2024 Georgian parliamentary election

Last updated

2024 Georgian parliamentary election
Flag of Georgia.svg
  2020 26 October 20242028 

All 150 seats in Parliament
76 seats needed for a majority
Turnout58.94% (Increase2.svg 3.24pp) [1]
  Irakli Kobakhidze 2024b (cropped).jpg Coalition for Change (Georgia).png Tina Bokuchava at the Lelo office.jpg
Leader Irakli Kobakhidze Nika Gvaramia
Nika Melia
Zurab Japaridze
Elene Khoshtaria
Tina Bokuchava
Alliance GD [a] CfC Unity–NM
Leader since8 February 20249 July 20248 July 2024
Last election902 [b] 39 [c]
Seats before83125
Seats won891916
Seat changeDecrease2.svg 1Increase2.svg 17Decrease2.svg 23
Popular vote1,120,053229,161211,216
Percentage53.93%11.03%10.17%
SwingIncrease2.svg 5.71%NewDecrease2.svg 23.95%

  Mamuka Khazaradze 2013.png Giorgi Gakharia 2021 (cropped).jpg
Leader Mamuka Khazaradze Giorgi Gakharia
Alliance Strong Georgia FG [d]
Leader since17 July 202429 May 2021
Last election6 [e] Did not exist
Seats before56
Seats won1412
Seat changeIncrease2.svg 8Increase2.svg 12
Popular vote182,922161,521
Percentage8.81%7.78%
SwingIncrease2.svg 4.33%New

Georgian Parliamentary Election results, October 2024.svg
Composition of the Georgian Parliament after the election:
  Georgian Dream: 89 seats
  Coalition for Change: 19 seats
  Unity – National Movement: 16 seats
  Strong Georgia: 14 seats
  For Georgia: 12 seats

Prime Minister before election

Irakli Kobakhidze
Georgian Dream

Elected Prime Minister

TBD

Parliamentary elections were held in Georgia on 26 October 2024. [2] [3] [4] The elections were held under the rules passed in 2017 through the constitutional amendments which shifted the electoral system towards a fully proportional representation with a 5% electoral threshold. [5] The ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party sought to win its fourth term in office. Its founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili—an influential oligarch and former prime minister often regarded as the country's éminence grise following his official departure from politics in 2021—returned to politics several months before the polls to lead GD in the elections. [6]

Contents

In its campaign, the Georgian Dream promoted the Global War Party conspiracy theory, promising "safeguarding peace" through a "pragmatic policy" with Russia amid the war in Ukraine; [7] [8] [9] [10] socially conservative policies, particularly the recent "LGBT propaganda law" and strengthening status of Georgian Orthodox Church in the constitution, [11] outlawing most major opposition parties; [12] [13] [14] joining the European Union whilst "playing by Georgian rules"; [15] and restoring the country's territorial integrity, with Ivanishvili making overtures to the Kremlin, and calling for an apology for Georgia's role in the 2008 war. [16] [17]

During the pre-election period, the opponents of GD have focused on criticizing what they describe as pro-Russian shift of the party and its unwillingness to fulfill the criteria set by the European Commission for EU accession, campaigning for the European integration. [7] [18] [19] The election was preceded by the 2023–2024 Georgian protests over controversial legislation requiring organizations receiving foreign funding to register as "foreign agents", sparking accusations of authoritarianism. [20] [21] This law has strained relations with the West; the European Union and the United States initiated a variety of measures against the law, including U.S. visa designations and financial sanctions against several Georgian officials, [22] de facto freezing Georgia's European Union membership candidate status, [23] [24] and proposed U.S. Congress MEGOBARI Act and the Georgian People's Act. [25] [26] However, these measures have also been criticized by some as interference in Georgia's internal affairs by the US and EU in order to protect the large network of Western-funded NGOs in Georgia. [32]

Based on preliminary results published by Central Election Commission of Georgia, Georgian Dream declared victory in the election with more than 53% of the vote, while the four major opposition coalitions—which agreed not to cooperate with Georgian Dream in the parliament through their Georgian Charter—received 37.79% in total. Georgian Dream posted the highest results in rural areas, particularly in the Samtskhe-Javakheti, Kvemo Kartli, Svaneti, Racha-Lechkhumi, Guria, and Adjara regions, but lost the capital Tbilisi and also Rustavi to the opposition, while only closely winning other major cities. In the capital, GD received 42% of the vote, while the four major opposition coalitions combined received 46%; the smaller libertarian Girchi party won 5.3%. Georgian Dream also dramatically lost to the opposition among the Georgian diaspora. [33]

The four major opposition coalitions and President Salome Zourabichvili claimed that the elections were marred with reported instances of vote-buying and ballot-box stuffing, as well as intimidation and pressure on voters. They accused Georgian Dream of "stealing the election", with Zourabichvili refusing to recognize the official results, which she called "illegitimate". [34] [33] The opposition announced that it was going to boycott the new parliament. [35] The European Union and the United States have called for an investigation into these allegations, with the ambassador of the European Union to Georgia Paweł Herczyński stating that "international observers have not declared the elections to be free and fair. Neither have they declared the contrary". [36] On 30 October, the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia launched investigation into the election fraud allegations. [37]

Background

Political context

By the time of the elections, Georgian Dream had been the ruling party in Georgia since defeating Mikheil Saakashvili's United National Movement (UNM) in the 2012 parliamentary election. Announcing its plans to pursue a policy of joining the European Union and NATO, Georgian Dream has also professed a more conciliatory approach towards Russia compared to its anti-Russian opponents; [38] however, the geopolitical strain of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict have made it more difficult to maintain a balancing act, amid statements from Ukrainian politicians that Georgia would have "greatly aided" Ukraine by opening a "second front" against Russia [39] and Western efforts to isolate Russia with international sanctions. [40]

During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Georgian government condemned Russian actions and provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, but did not join sanctions against Russia, which allowed an influx of Russian capital and highly skilled Russians dodging military mobilization. [41] In turn, Russia did not approve the proposal of Georgia's breakaway de facto South Ossetian republic to hold a referendum on joining the Russian Federation, [42] and despite otherwise hostile relations has not put Georgia on its unfriendly countries list. [43]

