2025 Moldovan parliamentary election

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2025 Moldovan parliamentary election
Flag of Moldova.svg
  2021 28 September 2025Next 

All 101 seats in Parliament
51 seats needed for a majority
Turnout52.21% (Increase2.svg 3.80 pp)
PartyLeaderVote %Seats+/–
PAS Igor Grosu 50.2055−8
BEP Igor Dodon 24.2026−6
Alternative Ion Ceban 7.968New
PN Renato Usatîi 6.206+6
PPDA Vasile Costiuc 5.626+6
This lists parties that won seats. See the complete results below.
2025 Moldovan parliamentary election results by district.svg
Results by district
Prime Minister beforePrime Minister after
Dorin Recean
Independent
TBA [a]

Parliamentary elections were held in Moldova on 28 September 2025. Moldova is a parliamentary republic; the Parliament of Moldova has the main authority of creating laws and appointing the government, and executive powers are primarily derived from the legislature. The main parties and coalitions contesting the election were the ruling pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), the pro-Russian Patriotic Electoral Bloc (BEP), the centre-left and nominally [b] pro-European Alternative (BA), and the left-wing populist and mildly pro-Russian Our Party (PN).

Contents

The election was described as potentially determining the fate of Moldova's accession bid into the European Union (EU), [2] with President Maia Sandu calling it "the most important election in the history of the country". [3] Reports both from the Moldovan authorities and national and international media outlets described alleged Russian electoral interference, which included disinformation and manipulation campaigns, plans for protests and unrest, cyberattacks and vote buying. Two pro-Russian parties, the Heart of Moldova Party (PRIM, part of the Patriotic Bloc) and the Greater Moldova Party (PMM), were banned from running days before the election following allegations of illegal financing linked to Russia.

The election was declared valid at 14:28 EEST (UTC+03:00) after 52.21% voter turnout surpassed the minimum of 33.3% required by law. PAS won just over 50% of the vote and 55 seats, retaining a reduced majority government; the Patriotic Bloc suffered modest losses (compared to the Bloc of Communists and Socialists in the 2021 election), while Alternative, PN, and the populist and unionist (pro-unification with Romania) Democracy at Home Party (PPDA) entered Parliament for the first time. The entry of PPDA was regarded as a surprise due to its pre-election polling numbers being below the electoral threshold.

Background

The 2021 Moldovan parliamentary election resulted in a landslide victory for the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), a pro-European party led by President Maia Sandu. PAS secured 63 out of 101 seats, allowing it to form a single-party majority government. The election marked a significant shift towards European integration, as PAS defeated the Bloc of Communists and Socialists, a pro-Russian electoral alliance. [4]

After coming to power, the PAS government pursued anti-corruption measures, judicial reforms, and European Union integration. [5] Pro-Russian opposition forces organized protests against the government amid Moldova's economic problems; the protests were partly financed with money from Russia according to Moldova's Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (PA). [6]

In the 2024 Moldovan presidential election, Sandu was re-elected with 55.3% of the vote, defeating pro-Russian candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo. [7] The election was overshadowed by Russian interference, [8] also featuring misuse of public resources by the government and unbalanced media coverage in Sandu's favour, [9] and it took place at the same time as a referendum on EU integration, which narrowly passed with 50.4% support. [10] Viorel Cernăuțeanu, the head of the Moldovan Police, stated that dozens of millions of US dollars had been transferred to a total of over 138,000 people in Moldova, [11] about 10% of the active electorate, [12] through the Russian bank Promsvyazbank in order to "massively corrupt the electorate" of the presidential election and referendum, with the number of people benefitting from this system reportedly being much greater as recipients were also given money for their family members. [11] As a result of Russian interference and vote buying, the outcome of both votes was influenced, with the EU referendum passing only narrowly. [13]

In January 2025, an energy crisis erupted in Moldova as Russia halted natural gas supplies to Moldova's Russia-backed unrecognized breakaway region of Transnistria. [14] Sandu and the Moldovan authorities accused Russia of causing the crisis to influence the upcoming parliamentary election, [15] [16] with several foreign analysts and think tanks supporting this view, arguing that the crisis could undermine the popularity of PAS and Moldova's path towards Europe and lead to pro-Russian parties regaining power. [14] [17] [18] [19]

According to Moldovan think tank WatchDog, PAS completed around 56% of its 2021 promises during its four years in government. [20] According to the German Marshall Fund, PAS has been criticized for limiting opportunities for other pro-EU parties. [21] The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argued that the "pro-Russian" label had been increasingly instrumentalized against the opposition during pro-government mobilization for the 2025 election, and stated that "Western-funded civil society" had increasingly become an extension of governmental capacity. [22] Although an International Press Institute survey among Moldovan media representatives found that the biggest worry was Russian disinformation and propaganda, some respondents also reported worry about self-censorship in outlets closely aligned editorially with the government's stances on European integration and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in a reported "sort of symbiosis" existing between some of these outlets and the government. [23] Further, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 during Sandu's first term, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 which triggered an economic setback and a massive influx of refugees, [24] the 2025 energy crisis, high inflation and reform fatigue reduced PAS' popularity. [21] Amidst Russian interference and disinformation campaigns, Euronews described the election as being for Sandu "a final battle" on Moldova's road to EU membership. [25]

Electoral system

The 101 members of the Parliament are elected by party-list proportional representation on a nationwide closed list. The electoral threshold at the national level varies according to the type of list; for parties or individual organizations it is 5%; for an electoral bloc it is 7%. For independent candidates, the threshold is 2%. [26] [27] Moldova is a parliamentary republic, with the Parliament having the main authority of creating laws and appointing the government and executive powers being primarily derived from the legislature. [28]

Campaign

Prelude and bloc formations

On 31 January, Moldovan opposition leader Alexandr Stoianoglo, who lost the 2024 presidential election to President Sandu, announced the formation of a new coalition to challenge the pro-Western ruling majority. The coalition, called Alternative, unites three political parties led by Chișinău Mayor Ion Ceban, former Prime Minister Ion Chicu, and former lawmaker Mark Tkachuk. [29] While Stoianoglo campaigned on a foreign policy that included both Russia and the West, he had leaned toward Russia, with his past presidential candidacy backed by the pro-Moscow Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM). [30]

In 2023, the National Alternative Movement (MAN) and the European Social Democratic Party (PSDE) started talks for a merger which fell apart in the prelude of the 2024 presidential election. [31] Tudor Ulianovschi claimed that PSDE was not invited into the MAN's Alternative coalition. [32] In May, former PDM leader Dumitru Diacov called for a merger of PSDE and Marian Lupu's Respect Moldova Movement (MRM). [33] In July, PSDE proposed a "European Moldova Alliance" with the Coalition for Unity and Welfare (CUB) and the League of Cities and Communes (LOC), both former members of the Together bloc. [34] In August, Boris Foca announced that the Modern Democratic Party (PDMM) will compete and called former PDM members to join. Diacov also reiterated his call for a merger of PSDE, MRM, and PDMM. [35]

On 4 June 2025, the For Moldova Platform was formed aiming to unite the opposition parties and later received support from the PSRM, the Party of Communists and Future of Moldova Party. [36] On 10 June, George Simion, leader of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) in Romania, called on Moldovans to vote in the election to "take revenge" and "defeat politically" Sandu. At the 2025 Romanian presidential election, in the second round, Sandu and PAS had supported Simion's opponent, Nicușor Dan, who won the election. [37] On 4 July, Igor Dodon announced negotiations for a left-wing bloc. [38] Vladimir Voronin later confirmed that the bloc would include the PSRM, PCRM, Heart of Moldova Party and the Future of Moldova Party. [39] The Patriotic Electoral Bloc was registered on 3 August without the PCRM, [40] which joined five days later. [41] The Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM), led by Vlad Filat, submitted its registration application for the election on 15 July, one day after the deadline. The PLDM's appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ) on 2 September, so the party was excluded from the race. [42]

In a 6 July 2025 congress of the Victory bloc held in Moscow in Russia, the bloc's leader, Moldovan fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, stated that he wanted Evghenia Guțul, Governor of Gagauzia, to head Victory's electoral list for the 2025 parliamentary election. At the moment, Guțul was being investigated for two criminal cases and was under house arrest. Shor also stated at the same congress that he believed "the only salvation" for Moldova was "union with the Russian Federation" [43] and that "it makes no sense to talk about the country's independence", adding the comment "one currency, one parliament". [44] On 5 August 2025, just weeks before the election, Guțul was sentenced to seven years in prison for using undeclared Russian funds to finance political activities. [45] In July, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) cancelled Victory's registration. [46] After its cancellation, the members decided to register separately [47] but on the next day (3 August), Chance, FASM and Victory (as well as non-member Agrarian Party of Moldova) were barred too. [48] The Ministry of Justice announced that it sought to dissolve said parties alongside also Victory bloc member Revival Party. [49] On 15 August, Revival was barred from running too. [50]

