Background
The last parliamentary election in Moldova was held on 11 July 2021, resulting in a landslide victory for the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), led by President of Moldova Maia Sandu. PAS secured 63 out of 101 seats, allowing it to form a single-party majority government. The election marked a significant shift towards European integration, as PAS defeated the Bloc of Communists and Socialists, a pro-Russian electoral alliance. [6]
After coming to power, the PAS government pursued anti-corruption measures, judicial reforms, and European Union (EU) integration. [7] Pro-Russian opposition forces organized protests against the government amid Moldova's economic problems; the protests were partly financed with money from Russia according to Moldova's Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office. [8]
In the 2024 presidential election, incumbent Maia Sandu was re-elected with 55.3% of the vote, defeating pro-Russian candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo. [9] The election was overshadowed by Russian interference, [10] also featuring misuse of public resources by the government and unbalanced media coverage in Sandu's favour, [11] and it took place at the same time as a referendum on EU integration, which narrowly passed with 50.4% support. [12] Viorel Cernăuțeanu, the head of the Moldovan Police, stated that dozens of millions of dollars had been transferred to a total of over 138,000 people in Moldova, [13] about 10% of the active electorate, [14] through the Russian bank Promsvyazbank in order to "massively corrupt the electorate" of the presidential election and referendum, with the number of people benefitting from this system reportedly being much greater as recipients were also given money for their family members. [13] As a result of Russian inteference and vote buying, the outcome of both votes was influenced, with the EU referendum passing only narrowly. [15]
In January 2025, an energy crisis erupted in Moldova as Russia halted natural gas supplies to Moldova's Russia-backed unrecognized breakaway region of Transnistria. [16] Sandu and the Moldovan authorities accused Russia of causing the crisis to influence the upcoming parliamentary election, [17] [18] with several foreign analysts and think tanks supporting this view, arguing that the crisis could undermine the popularity of PAS and Moldova's path towards Europe and lead to pro-Russian parties regaining power. [16] [19] [20] [21]
According to Moldovan think tank WatchDog, PAS completed around 56% of its 2021 promises during its four years in government. [22] According to the German Marshall Fund, PAS has been criticized for limiting opportunities for other pro-EU parties. [23] The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argued that the "pro-Russian" label had been increasingly instrumentalized against the opposition during pro-government mobilization for the 2025 election, and stated that "Western-funded civil society" had increasingly become an extension of governmental capacity. [24] Although an International Press Institute survey among Moldovan media representatives found that the biggest worry was Russian disinformation and propaganda, some respondents also reported worry about self-censorship in outlets closely aligned editorially with the government's stances on European integration and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in a reported "sort of symbiosis" existing between some of these outlets and the government. [25] Further, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 during Sandu's first term, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 which triggered an economic setback and a massive influx of refugees, [26] the 2025 energy crisis, high inflation and reform fatigue reduced PAS' popularity. [23] Amidst Russian interference and disinformation campaigns, Euronews described the election as being for Sandu "a final battle" on Moldova's road to EU membership. [27]
Campaign
On 31 January, Moldovan opposition leader Alexandr Stoianoglo, who lost the 2024 presidential election to President Sandu, announced the formation of a new coalition to challenge the pro-Western ruling majority. The coalition, called Alternative, unites three political parties led by Chișinău Mayor Ion Ceban, former Prime Minister Ion Chicu, and former lawmaker Mark Tkachuk. [30] While Stoianoglo campaigns on a foreign policy that includes both Russia and the West, he has leaned toward Russia, with his past presidential candidacy backed by the pro-Moscow Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM). [31]
In 2023, the National Alternative Movement (MAN) and the European Social Democratic Party (PSDE) started talks for a merger which fell apart in the prelude of the 2024 presidential election. [32] Tudor Ulianovschi claimed that PSDE was not invited into the MAN's Alternative coalition. [33] In May, former PDM leader Dumitru Diacov called for a merger of PSDE and Marian Lupu's Respect Moldova Movement (MRM). [34] In July, PSDE proposed a "European Moldova Alliance" with the Coalition for Unity and Welfare (CUB) and the League of Cities and Communes (LOC), both former members of the Together bloc. [35] In August, Boris Foca announced that the Modern Democratic Party (PDMM) will compete and called former PDM members to join. Diacov also reiterated his call for a merger of PSDE, MRM, and PDMM. [36]