On 25 February 2022, large protests took place in front of the Georgian parliament in Tbilisi, lasting for six consecutive days to show solidarity with Ukraine. The demonstration took on an anti-government tone, reflecting growing frustration with the Georgian authorities' allegedly inadequate response to Russian invasion. [44] [45] [46] Elene Khoshtaria, leader of the Droa party, addressed the crowd, demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili and his administration. She called for immediate and effective actions to support Ukraine, such as closing the sky to Russia, and urged Georgia to apply for EU membership. [47]

Protesters in Tbilisi condemn the Georgian government's allegedly insufficient support for Ukraine. Ukraine solidarity protests in Tbilisi, Georgia 26.02.2022 16.jpg
Protesters in Tbilisi condemn the Georgian government's allegedly insufficient support for Ukraine.

The rally also underscored dissatisfaction with the government's handling of the crisis. Protesters were angered by obstacles created for volunteers and the government's refusal to join Western sanctions against Russia. [48] On 28 February, Georgian authorities did not give landing permission to a Ukrainian charter sent to transport Georgian volunteers from Georgia to Ukraine. [49] Georgian Dream's leader Mamuka Mdinaradze said that Georgia could not send volunteers to Ukraine because Georgia was in vulnerable position and it would risk a war with Russia. [50] In response, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy decided to recall Ukraine's ambassador to Georgia. [51] Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili also announced that Georgia would not join Western sanctions against Russia because it would harm the Georgian economy more than it would hurt Russia, fueling the rising anti-government sentiment in the protests. [52] Garibashvili also noted that neither the West nor Ukraine imposed sanctions on Russia during or after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and even continued "business as usual", including a Russian reset, while Georgia was being asked to sacrifice itself and "destroy its economy". [53]

In June 2022, the European Union refused to approve Georgia's application to join the union, citing alleged media censorship and the government's refusal to join international sanctions against Russia. [54] This led to mobilization by the opposition against the government. [55] In turn, the sovereignist faction People's Power broke away from Georgian Dream in August 2022, and proposed legislation to regulate foreign influence by creating a special registry to monitor politically active foreign-funded organizations, many of which are Western-funded. [56] [57] While the government claimed that the bill was necessary for public disclosure and transparency, the opposition, aided by the statements of Western embassies and politicians, managed to mobilize protests to tackle the bill, likening it to Russian foreign agent law and saying that it would have jeopardized Euro-Atlantic integration, ultimately leading to the parliament withdrawing the bill. [58]

On 8 March 2023, tens of thousands of people gathered in front of the Parliament, demanding a halt to further discussions on the law. Opposition leader Giorgi Vashadze issued an ultimatum, calling for the rejection of the bills and the release of those detained during the protests. [59] Amid protests in Tbilisi, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement, cautioning against the violent change of power in Georgia, [60] with some Russian politicians suggesting Russia might use military means in case of "instability on the Russian border". In September 2023, the State Security Service of Georgia claimed to have uncovered plans of the opposition and the Western-funded groups to stage a coup in Georgia with the support of Ukraine-based Georgian oppositionist politicians. [61] [62] This in turn led to the pro-Russian Georgian opposition Conservative Movement party and the TV channel Alt-Info starting to mobilize an "Anti-Maidan movement" to counter the alleged coup. [63]

A banner reads "Yes to Europe" in bold letters Tbilisi - Yes to Europe, No to Russian Law 28 April 2024 (2).jpg
A banner reads "Yes to Europe" in bold letters

However, in December 2023, the European Union decided to grant Georgia candidate status following the release from prison of opposition journalist Nika Gvaramia, who had been arrested on charges of abuse of power and embezzlement, and the parliament's decision to turn down impeachment proceedings against pro-opposition president Salome Zourabichvili. [64] [65] [66] In late December 2023, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili summarized the year by saying that the government had managed to "preserve the peace" amid the threat of destabilization caused by "radical groups and hostile forces operating within the country", [67] and also to secure EU candidate status for Georgia. [68]

In early 2024, Georgia again experienced a significant political crisis and public unrest due to the reintroduction of the "foreign agent" law, which many citizens perceived as a threat to civil liberties and democratic principles. The leader of the parliamentary majority, Mamuka Mdinaradze, said that the reason for reintroduction of the bill was the continued circulation of slush funds in the country through non-governmental organizations and covert foreign financing of political activities. [69] On 8 April, the Bureau of the Parliament of Georgia registered the bill for the parliamentary discussions. [70] Critics said that the law, requiring organizations and individuals receiving foreign funding to register as "organizations carrying the interests of a foreign power," was a measure to stifle dissent and limit the activities of NGOs and independent media. Protests erupted across the country, with demonstrators calling for the repeal of the law and the "protection of democratic freedoms". The government's response to the protests varied, with some efforts to engage in dialogue, while many instances of police violence were reported. [20] [71] [21]

Bidzina Ivanishvili addressing a rally supporting the Georgian Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, 29 April 2024 Georgian Dream pro-"foreign agent law" rally, Tbilisi, 29 April 2024 (4).jpg
Bidzina Ivanishvili addressing a rally supporting the Georgian Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, 29 April 2024

On 11 May, a record-breaking protest rally took place, widely regarded as the largest in Georgian history. Despite the rain, tens of thousands gathered at four key locations in Tbilisi: First Republic Square, Marjanishvili Metro, 300 Aragveli Metro, and Tsereteli Avenue. Demonstrators marched along both banks of the Kura, with the four streams of protesters converging symbolically at Europe Square in Metekhi to celebrate Europe Day. Estimates suggest that at least 169,000 people participated, with some reports indicating peak numbers of up to 200,000 or even 300,000. [72] [73] [74]