On 20 August, PCRM leader Voronin commented on the so-called "kuliok" (black bag) case, stating that his coalition partner PSRM leader Dodon received 860,000 euros from Vladimir Plahotniuc and that he had already testified before the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office. In the case, Dodon was accused of passive corruption and of organizing and accepting funding for a political party from a criminal organization. According to the charges, Dodon accepted money from then PDM leader and later fugitive oligarch Plahotniuc in 2019 to fund the PSRM. [51] [52] Voronin withdrew his statements a day later, calling them a sarcastic joke. [53] Voronin had criticized Dodon many times in the past, considering him a "traitor" for having left the PCRM in 2011 and having divided the PCRM's voters with the PSRM. At the time, Voronin only held the 49th place on the Patriotic Bloc's list of candidates, which Dodon headed, having little chances of entering the parliament, although Voronin stated there was an agreement within the bloc to promote him to 32nd place. [54] According to Moldovan journalist and Nokta founder Mihail Sirkeli, his low place on the list would have humiliated Voronin, with Sirkeli suggesting Voronin could have made the statements about the kuliok case either to sabotage the bloc or as a personal maneuver to secure a safe position on its list. [55]

On 23 August, the registration of the Greater Moldova Party (PMM) was rejected by the CEC, the stated reason being that, following the exclusion from its electoral list of a person convicted of domestic violence, which made the person ineligible for being included as a candidate, the party's list failed to meet the minimum quota of candidates from each gender required by the legislation in effect. [56] Party president Victoria Furtună, who has ties to Shor, claimed that the decision was politically motivated and that she would appeal it. [57] The Party for People, Nature, and Animals (PONA), led by Ion Dron, was also excluded for the same reason and also because of incomplete documentation as the CEC stated. [58] Nevertheless, as per rulings by the Central Court of Appeal and the CSJ, the CEC registered the PMM in the election on 5 September, with the reservation of excluding the party again if it did not modify its list to comply with the gender quota. [59]

Start of the campaign

On 29 August, the electoral campaign officially started. [60] On 2 September, anti-corruption officials and prosecutors performed raids in Chișinău and Comrat with regards to a case of illegal funding of the Heart of Moldova Party (PRIM). As the National Anti-Corruption Center (CNA) declared that day, 17 people were suspects in the case, of whom 13 were under investigation and four others had been detained; the latter included three officials of PRIM's Comrat territorial organization and a deputy mayor of Comrat. In response, Vlah accused the government of exerting pressures. [61] On 5 September, Moldova's Interinstitutional Supervisory Council decided to block funds and economic resources in Moldova belonging to Vlah. [62] She had been sanctioned by Canada on 28 August, being accused of Russian interference activities before the election. [63]

On 8 September, Alternative bloc's Ceban, who on 9 July was banned from traveling into Romania and the entire Schengen Area for "national security reasons", was issued a warning by the CEC because, despite having been suspended from his duties as Chișinău mayor on 29 August, he requested a temporary visa citing his status as mayor to attend an event in Rome, Italy, after the electoral campaign started. [64] On 10 September, Our Party (PN) leader Renato Usatîi announced that a PN candidate for the election, Stela Vlas, had been excluded from the party's list after being informed that she had run for the unconstitutional Shor-affiliated Chance party at the 2023 Moldovan local elections. [65] On the same day, Alternative's Tkachuk stated that the 2003 Kozak memorandum should have been signed, sparking a protest by Transnistrian War veterans two days later. [66]

According to an investigation by Moldovan newspaper NordNews, a petition sent on 4 September by the PRIM to the Moldovan parliament and the Ministry of Education and Research for the repair of the school in the village of Constantinovca and the road to access the school contained only a few authentic signatures out of a total of 62, with most coming from people who either were dead, did not live in the village or directly did not exist. The school administration and the Edineț District Council told NordNews they had not informed the authorities about the issues raised in the petition, and one of the villagers was surprised to find his name on it along with a signature that did not belong to him. The list of signatures was reportedly compiled by Aliona Pistriuga, a PRIM member and then the 29th person on the Patriotic Bloc's list of candidates. Forging signatures and including false information in official documents constitutes a crime under Moldovan law. [67] On 16 September, Vlah was banned from entering Lithuania for five years due to her ties to Russia and her support for Russia's attempts at exerting influence over Moldovan politics as Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated. [68]

On 15 September, the CEC ruled that PAS and the Dignity and Truth Platform (PPDA) did not conform a camouflaged electoral bloc. This had been reported to the CEC by the Alternative bloc and the National Moldovan Party (PNM). [69] On 17 September, the CEC issued a warning to the Patriotic Bloc in the context of suspicions of illegal financing of the PRIM, also deciding that it would ask the Ministry of Justice to establish whether the PRIM's activities should be restricted and that it would carry out two financial audits, one for the PRIM and another for the bloc. The CEC also issued a warning for PAS and another for suspended Minister of Environment and PAS candidate Sergiu Lazarencu since, despite having been suspended from his duties during the election campaign, Lazarencu presented himself as minister at two public events, with one of them featuring government insignia on a screen. [70] On 19 September, the Ministry of Justice requested the Central Court of Appeal to restrict the activity of Vlah's PRIM for a year. [71]

Final week

On 22 September, the unionist (pro-unification with Romania) Unity of the Nation Bloc (BUN), composed by the National Liberal Party (PNL; led by Mihai Severovan) and the Home National Reunification Party (PRNA; led by Valentin Dolganiuc), announced it had withdrawn from the election and endorsed PAS, with both signing a political collaboration agreement. [72] The PNM's leader Dragoș Galbur criticized the BUN's decision and claimed that he had been called by politicians both from Moldova and outside and advised to withdraw from the election. [73] As of 26 September however, the BUN was still featured as a contender on the approved lists of candidates for the election, with representatives of the bloc stating they had presented a withdrawal request to the CEC two days before. [74] On the day of the election, CEC vice president Pavel Postica stated that the BUN had not officially withdrawn from the election and that its endorsement of the PAS had been "political declaration"; the "withdrawn" stamp was thus not put on the ballots for the bloc. [75]

On 23 September, former Moldovan president Nicolae Timofti endorsed PAS on the election. [76] On the next day, Moldovan fugitive oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc called on Moldovans to vote for opposition parties that had real chances of surpassing the electoral threshold, [77] and Vladimir Cebotari, the founder of the Modern Democratic Party of Moldova (PDMM) and an associate of Plahotniuc, incited citizens to vote for either Alternative or Our Party (PN). Both Ion Ceban, one of Alternative's leaders, and PN leader Renato Usatîi disavowed his endorsement. [78] Also on the same day, President of Romania Nicușor Dan urged Moldovan citizens in Romania to vote in the election, as it was "a decisive moment for Moldova". [79]

Also on 22 September, over 250 searches across over 100 localities in Moldova were carried out by the Moldovan police and agents from other institutions in the context of a criminal case dealing with the preparation of "mass disorder and destabilization" coordinated from Russia through criminal elements. [80] Dodon stated that searches had taken place in the homes of PSRM colleagues in the north of the country, resulting in the detention of four or five people, including the vice president of the PSRM's organization in Rîșcani District. [81] Dodon also declared that protests would take place if the PRIM's activity was limited. [82] On 24 September, Russia summoned Moldova's ambassador to the country Lilian Darii to receive a note of protest after Moldova allegedly refused to accredit Russian observers for the election; Postica stated that the CEC had not received any such official accreditation request so far. [83]

On 24 September, Chișinău police found 200 election ballots in a printing shop in the capital bearing the stamp "voted" for the Alternative bloc. According to Prime Minister Dorin Recean and the Moldovan authorities, they were to be allegedly used in a "carousel-type scheme" for electoral fraud at the election; as they described, in the scheme, a fake ballot would be inserted by a paid voter into the ballot box, and a clean official one, which was to be marked with the same political formation as the fake one, would be taken out of the polling station for its use by the next paid voter. [84] Ceban declared that the ballots were models for campaign advertising, with him demanding a public apology from the police and accusing PAS of lying. [85] However, the CEC stated that the ballots did not meet publicity law requirements and that they constituted electoral agitation and de facto misleading advertising, given, as Postica stated, the difficulty for a simple voter to distinguish a real ballot from a printed one. [86] According to Dan Perciun, Minister of Education and Research, Alternative's models looked identical to real ballots. [85]

