Internet censorship and surveillance in Oceania

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Internet censorship and surveillance by country (2018)
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This list of Internet censorship and surveillance in Oceania provides information on the types and levels of Internet censorship and surveillance that is occurring in countries in Oceania.

Contents

Detailed country by country information on Internet censorship and surveillance is provided in the Freedom on the Net reports from Freedom House, by the OpenNet Initiative, by Reporters Without Borders, and in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices from the U.S. State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. The ratings produced by several of these organizations are summarized below as well as in the Censorship by country article.

Country list

Australia

Australia does not allow content that would be classified "RC" (Refused Classification or banned) or "X18+" (hardcore non-violent pornography or very hardcore shock value) to be hosted within Australia and considers such content "prohibited"/"potentially prohibited" outside Australia, and Australia also prohibits cyberbullying or hate speech across Internet chat rooms; it also requires most other age-restricted content sites to verify a user's age before allowing access. Since January 2008 material that would be likely to be classified "R18+" or "MA15+" and which is not behind such an age verification service (and, for MA15+, which also meets other criteria such as provided for profit, or contains certain media types) also fits the category of "prohibited" or "potentially prohibited". The regulator ACMA can order local sites which do not comply taken down, and overseas sites added to a blacklist provided to makers of PC-based filtering software.

Australia is classified as "under surveillance" by Reporters Without Borders due to the internet filtering legislation proposed by Minister Stephen Conroy. Regardless, as of August 2010 and the outcome of the 2010 election, it would be highly unlikely for the filter to pass the Senate if proposed due to the close numbers of seats held by Labor and the Coalition, who Joe Hockey says do not support it. [15]

In June 2011 two Australian ISPs, Telstra and Optus, confirmed they would voluntary block access to a list of child abuse websites provided by the Australian Communications and Media Authority and more websites on a list compiled by unnamed international organizations from mid-year. [16]

In May 2013, Senator Scott Ludlam questioned the Department and Minister for Communications – and 3 agencies were identified as using section 313 powers within Australian legislation to block websites, two of which being The Australian Federal Police and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. [17]

In June 2015 legislation to force ISPs to block access to websites that link to copyrighted material was passed through the Senate. The new legislation will allow rights holders to obtain court orders to block overseas content that are found to contain copyrighted material. The legislation does not however extend to the use of VPN services, bringing into question the effectiveness of the legislation. [18]

Fiji

There are no government restrictions on general public access to the Internet, but evidence suggests that the government monitors private e-mails of citizens as well as Internet traffic in an attempt to control antigovernment reports by anonymous bloggers. [19]

From 2006 to 2014, the country operated under a military-led government and had no constitution or functioning parliament from 2009. A new constitution was introduced in 2013, and multi-party elections in 2014 restored a parliamentary form of government. During the interim military regime, a series of decrees were issued, including the Public Order Amendment Decree (POAD), the Media Decree, and the Crime Decree. The POAD gives the government the power to detain persons on suspicion of "endangering public safety or the preservation of the peace"; defines terrorism as any act designed to advance a political, religious, or ideological cause that could "reasonably be regarded" as intended to compel a government to do or refrain from doing any act or to intimidate the public or a section thereof; and makes religious vilification and attempts to sabotage or undermine the economy offenses punishable by fines and/or imprisonment. The POAD also permits military personnel to search persons and premises without a warrant from a court and to take photographs, fingerprints, and measurements of any person. Police and military officers may enter private premises to break up any meeting considered unlawful. The Media Decree prohibits "irresponsible reporting" and provides for government censorship of the media. The Crimes Decree includes criticism of the government in its definition of the crime of sedition, including statements made in other countries by any person. By decree all telephone and Internet service users must register their personal details with telephone and Internet providers, including their name, birth date, home address, left thumbprint, and photographic identification. [19]

New Zealand

Since February 2010 Department of Internal Affairs offers to ISPs voluntary Internet filtering. [20] Participating providers route suspect destination IP addresses to the Department, which blocks inappropriate HTTP requests. Other packets are routed back to correct networks. List of blocked addresses is secret.

In March 2019, several websites disseminating footage of the Christchurch mosque shooting became blocked by major ISPs in New Zealand, such as 4chan, 8chan, and LiveLeak. [21] [22]

Papua New Guinea

Only 2.3% of the population of Papua New Guinea had access to the Internet in 2012. [23]

There are no government restrictions on access to the Internet or credible reports that the government monitors e-mail or Internet chat rooms without judicial oversight. Individuals and groups engage in the expression of views via the Internet, including by e-mail. [24]

The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press, and the government generally respects these rights in practice. Newspapers offer a variety of editorial viewpoints and report on controversial topics. There is no evidence of officially sanctioned government censorship, although newspaper editors complained of intimidation tactics aimed at influencing coverage. There were some examples of police officers targeting journalists who negatively covered police activities. Although the constitution prohibits arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, or correspondence, there are instances of abuse. [24]

See also

Related Research Articles

Internet censorship in Tunisia significantly decreased in January 2011, following the ouster of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, as the new acting government removed filters on social networking sites such as YouTube.