The widespread opposition to the law underscored deep-seated concerns about the future of democracy and human rights in Georgia. [75] Protesters and other critics, including the European Union and Western countries, spoke out against the bill, arguing that it would stifle democracy and freedom of the press in Georgia and comparing it to the Russian foreign agent law. [76] European Union and the United States officials have been vocal in their opposition to the bill, considering that "Georgia does not need this law" and that its passage despite repeated calls from the EU "to retract such legislation" was unacceptable. [77] [78] [79] [80] Proponents of the bill denied this characterization, claiming it would ensure transparency of foreign funding and protect Georgia's sovereignty from malign foreign influence. People's Power has argued that the law would protect democracy and the sovereignty of Georgia from foreign interference through financing of NGOs with a goal of promotion of foreign agendas. [81] [82] Some have also criticized the European Union and the United States for interfering in Georgia's internal affairs and undermining its sovereign power to pass its own laws, and blackmailing Georgia with European Union candidate status and US sanctions in order to maintain their right to interfere into Georgia's sovereign ability through "unlimited" and "undisclosed" foreign funding of NGOs. [29] [30] They have also emphasized that local NGOs should be grassroots rather than reliant on foreign funding. [30]

Hundreds of protesters obstructing traffic at Heroes Square 2024 Georgian Protests, May 2 a.jpg
Hundreds of protesters obstructing traffic at Heroes Square

In August 2024, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze said that he expected the elections to be held against the backdrop of "unprecedented" and "disruptive" foreign interference. [83] His expectation was also shared by the Speaker of Parliament Shalva Papuashvili, who cited the Danish government-sponsored "Festival of Democracy" event, organized by the non-profit organization Eastern European Centre for Multiparty Democracy in Telavi, presenting banners demanding the release of Mikheil Saakashvili from prison. He said that foreign funding was funneled into Georgian politics for the purpose of election campaigning in favor of the radical opposition parties against the ruling party. [84]

On 5 October, President Salome Zourabichvili announced in an interview that she has a candidate in mind for the position of Prime Minister if the creation of a coalition government becomes relevant. She noted that the Georgian Charter requires the Prime Minister to be selected in consultation with the President. While she did not disclose the candidate's identity, Zourabichvili emphasized that the person has no political background, which she believes is important for building public trust and reducing political polarization. She also mentioned that she will soon begin negotiations with opposition parties that signed the charter. [85] [86] A day later, Shalva Papuashvili, during a briefing, revealed that the impeachment procedure against the president would be re-initiated. He cited her foreign visits without government permission, including trips to France, Germany, and Poland last week, as one of the reasons for the move. [87]

On 20 October 2024, thousands of Georgians gathered in Tbilisi for a pro-European rally, just days before the elections. Demonstrators, carrying Georgian and EU flags, converged at Freedom Square after marching from five different locations across the city. The crowd chanted the national anthem and sang the EU anthem, Ode to Joy , while holding banners with messages like "Georgia chooses the European Union". [88] [89] The rally was attended by an estimated 90,000 to 100,000 people. [90]

Zourabichvili joined the rally at Freedom Square, where she reaffirmed Georgia's commitment to joining the EU. In her speech, she expressed solidarity with Ukraine and Moldova, directly addressing their leaders, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Maia Sandu. Zourabichvili praised Sandu's leadership, endorsing her re-election bid and wishing for pro-European outcomes in the upcoming referendum. She commended Sandu for successfully guiding Moldova on its European path. Additionally, Zourabichvili extended her support to Zelenskyy, emphasizing that his fight against Russia is not only for Ukraine but also for Georgia, as both nations face shared Russian aggression. In conclusion, she urged Georgia's European and American partners to recognize the country's unwavering commitment to a European future, declaring that Georgia is already a winner on its path towards EU integration. [91]

Georgian Charter

On 26 May 2024, In response to the 2023–2024 protests, President Salome Zourabichvili introduced the Georgian Charter, an action plan aimed at "fostering unity among opposition parties ahead of the parliamentary elections". The Charter, announced during Georgia's Independence Day celebrations, seeks to create a platform for the opposition to present a unified stance. Zourabichvili's proposal emphasizes a new electoral format where voters will choose between the ruling party and a coalition of opposition parties. The plan includes forming a temporary government post-elections to implement key reforms intended to "enhance democratic processes and align Georgia more closely with European standards", after which new elections will be held. The Charter's main goals include repealing laws that the opposition considers as hindrances to European integration and undertaking significant judicial and electoral reforms to ensure "a fair and democratic process". [92] [93] [94]

The president emphasized that the October parliamentary elections should focused on the question of "what direction the country should take rather than which individuals or parties should be elected". She stated that the 2024 elections will effectively act as a referendum on whether Georgia seeks closer integration with Europe. [95] So far 17 political parties from the opposition, including UNM, Strategy Aghmashenebeli, Ahali, Lelo, European Georgia, Girchi – More Freedom, Droa, Citizens, For Georgia, [96] For the People, the Republican Party, the Greens Party of Georgia, For Justice, European Democrats, Law and Justice, Tavisupleba, State for the People and the National Democratic Party, as well as 5 individual MPs have signed the Georgian Charter presented by the president. [97] [98] [99]

Some opposition parties refused to sign the agreement. Girchi has praised Zourabichvili's initiative for attempting to bring opposition together, nevertheless, they criticized her for not taking their opinions into consideration and refused to sign it. [100] [101] Initially the For Georgia party also did not join the agreement, saying that they supported the reforms outlined in the charter, however, they said that talking about forming a temporary government post-elections was damaging to the pre-election process; [102] however, For Georgia later reversed its decision and signed the Charter. [103]

The ruling party MP Nino Tsilosani alleged that the opposition parties did not sign the agreement independently but were "influenced by Western embassies". [104]

Parties and coalitions

There was a split within the largest opposition United National Movement party months prior to the elections. [105] In January 2023, Levan Khabeishvili unseated Nika Melia from the position of United National Movement chairman after winning internal party elections. Accusing Khabeishvili of being a protégé of shadowy businessman Davit Kezerashvili, Melia announced a break with the UNM and plans for his own party in December 2023. [106] On 11 March 2024, Melia announced the formation of Ahali party. He was joined by Nika Gvaramia, another former UNM member and founder of pro-opposition Mtavari Arkhi TV. [107] On 8 June, Tinatin Bokuchava became chair of the United National Movement, succeeding Khabeishvili, who resigned due to health complications. [108]