On 25 September, Moldovan fugitive oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc was extradited from Greece to Moldova. [87] Plahotniuc had been on the run since 2019 and was the prime suspect in the 2014 Moldovan bank fraud scandal that saw 1 billion dollars, equivalent to 12% of Moldova's GDP at the time, stolen from the country's banking system. Plahotniuc's lawyer accused the ruling PAS government of turning the extradition into a "political spectacle", of trying to present the event as "a success of its own" and of having done everything possible to ensure the extradition would take place on the eve of the election. [88] On 26 September, PAS organized a rally in which representatives and supporters promoted the party's main campaign messages and urged Moldovans to vote in the election. [89] On the same day, the Promo-LEX NGO reported that it had documented 84 cases of use of administrative resources during the election campaign, with 66 of them from PAS alone, eight from the Patriotic Bloc and five from Alternative. [90]

Also on 25 September, the Heart of Moldova Party (PRIM)'s activity was precautionarily limited by the Central Court of Appeal for the duration of the examination of its case until a verdict was pronounced. [91] This followed a request, accepted by the Court on 23 September, by lawyer Fadei Nagacevschi on the party's behalf to verify the constitutionality of the provisions of the law on the basis of which the limitation of the PRIM's activity was requested, which the CSJ declared inadmissible two days later. [92] In response, Dodon promised that if Vlah and her colleagues were excluded from the Patriotic Bloc's list and the bloc managed to form a parliamentary majority, Vlah would be in the new government. [91] On the same day, Vlah was banned from entering three countries: Poland, for a period of five years, as she was helping Russia interfere in the preparations for Moldova's election according to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Latvia, for an indefinite period; and Estonia, as her actions "violate the norms of international law and threaten peace and security" as the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Margus Tsahkna stated, with Vlah having been included in the country's list of sanctioned people. [93] On 26 September, the CEC excluded the PRIM from the election amid accusations of illegal financing of the party. The Patriotic Bloc was required to remove PRIM members from its list of candidates within 24 hours, and members and supporters of the bloc organized a protest over the decision at the CEC's headquarters. [94]

On 26 September as well, Victoria Furtună's Greater Moldova Party (PMM) was also excluded from the election by the CEC, including under the justification that the party benefited from illegal foreign funding and that it promoted the interests of a foreign state, with the CEC also stating that it would ask the Ministry of Justice to limit the party's activity. The decision followed a complaint by the PSDE's leader Ulianovschi amid investigations by Moldovan newspapers Ziarul de Gardă and NordNews that showed the mobilization of the Russian NGO Evrazia's network in support of the PMM (as well as the Patriotic Bloc and Alternative). After receiving information from the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) and other institutions, the CEC determined that there existed suspicions of the party's illegal funding and of connections with formations created by oligarch Shor, with the CEC also highlighting Furtună's sanctioned status in the EU [58] since 15 July due to destabilizing or threatening actions against Moldovan sovereignty and independence. [95]

In the same session in which the PMM was excluded, [58] the CEC issued a warning to Alternative after Ceban showed a model ballot in the public space [96] and another to prime minister Recean, the 2nd on the PAS' list of candidates, [58] for using administrative resources in a press conference held at the government headquarters "where he made accusations against electoral competitors". [97] Furthermore, that same day, Moldovan newspaper Deschide.MD published alleged audio recordings from closed groups of Shor's network in which it was affirmed that Shor had personally ordered a few days earlier that the network's sympathizers be mobilized to vote for the Patriotic Bloc. [98] 26 September was the last day of the electoral campaign. [89] 27 September, the last day before the election, was the day of election silence; electoral agitation and political advertising were banned, and electoral participants were not allowed to appear on TV or radio broadcasts. [99]

Election

2,772,255 ballots were issued for the election for voters in government-controlled Moldova, 23,500 for voters from Transnistria and 864,300 for voters from the diaspora. For voters in government-held Moldova, 2,170,039 ballots were issued in Romanian, 649,573 in Russian, 3,400 in Gagauz, 1,827 in Bulgarian and 416 in the Romani language. For voters from Transnistria, 14,500 ballots were issued in Romanian and 9,000 in Russian. [100]

2,274 polling stations were opened for the election, of which 1,961 were in Moldova, including 12 in Transnistria, and 301 were opened for the diaspora throughout 45 countries. [101] The countries with the most polling stations were Italy (75), Germany (36), France (26), the United Kingdom (24), Romania (23), the United States (22), Spain (15) and Ireland (12). [100] Two were opened in Russia, in the Embassy of Moldova in Moscow, down from five stations in the 2014 parliamentary election in comparison. The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Moldova cited as the reason security risks and the impossibility of ensuring the development of the electoral process and the protection of CEC officials in other Russian cities. [102] Similar reasons were invoked for Israel and Ukraine, where two stations were also opened for each. [103] Furthermore, for the first time in a parliamentary election, voters from ten countries had the possibility of voting by mail. According to the CEC, 2,055 people voted through this method. [100] The deadline for mail voting was 26 September at 18:00 in each country's local time. Four polling stations were opened for mail voting. [104]

Polling stations were to be open from 7:00 to 21:00. The first vote in the election was cast by Ana Teișanu, a Moldovan student at the University of Tsukuba in Japan. [100] For Moldovan citizens in Ukraine, voting began under air alert. Valeriu Chiveri, the Moldovan ambassador to Ukraine, a country then under Russian invasion, stated that, although a large attendance by voters could not be expected under such conditions, the station in Kyiv (there was another in Odesa) was ready to receive them. [105] During the election, Romanian president Nicușor Dan incited Moldovan citizens in Romania to vote. [106] The election was declared valid at 14:28 EEST after 52.21% voter turnout surpassed the minimum 33.3% required by law. [107]

Prime minister Dorin Recean reported that a massive cyberattack had targeted infrastructure related to Moldova's electoral process, with around 4,000 websites being down. He declared that all attacks had been detected and neutralized in real time, without affecting the electoral process. [108] The night before the election, Moldovan government sites had been subject to over 14 million login attempts. [109] The organized transport of voters, illegal under Moldovan law, was reported in Russia (to Moscow and Belarus) [110] and in Transnistria (to government-held Moldova). [111] Furthermore, bomb alerts were reported at several polling stations in the diaspora, which the Moldovan authorities denounced as part of Russia's assault on the electoral process of Moldova. [112] At a polling station in Iași, Romania, a person fired tear gas; nobody was injured and the person was taken away by law enforcement agents. [113] President Sandu declared that so-called "carousel" cases had been recorded, as attempts had been made to take out clean ballots from polling stations to later reintroduce them already stamped. [114] Several bomb scares also disrupted voting in polling places catering to residents of Transnistria. Three people possessing flammable materials were arrested in Chișinău on suspicion of planning riots on election day. [115]

For the election, Moldova's Russian-backed breakaway region of Transnistria requested that 41 polling stations be opened for residents in Transnistria to vote, as it had been the case for the 2021 Moldovan parliamentary election. However, the Moldovan authorities reduced the number to 12. On 25 September, the CEC announced it had decided that five polling stations (two in Varnița and one each in Cocieri, Doroțcaia and Hagimus) meant to serve voters living in Transnistria would be moved dozens of kilometers away; the ones in Varnița to Anenii Noi, the ones in Cocieri and Doroțcaia to Chișinău and the one in Hagimus to Căușeni, making it much more difficult for residents in Transnistria to vote in the election. The CEC stated that it taken the decision following reports from Moldovan police and the SIS, which warned of potential threats, such as possible false bomb alerts and other provocations, in the Security Zone, in which special equipped teams could not be mobilized to intervene in such scenarios if necessary without prior coordination with the Joint Control Commission, a trilateral (Moldovan, Transnistrian, Russian) peacekeeping force and joint military command structure in Transnistria. [116] As of election day, the 12 polling stations for residents in Transnistria had been placed outside of the region, [117] and the bridges connecting Transnistria with the rest of Moldova were closed amid reports that they had been mined. Transnistria's so-called Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the Moldovan authorities of attempting to prevent residents in Transnistria from voting, with Moldovan TV channel TV8 reporting that bridges were also blocked for the same threat, which was not confirmed, during the 2024 presidential election, preventing many people from voting. [118]

Parties and coalitions

Parliamentary parties

PartyParliamentary
faction
Main ideologyInternational stanceLeader(s)Faction leaderLast electionGovernment
PAS Liberalism Pro-Europeanism Igor Grosu Doina Gherman
63
Majority government
PSRM Patriotic Bloc Democratic socialism
Social conservatism
Russophilia
Euroscepticism
Igor Dodon Vlad Batrîncea
32
Opposition
PCRM Marxism–Leninism
Social conservatism
Russophilia
Euroscepticism
Vladimir Voronin Opposition
Independents
(formerly Șor)
National conservatism Russophilia
Hard Euroscepticism
6
Opposition

