| |||||||
| Founded | 20 December 1948 [4] incorporated in California | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Commenced operations | January 1946 as Los Angeles Air Service 18 July 1960 [5] as Trans International Airlines 1 October 1979 [6] as Transamerica Airlines | ||||||
| Ceased operations | 30 September 1986 [7] | ||||||
| Operating bases | Oakland, California | ||||||
| Fleet size | See Fleet below | ||||||
| Destinations | See Destinations below | ||||||
| Parent company | Studebaker (1962–1964) Transamerica Corporation (1968–1986) | ||||||
| Headquarters | Oakland, California Las Vegas, Nevada | ||||||
| Key people | Kirk Kerkorian Lee Taylor James Porter | ||||||
| Notes | |||||||
(1) IATA, ICAO codes were the same until the 1980s | |||||||
Trans International Airlines (TIA) was how billionaire Kirk Kerkorian made his first fortune. Until 1978, TIA was a United States supplemental air carrier regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the now-defunct Federal agency that, at the time, tightly controlled almost all US commercial air transport. From 1964 on, supplemental airlines were just charter carriers, but until 1964, they were charter/scheduled hybrids; TIA flew scheduled service to Hawaii as late as 1961. TIA was founded as Los Angeles Air Service (LAAS) in the 1940s. Kerkorian owned the airline 1948–1962 and again 1964–1968, when he sold it to insurance company Transamerica Corporation for his first fortune.
At the end of the regulated airline era in 1978, TIA was, after buying Saturn Airways in 1976, by far the largest supplemental carrier, although still modest in size relative to US scheduled carriers. After US airline deregulation in 1979, the airline changed its name to Transamerica Airlines and added limited scheduled service. In 1986 Transamerica Corporation, reversing earlier diversification, tried selling the airline, but liquidated it instead.
In 1984, while Transamerica Airlines was seeking wage cuts, Transamerica Corporation started a second Trans International Airlines, as a non-union subsidiary. Transamerica Corporation set a legal precedent for being allowed to own separate union and non-union airline subsidiaries.
Kirk Kerkorian was a pilot in World War II, engaged in pilot instruction and aircraft delivery across the Atlantic, including a record-setting nonstop flight of a deHavilland Mosquito from Canada to the UK.
In January 1946, Kerkorian and his sister formed a partnership to trade aircraft. [8] This activity attracted significant attention when, in October 1946, while Kerkorian was flying a war-surplus Douglas DC-3 from Hawaii to the mainland, the ferry tank system malfunctioned and the engines quit. His crew issued a distress call before it was able to restore power, leading to news stories. [9]
Los Angeles Air Service (LAAS) was a separate nonscheduled airline, later known as an irregular air carrier or supplemental air carrier. LAAS was in operation with a C-47 as early as January 1946. [10] In 1946, LAAS's presence was noted at LaGuardia in March, [11] Chicago in April [12] and LAAS advertised a charter flight to Alaska from Seattle in May. [13] In 1947, LAAS started scheduled DC-3 service from Los Angeles Municipal Airport to Big Bear, at which time its owners/operators were James Porter and Lee Taylor. [14]
Kerkorian's partnership bought LAAS in June 1948, which on 13 August 1948 was issued a Letter of Registration by the CAB as a irregular air carrier (what the CAB then issued to such airlines in lieu of a certificate). [8] Kerkorian incorporated Los Angeles Air Service, Inc., in California on 20 December 1948, a separate [15] entity from the original LAAS. However, it was only on 5 April 1951 that the Letter of Registration was transferred from the LAAS partnership to the LAAS corporation, thereby making the corporate entity the airline. [16]
Under Kerkorian, LAAS operated intermittently; it operated no flights at all from 3rd quarter of 1951 through 1st quarter of 1954, [17] and had minimal operations in 1957 and 1958 (see Table 1). In September 1957, the CAB warned LAAS to operate within the next 30 days or lose operating authority, the airline having sold all its aircraft. [18] Kerkorian's interests were as much in aircraft trading as airline operation: when Kerkorian took a stake in a Las Vegas casino in 1955, Variety Magazine referred to him not an airline operator but as an airplane dealer. [19] Kerkorian made some famous deals through LAAS. For instance, in 1951, LAAS bought the wreckage of a British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) Constellation in the UK from BOAC's insurers, shipped it to the US and had Lockheed rebuild it, [20] leasing it to California Hawaiian Airlines, another irregular airline. [21] All-told, the deal netted Kerkorian over a half-million dollars (over $5.5 million in 2025 dollars). [22] See External links for photos of LAAS C-46 and DC-4 aircraft.