Internet censorship in Australia is enforced by both the country's criminal law as well as voluntarily enacted by internet service providers. The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) has the power to enforce content restrictions on Internet content hosted within Australia, and maintain a blocklist of overseas websites which is then provided for use in filtering software. The restrictions focus primarily on child pornography, sexual violence, and other illegal activities, compiled as a result of a consumer complaints process.

Censorship in South Asia can apply to books, movies, the Internet and other media. Censorship occurs on religious, moral and political grounds, which is controversial in itself as the latter especially is seen as contrary to the tenets of democracy, in terms of freedom of speech and the right to freely criticise the government.

The OpenNet Initiative (ONI) was a joint project whose goal was to monitor and report on internet filtering and surveillance practices by nations. Started in 2002, the project employed a number of technical means, as well as an international network of investigators, to determine the extent and nature of government-run internet filtering programs. Participating academic institutions included the Citizen Lab at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto; Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School; the Oxford Internet Institute (OII) at University of Oxford; and, The SecDev Group, which took over from the Advanced Network Research Group at the Cambridge Security Programme, University of Cambridge.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Internet in Yemen</span>

Use of the Internet in Yemen began in 1996 through the ISPs TeleYemen and the Public Telecommunications Corporation. The country has 8,243,772 internet users, 15,000,000 mobile cellular telephone subscriptions, more than 1,160 .ye domains, and around 3,631,200 Facebook users. By July 2016, 6,732,928 people were Internet users.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Internet censorship</span> Legal control of the internet

Internet censorship is the legal control or suppression of what can be accessed, published, or viewed on the Internet. Censorship is most often applied to specific internet domains but exceptionally may extend to all Internet resources located outside the jurisdiction of the censoring state. Internet censorship may also put restrictions on what information can be made internet accessible. Organizations providing internet access – such as schools and libraries – may choose to preclude access to material that they consider undesirable, offensive, age-inappropriate or even illegal, and regard this as ethical behavior rather than censorship. Individuals and organizations may engage in self-censorship of material they publish, for moral, religious, or business reasons, to conform to societal norms, political views, due to intimidation, or out of fear of legal or other consequences.

The Internet in Norway is available through Fiber or Mobile. The country code top level domain is .no.

Sweden's internet usage in 2022 was 96%, higher than the European Union (EU) average of 89%. This contributes to Sweden's digital skills development, with 67% of Swedes possessing basic digital skills, compared to the EU's 54%. Additionally, 36% of Swedes have above-basic digital skills and 77% have basic digital content creation skills, exceeding the EU averages of 26% and 66%, respectively. Codeweek 2022 in Sweden also demonstrated gender inclusivity, with a female participation rate of 51%.

Censorship in Denmark has been prohibited since 1849 by the Constitution:

§ 77: Any person shall be at liberty to publish his ideas in print, in writing, and in speech, subject to his being held responsible in a court of law. Censorship and other preventive measures shall never again be introduced.

Use of the Internet in Qatar has grown rapidly and is now widespread, but Internet access is also heavily filtered.

In Ethiopia, the Internet penetration rate is 25% as of January 2022, and it is currently attempting a broad expansion of access throughout the country. These efforts have been hampered by the largely rural makeup of the Ethiopian population and the government's refusal to permit any privatization of the telecommunications market. Only 360,000 people had Internet access in 2008, a penetration rate of 0.4%. The state-owned Ethio Telecom is the sole Internet service provider (ISP) in the country. Ethio Telecom comes in at very high prices which makes it difficult for private users to purchase it.

The Internet in Kazakhstan is growing rapidly. Between 2001 and 2005, the number of Internet users increased from 200,000 to 1 million. By 2007, Kazakhstan reported Internet penetration levels of 8.5 percent, rising to 12.4 percent in 2008 and 34.3% in 2010. By 2013, Kazakhstani officials reported Internet penetration levels of 62.2 percent, with about 10 million users. There are five first-tier ISPs with international Internet connections and approximately 100 second-tier ISPs that are purchasing Internet traffic from the first-tier ISPs. As of 2019, more than 75% of Kazakhstan's population have access to the internet, a figure well ahead of any other country in Central Asia. The Internet consumption in the country rose from 356 PB in 2018 to 1,000 PB in 2022.

This list of Internet censorship and surveillance by country provides information on the types and levels of Internet censorship and surveillance that is occurring in countries around the world.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">State Security Service (Uzbekistan)</span> National intelligence agency of the government of Uzbekistan

The State Security Service is the national intelligence agency of the government of Uzbekistan. It was formerly known as the National Security Service.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Internet censorship in Russia</span>

In Russia, internet censorship is enforced on the basis of several laws and through several mechanisms. Since 2012, Russia maintains a centralized internet blacklist maintained by the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor).