Main extra-parliamentary parties and coalitions

PartyCoalitionMain ideologyInternational stanceLeader
Future of Moldova Patriotic Bloc Left-wing populism Russophilia Vasile Tarlev
Heart of Moldova [c] Social democracy
Social conservatism
Russophilia Irina Vlah
MAN [d] Alternative Social democracy Pro-Europeanism (alleged [b] ) Ion Ceban
PDCM Christian democracy Pro-Europeanism (alleged [b] ) Ion Chicu
PAC–CC Democratic socialism Pro-Europeanism (alleged [b] ) Mark Tkachuk
Our Party Left-wing populism
Social conservatism
Euroscepticism
Soft Russophilia
Renato Usatîi
PSDE Social democracy Pro-Europeanism Tudor Ulianovschi

Electoral lists

#Party or allianceAbbr.Lead candidateIdeologyCandidatesBloc members/supported by
1 Party of Action and Solidarity PAS Igor Grosu Liberalism 104 PPDA, [122] BUN [e] (PNL, PRNA) [72]
2 Democracy at Home Party PPDA Vasile Costiuc Moldovan–Romanian unionism 88
3 Coalition for Unity and Welfare CUB Igor Munteanu Social liberalism 59
4 Andrei Năstase Non-partisan 1
5 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe ALDE Arina Spătaru Social liberalism 54
6 Olesea Stamate Non-partisan 1
7 European Social Democratic Party PSDE Tudor Ulianovschi Social democracy 86
8 National Moldovan Party PNM Dragoș Galbur Conservatism 54
9 Patriotic Electoral Bloc BEP Igor Dodon Russophilia 80 PSRM, PCRM, PVM, PRIM [c]
10 Alternative Bloc BeA Ion Ceban [f] Pro-Europeanism (alleged [b] )106 MAN, PDCM, PAC–CC
11 Respect Moldova Movement MRM Marian Lupu Social democracy 101
12 Together Bloc BeÎ Sergiu Tofilat Pro-Europeanism 60 PS  [ ro ], PVE
13 League of Cities and Communes  [ ro ]LOC Alexandru Bujorean Technocracy 54
14 Alliance for the Union of Romanians  [ ro ]AUR Boris Volosatîi Moldovan–Romanian unionism 62
15Victoria Sanduța Non-partisan 1
16 Moldovans Alliance AM Denis Roșca Conservatism 57
17 Unity of the Nation Bloc  [ ro ] (endorsed PAS [e] )BUN Aurelian Silvestru Moldovan–Romanian unionism 79 PNL, PRNA  [ ro ]
18 New Historical Option NOI Dimitri Torner Moderate conservatism 55
19 Liberal Party PL Mihai Ghimpu Conservative liberalism 58
20 Christian-Social Union of Moldova UCSM Gabriel Călin Christian left 53
21Tatiana Crețu Non-partisan 1
22 Our Party PN Renato Usatîi Left-wing populism 103
Source: [124]
  1. Alexandru Munteanu most likely candidate [1]
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 Alternative's true commitment to pro-Europeanism was questioned by multiple media sources and political analysts [120] and by PAS and the European Union (EU). [121]
  3. 1 2 The PRIM was excluded from the election on 26 September. [94]
  4. The MAN gained representation in December 2022 after parliament member Gaik Vartanean defected from the PSRM and joined the MAN. [119]
  5. 1 2 The BUN stated it had withdrawn from the election and endorsed PAS on 22 September, [72] presenting a withdrawal request two days later. [74] However, CEC vice president Pavel Postica stated the bloc did not withdraw officially and that its endorsement had only been a "political declaration", so it remained on the ballot. [75]
  6. Ceban stated that he did not want to become a parliament member and that he would remain Mayor of Chișinău after the campaign. The following candidate on the list was Alexandr Stoianoglo. [123]

Furthermore, the Greater Moldova Party (PMM), led by Victoria Furtună and excluded from participating in the election by the CEC on 26 September, still appeared on the ballot, and without a "withdrawn" mention. This was because the CEC could not take any further measures until the courts gave a final decision, and the party's appeal against the CEC's decision was examined by the Central Court of Appeal early on 28 September, the day of the election. [125] The appeal was rejected later that day, [126] and the votes cast for the party were annulled. [127]

Opinion polls

Opinion polling for the 2025 Moldovan parliamentary election - Alt.svg

The following table shows opinion polls on the 2025 parliamentary election taken since the 2021 election, as well as developments relevant in the context of the election that took place meanwhile involving the listed parties. The featured figures exclude poll respondents who were undecided, chose none or did not reply. A number in bold shows that the party surpassed the 5% threshold (7% for coalitions, 2% for independent candidates) to enter parliament. A smaller number shown below shows how many of the 101 seats in parliament the party would have taken. Explanatory notes are provided for extra necessary information.

