michigan leaders issued a public statement saying they did not have "any information that would change the outcome of the election in Michigan." On December 4, Giuliani asked the Michigan House Speaker to revoke the Biden electors: "Help me get this done in Michigan." He made a similar request on December 7 of the Michigan Senate Majority Leader. On December 14, the two Michigan leaders refused to decertify the election results or the electors. The Michigan Senate Majority Leader publicly stated that they had no "evidence of fraud on a scale that would change the outcome". The Michigan House Speaker publicly stated: "This truly would bring mutually assured destruction for every future election...I won't." On January 6, Trump publicly repeated his lie about election fraud in Michigan. | 34–41 | 36–40 |
| Change: The original indictment referred to a voter fraud allegation Trump made on November 5; this was removed from the superseding indictment. The naming of Ronna McDaniel and Giuliani in the November 20 meeting is new to the superseding indictment. The original indictment said that, on December 1, the Attorney General told Trump there was no evidence of voter fraud in Detroit and that the next day Trump nevertheless falsely alleged this; this was removed from the superseding indictment. |
| Pennsylvania: On November 11, Trump publicly maligned a Philadelphia city commissioner for saying there was no evidence of local voter fraud. On November 25, Giuliani made false claims of voter fraud to state legislators at a Gettysburg event he organized. Internally, a campaign staffer said there was "no way to defend" Giuliani's claims, and the deputy campaign manager agreed: "We have been saying this for a while. It's very frustrating." On December 6, Trump tweeted that the state legislators were cowards for refusing to overturn the election results. On December 31 and January 3, the acting attorney general Jeffrey Rosen and acting deputy attorney general Richard Donoghue told Trump that his claims of voter fraud in Pennsylvania were false. On January 6, Trump publicly repeated his lie about election fraud in Pennsylvania. | 42–46 | 41–44 |
| Change: The superseding indictment corrected the date of the tweet from December 4 to December 6. The superseding indictment omits mention of Rosen and Donoghue. |
| Wisconsin: On November 29, a Wisconsin recount that Trump's campaign had paid for increased his margin of defeat. The next day, the Wisconsin governor certified Biden's electors. On December 14, the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected Trump's challenge, saying there was no "legitimate doubt", and on December 21, the Wisconsin governor certified that the state Supreme Court had resolved the matter in favor of Biden –in response to which Trump tweeted a demand that the Wisconsin legislature overturn the election. On December 27, Rosen and Donoghue told Trump that his claims of voter fraud in Wisconsin were false. On January 6, Trump publicly repeated his lie about election fraud in Wisconsin. | 47–52 | 45–49 |
| Change: The superseding indictment omits mention of Rosen and Donoghue. |
| Beginning in early December 2020, Trump and co-conspirators came up with the fake electors plot, intending to "create a fake controversy at the certification proceeding". They targeted the five states mentioned above plus Nevada and New Mexico. | 53 | 50 |
| Change: The superseding indictment adds this context: "The Defendant had no official responsibilities related to the convening of legitimate electors or their signing and mailing of their certificates of vote." |
| Chesebro's three memos on November 18 ("Wisconsin Memo"), December 6 ("Fraudulent Elector Memo") and December 9 ("Fraudulent Elector Instructions") together laid out "a corrupt plan to subvert the federal government function" of certifying Biden's victory. | 54 | 51 |
| On December 6, Trump's chief of staff sent the Wisconsin Memo to campaign staff, explaining: "We just need to have someone coordinating the electors for states." The campaign went on to apply the idea in the Wisconsin memo "to any state that the Defendant [Trump] claimed was 'contested'—even New Mexico, which the Defendant had lost by more than ten percent of the popular vote." | 55 | 52 |
| On December 6, Trump and Eastman told Ronna McDaniel that the RNC should help find electors in the states they were targeting. They lied to her that these alternative slates of electors were intended as a backup plan to be used only if a court were to rule that Trump, not Biden, had won a state's election. McDaniel reported back to Trump that electors were being gathered. | 56 | 53 |
| On December 7, Giuliani received the Wisconsin Memo and the Fraudulent Elector Memo. He asked Co-conspirator No. 6 for attorneys who could help with the fake elector plot, and Co-conspirator No. 6 named attorneys in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. | 57 | 54 |