On 20 July 2023, the United National Movement announced an alliance with Strategy Aghmashenebeli of Giorgi Vashadze. [109] According to Khabeishvili, the coalition, named "Victory Platform", will center around former president Mikheil Saakashvili. Imprisoned on charges of abuse of power and violence, Saakashvili will lead his party in the election from prison. [110] On 30 December 2023, Bidzina Ivanishvili, a founder of Georgian Dream, announced his return to politics as honorary chairman of Georgian Dream, suggesting he would play an active role in the election campaign. [6] On 8 February 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze was confirmed by the parliament as the new Prime Minister from the ruling Georgian Dream party. [111] In March 2024, the People's Power movement was registered as a political party, and is expected to participate in the election. [112] On 11 April, the Public Registry revoked the registration of the Conservative Movement party, banning it from participating in the election. In June 2024, it was announced that the party would merge with the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia and run together in the election. [113] [114]

On 8 July, the Chair of the United National Movement, Tina Bokuchava, announced a new political platform named "Unity – to Save Georgia". This platform aims to bring together the United National Movement, Strategy Agmashenebeli — two parties that have been in "Victory Platform" coalition for a year already — as well as representatives from other parties, civil society, and academia. The new platform will use the UNM ballot number 5 in the upcoming elections. [115] On 9 July, three opposition parties, Ahali, Girchi – More Freedom, and Droa, announced their decision to post a joint election list for the Parliamentary elections in October. The leaders mentioned that an expected alliance with another party, Lelo, did not materialize due to "minor differences". [116] Subsequently, this alliance was renamed to "Coalition for Change". [117] On 18 August, the Republican Party and the youth organization of Georgian Azerbaijanis "Activists for the Future" joined the coalition. [118] [119] [120]

On 24 June 2024, the leader of Alliance of Patriots of Georgia, Irma Inashvili announced that ten conservative parties and civic organizations signed the "Declaration of Unity of the Patriots of Georgia," starting a coalition aimed at unifying traditionalist forces to promote a conservative agenda in the next parliament. The declaration invited all individuals who shared this worldview to join, fostering inclusivity while critiquing the dominant narratives of the GD and the UNM, which have "marginalized conservative voices." Its primary goal is to ensure robust representation of conservative values and interests in the Georgian Parliament. [121] [122] [123] On 10 July, it was reported that several parties would run under the banner of Alliance of Patriots alongside Conservative Movement/Alt Info to foster a joint electoral efforts: Georgian Idea, Georgian Mission, Conservative-Monarchist Party, Christian-Democratic Movement, and National Unit. [124] On 16 July, Mamuka Mdinaradze, Executive Secretary of Georgian Dream, announced during his speech at the opening of the election campaign and the new central office of Georgian Dream that People's Power will participate in the parliamentary elections with a common list alongside the ruling Georgian Dream party. [125] [126] On 17 July, Lelo for Georgia, For the People, and the political movement Freedom Square announced their unification under a single electoral list for the upcoming elections. [127] Subsequently, this alliance was renamed to "Strong Georgia". Later in August, the Citizens party also joined the alliance. [128]

On 1 August, a majority of the European Georgia electoral list, chosen during the party's internal primary election, left the party, including key figures Giga Bokeria and Tamar Chergoleishvili. The split arose from disagreements with other key figures, Gigi Tsereteli and Akaki Bobokhidze over the primary results. [129] [130] Later on 15 August, the members who left European Georgia formally established a new party called the Federalists. [131] [132] 2 days later European Georgia, in an announcement with the Unity coalition, announced that it would be running on a joint list with the UNM and Strategy Aghmashenebeli. [133] On 25 September the Federalists confirmed that they will not participate in the elections, as they were late in registering the party. Despite this, the party called on its supporters to remain engaged and vote against the Georgian Dream. [134] The Central Election Commission of Georgia refused to register European Socialists, Union of Georgian Traditionalists and Generations for Georgia parties, citing their failure to comply with the legislative requirement to present signatures of 25 thousands voters for the registration. Along with them, 8 other parties were refused registration. Therefore, they will not take part in the elections. [135] Ilia Injia, the son of European Socialists leader Fridon Injia became a Georgian Dream candidate. [136]

At a special briefing on 16 September, Salome Zourabichvili emphasized the need for a "positive, third center" to provide opposition-leaning and undecided voters with a clearer choice and announced the forthcoming coalition of two major opposition forces: Strong Georgia and ex-Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia's For Georgia. [137] She expressed her support for their readiness to unite and invited them to the Orbeliani Palace on 17 September to complete the final steps of the negotiations. Zourabichvili concluded by asserting, "I am confident that this is what society expects from you." [138] [139] The Georgian Dream MP Giorgi Kakhiani accused the President of allegedly showing her political sympathies towards these parties with her invitation, which he claimed was a violation of the Georgian constitution requiring the President to be neutral. [140] The following day, after a meeting at the presidential administration, Khazaradze acknowledged that while some issues persist, including questions regarding the events of 20 June 2019, [141] and the Anaklia Sea Port project, he and Gakharia are united in their goal to oust the ruling Georgian Dream party. Khazaradze emphasized the critical need for the country to decide between a path aligned with Russia or a future integrated with Europe. [142]

Gakharia mentioned that Khazaradze had requested additional time to clarify his stance, indicating that negotiations were still ongoing. Gakharia reaffirmed his party's commitment to prioritizing Georgia's democratic path. He expressed gratitude to president Salome Zourabichvili for facilitating the dialogue and highlighted the upcoming elections as crucial in preventing any single party from dominating Georgian politics. [143] [144] [145] On 19 September, For Georgia announced via Facebook that the negotiations collapsed, [146] citing internal disagreements within Strong Georgia. However, Mamuka Khazaradze, refuted this claim, saying Strong Georgia was ready to sign the deal but was waiting for the president's invitation to finalize it. The alliance was intended to challenge the dominance of the ruling Georgian Dream party and the opposition UNM, potentially attracting hesitant voters. Despite this, disagreements, particularly over the former prime minister's controversial past and issues of equal representation on the joint party list, led to the breakdown. [147] On 25 September, Strong Georgia announced that former President Giorgi Margvelashvili had joined their coalition. [148] Overall, 27 parties were registered for the October elections. [149] On voting day, Zourabichvili expressed hope that the election would bring an end to "one-party rule in Georgia". [150]

List of major coalitions or political parties

List of major parties and coalitions which take part in the election.