PollsterFieldwork dateSample
size
PAS BEP Alternative PN PPDA Victory [a] PMM [b] PSDE CUB LOC PPDA [c] Together MRM PNM Others Lead
BCS PVM PRIM [b] ȘOR PR [a]
PSRM PCRM MAN PDCM CC PPȘ [a] ȘOR [d] PS PVE
26 September 2025The Central Electoral Commission excludes Heart of Moldova Party [94] and Greater Moldova Party from the election. [58]
CBS Research [129] 12–22 Sep 20251,11749.524.07.38.83.12 [a] 2.00 [c] 5.2825.5
iData [130] 7–19 Sep 20251,05933.6
40
33.9
41
9.8
11
7.4
9
3.1
0
[a] 2.9
0
2.5
0
0.5
0
0.6
0
[c] 0.6
0
1.8
0
0.3
0
3.1 [e]
0
0.3
CBS Research–Watchdog [131] 6–13 Sep 20251,12748.721.66.912.33.8 [a] 2.61.10.20.5 [c] 0.20.51.6 [f] 27.1
iData [132] 20 Aug–3 Sep 20251,05934.7
40
36.0
42
7.9
9
8.4
10
1.7
0
[a] [g] 3.9
0
0.5
0
0.4
0
[c] 1.3
0
1.3
0
0.4
0
3.5 [h]
0
1.3
IRI [133] [i] 12–27 Aug 20251,17043.227.211.14.92.54.9 [a] 1.2 [g] [c] 1.23.716.0
iData [134] 7–16 Aug 20251,07133.8
41
30.1
36
10.9
13
9.3
11
2.3
0
[a] 3.2
0
1.9
0
0.7
0
1.2
0
0.1 [c]
0
1.0
0
1.3
0
0.6
0
3.6 [j]
0
3.7
3 and 8 August 2025The Patriotic Electoral Bloc, formed by PSRM, PRIM and PVM, is registered; [40] PCRM officially joins the bloc five days later. [41]
19 July 2025The Central Electoral Commission rejects the registration of the "Victory" political bloc; [46] all its members were later individually rejected too. [48] [50]
7 and 18 July 2025 League of Cities and Communes (7 Jul) [135] and Dignity and Truth Platform (18 Jul) leave "Together" political bloc; the latter announces it will run on PAS' list. [122]
ATES Research Group [136] 28 Jun–7 Jul 20251,03239.1
50
14.9
19
4.0
0
1.6
0
3.6
0
9.4
12
7.7
10
2.0
0
8.9
11
0.72.3
0
0.1
0
3.1
0
1.10.3
0
1.0 [k]
0
24.2
IMAS [137] 17–28 Jun 202583731.517.43.22.35.811.79.41.210.42.70.82.914.1
30.034.811.48.99.52.10.82.54.8
iData [138] 14–23 Jun 20251,01540.4
49
16.4
20
3.5
0
0.5
0
0.9
0
10.3
13
4.3
0
0.8
0
15.5
19
0.92.1
0
0.2
0
0.9
0
2.30.3 [l]
0
24.0
iData [139] [140] 17–24 May 20251,00639.2
46
16.5
19
3.4
0
1.3
0
2.0
0
9.3
12
5.4
6
0.4
0
16.0
18
0.6
0
2.6
0
0.2
0
0.9
0
2.1
0
0.1
0
22.7
Magenta Consulting–IRI [141] 3–18 May 20251,20643.920.714.64.82.43.7<1.2<1.22.4223.2
iData [142] 16–28 Apr 20251,02638.7
45
17.0
20
2.9
0
1.0
0
1.6
0
9.9
11
6.2
7
0.3
0
15.8
18
3.3
0
0.3
0
1.3
0
0.1
0
4.8
0
22.9
ATES Research Group [143] [144] 5–13 Apr 20251,13041.715.43.91.22.610.37.92.39.22.32.40.20.9 [m] 26.3
IMAS [145] 26 Mar – 8 Apr 20251,11333.117.73.53.53.912.08.81.111.61.00.21.90.50.40.8 [n] 15.4
iData [146] 14–25 Mar 20251,00735.0
45
16.0
21
3.2
0
0.8
0
2.7
0
7.8
10
5.0
6
0.5
0
15.0
19
4.5
0
0.9
0
1.3
0
0.1
0
0.3 [o]
0
19.0
1 March 2025 Ecologist Green Party joins "Together" political bloc. [147]
iData [148] 13–24 Feb 20251,00537.3
45
18.2
22
5.9
7
3.4
0
5.3
0
7.0
8
0.4
0
16.2
19
2.1
0
1.4
0
1.8
0
1.0
0
19.1
Intellect Group [149] 13–21 Feb 20251,17943.620.52.14.211.69.26.61.80.323.1
IMAS [150] 15 Jan – 1 Feb 20251,13033.628.25.32.82.410.01.211.80.60.71.50.30.31.3 [p] 5.4
31 January 2025 National Alternative Movement, Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova, Civil Congress and Alexandr Stoianoglo form the Alternative political bloc. [151]
iData-IPP [152] 2–8 Dec 20241,00644.0
49
20.4
23
2.4
0
1.3
0
5.3
6
1.9
0
6.9
8
0.1
0
13.9
15
0.8
0
1.2
0
1.6
0
0.1
0
0.1
0
23.6
IMAS [153] 15 Nov – 1 Dec 20241,03037.030.24.11.92.79.81.08.70.60.41.80.50.31.0 [q] 6.8
CBS Research–Watchdog [154] 11–16 Oct 20241,03458.315.92.92.70.51.17.77.70.90.91.642.4
Intellect Group [155] 13–15 Oct 202498540.216.64.44.714.812.76.523.6
iData-IPP [156] [157] 19 Sep–10 Oct 20241,10036.015.83.30.91.63.213.617.62.41.92.30.11.3 [r] 20.2
CBS Research–Watchdog [158] 17–22 Sep 20241,02151.912.56.31.71.41.66.112.02.82.11.739.4
iData [159] 13–18 Sep 20241,02137.6
46
15.4
18
1.8
0
4.1
0
4.6
0
13.4
16
17.5
21
1.6
0
1.5
0
1.3
0
0.1
0
1.1 [s]
0
20.1
iData [160] [161] 19–25 Aug 20241,00437.0
46
16.1
20
4.1
0
2.2
0
3.5
0
11.2
14
17.1
21
2.5
0
1.6
0
4.3
0
19.9
CBS Research–Watchdog [162] 20–23 Aug 20241,01144.815.96.82.71.32.75.512.74.42.11.128.9
9 August 2024 Coalition for Unity and Welfare leaves "Together" political bloc. [163]
IMAS [164] 8–21 Jul 20241,09341.125.41.93.87.11.513.71.11.50.70.61.6 [t] 15.7
CBS-AXA [165] 28 Jun–18 Jul 20241,11940.822.11.53.83.28.112.81.41.41.13.7 [u] 18.7
IRI [166] [167] 23 May–13 Jun 20241,22544.020.04.04.06.75.31.312.0<1.31.34.0 [v] 24.0
iData [168] 22–27 May 20241,02238.2
49
19.5
25
3.7
0
1.8
0
4.2
0
3.4
0
20.4
27
2.8
0
4.9
0
1.0
0
17.8
IMAS [169] 2–19 May 20241,08842.528.21.93.24.41.514.71.01.00.60.40.7 [w] 14.3
iData [170] 22–26 Apr 20241,00637.8
50
19.7
26
4.5
0
1.6
0
4.7
0
4.5
0
19.1
25
2.8
0
3.6
0
1.6
0
18.7
21 April 2024 Chance, Revival, Alternative and Salvation Force of Moldova and Victory form "Victory" political bloc. [171]
14 April 2024 Dignity and Truth Platform, Party of Change, Coalition for Unity and Welfare and League of Cities and Communes form "Together" political bloc. [172]
CBS-AXA–WatchDog [173] 6–13 Apr 20241,00841.622.66.82.52.04.28.53.23.23.52.019.0
iData [174] 18–24 Mar 20241,13136.3
45
20.0
24
7.6
9
1.6
0
3.3
0
4.7
0
18.8
23
2.7
0
1.9
0
3.1
0
16.3
IMAS [175] 9–27 Feb 20241,09138.428.72.24.04.61.514.51.00.80.51.60.40.31.5 [x] 9.7
IRI [176] 27 Jan–22 Feb 20241,24737.023.35.55.54.14.11.413.71.41.43.2 [y] 13.7
CBS Research [177] 7–12 Feb 20241,10434.329.31.53.80.34.72.610.12.12.31.71.50.90.54.8 [z] 5.0
iData [178] 26–30 Jan 20241,01137.2
49
20.3
27
3.2
0
4.7
0
2.9
0
3.1
0
19.2
25
3.6
0
2.8
0
0.9
0
1.2
0
0.9
0
16.9
IMAS [179] 29 Nov–16 Dec 202395434.730.44.83.85.70.613.50.71.10.72.00.31.8 [aa] 4.3
iData [180] 2–15 Dec 202399735.5
45
19.0
24
2.7
0
7.2
9
3.7
0
4.0
0
1.2
0
17.8
23
2.1
0
2.5
0
1.3
0
2.4
0
0.1
0
0.5 [ab]
0
16.5
2023 local elections [ citation needed ]5 November 20231,147,31732.923.64.31.85.34.10.53.28.13.612.69.3
iData [181] 22–29 Oct 20231,32235.6
44
19.3
23
2.8
0
5.2
6
5.1
6
4.6
0
18.3
22
1.0
0
3.3
0
0.9
0
2.1
0
1.6 [ac]
0
16.3
iData [182] 24–30 Sep 20231,00245.4
56
31.6
39
4.2
0
5.0
6
3.8
0
3.8
0
0.6
0
1.8
0
0.8
0
1.6
0
0.2
0
1.2 [ad]
0
13.8
IMAS [183] 2–24 Sep 202382239.130.12.34.49.51.75.30.50.31.10.25.5 [ae] 9.0
iData [184] 31 Aug–7 Sep 20231,02149.4
59
29.6
35
3.0
0
5.6
7
3.4
0
2.2
0
0.6
0
1.0
0
0.6
0
1.8
0
0.8
0
0.61.6
0
19.8
CBS-AXA–IPP [185] 9–23 Aug 20231,21542.623.66.41.11.80.51.915.22.10.52.70.51.1 [af] 12.6
IRI [186] 11 Jul–1 Aug 20231,19941.216.24.44.44.41.52.914.72.91.55.9 [ag] 25.0
CBS-AXA–IPRE [187] 13–28 Jun 20231,12044.025.71.31.14.515.51.60.31.70.20.53.7 [ah] 18.3
19 June 2023The Șor Party was outlawed by the Constitutional Court. [128]
Intellect Group [188] 15–19 Jun 20231,05638.116.09.64.83.44.722.60.815.5
CBS-AXA–WatchDog [189] 10–19 Jun 20231,12144.321.53.74.04.113.61.50.71.91.30.33.1 [ai] 22.8
iData [190] [191] 23–30 May 20231,03238.5
44
24.2
28
2.1
0
2.7
0
1.9
0
25.1
29
0.8
0
1.1
0
1.4
0
2.2 [aj]
0
13.4
iData [192] 27 Apr–8 May 20231,04936.8
43
25.9
31
1.8
0
3.8
0
3.5
0
22.8
27
1.2
0
1.3
0
1.3
0
1.6
0
10.9
CBS-AXA–WatchDog [193] 4–13 Apr 20231,01547.126.62.43.52.610.11.80.81.50.60.52.4 [ak] 20.5
iData [194] 15–26 Mar 20231,06538.4
45
27.1
32
5.4
6
2.7
0
1.9
0
16.1
18
1.3
0
1.1
0
2.8
0
3.3
0
11.3
CBS-AXA–WatchDog [195] 24 Feb–3 Mar 20231,00046.531.72.02.32.810.40.51.10.62.014.8
iData [196] [197] 15–24 Feb 20231,04034.5
42
29.4
35
4.8
0
2.1
0
2.3
0
20.6
24
1.4
0
1.8
0
3.1
0
5.1
IMAS [198] 6–23 Feb 20231,10032.334.44.63.15.41.814.60.20.51.61.5 [al] 2.1
Intellect Group [199] [200] 12–22 Feb 20231,19838.3
44
18.4
21
10.4
12
4.3
0
4.9
0
20.7
24
1.5
0
1.5 [am]
0
17.6
Magenta Consulting–FNF [201] [202] 11 Jan–6 Feb 20231,42140.921.64.54.51.12.317.01.11.13.419.3
CBS-AXA–WatchDog [203] 17–26 Jan 20231,00133.131.14.12.30.23.116.01.32.61.84.4 [an] 2.0
iData [204] 15–26 Dec 20221,00634.7
39
34.0
38
5.6
6
1.7
0
0.1
0
0.6
0
0.4
0
16.5
18
0.7
0
3.2
0
0.1
0
0.3
0
0.5 [ao]
0
0.7
Intellect Group [205] 1–20 Dec 20221,20941.55
46
18.73