| On December 8, Chesebro called the Arizona attorney whom Co-Conspirator 6 had named. The attorney wrote up his notes from the call: "His idea is basically that all of us (GA, WI, AZ, PA, etc.) have our electors send in their votes (even though the votes aren't legal under federal law—because they're not signed by the Governor); so that members of Congress can fight about whether they should be counted on January 6th. (They could potentially argue that they're not bound by federal law because they're Congress and make the law, etc.) Kind of wild/creative—I'm happy to discuss. My comment to him was that I guess there's no harm in it, (legally at least)—i.e. we would just be sending in 'fake' electoral votes to Pence so that "someone" in Congress can make an objection when they start counting votes, and start arguing that the 'fake' votes should be counted." | 58 | 55 |
| On December 10, Chesebro (as directed by Giuliani) sent a version of the Wisconsin Memo, the Fraudulent Elector Instructions, and fake elector certificates to the targeted states (except Wisconsin, which had already received them). | 59 | 56 |
| On December 11, Giuliani (through Chesebro) suggested that the Arizona lawyer file a case with the Supreme Court so he could claim there was pending litigation. Chesebro said that a state official and state provisional elector had allegedly told Giuliani that "it could appear treasonous for the AZ electors to vote" without a pending court case. | 60 | 57 |
| On December 12, Giuliani, Chesebro and Co-Conspirator 6 were on a call organized by the Trump campaign. When the fake electors in Pennsylvania said they were worried about falsely representing themselves as the real electors, Giuliani lied to them, saying that their certificates would be used only if a court said that Trump had won. Co-Conspirator 6 later proposed disclaimer language for the fake elector certificates in Pennsylvania. Another Trump campaign official said not to offer this disclaimer language to any more states. Some fake electors refused to participate. | 61 | 58 |
| On December 13, Chesebro emailed Giuliani with a plan to present the fake elector slates at the Congressional certification proceeding regardless of whether any court were to rule that Trump had won a state election. | 62 | 59 |
| On December 13, Trump asked for a statement about the electors to be put out by his senior campaign advisor, who was then invited to a conference call with Giuliani and Co-Conspirator 6. The deputy campaign advisor sent a group text: "the way this has morphed[,] it's a crazy play so I don't know who wants to put their name on it"; a senior advisor to Trump replied, characterizing the plan as "[c]ertifying illegal votes." The senior campaign advisor (who was supposed to put out the statement) and a campaign staffer were included on these texts. None of them wanted their names on the statement. | 63 | 60 |
| On December 13, Chesebro drafted and sent fake elector certificates for New Mexico. The Trump campaign had not previously targeted this state and had no pending court case there. The next day, the campaign filed a lawsuit six minutes before the noon deadline to meet the requirement for having pending litigation when the fake electors voted. | 64 | 61 |
| On December 14, all real electors met in their home states to cast their votes. In the seven states that the Trump campaign targeted, the real electors voted for Biden. In those states, the fake electors convened their own fake proceeding and declared that they would vote for Trump. In some of these states, the fake electors partially satisfied legal requirements by meeting in the state capitol building, while in other states, the fake electors were unable to meet requirements. Certificates for all seven slates of fake electors were mailed to the President of the Senate, the Archivist of the United States, and others, following Chesebro's plan in his Fraudulent Elector Instructions. Before being mailed, the legitimate electors' certificates were attached to the state executives' certificates of ascertainment; the fake electors' certificates were not. That evening, Ronna McDaniel forwarded Trump an email saying that in six of the contested states (all except NM), the fake electors for Trump had cast their votes alongside the legitimate electors for Biden. Trump's executive assistant confirmed that Trump received the email. | 65–69 | 62–66 |
| This section about the Justice Department was entirely removed from the superseding indictment. In late December 2020, Trump "attempted to use the Justice Department" to lie about election fraud, "thus giving the Defendant's lies the backing of the federal government". On December 22, Jeffrey Clark went to the White House to meet with Trump without telling the Justice Department he was doing so, violating a Justice Department policy meant "to guard against improper political influence." On December 26, Clark lied to the acting attorney general Jeffrey Rosen, saying his meeting with Trump had been unplanned and promising not to do it again. The next morning, Clark had a three-minute phone call with Trump. In the afternoon, Trump called Rosen and acting deputy attorney