| USD 000 | 1952(1) [23] | 1953(1) [24] | 1954 [25] | 1955 [26] | 1956 [27] | 1957 [28] | 1958 [29] | 1959 [30] | 1960 [30] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating revenue: | |||||||||
| Military charter | 624 | 1,032 | 1,950 | 21 | 31 | 1,315 | 1,652 | ||
| Civilian charter | 64 | 8 | 49 | 4 | 5 | 249 | 279 | ||
| Scheduled | 27 | 59 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 939 | ||
| Other | 0 | 1 | 0 | 313 | 184 | 78 | 0 | ||
| Total | 0 | 0 | 715 | 1,100 | 2,009 | 338 | 220 | 1,642 | 2,870 |
| Profit (loss) before taxes | 0 | 1 | 34 | 3 | (5) | (169) | (249) | (69) | 287 |
| Operating revenue: | |||||||||
| % of industry(2) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 3.0 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 2.1 | 3.4 |
| Industry(2) rank | NA | NA | 21 | 18 | 15 | 23 | 24 | 7 | 7 |
LAAS changed its name in 1960 in part to eliminate confusion with Los Angeles Airways, a scheduled helicopter airline. It originally wanted "California National Airlines", changing to "California International Airlines" when National Airlines objected, before settling on Trans International. Originally just a trade name, [31] later in the year LAAS changed the name of the corporation. [32] Coincident with the name change, the airline entered the scheduled market from the west coast to Hawaii flying DC-6B aircraft; its Hawaii representative was Peter Ueberroth, later famous for running the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. [33] TIA's 1960 revenues reflect a far higher level of scheduled service than previously. See Table 1. But from April 1960, the legal status of supplemental carriers was in question and when Congress settled the issue in 1962, it limited supplemental carriers to purely charter service from 1964.
In 1960 the US Air Force shifted emphasis from using its own transportation service to commercial charters, which it no longer awarded on the basis of competitive bidding. Instead, the CAB set uniform (and much higher) prices for military charters, which were awarded on the basis of participation in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), rewarding airlines that enrolled aircraft in CRAF that the military valued, such as long-range jets and those with cargo capability, and above all convertible (able to carry passenger or cargo) aircraft.
TIA was the first supplemental to fly jets, [34] buying the Douglas DC-8 prototype, "Ship One", [35] which had been upgraded to then-modern JT3D turbofan engines, [36] in June 1962. TIA immediately landed a $6.2 million military charter contract, [37] an amount greater than TIA's total 1961 revenue (see Table 2). In July 1963 TIA was the first airline of any kind to fly cargo jet charters for the military, leveraging the military's preference by acquiring a convertible passenger/cargo aircraft. [38] Kerkorian later said moving to jets "was the real breakthrough." [39] Note the substantial difference in performance between Table 1 and Table 2. Apart from Ship One, TIA would buy 12 DC-8s new from Douglas in the 1960s, all convertible. [40] Military charters boomed because of the Vietnam War. [41] TIA had much lower costs than most airlines, [42] and that plus higher military charter rates and demand for convertible jets resulted in fast growth and high operating margins. [43] For instance, from 1964 to 1965, TIA's revenues grew by 56% while operating margin expanded from 19.4% to 33.0%.