#Party/CoalitionConstituent partiesLeadersLast election (2020)Ideology
41GD Georgian Dream Georgian Dream
People's Power
Irakli Kobakhidze GD: 48.22%
PP: N/A
Populism, Conservatism, Soft Euroscepticism
5U–NM Unity – National Movement United National Movement
Strategy Aghmashenebeli
European Georgia
Tinatin Bokuchava UNM: 27.18% [f]
SA: 3.15%
EG: 3.79%
Liberal conservatism, Pro-Europeanism
4CC Coalition for Change Ahali
Girchi – More Freedom
Droa
Republican Party
Nika Gvaramia
Nika Melia
Zurab Japaridze
Elene Khoshtaria
Ahali: N/A
G–MF: N/A
Droa: N/A
Republicans: N/A
Liberalism, Libertarianism, Pro-Europeanism
25FG For Georgia For Georgia
Conservative Party [151]
Giorgi Gakharia FG: N/A
CPG: 0.16%
Social democracy, Technocracy, Pro-Europeanism
9SG Strong Georgia Lelo for Georgia
For the People
Citizens
Freedom Square
Mamuka Khazaradze Lelo: 3.15%
FP: N/A
Citizens: 1.33%
FS: N/A
Liberalism, Social democracy, Pro-Europeanism

List of minor coalitions or political parties

List of minor parties and coalitions which take part in the election as of the 2 October. [152]

#Party/CoalitionConstituent partiesLeadersLast electionIdeology
3Party of Georgian Unity and DevelopmentKamal Muradkhanovi
6EG European Democrats Paata DavitaiaPro-Europeanism
8APG Alliance of Patriots Alliance of Patriots
Conservative Movement/Alt-Info
Georgian Idea
Christian-Democratic Movement [124]
Irma Inashvili
Davit Tarkhan Mouravi
APG: 3.14
CM/Alt-Info: N/A
GI: 0.43%
CDM: N/A
National conservatism, Right-wing populism, Hard Euroscepticism, Russophilia
10GLP Georgian Labor Party Shalva Natelashvili 1.00%Social Democracy, Pro-Europeanism
12Our United GeorgiaIsaki Giorgadze Reformism
13Social Democratic Party of GeorgiaAvtandil Veltauri Social democracy
16Change GeorgiaGiorgi Gagnidze0.07%Populism
17GeorgiaGiorgi Liluashvili0.06%
20FG Free Georgia Kakha Kukava 0.33%National conservatism
21TribunaDavit Tchitchinadze0.14%Left-wing populism
23C Chven Vacant [153] Pro-Europeanism
26Left AllianceKonstantine GugushviliLeft-wing nationalism
27Georgian UnityGaioz MamaladzeNationalism
36NPC-Girchi New Political Centre - Girchi Iago Khvichia 2.89%Libertarianism

Campaign and party programmes

Georgian Dream

The ruling Georgian Dream party officially announced starting a pre-election campaign on 21 August 2024. [154] The first campaign event was launched in the Georgian town of Mtskheta on 22 August, [155] with others following in Ambrolauri, [156] Ozurgeti, Akhaltsikhe, Gori, Telavi, and other regions. [157] The campaign events culminated on 23 October in Tbilisi. [158] During the campaign events of Georgian Dream, Bidzina Ivanishvili, Irakli Kobakhidze, Mamuka Mdinaradze and its other leaders gave speeches in front of public. [159] [160] Prior to officially launching its campaign, on 20 August, the Political Council of Georgian Dream issued a statement, saying that the election would be a referendum on "on war vs. peace, traditional values vs. moral degradation, subservience to external powers vs. an independent and sovereign state". The party urged its supporters to "put everything aside and come out to vote", emphasizing the need for the ruling party to secure a constitutional majority in the election to implement its long-term goals. The party presented the objectives for which it would use the constitutional majority, which became the main campaign issues of the party. [161]

The Georgian Dream pledged to ban the "collective United National Movement", a term used by it to describe the former ruling United National Movement party and other parties which have signed the Georgian Charter with the UNM, envisaging a united strategy to form a coalition government to oust the Georgian Dream from power. The Georgian Dream accused the United National Movement of various "crimes against the Georgian people" during its rule, including "pushing Georgia into the war with Russia in 2008" and seeking to embroil Georgia into a "second front" of the Russo-Ukrainian War. According to the statement, the existence of the "collective UNM", "which is entirely controlled from outside and is constantly engaged in hostility towards the state", makes the healthy democratic process and alteration of political forces "impossible". [161] Later Ivanishvili described the "Collective UNM" as a "severe disease" that has plagued the country for two decades. He asserted that the constitutional majority would enable legal action to ban "the UNM and its affiliated parties", citing legal grounds for such a move and comparing it to "Nuremberg Trials". [162] He further called the UNM "foreign agents who are engaged in anti-state activities". According to Ivanishvili, only when Georgia would replace the "Collective UNM" with the "patriotic political forces", it would be able to conduct "truly healthy elections". [162] Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze clarified that Georgian Dream intends to ban the Unity – National Movement (UNM, European Georgia – Movement for Liberty, and Strategy Aghmashenebeli), Coalition for Change (Ahali, Girchi – More Freedom, Droa, and Republican Party), Strong Georgia (Lelo, For the People, Freedom Square, and Citizens) alliances, and the For Georgia party founded by former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia. Kobakhidze accused these parties of aligning with the United National Movement and called for criminal investigations particularly against figures like Mamuka Khazaradze of Lelo. [163] [164] Kobakhidze stated the prohibition of political parties is considered a democratic process when there is a legal basis for it. He argued that in a democratic state, such actions are justifiable. Kobakhidze noted that political parties have been banned in Ukraine and Moldova, and similar measures have received positive evaluations from the EU. [165]