21
6.90
8
4.37
0
3.94
0
24.08
26
0.43
0
17.47
IMAS [206] 10–29 Nov 20221,10034.833.73.12.63.11.516.91.10.31.41.5 [ap] 1.1
IDIS–CBS Research–ISPRI [207] 16–23 Nov 20221,01536.528.96.82.23.313.32.23.31.30.9 [aq] 7.6
IRI [208] 1 Oct–15 Nov 20221,23336.422.77.64.53.01.515.21.51.56.113.7
CBS Research/IPP [209] 29 Oct–10 Nov 20221,13440.627.46.41.00.70.716.71.81.80.52.2 [ar] 13.2
IDIS–CBS Research–ISPRI [210] 29 Sep–11 Oct 20221,06638.730.86.11.01.00.52.312.81.42.82.7 [as] 7.9
iData [211] [212] 4–10 Oct 20221,02031.4
34
22.8
25
6.1
7
2.1
0
1.1
0
1.1
0
27.2
30
5.1
5
3.2 [at]
0
4.3
Intellect Group [213] 16 Apr–25 Sep 20221,08733.429.814.116.36.43.6
iData [214] 3–12 Sep 20221,01229.7
34
31.9
37
3.5
0
1.8
0
1.2
0
25.6
30
4.4
0
1.8
0
2.2
IMAS [215] 6–18 Jul 20221,00730.742.51.13.42.015.51.41.61.8 [au] 11.8
iData [216] 15–23 Jun 20221,09533.1
37
38.5
43
2.0
0
2.6
0
0.9
0
18.7
21
2.9
0
1.2
0
5.4
iData [217] 13–28 May 20221,01235.9
40
36.9
41
2.3
0
1.1
0
17.9
20
0.4
0
4.9
0
0.6
0
1.0
CBS Research [218] 27 Apr–6 May 20221,11139.730.77.12.91.510.61.52.20.52.7 [av] 7.0
iData [219] 7–18 Apr 20221,05338.4
41
37.7
40
0.4
0
1.6
0
0.1
0
18.2
20
0.4
0
2.5
0
0.4 [aw]
0
0.7
IMAS [220] 4–18 Apr 20221,10938.736.50.84.42.314.70.40.91.3 [ax] 2.2
Intellect Group [221] 7–10 Apr 20221,08934.4
38
44.9
49
3.8
0
c. 2.0
0
12.5
14
c. 1.0
0
c. 1.0
0
c. 0.5
0
10.6
IRI [222] 9 Feb–30 Mar 20221,30646.728.96.7<2.28.9<2.2<2.24.517.8
iData [223] 28 March 20221,08440.0
44
33.7
37
0.7
0
0.3
0
1.4
0
1.0
0
18.9
20
0.7
0
1.4
0
1.8 [ay]
0
6.3
iData [224] 15–24 Feb 20221,00732.6
37
29.4
43
8.92.3
0
1.1
0
18.9
21
4.7
0
2.3
0
3.3
IMAS [225] 24 Jan–14 Feb 20221,12335.236.10.75.81.815.71.21.22.3 [az] 0.9
IDIS–CBS Research–ISPRI [226] 25 Jan–5 Feb 20221,13436.040.02.03.212.91.12.30.51.8 [ba] 4.0
iData [227] 11–23 Jan 202299939.2
43
25.8
33
4.5
0
1.4
0
1.5
0
16.8
19
5.4
6
5.4
0
8.9
iData [228] 12–19 Dec 20211,02143.822.75.83.816.55.91.515.3
TSZSZSPP [229] 14–18 Dec 202135553.79
64
27.02
31
0.38
0
0.73
0
4.06
0
1.41
0
5.58
6
1.76
0
2.28
0
0.13
0
0.02
0
2.84 [bb]
0
26.77
IDIS–CBS Research–ISPRI [230] 4–15 Dec 20211,05537.737.83.712.60.63.83.8 [bc] 0.1
iData [231] 15–25 Nov 20211,04745.531.54.19.84.54.514.0
TSZSZSPP [232] 16–20 Nov 202135053.69
64
27.03
31
0.39
0
0.74
0
4.07
0
1.42
0
5.59
6
1.77
0
2.29
0
0.14
0
0.03
0
2.84 [bd]
0
26.66
IMAS [233] 23 Oct–15 Nov 202183438.636.90.76.12.210.81.61.71.3 [be] 1.7
IRI [234] 16 Sep–1 Nov 20211,61956.321.97.83.11.64.71.61.61.626.4
iData [235] 3–18 Oct 202183451.527.55.70.76.74.23.823.9
iData [236] 12–24 Sep 20211,08650.529.33.010.34.10.42.3 [bf] 21.2
2021 parliamentary election [237] 11 Jul 20211,467,20552.80
63
27.17
32
0.43
0
0.77
0
4.10
0
1.45
0
5.74
6
1.81
0
2.33
0
0.17
0
0.08
0
3.15
0
25.63
Notes:
  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Registration rejected by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC). [46] [48] [50]
  2. 1 2 The CEC excluded the PRIM and the PMM from the election on 26 September. [94] [58]
  3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 The Dignity and Truth Platform (PPDA) renounced participating in the parliamentary election and agreed to include two of its own candidates within the PAS' list on 18 July 2025. [122]
  4. In June 2023, the Șor Party was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Moldova and has been banned ever since. [128]
  5. Moldovans Alliance – 0.9, Andrei Năstase – 0.8, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe – 0.4, Christian-Social Union of Moldova – 0.4, Liberal Party – 0.2, AUR Moldova – 0.1, Olesea Stamate – 0.1, New Historical Option – 0.1, Victoria Sanduța – 0.1, Tatiana Crețu – 0.0
  6. Andrei Năstase – 0.8, Olesea Stamate – 0.5
  7. 1 2 Barred from running during some or all of the fieldwork.
  8. Andrei Năstase – 1.1, Moldovans Alliance – 0.6, Liberal Party – 0.4, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe – 0.3, Christian-Social Union of Moldova – 0.3, Olesea Stamate – 0.3, Unity of the Nation Bloc – 0.1, New Historical Option – 0.1, Victoria Sanduța – 0.1, AUR Moldova – 0.1, Tatiana Crețu – 0.1
  9. Values calculated by excluding do not know/will not vote/no answer options
  10. Moldovans Alliance – 0.7, AUR Moldova – 0.1, independent candidates – 2.8
  11. Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe – 0.9, independent candidates – 0.1
  12. Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe – 0.2, independent candidates – 0.1
  13. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 0.2
  14. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 0.3
  15. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 0.3
  16. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 0.4
  17. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 0.4
  18. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 1.2
  19. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 0.3, Liberal Party – 0.1, independent candidates – 0.7
  20. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 1.1
  21. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 1.1, AUR Moldova – 0.6, People's Power Party – 0.6, Liberal Party – 0.6
  22. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 1.3
  23. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 0.6
  24. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 0.8
  25. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 1.4
  26. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 1.8
  27. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 0.7
  28. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 0.4, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe – 0.1
  29. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 0.6
  30. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 0.2
  31. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 0.3, We Build Europe at Home Party – 0.2, AUR Moldova – 0.2
  32. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 0.5
  33. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 1.5
  34. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 1.3, Working People's Party – 0.8, Liberal Party – 0.8, AUR Moldova – 0.5
  35. We Build Europe at Home Party – 1.1
  36. We Build Europe at Home Party – 0.6
  37. We Build Europe at Home Party – 1.2
  38. We Build Europe at Home Party – 0.7, AUR Moldova – 0.4, National Unity Party – 0.1
  39. We Build Europe at Home Party – 1.2
  40. AUR Moldova – 2.2
  41. AUR Moldova – 0.4, Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 0.1
  42. AUR Moldova – 0.3, National Unity Party – 0.3
  43. National Unity Party – 0.4
  44. National Unity Party – 0.7
  45. Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 0.4
  46. We Build Europe at Home Party – 1.8
  47. AUR Moldova – 0.5, National Unity Party – 0.4
  48. AUR Moldova – 1.2, Liberal Party – 0.3, National Unity Party – 0.1
  49. National Unity Party – 0.3, AUR Moldova – 0.1
  50. AUR Moldova – 0.7
  51. National Unity Party – 0.3
  52. AUR Moldova – 0.5, National Unity Party – 0.5
  53. National Unity Party – 0.4, Liberal Party – 0.2
  54. We Build Europe at Home Party – 1.24, AUR Moldova – 0.45, National Unity Party – 0.41, New Historical Option – 0.33, Hope – 0.15, People's Power Party – 0.07, Working People's Party – 0.06, Party of Law and Justice – 0.05, We – 0.04, Party of Regions of Moldova – 0.03, Patriots of Moldova – 0.01
  55. National Unity Party – 0.9, Liberal Party – 0.2
  56. We Build Europe at Home Party – 1.25, AUR Moldova – 0.46, National Unity Party – 0.42, New Historical Option – 0.23, Hope – 0.16, People's Power Party – 0.08, Working People's Party – 0.07, Party of Law and Justice – 0.06, We – 0.05, Party of Regions of Moldova – 0.04, Patriots of Moldova – 0.02
  57. AUR Moldova – 0.7, National Unity Party – 0.3
  58. AUR Moldova – 1.3, People's Power Party – 0.4, National Unity Party – 0.3