general Richard Donoghue, making claims of election fraud (which they refuted) and suggesting that he install Clark. Rosen told Trump that the Justice Department would not change the election outcome. Trump replied: "Just say that the election was corrupt and leave the rest to me and the Republican congressmen." On December 28, Clark proposed that Rosen and Donoghue sign a letter to state officials in Georgia and other targeted states. The draft letter contained false claims that the Justice Department had "concerns" about events that may have "impacted the outcome of the election in multiple States", including that the fake Trump electors who had voted on December 14 in some targeted states were valid electors. It urged the state legislature to convene a special session to choose the fake electors. Donoghue told Clark that "we have not seen" any such fraud, and together with Rosen, he again told Clark to avoid unauthorized communications with the White House. On December 31, Trump summoned Rosen and Donoghue to repeat his false claims of fraud and threaten to replace Justice Department leadership. On January 2, Clark pressured Rosen and Donoghue to sign the letter, saying that Trump was likely to offer him Rosen's position but that Clark would decline the offer if Rosen and Donoghue would comply. They did not. The next morning, Clark sent a revised draft to a Justice Department colleague, changing "concerns" to "evidence of significant irregularities". Without informing Justice Department leadership, he went to the White House and accepted Trump's offer to become acting attorney general. That afternoon, Clark spoke to deputy White House counsel Patrick Philbin. Philbin had previously told Trump that he had to "leave the White House [o]n January 20th" and now told Clark not to assume the role of acting attorney general. Philbin warned of "riots" if Trump did not leave office; Clark replied that authorities could use the Insurrection Act to silence any protests. Separately, Clark informed Rosen (his superior) that he was replacing him. Rosen objected and scheduled a meeting with Trump. On the evening of January 3, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that Trump take no action on "an overseas national security issue" so close to the inauguration, and Trump agreed: "Yeah, you're right, it's too late for us. We're going to give that to the next guy." Trump then went to the meeting that Rosen had requested. Clark, Donoghue, Steven Engel, and others — White House counsel, deputy White House counsel, and a senior advisor — attended. Though Trump expressed frustration that Rosen would not overturn the election result, he agreed not to replace Rosen with Clark upon being warned that many at the Justice Department and his White House counsel would resign in protest. Clark suggested that the Justice Department could issue an opinion that Pence could change the election outcome; Engel said the Justice Department should not do this. Trump said that he alone would contact Pence, and he ended the meeting. | 70–85 | |
| Trump sought to enlist Pence "to use his ceremonial role at the certification" (original) or "to use his role as President of the Senate" (superseding) to overturn the election results. Later, he would gather a "crowd of supporters" in Washington to pressure Pence. | 86 | 67 |
| Change: The superseding indictment clarifies that Trump "had no official responsibilities related to the certification proceeding, but he did have a personal interest as a candidate in being named the winner of the election." |
| On December 19, Trump tweeted: "Big protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild!" In late December and early January, Trump urged his supporters to attend. | 87 | 68 |
| Change: The superseding indictment added "and early January". |
| On December 23, Trump retweeted a memo titled "Operation 'PENCE' CARD" that falsely claimed Pence could, on his own, disqualify legitimate electors from six targeted states. Eastman, reversing his own position he had expressed on October 11, circulated a memo about how Pence could declare Trump the winner. | 88–89 | 69–70 |
| Change: The original indictment includes two sentences describing this memo; the superseding indictment omits them. |
| On December 25, when Pence called Trump to wish him Merry Christmas, Trump asked him to reject electoral votes on January 6, to which Pence replied: "You know I don't think I have the authority to change the outcome." | 90 | 71 |
| On December 29, Trump lied to Pence that the Justice Department was "finding major infractions." | 90 | |
| On January 1, Trump berated Pence for objecting to seeking a court determination about whether the vice president may reject electoral votes. Pence believed he simply did not have that authority. Trump told him: "You're too honest." Trump tweeted to remind his supporters to come to Washington on January 6 to "StopTheSteal!" | 90 | 72 |
| On January 3, Trump again told Pence that he had the right to reject electoral votes. Pence again replied that he did not, observing that, the previous day, "a federal appeals court had rejected the lawsuit making that claim". | 90 | 73 |