Internet filtering in Indonesia was deemed "substantial" in the social arena, "selective" in the political and internet tools arenas, and there was no evidence of filtering in the conflict/security arena by the OpenNet Initiative in 2011 based on testing done during 2009 and 2010. Testing also showed that Internet filtering in Indonesia is unsystematic and inconsistent, illustrated by the differences found in the level of filtering between ISPs. Indonesia was rated "partly free" in Freedom on the Net 2020 with a score of 49, midway between the end of the "free" range at 30 and the start of the "not free" range at 60.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Internet censorship and surveillance in Europe</span>

This list of Internet censorship and surveillance in Europe provides information on the types and levels of Internet censorship and surveillance that is occurring in countries in Europe.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Internet censorship and surveillance in Asia</span>

This list of Internet censorship and surveillance in Asia provides information on the types and levels of Internet censorship and surveillance that is occurring in countries in Asia

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Internet censorship and surveillance in the Americas</span>

This list of Internet censorship and surveillance in the Americas provides information on the types and levels of Internet censorship and surveillance that is occurring in countries in the Americas.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Internet censorship and surveillance in Africa</span>

This list of Internet censorship and surveillance in Africa provides information on the types and levels of Internet censorship and surveillance that is occurring in countries in Africa.

References

  1. ↑ "Freedom on the Net 2018" (PDF). Freedom House. November 2018. Archived (PDF) from the original on 1 November 2018. Retrieved 1 November 2018.
  2. ↑ "Filtering Data | OpenNet Initiative". opennet.net. Archived from the original on 27 April 2019. Retrieved 13 May 2019.
  3. ↑ "Country Profiles | OpenNet Initiative". opennet.net. Archived from the original on 27 April 2019. Retrieved 13 May 2019.
  4. ↑ "Internet Enemies" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 23 March 2012. Retrieved 14 May 2019.
  5. ↑ ""Internet Enemies"". Archived from the original on 12 March 2014. Retrieved 14 May 2019.
  6. ↑ Due to legal concerns the OpenNet Initiative does not check for filtering of child pornography and because their classifications focus on technical filtering, they do not include other types of censorship.
  7. ↑ "Australia". freedomhouse.org. January 13, 2012. Archived from the original on April 24, 2019. Retrieved May 13, 2019.
  8. ↑ "Australia". freedomhouse.org. September 17, 2012. Archived from the original on April 24, 2019. Retrieved May 13, 2019.
  9. ↑ "Australia". freedomhouse.org. September 26, 2013. Archived from the original on April 24, 2019. Retrieved May 13, 2019.
  10. ↑ "Australia". Freedom on the Net 2014. Freedom House. Archived from the original on 1 August 2015. Retrieved 13 June 2015.
  11. ↑ "Australia". Freedom on the Net 2015. Freedom House. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 2 January 2016.
  12. ↑ "Filtering Data | OpenNet Initiative". opennet.net. Archived from the original on 27 April 2019. Retrieved 13 May 2019.
  13. ↑ "Country Profiles | OpenNet Initiative". opennet.net. Archived from the original on 27 April 2019. Retrieved 13 May 2019.
  14. 1 2 "Australia and New Zealand | OpenNet Initiative". opennet.net. Archived from the original on 24 April 2019. Retrieved 13 May 2019.
  15. ↑ "Countries under surveillance: Australia". Reporters Without Borders. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016.
  16. ↑ "Web censorship begins quietly next month". NewsComAu. June 22, 2011. Archived from the original on March 26, 2019. Retrieved May 13, 2019.
  17. ↑ "Minister Conroy, are you filtering our internets?". YouTube. 30 May 2013. Archived from the original on 19 May 2015. Retrieved 15 June 2013.
  18. ↑ Taylor, Josh (22 June 2015). "Labor waves piracy site-blocking Bill through Australian Senate, despite concerns". ZDNet. Archived from the original on 23 June 2015. Retrieved 24 June 2015.
  19. 1 2 "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018". www.state.gov. Retrieved 24 April 2019.
  20. ↑ "New Zealand's government internet filter is already running". Tech Liberty NZ. 10 March 2010. Archived from the original on 17 March 2010. Retrieved 24 March 2010.
  21. ↑ Kelly, Makena (18 March 2019). "New Zealand ISPs are blocking sites that do not remove Christchurch shooting video". The Verge. Retrieved 21 November 2020.
  22. ↑ Brodkin, Jon (20 March 2019). "4chan, 8chan blocked by Australian and NZ ISPs for hosting shooting video". Ars Technica. Retrieved 21 November 2020.
  23. ↑ ""Percentage of Individuals using the Internet 2000–2012"". Archived from the original on 9 February 2014. Retrieved 24 April 2019.
  24. 1 2 "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018". www.state.gov. Retrieved 24 April 2019.

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