On 4 June 2025, the For Moldova Platform was formed aiming to unite the opposition parties and later received support from the PSRM, the Party of Communists and Future of Moldova Party. [37] On 10 June, George Simion, leader of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) in Romania, called on Moldovans to vote in the election to "take revenge" and "defeat politically" Sandu. At the 2025 Romanian presidential election, in the second round, Sandu and PAS had supported Simion's opponent, Nicușor Dan, who won the election. [38] On 4 July, Igor Dodon announced negotiations for a left-wing bloc. [39] Vladimir Voronin later confirmed that the bloc would include the PSRM, PCRM, Heart of Moldova Party and the Future of Moldova Party. [40] The Patriotic Electoral Bloc was registered on 3 August without the PCRM, [41] which joined five days later. [42] The Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM), led by Vlad Filat, submitted its registration application for the election on 15 July, one day after the deadline. The PLDM's appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ) on 2 September, so the party was excluded from the race. [43]
In a 6 July 2025 congress of the Victory bloc held in Moscow in Russia, the bloc's leader, Moldovan fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, stated that he wanted Evghenia Guțul, Governor of Gagauzia, to head Victory's electoral list for the 2025 parliamentary election. At the moment, Guțul was being investigated for two criminal cases and was under house arrest. Shor also stated at the same congress that he believed "the only salvation" for Moldova was "union with the Russian Federation" [44] and that "it makes no sense to talk about the country's independence", adding the comment "one currency, one parliament". [45] On 5 August 2025, just weeks before the election, Guțul was sentenced to seven years in prison for using undeclared Russian funds to finance political activities. [46] In July, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) cancelled Victory's registration. [47] After its cancellation, the members decided to register separately [48] but on the next day (3 August), Chance, FASM and Victory (as well as non-member Agrarian Party of Moldova) were barred too. [49] The Ministry of Justice announced that it sought to dissolve said parties alongside also Victory bloc member Revival Party. [50] On 15 August, Revival was barred from running too. [51]
On 20 August, PCRM leader Voronin commented on the so-called "kuliok" (black bag) case, stating that his coalition partner PSRM leader Dodon received 860,000 euros from Vladimir Plahotniuc and that he had already testified before the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office. In the case, Dodon was accused of passive corruption and of organizing and accepting funding for a political party from a criminal organization. According to the charges, Dodon accepted money from then PDM leader and later fugitive oligarch Plahotniuc in 2019 to fund the PSRM. [52] [53] Voronin withdrew his statements a day later, calling them a sarcastic joke. [54] Voronin had criticized Dodon many times in the past, considering him a "traitor" for having left the PCRM in 2011 and having divided the PCRM's voters with the PSRM. At the time, Voronin only held the 49th place on the Patriotic Bloc's list of candidates, which Dodon headed, having little chances of entering the parliament, although Voronin stated there was an agreement within the bloc to promote him to 32nd place. [55] According to Moldovan journalist and Nokta founder Mihail Sirkeli, his low place on the list would have humiliated Voronin, with Sirkeli suggesting Voronin could have made the statements about the kuliok case either to sabotage the bloc or as a personal maneuver to secure a safe position on its list. [56]
On 23 August, the registration of the Greater Moldova Party (PMM) was rejected by the CEC, the stated reason being that, following the exclusion from its electoral list of a person convicted of domestic violence, which made the person ineligible for being included as a candidate, the party's list failed to meet the minimum quota of candidates from each gender required by the legislation in effect. [57] Party president Victoria Furtună, who has ties to Shor, claimed that the decision was politically motivated and that she would appeal it. [58] The Party for People, Nature, and Animals (PONA), led by Ion Dron, was also excluded for the same reason and also because of incomplete documentation as the CEC stated. [59] Nevertheless, as per rulings by the Central Court of Appeal and the CSJ, the CEC registered the PMM in the election on 5 September, with the reservation of excluding the party again if it did not modify its list to comply with the gender quota. [60]
Start of the campaign
On 29 August, the electoral campaign officially started. [61] On 2 September, anti-corruption officials and prosecutors performed raids in Chișinău and Comrat with regards to a case of illegal funding of the Heart of Moldova Party (PRIM). As the National Anti-Corruption Center (CNA) declared that day, 17 people were suspects in the case, of whom 13 were under investigation and four others had been detained; the latter included three officials of PRIM's Comrat territorial organization and a deputy mayor of Comrat. In response, Vlah accused the government of exerting pressures. [62] On 5 September, Moldova's Interinstitutional Supervisory Council decided to block funds and economic resources in Moldova belonging to Vlah. [63] She had been sanctioned by Canada on 28 August, being accused of Russian interference activities before the election. [64]