| On January 3, Eastman circulated a second memo stating that — "contrary to the ECA," as the indictment observes — Pence could ask the state legislatures to decide which slate of electors to use. | 91 | 74 |
| On January 4, Trump met with Eastman, Pence, Pence's chief of staff, and Pence's counsel. During the meeting, Trump said (as recorded in Pence's notes): "Bottom line—won every state by 100,000s of votes" and "We won every state." Trump and Eastman again pressured Pence. When Pence asked Eastman to justify why he should be allowed to send votes back to the states, Eastman said: "Well, nobody's tested it before." Pence complained to Trump: "Even your own counsel is not saying I have that authority." Trump replied that he anyway "prefer[red] the other suggestion" of the Pence rejecting the electors unilaterally. | 92–93 | 75–76 |
| Change: The original indictment says that the purpose of the January 4 meeting was to pressure Pence to outright reject electoral votes for Biden or at least send them back to the targeted states for possible rejection, and it notes that Trump "deliberately excluded his White House Counsel from the meeting" for having previously "pushed back" on his lies about the election. The superseding indictment omits those claims, saying only that Trump's White House Counsel did not attend the meeting. Additionally, the original indictment reflects a specific claim he made about Pennsylvania, which the night before Justice Department officials had reminded him was false; the superseding indictment omits that claim. |
| On January 4, Trump's senior advisor warned Eastman that the plan would “cause riots in the streets.” Eastman replied that violence is sometimes necessary. | 94 | 77 |
| Change: The original indictment said the senior advisor informed Trump that Eastman admitted that the plan was going to fail; this was omitted from the superseding indictment. |
| On the morning of January 5, at Trump's direction, Pence's chief of staff and Pence's counsel met again with Eastman. Eastman pushed Trump's preference that Pence unilaterally reject electors from the targeted states. Eastman told Pence's counsel that he knew the Supreme Court would unanimously reject his proposal and thus he hoped the question would not be submitted to a court to decide. Pence's counsel warned him that the plan would cause a “disastrous situation” of the election being “decided in the streets.” Trump encouraged supporters to travel to Washington on January 6, setting the false expectation that Pence could legitimately use his ceremonial role [superseding indictment clarifies: “as President of the Senate”] to overturn the election result. Trump tweeted: "The Vice President has the power to reject fraudulently chosen electors” and “I will be speaking at the SAVE AMERICA RALLY tomorrow”, including the time and place. | 95–96 | 78–79 |
| Change: The original indictment said that Trump tweeted that his supporters were “inundat[ing]” Washington because they “don’t want to see an election victory stolen .... Our Country has had enough, they won’t take it anymore! We hear you (and love you) from the Oval Office.” This tweet was omitted from the superseding indictment. |
| On January 5, Trump and Pence met privately. Pence again refused to comply with the request [the superseding indictment clarifies that he was being asked to "use his position as President of the Senate" to obstruct the proceeding], and Trump threatened to publicly criticize him. Pence's chief of staff learned of this threat and alerted the head of Pence's Secret Service detail. | 97 | 80 |
| This statement was omitted from the superseding indictment: "As crowds began to gather in Washington and were audible from the Oval Office, the Defendant remarked to advisors that the crowd the following day on January 6 was going to be 'angry.'" | 98 | |
| On the evening of January 5, at Trump's direction, his campaign issued a statement he knew to be false: “The Vice President and I are in total agreement that the Vice President has the power to act.” | 99 | 81 |
| From the early morning of January 6, Trump was lying to pressure Pence to fraudulently declare him the victor, and he raised a public expectation that Pence might determine the victor. Trump tweeted at 1 a.m.: "If Vice President@Mike_Pence comes through for us, we will win the Presidency.” Shortly after 8 a.m., he tweeted: "States want to correct their votes, which they now know were based on irregularities and fraud, plus corrupt process never received legislative approval. All Mike Pence has to do is send them back to the States, AND WE WIN. Do it Mike, this is a time for extreme courage!" | 100 | 82 |
| On the morning of January 6, an agent for Trump, on the understanding that the fake elector certificates for MI and WI had not been successfully mailed to Pence or the Archivist, asked a U.S. Senator to hand-deliver them to Pence. The agent gave the documents to the Senator's staffer, saying they were ”[a]lternate slate[s] of electors for MI and WI because archivist didn't receive them”. The Senator's staffer offered them to Pence's staffer, but Pence's staffer rejected the delivery. | 101 | 83 |