On 14 September, during the campaign event in Gori, Ivanishvili blamed the United National Movement for provoking the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and called it the "worst crime committed by them". Ivanishvili accused the UNM of committing "many atrocities" which he claimed were proved by evidences. Ivanishvili claimed that the 2008 war was "a well-planned provocation from the outside against the Georgian and Ossetian people, the purpose of which was to split unity, destroy relations and make them exist in conditions of endless, artificial confrontation". He stated that the 2008 war was "ordered from outside" and executed by the "stateless agents". He pledged to hold the "Nuremberg trials" for the UNM and also said that Georgia would need to apologize to the Ossetian people for "the flames of fire in which our Ossetian brothers and sisters were enveloped by the traitorous National Movement in 2008". He said that only Georgian Dream could ensure reconciliation with the Ossetian people. [166] [167] [168] These statements of Ivansihvili proved to be particularly controversial among the public. [179]

The second objective presented by the Georgian Dream party envisaged a further push to adopt the Protection of Family Values and Minors bill, which the party had already initiated in the Georgian Parliament. The bill, intended to ban the "LGBT propaganda", has been justified by the ruling party by a necessity of preventing the spread of "pseudo-liberal ideology" into Georgia from outside. [161] The bill was paired with the Georgian Dream's promise to protect the traditional values of the country. Mamuka Mdinaradze, executive secretary of the Georgian Dream, emphasized the necessity of maintaining peace, working to restore territorial integrity, and preserving traditional values and independence. He emphasized that only Georgian Dream was capable of preserving peace with Russia, and at the same time pushing for the country's European integration. Mdinaradze also emphasized the importance of traditional values and Christianity for the Georgian identity. Ultimately, he framed the party's campaign promises as "surviving physically and surviving spiritually". [180] [181] On 28 September, during his campaign speech in Telavi towards Kakhetians, Ivanishvili further accused the UNM of trying to alienate Georgia from its national values. In particular, Ivanishvili highlighted the "UNM's attack on Georgian viniculture", which he described as a part of Georgian national identity. On the other hand, he claimed that the Georgian Dream implemented state programs to restore the viniculture, winemaking industry and traditional Russian market. [182] Speaker of Georgian parliament Shalva Papuashvili stated that the Georgia's integration into the European Union should be paired with the respect for the Georgian traditional values, with him calling Georgia "one of the first cradles of European civilization" as "the co-creators of the fact that agriculture, viticulture, Christian faith were woven into the European identity". [183]

The third objective outlined by the ruling party revolved around reintegrating Georgia's Russian-backed separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to the Georgian Dream's statement, given the "dynamic development of events", Georgia might get a chance to "peacefully restore" its territorial integrity at "any time", therefore, "it will be necessary to amend the Constitution of Georgia to bring Georgia's governance system and territorial state structure in line with the new reality". According to the ruling party, the "externally-controlled anti-state" opposition parties would not be willing to support the restoration of territorial integrity, therefore, it would be necessary for the ruling party to hold constitutional majority. [161] [184] There has also been a fourth issue related to "protecting Georgia's identity and national values", however, the statement said that the issue was still under discussion within the ruling party. [161] Later Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of the Georgian Dream, elaborated that the issue was related to "faith", with several observers speculating on a plan to make the Orthodox Christianity a state religion in Georgia. [161] [185] It was later confirmed that the proposed amendment would focuse on designating Orthodox Christianity as the state religion. The ruling party branded this initiative as part of their commitment to uphold "national values and traditions," in line with their campaign promises to ban "LGBT propaganda" and reinforce the role of the Church. [186] In contrast, the Georgian Orthodox Church has expressed skepticism, fearing that such a change could compromise its independence and increase government control. High-ranking clergy members, including Metropolitan Shio Mujiri and Metropolitan Nikoloz Pachuashvili, have raised concerns about the potential implications of this proposal, arguing that it could alter the traditionally independent yet cooperative relationship between the state and the Church established by the 2002 Concordat. [187] After the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) turned down the ruling party's proposal on declaring the GOC as the state religion in Georgia, on 31 August, during the campaign rally speech in Ozurgeti, Bidzina Ivanishvili once again addressed the issue. He confirmed the ongoing discussions between the Georgian Orthodox Church and the ruling party on the constitutional status of the Georgian Orthodox Church. He said that the proposed amendment by the ruling party would clarify the Orthodox Christianity as the "pillar of the Georgian statehood" and emphasize its role in the country's history and present. [11]

Unity — National Movement

Billboard and bus advertisements of the UNM-led political coalition Unity - National Movement Unity - National Movement advertisements.jpg
Billboard and bus advertisements of the UNM-led political coalition Unity - National Movement

In early January 2022, it was revealed that imprisoned former president and leader of United National Movement (UNM), Mikheil Saakashvili, was working on a 9-point economic plan with the UNM economist Roman Gotsiridze. [188] [189]

On 10 January, Saakashvili announced that the plan was completed and soon to be presented to the public. [190] The Saakashvili plan was ultimately released on 3 February. The plan outlined nine theses for economic development: judicial reform, English law, arbitration, decriminalization of economic crimes; de-oligarchization; energy development; elimination of bureaucracy and irrelevant spending; a single tax principle; Infrastructure and transport development; construction of the planned city of Lazika, agricultural development and "Georgian silicon valley". [191] [192] It focused on deregulation, digitalization of public services, reducing corruption in the court system, democratic development, Small government, the non-interventionism in the economics and protection of the private property as the means of attracting foreign investments to stimulate the economic growth. [193]

The plan envisaged the creation of the constitutional commission on the judiciary reform, decreasing time frames for case review, and limiting corruption. It called for the unrestricted application of the English law in Georgia on the commercial matters, expansion of the application of private arbitrate, and decriminalization of economic crimes. [193] The plan outlined deoligarchization as one of its main goals and proposed to ban the individuals owning more than 5% of Georgia's GDP from joining, founding or funding political parties. [193]

Tina Bokuchava presents "5 priorities" during the campaign event in Kvareli. Tina Bokuchava.jpg
Tina Bokuchava presents "5 priorities" during the campaign event in Kvareli.