On 8 September, Alternative bloc's Ceban, who on 9 July was banned from traveling into Romania and the entire Schengen Area for "national security reasons", was issued a warning by the CEC because, despite having been suspended from his duties as Chișinău mayor on 29 August, he requested a temporary visa citing his status as mayor to attend an event in Rome, Italy, after the electoral campaign started. [65] On 10 September, Our Party (PN) leader Renato Usatîi announced that a PN candidate for the election, Stela Vlas, had been excluded from the party's list after being informed that she had run for the unconstitutional Shor-affiliated Chance party at the 2023 Moldovan local elections. [66] On the same day, Alternative's Tkachuk stated that the 2003 Kozak memorandum should have been signed, sparking a protest by Transnistrian War veterans two days later. [67]
According to an investigation by Moldovan newspaper NordNews, a petition sent on 4 September by the PRIM to the Moldovan parliament and the Ministry of Education and Research for the repair of the school in the village of Constantinovca and the road to access the school contained only a few authentic signatures out of a total of 62, with most coming from people who either were dead, did not live in the village or directly did not exist. The school administration and the Edineț District Council told NordNews they had not informed the authorities about the issues raised in the petition, and one of the villagers was surprised to find his name on it along with a signature that did not belong to him. The list of signatures was reportedly compiled by Aliona Pistriuga, a PRIM member and then the 29th person on the Patriotic Bloc's list of candidates. Forging signatures and including false information in official documents constitutes a crime under Moldovan law. [68] On 16 September, Vlah was banned from entering Lithuania for five years due to her ties to Russia and her support for Russia's attempts at exerting influence over Moldovan politics as Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated. [69]
On 15 September, the CEC ruled that PAS and the Dignity and Truth Platform (PPDA) did not conform a camouflaged electoral bloc. This had been reported to the CEC by the Alternative bloc and the National Moldovan Party (PNM). [70] On 17 September, the CEC issued a warning to the Patriotic Bloc in the context of suspicions of illegal financing of the PRIM, also deciding that it would ask the Ministry of Justice to establish whether the PRIM's activities should be restricted and that it would carry out two financial audits, one for the PRIM and another for the bloc. The CEC also issued a warning for PAS and another for suspended Minister of Environment and PAS candidate Sergiu Lazarencu since, despite having been suspended from his duties during the election campaign, Lazarencu presented himself as minister at two public events, with one of them featuring government insignia on a screen. [71] On 19 September, the Ministry of Justice requested the Central Court of Appeal to restrict the activity of Vlah's PRIM for a year. [72]
Final week
On 22 September, the unionist (pro-unification with Romania) Unity of the Nation Bloc (BUN), composed by the National Liberal Party (PNL; led by Mihai Severovan) and the Home National Reunification Party (PRNA; led by Valentin Dolganiuc), withdrew from the election and endorsed PAS, with both signing a political collaboration agreement. [73] The PNM's leader Dragoș Galbur criticized the BUN's decision and claimed that he had been called by politicians both from Moldova and outside and advised to withdraw from the election. [74] The next day, former Moldovan president Nicolae Timofti endorsed PAS on the election. [75] On 24 September, Moldovan fugitive oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc called on Moldovans to vote for opposition parties that had real chances of surpassing the electoral threshold. [76] On the same day, Vladimir Cebotari, the founder of the Modern Democratic Party of Moldova (PDMM) and an associate of Plahotniuc, incited citizens to vote for either Alternative or Our Party (PN). Both Ion Ceban, one of Alternative's leaders, and PN leader Renato Usatîi disavowed his endorsement. [77] Also on the same day, President of Romania Nicușor Dan urged Moldovan citizens in Romania to vote in the election, as it was "a decisive moment for Moldova". [78]
Also on 22 September, over 250 searches across over 100 localities in Moldova were carried out by the Moldovan police and agents from other institutions in the context of a criminal case dealing with the preparation of "mass disorder and destabilization" coordinated from Russia through criminal elements. [79] Dodon stated that searches had taken place in the homes of PSRM colleagues in the north of the country, resulting in the detention of four or five people, including the vice president of the PSRM's organization in Rîșcani District. [80] Dodon also declared that protests would take place if the PRIM's activity was limited. [81] On 24 September, Russia summoned Moldova's ambassador to the country Lilian Darii to receive a note of protest after Moldova allegedly refused to accredit Russian observers for the election; CEC vice president Pavel Postica stated that the CEC had not received any such official accreditation request so far. [82]