| At 11:15 a.m., Trump called Pence to pressure him. Pence refused. Anticipating making a speech within the hour, Trump decided to lie to the crowd that Pence had authority to send the electoral votes back to the states — language that his advisors had told him to remove. | 102 | 84 |
| At Trump's request, Giuliani and Eastman gave their own public remarks first, intensifying pressure on Pence based on election claims they knew were false. Giuliani told the crowd that Pence could "cast [the Electoral Count Act] aside" and unilaterally "decide on the validity of these crooked ballots". He lied that they had "letters from five legislatures begging us" to send the elector slates back to the legislatures, and he called for "trial by combat." Eastman told the crowd that Pence must "let the legislatures of the state look into this so we get to the bottom of it and the American people know whether we have control of the direction of our government or not. We no longer live in a self governing republic if we can’t get the answer to this question." | 103 | 85 |
| Once Trump began speaking at 11:56 a.m., he lied repeatedly. What he said was "integral to his criminal plans to defeat the federal government function, obstruct the certification, and interfere with others’ right to vote and have their votes counted." He "repeated false claims of election fraud, gave false hope that the Vice President might change the election outcome, and directed the crowd in front of him to go to the Capitol as a means to obstruct the certification and pressure the Vice President to fraudulently obstruct the certification." Trump lied that "the states got defrauded" and "now they want to recertify." He said that Pence could change the election outcome. After Trump said "the only way that can happen is if Mike Pence agrees to send it back," the crowd began to chant, "Send it back." Trump said, “When you catch somebody in a fraud, you’re allowed to go by very different rules.” He told the crowd that "if you don't fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country anymore," and told them to march to the Capitol, implying that he would accompany them, and told them to meet Members of Congress with "pride and boldness…to take back our country." | 104 | 86 |
| Change: The superseding indictment clarifies that Trump was asking Pence to "use his position as President of the Senate". Regarding Trump's statement that "you're allowed to go by very different rules," the superseding indictment adds that Trump “specifically referenced the process by which electoral votes are counted during the proceeding, including by stating, "We have come to demand that Congress do the right thing and only count the electors who have been lawfully slated, lawfully slated." |
| Thousands of people began marching to the Capitol. | 105 | 87 |
| Shortly before 1 p.m., Pence issued a public statement that his role as President of the Senate at the certification proceeding did not authorize him "to determine which electoral votes should be counted and which should not." The original indictment specifies that the certification proceeding "was about to begin"; the superseding indictment omits that. | 106 | 88 |
| While Trump spoke, a crowd gathered at the Capitol. Trump supporters who had come to Washington at his direction "broke through barriers cordoning off the Capitol grounds and advanced on the building, including by violently attacking law enforcement officers trying to secure it." | 107 | 89–91 |
| Change: The superseding indictment adds this context: "On the floor of the House of Representatives, the Vice President, in his role as President of the Senate, began the certification proceeding. At approximately 1:11 p.m., the Vice President opened the certificates of vote and certificates of ascertainment that the legitimate electors for the state of Arizona had mailed to Washington, consistent with the ECA. After a Congressman and Senator lodged an objection to Arizona's certificates, the House and Senate retired to their separate chambers to debate the objection." |
| After Trump finished speaking, he returned to the White House, watching TV and reading Twitter. | 108 | 92 |
| Change: The superseding indictment clarifies that he returned around 1:30 p.m. The original indictment says he "watched events at the Capitol unfold on the television in the dining room next to the Oval Office." The superseding indictment says: "He spent much of the afternoon reviewing Twitter on his phone, while the television in the dining room showed live events at the Capitol." |
| Following over "an hour of steady, violent advancement, the crowd at the Capitol broke into the building." At approximately 2:20 p.m., the official proceeding having been interrupted, staffers evacuating from the Senate carried with them the legitimate electors' certificates of vote and their governors' certificates of ascertainment. The House also was forced to recess." | 109 | 93 |