The plan envisaged Georgia's economic development model as largely infrastructure-driven. In particular, the plan focused on building new hydro power plants, railways, and airports in Georgia, for the country to become a "regional logistical and transport hub". It named the bitcoins as a major problem, citing the "Abkhaz and Georgian clans" over-exploiting electricity, and the lack of accountability. [193]

The Saakashvili plan called for outsourcing large parts of public services to the private sector and gradual downsizing of public sector. It also revived the idea of building the new Lazika city within the planned time frame of 10 years, presenting it as a future "financial capital" of the country. For the Georgian agricultural sector, Saakashvili stated that bringing new technologies from abroad would be the only viable path for the development, and also supported the idea of cutting subsidies to some sectors, which he claimed would actually stimulate more entrepreneurship and growth. The plan called for "agricultural insurance system" to be devised by the government for stimulating agricultural development. [193] Citing Belarus, Saakashvili presented "Georgian silicon valley" as a new project. He called for Rustavi or some other city close to Tbilisi to become a "tax-free zone" and privatization of enterprises there for symbolic prices with the investment obligations. [193]

On 4 September 2024, the chairman of the UNM Tina Bokuchava presented "5 priorities" of her party and coalition partners during the campaign event in Kvareli: European integration, increasing average income, increasing pension, strengthening Georgian families and breaking up monopolies. In foreign policy, the coalition promised opening accession negotiations with the European Union, negotiating free trade and visa liberalization agreements with the United States and scrapping Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence. In terms of internal policy, Bokuchava promised free school meals, free housing for students and cancelling pension loans. [194]

The Unity – National Movement prioritizes securing Georgia's membership in the European Union. Together with its coalition partners, the party plans to initiate EU accession talks immediately after winning the election, unlocking access to Georgia's "14 billion euro European fund". Additionally, the party commits to signing a free trade agreement with the United States and securing visa-free travel for Georgian citizens to the U.S. The party also promises to create tens of thousands of new jobs annually. A 1 billion euro EU subsidy will be allocated to agriculture, with the goal of increasing the average national salary to 3,500 lari and setting a minimum wage of 1,500 lari. Other key pledges include abolishing pension loans, raising pensions to 1,000 lari, and establishing a billion-lari fund in Mikheil Saakashvili's name to support the return of Georgian emigrants. [195]

For Georgia

On 8 August 2024, the For Georgia party leader, Giorgi Gakharia, went to Batumi to meet with the people and canvass the vote. On 17 August 2024, Gakharia officially kicked off the party's election campaign with the opening ceremony in Zugdidi. [196] Gakharia's promises during the election campaign included increasing the minimum wage from 50 GEL to 950 GEL, introducing six-month unemployment benefits and tying the increase of pensions with that of the economy. [197] For Georgia believes healthcare is a fundamental human right, and the state must ensure its protection. The party plans to transition to a compulsory universal healthcare insurance model, funded by excise taxes on tobacco, alcohol, and vehicle imports. Primary healthcare will be strengthened, doctors retrained, and service quality and regulated costs to ensure access to quality medicines. The party is committed to fast-tracking Georgia's EU integration, ensuring sectoral benefits like access to the single market, the European Energy Union, and application of digital policies before full membership. Additionally, the party advocates for NATO membership without a "Membership Action Plan" (MAP), following Finland and Sweden's model.

Giorgi Gakharia with the For Georgia team Gakharia with his team.jpg
Giorgi Gakharia with the For Georgia team

Economically, the party aims to establish a European-style social state, focused on sustainable and inclusive growth. Key priorities include employment programs, sectoral policy development, and an export financing agency. A 4-year infrastructure project will complete gasification, water supply, and internet access nationwide, with an emphasis on building a green economy to safeguard natural resources. In education, the party seeks to promote critical thinking, civic awareness, and lifelong learning through improved quality, infrastructure, and financing. Defense spending will rise to 2% of GDP, and military cooperation with Western partners, especially the United States, will enhance Georgia's defense capabilities. The depoliticization and strengthening of the State Security Service will focus on combating hybrid threats from Russia.

The party will draft a national strategy for de-occupation and peaceful reunification of the country, involving public and Western partner input within one year. Governance reforms will strengthen institutions, ensure mutual checks and balances, and promote fair, transparent elections. Key government appointments (e.g., prosecutor general, court judges) will be made through political consensus. Judicial reforms will focus on eliminating corruption, including the removal of high-ranking officials who have lost public trust. The High Council of Justice will undergo comprehensive reform to restore integrity. Fighting corruption is a central priority. The party promises to dismantle elite networks that enrich themselves at the expense of citizens, ensuring regional and municipal governments are free from corruption. Through fiscal decentralization, municipalities will gain more authority and resources, with anti-corruption units established locally to monitor risks. [198] [199]

Strong Georgia

On 5 September 2024, the Strong Georgia coalition presented its election plan called "Ilia's way" [200] to the public in Saguramo, in the vicinity of Ilia Chavchavadze's statue. The coalition stated that it would introduce a visa regime for Russian citizens in Georgia, restrict direct flights with Russia, and ban selling agricultural land to Russians. It promised to push for Anaklia deepwater port construction and to create "200 thousand new jobs", although it did not specify what measures would be taken for this goal. It promised to introduce a heavy gambling tax and use the increased budget funds to raise pensions. Ana Dolidze, social democratic member of coalition from For the People party, presented plan to increase average income and minimum wage. She announced that these goals would be achieved in cooperation with the "business, small and medium businesses". Levan Tsutskiridze, a leader of Freedom Square party, focused on education reform. The coalition promised greater European Integration, vowing to establish special ministry to push for Georgia's accession to the EU, increase trade with the EU, and create greater opportunities for the youth to move to the European countries through student exchange programs. [201]