On 24 September, Chișinău police found 200 election ballots in a printing shop in the capital bearing the stamp "voted" for the Alternative bloc. According to Prime Minister Dorin Recean and the Moldovan authorities, they were to be allegedly used in a "carousel-type scheme" for electoral fraud at the election; as they described, in the scheme, a fake ballot would be inserted by a paid voter into the ballot box, and a clean official one, which was to be marked with the same political formation as the fake one, would be taken out of the polling station for its use by the next paid voter. [83] Ceban declared that the ballots were models for campaign advertising, with him demanding a public apology from the police and accusing PAS of lying. [84] However, the CEC stated that the ballots did not meet publicity law requirements and that they constituted electoral agitation and de facto misleading advertising, given, as Postica stated, the difficulty for a simple voter to distinguish a real ballot from a printed one. [85] According to Dan Perciun, Minister of Education and Research, Alternative's models looked identical to real ballots. [84]
On 25 September, Moldovan fugitive oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc was extradited from Greece to Moldova. Plahotniuc had been on the run since 2019 and was the prime suspect in the 2014 Moldovan bank fraud scandal that saw 1 billion dollars, equivalent to 12% of Moldova's GDP at the time, stolen from the country's banking system. Plahotniuc's lawyer accused the ruling PAS government of turning the extradition into a "political spectacle", of trying to present the event as "a success of its own" and of having done everything possible to ensure the extradition would take place on the eve of the election. [86] On 26 September, PAS organized a rally in which representatives and supporters promoted the party's main campaign messages and urged Moldovans to vote in the election. [87] On the same day, the Promo-LEX NGO reported that it had documented 84 cases of use of administrative resources during the election campaign, with 66 of them from PAS alone, eight from the Patriotic Bloc and five from Alternative. [88]
Also on 25 September, the PRIM's activity was precautionarily limited by the Central Court of Appeal for the duration of the examination of its case until a verdict was pronounced. [89] This followed a request, accepted by the Court on 23 September, by lawyer Fadei Nagacevschi on the party's behalf to verify the constitutionality of the provisions of the law on the basis of which the limitation of the PRIM's activity was requested, which the CSJ declared inadmissible two days later. [90] In response, Dodon promised that if Vlah and her colleagues were excluded from the Patriotic Bloc's list and the bloc managed to form a parliamentary majority, Vlah would be in the new government. [89] On the same day, Vlah was banned from entering three countries: Poland, for a period of five years, as she was helping Russia interfere in the preparations for Moldova's election according to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Latvia, for an indefinite period; and Estonia, as her actions "violate the norms of international law and threaten peace and security" as the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Margus Tsahkna stated, with Vlah having been included in the country's list of sanctioned people. [91] On 26 September, the CEC excluded the PRIM from the election amid accussations of illegal financing of the party. The Patriotic Bloc was required to remove PRIM members from its list of candidates within 24 hours, and members and supporters of the bloc organized a protest over the decision at the CEC's headquarters. [92]
On 26 September as well, Furtună's PMM was also excluded from the election by the CEC, including under the justification that the party benefited from illegal foreign funding and that it promoted the interests of a foreign state, with the CEC also stating that it would ask the Ministry of Justice to limit the party's activity. The decision followed a complaint by the PSDE's leader Ulianovschi amid investigations by Moldovan newspapers Ziarul de Gardă and NordNews that showed the mobilization of the Russian NGO Evrazia's network in support of the PMM (as well as the Patriotic Bloc and Alternative). After receiving information from the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) and other institutions, the CEC determined that there existed suspicions of the party's illegal funding and of connections with formations created by oligarch Shor, with the CEC also highlighting Furtună's sanctioned status in the EU [59] since 15 July due to destabilizing or threatening actions against Moldovan sovereignty and independence. [93]
In the same session in which the PMM was excluded, [59] the CEC issued a warning to Alternative after Ceban showed a model ballot in the public space [94] and another to prime minister Recean, the 2nd on the PAS' list of candidates, [59] for using administrative resources in a press conference held at the government headquarters "where he made accusations against electoral competitors". [95] Furthermore, that same day, Moldovan newspaper Deschide.MD published alleged audio recordings from closed groups of Shor's network in which it was affirmed that Shor had personally ordered a few days earlier that the network's sympathizers be mobilized to vote for the Patriotic Bloc. [96] 26 September was the last day of the electoral campaign. [87] 27 September, the last day before the election, was the day of election silence; electoral agitation and political advertising were banned, and electoral participants were not allowed to appear on TV or radio broadcasts. [97]