In 1965, TIA's jets brought further benefit. The CAB provided an exemption for TIA (and World Airways) to offer European charters that summer. [44] The CAB wanted more jet capacity and the supplemental airlines already certificated for Europe, Saturn and Capitol, had no jets and a single jet respectively. [45] Obtaining Europe access was fortunate for TIA; as discussed below, Europe became the key non-military market for supplementals.
| USD 000 | 1961 [46] | 1962 [47] | 1963 [47] | 1964 [48] | 1965 [49] | 1966 [50] | 1967 [51] | 1968 [52] | 1969 [52] | 1970 [53] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating revenue: | ||||||||||
| Military charter | 3,960 | 9,973 | 10,559 | 11,591 | 13,731 | 18,543 | 14,034 | 22,124 | 22,630 | 25,832 |
| Civilian charter | 198 | 52 | 324 | 2,189 | 7,064 | 10,931 | 13,745 | 22,617 | 25,806 | 33,834 |
| Scheduled | 1,524 | 20 | ||||||||
| Other | 72 | 6 | 30 | 204 | 1,068 | 1,371 | 3,741 | 3,385 | 1,579 | 1,267 |
| Total | 5,754 | 10,050 | 10,910 | 13,984 | 21,863 | 30,846 | 31,519 | 48,125 | 50,016 | 60,933 |
| Op profit (loss) | 176 | 1,409 | 2,581 | 2,710 | 7,204 | 9,142 | 8,629 | 10,416 | 4,763 | 7,809 |
| Net profit (loss) | 276 | 1,280 | 1,856 | 1,101 | 3,890 | 4,545 | 5,391 | 6,535 | 4,012 | 2,388 |
| Op margin (%) | 3.1 | 14.0 | 23.7 | 19.4 | 33.0 | 29.6 | 27.4 | 21.6 | 9.5 | 12.8 |
| Operating revenue: | ||||||||||
| % of industry(1) | 7.0 | 9.4 | 11.8 | 13.2 | 15.5 | 14.7 | 12.2 | 14.8 | 13.8 | 18.1 |
| Industry(1) rank | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 |
In October 1962, Studebaker, attempting to diversify, bought TIA [54] for $2.7 million in stock. [55] In 1964, Studebaker reversed course, and in June Kerkorian bought TIA back for $2.5 million in cash, with president Glenn Cramer a significant minority shareholder. To repay the loan the company took to pay Studebaker, [56] Kerkorian took TIA public in April 1965, the first supplemental to go public. [57] In 1966, the airline moved its headquarters from Las Vegas to Oakland, California. [58] In September 1967, Transamerica Corporation, an insurance company then based in San Francisco, offered to buy TIA for stock then valued at $147 million (over $1.3 billion in 2025 terms). [59] The transaction closed March 1968. [60] Kerkorian made $104 million. [39] Cramer became president and CEO of TIA and a director of Transamerica. [61]
Europe became a uniquely important commercial market for supplementals. By 1974, there were eight remaining supplemental carriers, the so-called Big Five (Capitol, Overseas National (ONA), Saturn, TIA and World) and Little Three (Johnson, McCulloch and Modern). [62] By 1972, TIA had the leading market share in Europe charters, [63] and such charters accounted for 64.6% of TIA's commercial passenger revenue, the lowest such metric of any of the Big Five. For instance, ONA depended on Europe for 99.5% of commercial passenger revenue. [64] [65] The Europe market grew strongly until 1973, when demand unexpectedly plateaued, a situation that became even more challenging in the fourth quarter when fuel prices spiked as a result of the 1973 oil crisis. [66] TIA was already more diversified, relative to Europe commercial revenue, than others in the Big Five. In offering to buy Saturn Airways in 1974, TIA bought an airline that, by the time the deal closed in 1976, had no Europe passenger charter exposure at all.