Accusations of Russian interference

On 12 December 2024, Alexandru Musteață, the head of the SIS, stated that the parliamentary election was expected to face significant interference from Russia, warning that Moscow was likely to employ the tactics used during the 2024 presidential election and the EU referendum. These would include disinformation and manipulation campaigns, political and electoral corruption, and street protests and unrest. [238] On 3 September 2025, after an interview with Moldova's energy minister Dorin Junghietu, Euronews reported that Moldovan officials were anticipating an intensification of disinformation campaigns and even attacks on the Moldovan energy system by Russia to increase tensions before the parliamentary election. [239] On 24 September, Recean declared that Russia wanted "to take power in Chișinău, violating the sovereign will of the Moldovans" and stated that Moldova was pushing back firmly and that it would "thwart the Russian plan of occupation". He described Russian methods as increasingly radical, including involving criminal groups to prepare mass disorder, electoral corruption by Shor's criminal network, cyberattacks and mass information intoxication. [240] According to Agence France-Presse, analysts warned that Moldova had become a "testing ground" for Russia's information warfare in Europe. [241]

A BBC News investigation found a network in Moldova which participants were promised to get paid if they posted pro-Russian propaganda and fake news undermining PAS ahead of the election. [242] An investigation by Ziarul de Gardă reported that hundreds of accounts with false identities were created to spread Russian propaganda in TikTok and Facebook before the election, [243] with many of these supporting Furtună's Greater Moldova Party (PMM). [244] NordNews published an investigation in which members of the newspaper's team infiltrated one of the influence networks of the Russian NGO Evrazia controlled by Shor, even providing services for the Patriotic Bloc, Alternative and the PMM, "all to show you how Russia is trying to dictate who you should put your stamp on on 28 September". [245]

On 22 September 2025, Bloomberg reported, citing European officials and documents of undisclosed origin, that Russia had prepared a plan to interfere in the Moldovan parliamentary election, which would include vote buying and transport of voters in the Moldovan diaspora, a disinformation campaign in both Romanian and Russian on social media (Facebook, Telegram, TikTok) and through call centres, the leak of compromising information about Moldovan officials, and provocations during the election and mass protests afterward carried out by youth from sports clubs and criminal groups. [246] The next day, the Moldovan ambassador to Romania Victor Chirilă stated that Moldovans in France, Germany, Italy, Romania and the United Kingdom were being offered up to 100 euros for their vote. [247] Furthermore, according to Reuters, Russia paid for Moldovan priests' trips to Moscow and gave them bank cards, to which money was sent in exchange of them creating Telegram channels, promoting anti-European ideas and criticizing the Moldovan authorities. [248]

According to European officials cited by Bloomberg, for interfering in the election, Russia would have likely allocated an amount comparable to the money it used to interfere in the 2024 presidential election and EU referendum; that is, around 150 million euros, or approximately 1% of Moldova's GDP. [246] According to Chirilă, if Russia would have invested almost 50 million euros to interfere in the Moldovan electoral period in 2024, for the 2025 election it would have invested over 300 million euros. [247] Ukrainian journalist Dmitry Gordon, citing "documents leaked from the Kremlin", put this figure at 350 million dollars at least. [249] Gordon also claimed that, in the case of a pro-Russian victory in the election, Russia would seek to capture Moldova's state institutions and that it was even considering to use Moldova to open a second front in its invasion of Ukraine, attacking Odesa Oblast with up to 40,000 contract soldiers from various regions that could be brought to Transnistria together with weapons and ammunition within a year as he reported. [250]

In September, the European Digital Media Observatory reported that, in the final stretch of the campaign for the election, "the information warfare landscape continues to evolve with increasing intensity". [251] According to a study by the international analysis company OpenMinds published on the eve of the election, in Moldova, a third of all Telegram channels systematically spread Russian propaganda and one in eight comments came from bots. [252] According to Liliana Vițu, the chair of Moldova's Audiovisual Council, the country was at "the mercy of the very big platforms", which she said were being used to spread Russian disinformation and narratives to destabilize the country. The EU took several measures to help counter cyberattacks and disinformation against Moldova, and in the United States, several bipartisan lawmakers expressed concern over the magnitude of Russia's interference in the Moldovan election. [251] Allegedly, part of Russia's disinformation campaign were images spread by propagandists of fake LEGO sets portraying the Moldovan Armed Forces helping Ukraine. [253]

On 11 September, Moldova's interior minister Daniella Misail-Nichitin stated that, since the beginning of the electoral campaign, around 2,000 searches had been carried out, multiple criminal cases had been opened including complaints about paid protests, and dozens of people had been detained. [254] On 16 September, the CNA announced that over 20 million Moldovan lei had been seized during searches in Chișinău amid a case of illegal party financing. [255] On 22 September, Moldovan police conducted raids across the country targeting those they suspected of "preparing Russia-backed disorder". There were over 250 searches conducted according to Moldpres. [256] On 26 September, Serbian police announced the arrest of two people on suspicion of organizing training for 170 participants. The Moldovan government expressed its belief that the Russian military intelligence agency, the GRU, was involved. [257]

For its part, Russia denied meddling in the election and accused the Moldovan government of spreading anti-Russian hysteria to win votes. On the day of the election, Dodon accused Sandu of planning to annul the vote, calling for protests in front of the parliament. [258]

Results

2025-09-Moldovan-Parl.svg
PartyVotes%Seats+/–
Party of Action and Solidarity 792,55750.2055–8
Patriotic Electoral Bloc 381,98424.2026–6
Alternative Bloc 125,7067.968New
Our Party 97,8526.206+6
Democracy at Home Party 88,6795.626+6
European Social Democratic Party 15,0600.9500
Coalition for Unity and Welfare 13,3140.8400
Respect Moldova Movement 10,1440.6400
League of Cities and Communes  [ ro ]6,1200.3900
Together Bloc 5,0300.3200
National Moldovan Party 4,8130.3000
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 3,5760.2300
Moldovans Alliance 3,5090.2200
Christian-Social Union of Moldova 1,8370.1200
Alliance for the Union of Romanians 1,6040.1000
Liberal Party 1,5910.1000
New Historical Option 1,4120.0900
Unity of the Nation Bloc (endorsed PAS [a] )7970.0500
Independents [b] 23,1371.4700
Total1,578,722100.001010
Valid votes1,578,72298.08
Invalid/blank votes30,8571.92
Total votes1,609,579100.00
Registered voters/turnout3,080,86652.24
Source: CEC (see also; votes), Agora (seats)
  1. The BUN announced it had withdrawn from the election and endorsed PAS on 22 September, [72] presenting a withdrawal request on 24 September. [74] However, CEC vice president Pavel Postica stated the bloc did not withdraw officially and that its endorsement had only been a "political declaration", so the BUN remained on the ballot. [75]
  2. Andrei Năstase – 13,420, 0.85%; Olesea Stamate – 5,257, 0.33%; Victoria Sanduța – 2,862, 0.18%; Tatiana Crețu – 1,598, 0.10%

A significant part of the null votes were cast for the Greater Moldova Party (PMM), excluded two days before the election; these votes were not recorded separately, though they were not a majority of the null votes according to the CEC. [127] One vote cast for the party in Tokyo, Japan, was initially counted as valid as the corresponding polling station approved the results of its vote count before the CEC issued its decision to annul votes for the PMM due to the time difference between Moldova and Japan, with the vote later being annulled as well. [259]

Popular vote
PAS
50.20%
BEP
24.20%
BEA
7.96%
PN
6.20%
PPDA
5.62%
Others
5.83%
Parliamentary seats
PAS
54.46%
BEP
25.74%
BEA
7.92%
PN
5.94%
PPDA
5.94%