On 12 December 2024, Alexandru Musteață, the head of the SIS, stated that the parliamentary election was expected to face significant interference from Russia, warning that Moscow was likely to employ the tactics used during the 2024 presidential election and the EU referendum. These would include disinformation and manipulation campaigns, political and electoral corruption and street protests and unrest. [209] On 3 September 2025, after an interview to Moldova's Minister of Energy Dorin Junghietu, Euronews reported that Moldovan officials were anticipating an intensification of disinformation campaigns and even attacks on the Moldovan energy system by Russia to increase tensions before the parliamentary election. [210] According to Agence France-Presse, analysts warned that Moldova had become a "testing ground" for Russia's information warfare in Europe. [211]
A BBC News investigation found a network in Moldova which participants were promised to get paid if they posted pro-Russian propaganda and fake news undermining PAS ahead of the election. [212] An investigation by Ziarul de Gardă reported that hundreds of accounts with false identities were created to spread Russian propaganda in TikTok and Facebook before the election, [213] with many of these supporting Furtună's Greater Moldova Party (PMM). [214] NordNews published an investigation in which members of the newspaper's team infiltrated one of the influence networks of the Russian NGO Evrazia controlled by Shor, even providing services for the Patriotic Bloc, Alternative and the PMM, "all to show you how Russia is trying to dictate who you should put your stamp on on 28 September". [215]
On 22 September 2025, Bloomberg reported, citing European officials and documents of undisclosed origin, that Russia had prepared a plan to interfere in the Moldovan parliamentary election, which would include vote buying and transport of voters in the Moldovan diaspora, a disinformation campaign in both Romanian and Russian on social media (Facebook, Telegram, TikTok) and through call centres, the leak of compromising information about Moldovan officials, and provocations during the election and mass protests afterward carried out by youth from sports clubs and criminal groups. [216] The next day, the Moldovan ambassador to Romania Victor Chirilă stated that Moldovans in France, Germany, Italy, Romania and the United Kingdom were being offered up to 100 euros for their vote. [217] Furthermore, according to Reuters, Russia paid Moldovan priests trips to Moscow and gave them bank cards to which money was sent in exchange for them creating Telegram channels, promoting anti-European ideas and criticizing the Moldovan authorities. [218]
According to European officials cited by Bloomberg, for interfering in the election, Russia would have likely allocated an amount comparable to the money it used to interfere in the 2024 presidential election and EU referendum; that is, around 150 million euros, or approximately 1% of Moldova's GDP. [216] According to Chirilă, if Russia would have invested almost 50 million euros to interfere in the Moldovan electoral period in 2024, for the 2025 election it would have invested over 300 million euros. [217] Ukrainian journalist Dmitry Gordon, citing "documents leaked from the Kremlin", put this figure at 350 million dollars at least. [219] Gordon also claimed that, in the case of a pro-Russian victory in the election, Russia would seek to capture Moldova's state institutions and that it was even considering to use Moldova to open a second front in its invasion of Ukraine, attacking Odesa Oblast with up to 40,000 contract soldiers from various regions. [220]
In September, the European Digital Media Observatory reported that, in the final stretch of the campaign for the election, "the information warfare landscape continues to evolve with increasing intensity". [221] According to a study by the international analysis company OpenMinds published on the eve of the election, in Moldova, a third of all Telegram channels systematically spread Russian propaganda and one in eight comments came from bots. [222] According to Liliana Vițu, the chair of Moldova's Audiovisual Council, the country was at "the mercy of the very big platforms", which she said were being used to spread Russian disinformation and narratives to destabilize the country. The EU took several measures to help counter cyberattacks and disinformation against Moldova, and in the United States, several bipartisan lawmakers expressed concern over the magnitude of Russia's interference in the Moldovan election. [221] Allegedly, part of Russia's disinformation campaign were images spread by propagandists of fake LEGO sets potraying the Moldovan Armed Forces helping Ukraine. [223]
On 11 September, Moldova's Minister of Internal Affairs Daniella Misail-Nichitin stated that, since the beginning of the electoral campaign, around 2,000 searches had been carried out, multiple criminal cases had been opened including complaints about paid protests, and dozens of people had been detained. [224] On 16 September, the CNA announced that over 20 million Moldovan lei had been seized during searches in Chișinău amid a case of illegal party financing. [225] On 22 September, Moldovan police conducted raids across the country targeting those they suspected of "preparing Russia-backed disorder". There were over 250 searches conducted according to Moldpres. [226] On 26 September, Serbian police announced the arrest of two people on suspicion of organizing a training camp with 170 participants on how to commit violent activities in Moldova. The Moldovan government expressed its belief that the Russian military intelligence agency, the GRU, was involved in the camp. [227]
Moldovaportal 