For further on supplemental air carriers and US-Europe charters see:
In April 1974, TIA tentatively agreed to buy Saturn for $15 million in Transamerica stock. [67] As the CAB noted, Saturn was the most profitable supplemental, and complementary to TIA. In 1974, freight was 2/3 of Saturn's revenues versus 3.3% of TIA's, and military was 47% of Saturn's revenues versus 12.5% of TIA. [68] Saturn withdrew from flying passengers entirely in November 1974. [69] The transaction closed November 1976 and in the meantime Saturn's financial performance improved significantly. Saturn renegotiated and the price more than doubled to $35 million (over $190 million in 2025 terms) by closing. [70] [71] TIA thus gained a strong freight business, including Lockheed L-100 Hercules and Lockheed L-188 Electra freighter aircraft. In particular, Saturn had a leading position in the domestic air freight networks Logair and Quicktrans of the US Air Force and US Navy, respectively. Saturn's share of the combined Logair/Quicktrans contract was as high as 86% during the mid-1970s, based on its monopoly as an L-100 provider, [72] a position TIA inherited.
| USD 000 | 1971 [73] | 1972 [74] | 1973 [68] | 1974 [68] | 1975 [75] | 1976 [75] | 1977 [76] | 1978 [76] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating revenue: | ||||||||
| Military charter | 21,362 | 11,649 | 13,116 | 26,100 | 24,807 | 72,855 | 71,970 | |
| Civilian charter | 41,309 | 53,492 | 62,075 | 88,623 | 93,969 | 105,073 | 117,250 | 153,306 |
| Other | 3,119 | (236) | 2,892 | 3,277 | 3,910 | 20,711 | 5,884 | |
| Total | 65,790 | 74,275 | 73,486 | 104,634 | 123,347 | 133,788 | 210,815 | 231,161 |
| Op profit (loss) | 12,066 | 4,304 | 2,934 | 3,754 | 17,601 | 12,394 | 16,397 | 25,651 |
| Net profit (loss) | 4,350 | 4,960 | (1,490) | 4,986 | 3,127 | 9,541 | 16,319 | |
| Op margin (%) | 18.3 | 5.8 | 4.0 | 3.6 | 14.3 | 9.3 | 7.8 | 11.1 |
| Operating revenue: | ||||||||
| % of industry(1) | 18.2 | 22.4 | 19.6 | 24.4 | 28.5 | 32.0 | 40.8 | 43.6 |
| Industry(1) rank | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
After the Saturn merger, TIA was by far the most dominant supplemental. As Table 3 shows, in 1978, the last year of the regulated era, TIA accounted for over 43% of all supplemental revenue. But TIA was still of modest size overall; in 1978, the largest scheduled airline by revenue was United Airlines, with over 15 times TIA's revenue at $3.5 billion. [77] US airline deregulation came into effect in 1979, but by year-end 1978, the CAB had already approved TIA scheduled servic to Europe. [78] By May 1979, TIA was flying scheduled service to Amsterdam from Los Angeles and New York. [79] On October 1, the airline aligned its name with that of its parent, becoming Transamerica Airlines (TA). [80]
At the time, TA said it wanted to become a leading international scheduled carrier and add eight Boeing 747s over three years. [81] But instead the airline (proud of its record of profitability) took a cautious stance, largely sticking to the charter business it knew, aiming, as of 1982, to generate 15% of revenues from scheduled service, with military charters another 30%. It continued to focus on international charters, where it benefitted from former players dropping out, [82] as, overall, international charter volumes declined substantially in the first few years after deregulation. [83] TA's scheduled service reflected this modest ambition, with low frequency service on relatively few routes, mostly international (see Destinations). In the end Transamerica took delivery of only three 747s. It converted 12 DC-8-61/63s to DC-8-71/73s (re-engining with CFM56-2 high-bypass turbofans and other upgrades). Transamerica noted its 70-series DC-8s had the same number of seats as the then brand-new Boeing 767, while having international range (not true of initial 767 models, which, pre-ETOPS, were not intercontinental aircraft) and operating costs within 1% of the 767, at half the cost. [82]