Results by administrative-territorial units

Territorial unitNr. of votesTurnout PAS BEP BA PN PPDA Others
Flag of Chisinau.svg Chișinău Municipality 370,16754.7252.6821.2614.484.122.494.97
Flag of Botanica.pngBotanica Sector 73,59053.7945.0227.1917.323.852.004.62
Flag of Buiucani.pngBuiucani Sector 54,59155.1653.9320.8714.473.932.074.73
Flag of Centru.pngCentru Sector 47,19157.4753.4920.9613.634.372.175.38
Flag of Ciocana.pngCiocana Sector 53,73053.7653.9520.6814.753.902.334.39
Flag of Rascani.pngRîșcani Sector 68,93055.3149.5024.8915.543.631.744.70
Flag of Chisinau.svg ↳ municipality suburbs72,13553.8161.1112.6910.944.994.345.93
Flag of Balti.png Bălți Municipality 49,21150.2326.5741.5110.9814.531.874.54
Flag of Anenii Noi District.gif Anenii Noi 30,57645.4547.2725.727.935.568.025.50
Flag of Basarabeasca District.png Basarabeasca 8,76438.0535.7542.246.724.327.053.2
Flag of Briceni.svg Briceni 22,57039.8327.0148.486.796.185.366.28
Flag of District Cahul.svg Cahul 39,82441.4944.3528.308.443.869.785.27
Flag of Cantemir District.gif Cantemir 17,75837.5252.8120.175.916.049.735.34
Rajon Calarasi flag.gif Călărași 25,09243.5459.3616.194.725.647.336.77
Flag of Causeni District.jpg Căușeni 29,58043.1249.5422.994.294.5912.256.34
Cimislia flag.png Cimișlia 18,74139.9951.0520.798.044.489.945.7
Drapel Raionul Criuleni.gif Criuleni 28,93950.8558.6214.355.595.587.488.38
Flag of Donduseni District.gif Dondușeni 14,60849.4425.2548.127.247.175.896.33
Drochia rajon flag.png Drochia 28,49644.7831.7429.858.3917.405.966.66
Dubasari District flag.svg Dubăsari 12,74145.0239.9431.2910.916.555.655.66
Steag raionul edinet.svg Edineț 26,08844.3627.5142.518.895.436.289.38
Rajon Falesti Flag.gif Fălești 30,87346.3830.5327.585.3623.434.548.56
Flag of Floresti.gif Florești 29,85345.7237.6828.608.079.746.899.02
Flag of Glodeni District.gif Glodeni 19,28844.2131.3731.0914.6613.005.194.69
Hincesti rajon flag.gif Hîncești 37,97940.3358.0213.855.925.049.897.28
Flag of Ialoveni District.gif Ialoveni 41,78049.1065.578.625.884.408.177.36
Leova rajon flag.png Leova 16,80041.4947.3220.724.554.0910.0213.3
Nisporeni rajon flag.gif Nisporeni 21,20941.2757.5611.074.707.258.7910.63
Ocnitar.gif Ocnița 17,00645.9620.6752.228.594.965.807.76
Orhei2.gif Orhei 42,68445.5347.4323.877.044.029.508.14
Flag of District Rezina.svg Rezina 16,68546.6047.0123.106.195.459.798.47
Riscani rajon flag.gif Rîșcani 22,96247.0129.9540.466.8011.294.956.55
Singerei rajon flag.gif Sîngerei 28,93943.6243.0527.305.4910.717.46.05
Flag of District Soroca.svg Soroca 33,18445.4537.7935.495.278.526.936.0
Straseni rajon flag.gif Strășeni 34,47746.5463.1212.974.586.406.706.23
Soldanesti rajon flag.gif Șoldănești 14,10547.0639.7925.574.177.7312.1310.61
Stefan voda rajon flag.gif Ștefan Vodă 22,67242.6747.0223.714.554.8310.109.77
Flag of Taraclia County.gif Taraclia 15,56547.696.1079.5110.510.690.722.47
TELENESTI DRAP.jpg Telenești 23,14944.4756.9314.254.084.569.9310.25
Flag of District Ungheni.svg Ungheni 39,23545.6842.8324.355.179.408.659.60
Flag of Gagauzia.svg UTA Gagauzia 57,14745.333.1982.3511.470.700.311.98
Flag of Moldova.svg Left Bank of the Dniester 12,01729.8951.028.912.922.364.9
Diaspora 277,96478.615.032.085.505.123.66
Total1,578,72852.2150.2024.177.966.205.625.85
Source: CEC

Analysis

Former defense minister Anatol Șalaru commented that the defeat of the pro-Russian parties in the election showed that the number of supporters of the "Russian world" in Moldova was decreasing, citing the example of Transnistria, where PAS obtained almost 30% of the vote. He stated that, while Russia "is always ready for any outcome", it wanted much more, it wanted a victory in Moldova after running out of victories in its invasion of Ukraine, "but little Moldova denied Russia of this, and they received a severe blow". Șalaru also asserted that Russia now had the problem of how to get rid of "expired" pro-Russian politicians that he said could no longer be "washed clean" and that Russia would need to look for new politicians and methods in Moldova. [260]

For his part, Moldovan political analyst Andrei Curăraru stated that the election represented a battle lost by Russia in its hybrid war against Moldova, that he thought the results were very close to what pro-Russian parties would have obtained without any external interference and that these parties lost in some areas of the country where they traditionally won, which would indicate that Moldovans were becoming more pro-European. He also highlighted the "high-quality work" of the Moldovan police, the SIS, the National Anti-Corruption Center (CNA) and the Office of the Prosecutor General (PG), which he said appeared to have deterred many people from selling their vote. [260]

In a NewsMaker article, Moldovan journalist Ecaterina Dubasova stated that one of the election's surprises was Alternative's unexpectedly modest result. The bloc, informally led by Chișinău mayor Ion Ceban, obtained 7.96% of the nationwide vote and 14.48% in Chișinău, being behind PAS and the Patriotic Bloc in the capital despite Ceban having won in the first round the city's mayoral election in 2023. Moldovan political analyst Victor Juc cited as a possible reason for the bloc's result that voters vote differently in presidential, parliamentary and local elections, with them voting for a manager in local elections and for a specific political project in parliamentary ones. Dubasova, Juc and political analyst Angela Colațchi also mentioned a lack of voter confidence in Ceban's pro-European orientation. [261] According to Curăraru, PAC–CC leader Mark Tkachuk contributed enormously by himself to the loss of potential pro-European voters for Alternative. [260] Following the election, there were several changes in Ceban's mayoral team, which experts believed, as described by Dubasova, could be related to Alternative's modest result in the parliamentary election. [261]

Aftermath

Dodon had claimed victory in the election before results even started coming in, thanking Moldovans for voting "in record numbers", calling on PAS to "leave power" and calling for his supporters to take to the street to defend his "victory" stating that "The citizens have voted. Their vote must be respected even if you don't like it." [117] As the results actually came in, it became apparent Dodon's Patriotic Electoral Bloc had lost. He again called for protests, this time outside parliament on 29 September at 12:00, alleging "falsifications" and calling for fresh elections. [262] [263] [117] Protesters were paid to attend the rally. [264] The protests were described as "modest" and "tightly policed" by the German Marshall Fund who concluded that it failed to "generate real momentum" against the election results. [265] Russian state media such as RIA Novosti prepared an "alternative narrative" within an hour of the results coming out, also alleging that Dodon had won. [266] [117] The Kremlin also accused the Moldovan government of disenfranchising hundreds of thousands of Moldovans by opening only two polling stations in Russia. [267]

On 30 September, Sandu stated that the measures taken by the Moldovan authorities to discourage vote buying in the election by the Shor group had worked, as far fewer votes had been bought compared to the 2024 EU referendum. [268] Later, at the 7th European Political Community Summit on 2 October, she stated that Russia had spent hundreds of millions of euros in the parliamentary election to fund parties illegally in Moldova, also stating that, in the past two years only, Russia had assisted in creating at least seven new parties in the country. [269]

On 3 October, the CEC sanctioned the Democracy at Home Party, which had won six seats, in response to complaints filed by PAS and the Moldovan police. The CEC's decision stated Democracy at Home had benefited from a promotional campaign on TikTok without declaring any expenses for online advertising, was illegally promoted by a foreign politician (George Simion from Romania), and constituted a "camouflaged electoral bloc" with the Alliance for the Union of Romanians party (which ran separately in the election). Democracy at Home leader Vasile Costiuc in response claimed the TikTok content was created and distributed for free by supporters. The CEC in its decision left it to the Constitutional Court of Moldova to decide whether to cancel the seats Democracy at Home won. [270] On October 16, the Court validated the entire election, including PPDA's 6 mandates. [271]

Reactions

International reactions

References

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