| Change: The superseding indictment adds that the break-in "forced the Senate to recess." |
| Upon learning of the Capitol breach,Trump's advisors informed him of the situation. They advised him to make a statement that would calm the rioters, but he refused, repeatedly saying that they were angry because the election had been stolen. | 110 | |
| Intending to “further delay and obstruct the certification”, Trump tweeted that "Mike Pence didn't have the courage to do what should have been done". One minute later, the Secret Service evacuated Pence to a secure location. The crowd at the Capitol chanted, "Hang Mike Pence!"; "Where is Pence? Bring him out!"; and "Traitor Pence!" | 111–113 | 94–96 |
| Change: The original indictment says Trump sent this tweet “after advisors had left [him] alone in his dining room", whereas the superseding indictment says he sent it “personally, without assistance”. |
| Despite the urging of senior advisors including the White House Counsel, a Deputy White House Counsel, the Chief of Staff, a Deputy Chief of Staff, and a senior advisor, Trump would not send a message asking rioters to leave the Capitol. Instead, he tweeted false suggestions that the crowd was already peaceful, including: “Stay peaceful!” And “I am asking for everyone at the U.S. Capitol to remain peaceful. No violence! Remember, WE are the Party of Law & Order…” He spoke by phone with House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, telling him that the crowd was apparently more upset about the election than McCarthy was. In the Rose Garden, he taped a video in which he lied that the election had been “stolen from us,” telling supporters that they were “very special” and that “we love you", but asking them to leave the Capitol. This video was posted to Twitter. He then watched the attack on the Capitol on television, saying: “See, this is what happens when they try to steal an election. These people are angry.” In the evening, he tweeted: “These are the things and events that happen when a sacred landslide election victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped away from great patriots who have been badly & unfairly treated for so long. Go home with love & in peace. Remember this day forever!” | 114–118 | |
| On the evening of January 6, Trump and Giuliani tried to exploit the Capitol riot. From 6:59 p.m. to 7:22 p.m., Giuliani called five U.S. senators and one U.S. representative. Co-Conspirator 6 attempted to confirm phone numbers for six U.S. senators whom Trump had told Giuliani to call. For one senator, Giuliani left a voicemail: "We need you, our Republican friends, to try to just slow it down...ideally until the end of tomorrow." For another, Giuliani repeated lies about fraud, including that governors had certified the vote counts knowing they were incorrect; that substantial numbers of ineligible people (non-citizens and minors) had voted; that Pence's actions were surprising; and that the senator should "object to every state and kind of spread this out a little bit like a filibuster". | 119 | 97 |
| Change: Original indictment says Trump and Giuliani tried to exploit the riot "by calling lawmakers to convince them...to delay the certification" while continuing to lie about election fraud. The superseding indictment says more specifically that the two of them had Giuliani make those calls, and it clarifies that Trump "had no official role" in the certification "proceeding". The original indictment says that Trump tried to reach two U.S. senators through White House aides; the superseding indictment omits this. The original indictment had said Giuliani's calls ended at 7:18 p.m. The superseding indictment corrects this to 7:22 p.m. |
| While Giuliani was making these calls, the White House Counsel called Trump to ask him to allow the certification. Trump refused. | 120 | |
| "The attack on the Capitol obstructed and delayed the certification for approximately six hours, until the Senate and House of Representatives came back into session separately at 8:06 p.m. and 9:02 p.m., respectively, and came together in a Joint Session at 11:35 p.m." | 121 | 98 |
| At 11:44 p.m., Eastman emailed Pence's counsel, asking for Pence to prompt a 10-day delay. Eastman referred to his illegal proposal as "one more relatively minor violation" of the Electoral Count Act. In Eastman's words, this would give an opportunity for "the legislatures to finish their investigations" and to have "a full forensic audit of the massive amount of illegal activity that has occurred". | 122 | 99 |
| At 3:41 a.m. on January 7, as President of the Senate, Pence announced Biden as the victor. | 123 | 100 |
| Trump and his co-conspirators committed one or more of the acts described in: 13, 15–16, 18–22, 24, 26, 28, 30–33, 35, 37–39, 41, 43–44, 46, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57–64, 67, 71–75, 78–82, 84, 85, 87–97, 99–100, 102–104, 111, 114, 116, 118–119, and 122. | 124 | |