| USD 000 | 1979 [84] | 1980 [85] | 1981 [86] | 1982 [87] | 1983 [87] | 1984 [88] | 1985 [89] | 1986 [90] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating revenue: | ||||||||
| Passenger charter | 160,967 | 205,963 | 168,895 | 137,032 | 117,225 | 115,093 | 84,848 | |
| Cargo charter | 92,285 | 113,885 | 126,721 | 79,454 | 105,983 | 133,455 | 54,468 | |
| Scheduled | 8,329 | 23,470 | 20,516 | 20,002 | 20,756 | 7,306 | ||
| Other | 8,958 | 4,650 | 2,931 | 3,020 | 3,626 | 9,467 | 4,552 | |
| Total | 270,539 | 347,969 | 319,063 | 239,507 | 247,590 | 274,000 | 265,321 | 143,868 |
| Op profit (loss) | 11,057 | 34,272 | 24,010 | 26,290 | 33,112 | 15,448 | (19,990) | |
| Net profit (loss) | 16,495 | 24,457 | 24,733 | 23,559 | 26,650 | 38,100 | 20,796 | 2,197 |
| Op margin (%) | 4.1 | 9.8 | 7.5 | 11.0 | 13.4 | 5.8 | -13.9 | |
| Scheduled as % of total revenue | 3.1 | 6.7 | 6.4 | 8.4 | 8.4 | 2.8 |
In late 1983 TA asked for wage givebacks from its pilots. [91] The pilot union, Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), claimed this amounted to a 50% wage cut [92] (later bumping this to 60%) [88] for a profitable airline. But TA noted new entrant charter carriers had much lower wages. Pilot wages were an industry-wide issue. For instance, in 1983, bankrupt Continental Airlines imposed much lower wages on pilots and others. [93] In the same year, ALPA said it had provided savings of over $2 billion to airlines since deregulation through concessions. [94]
In 1984, Transamerica Corporation announced it would establish a second Trans International Airlines as a non-union sibling to TA, using the certificate of a dormant airline, Louisville-based Central American International. It denied any intention to transfer business to the new carrier from TA, but ALPA was skeptical. ALPA offered concessions in exchange for killing the new airline, but Transamerica declined. ALPA sued to force the government to impose labor protective provisions, a routine part of airline mergers in the regulated era. The government argued this was inconsistent with the intent of airline deregulation and courts agreed, confirming the ability of a holding company to own both union and non-union airlines.
In 1984, TA got a court injunction to stop a pilot sickout. [95] In early 1985, the pilots launched a public relations campaign against the airline. [96] In August, TA shut its Oakland maintenance base, contracting with World Airways, also based at Oakland. Many former TA mechanics transferred to World, but at lower rates. [88] A few days later, TA also fired 75 white-collar workers. Layoffs reflected, in part, the sale of five DC-8s. [97] The reduction in activity can be seen in Table 4. In January 1986, Transamerica Corporation announced it was exiting non-financial businesses, putting TA for sale along with Budget Rent-a-Car and an industrial subsidiary. [98] In July, an employee group formed to buy TA was shocked at the (undisclosed) asking price, and meanwhile TA's entire fleet was on the market. [99] Finally, in August, the corporation decided to shut the airline as of September 30, timing driven by annual military contract awards. [100] In the subsequent year, TA would sell two 747s for $126 million and 7 DC-8-73CFs for $165.5 million, [101] , a third 747 for $63 million [102] and 11 Hercules for $86.35 million. [103] TA received insurance proceeds for a 12th Hercules when the $7.75 million aircraft, leased to Southern Air Transport, crashed on 4 October 1986, only days after TA shutdown. [104]
November 1947: LAAS was offering scheduled service between Los Angeles and Big Bear, California.
1 October 1960: TIA schedule shows 3/week service from Burbank and San Francisco to Honolulu. [105]
1 May 1984: Transamerica system timetable shows mostly low frequency (couple times/week) flights: [106]
Los Angeles Air Service, April 1956: [107]
Los Angeles Air Service, January 1960: [108]
Trans International, August 1962: [109]
Trans International, August 1971: [110]
Trans International according to World Airline Fleets 1979 (copyright 1979): [111]
Transamerica Airlines, September 1986: [112]