On 19 September, during the meeting with pensioners, Mamuka Khazaradze noted that the coalition was planning to increase the taxes on gambling from 15% to 25%, citing Illinois as an example. He also called for an end to the "exploitative practices related to pension loans and overdrafts" and promised "proper oversight" over the pension fund. [202] A key component of Lelo's platform is its 1,000 GEL pension plan for seniors, which Khazaradze assured is a concrete initiative rather than a campaign slogan. "This is about ensuring that our pensioners have the basic means to live in dignity," he explained. [203]

The coalition plans to draft regulations aimed at separating educational institutions from political control, promoting independence within the education system. Proposed initiatives include developing a school nutrition program, providing housing support for students, updating research laboratories, promoting vocational education, and increasing the number of kindergartens in municipalities with significant ethnic minority populations. Additionally, the coalition intends to establish a national security system based on NATO best practices, which will involve reforms to the National Security Council. Plans include reinstating visa regulations for Russian citizens and limiting the influence of Russian soft power in Georgia. To address the needs of populations in occupied regions and promote peaceful conflict resolution, the coalition aims to create better educational and employment opportunities while enhancing access to prospects arising from Georgia's candidacy for European Union membership and establishing free economic and trade zones.

The coalition supports democratic governance, allowing all parties to operate freely while strengthening local self-government and decentralizing power. They plan a comprehensive review of judges through a vetting mechanism, leading to the dissolution of the current judicial council. A new council will be formed based on the vetting results, increasing the number of judges and welcoming qualified professionals from outside the existing system. A National Anti-Corruption Agency is proposed, equipped with investigative powers and accountable to parliament. Reforms will focus on improving the state procurement system, increasing transparency regarding offshore companies, and subjecting any undocumented property obtained through corruption to confiscation. The coalition argues that existing Controversial laws hinder Georgia's European integration and do not align with national interests, and they plan to repeal these laws upon taking office.

The coalition envisions a decentralization process that provides municipalities and councils with increased financial resources and authority tailored to local needs. To achieve this, they intend to strengthen the role of councils, abolish state representative administrations, and improve the management of local revenues for greater financial independence. They will also review current administrative-territorial arrangements and the status of self-governing cities altered in 2017, while reinforcing the functions of the parliamentary committee on regional policy and self-government. [204]

Coalition for Change

On 25 September 2024, Nika Gvaramia, co-leader of the Coalition for Change, announced he would not be on the coalition's candidate list, pledging to make space for new people. The following day, it was revealed that the top spot on the CfC's electoral list would be held by Nana Malashkhia, known as the "Woman with the EU Flag", a symbol of the March protests. [205] [206] [207] [208]

During the congress in Rustavi, Gvaramia addressed the audience. Gvaramia told the representatives of small and medium businesses that they represented "the driving force propelling this country forward" and promised them to lower taxes, attract more investments and open avenues to the European, American, and Chinese markets. In addition, Gvaramia addressed Georgian farmers, saying "do not let anyone deceive you into believing that you need state assistance every year. Do not be misled into thinking that your labor is futile or that Russia is your only solution. The European Union, the United States, and China offer enormous markets, which will be available to you once we take office". [209] Gvaramia emphasized his own experience of what he called a "political imprisonment" at the hands of the Georgian Dream government, addressing the prison population by telling them that "I will be your supporter in every circumstance" and promising to deliver them what they deserve. [210]

Coalition for Change electoral billboard "The future is yours" Ahali electoral billboard 2024.jpg
Coalition for Change electoral billboard "The future is yours"

On 17 October, Nika Gvaramia, presented the main directions of the coalition's program to the public. Gvaramia introduced the "4-4-4 Plan", which outlines initiatives in four key areas to be implemented within four days of the formation of the new parliament. According to Gvaramia, the coalition aims to prioritize the following four areas immediately after taking office:

Alliance of Patriots of Georgia

During the election campaign, the Alliance of Patriots, Conservative Movement/Alt-Info and Georgian Idea, running on the same electoral list, held joint meetings with the supporters throughout country. The meetings were held in Mtskheta, Rustavi, Dedoplistskaro, Gori, Zestaponi, Batumi, Kutaisi and others. Moreover, members of Alt-Info opened several new offices in various regions to better communicate with the potential voters. [212] [213]

Zura Makharadze, co-founder of a pro-Russian Conservative Movement/Alt Info, personally sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury. Zura Makharadze 2024.png
Zura Makharadze, co-founder of a pro-Russian Conservative Movement/Alt Info, personally sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury.

During the meetings, the parties presented several initiatives to the voters. In terms of education, the parties promised to introduce teaching religion into school curriculums, increase wages for teachers, free school meals and extra-courses, and free strength training sections in all schools. In healthcare and social protection, the parties promised universal health care, establishing state-run pharmacies run on low prices to counteract privately held pharmacies and monopolies, and an abortion ban. To reinvigorate economy, the parties stated that they would issue low-percent state loans to the businesses, protect Georgian businesses from foreign imports through high tariffs, negotiate opening up Russian and other post-Soviet markets for Georgian products, and nationalize "strategic resources". The parties said that they would argue for a ban on foreign ownership of Georgian agricultural land, an increased support for local manufacturing, as well as abolishing taxes on land in mountainous regions to counteract their depopulation. The parties named several legislative proposals they would push for in the Parliament of Georgia: expanding the use of referendums to decide on public issues, making the office of Public Defender of Georgia electable, abolishing "gender legislation", introducing an amnesty for those imprisoned on family violence charges, and establishing a "real anti-monopoly agency". [212]

In September 2024, the Alliance of Patriots published its electoral video clip called "Why are we poor?". It argued that Georgia remains a developing economy because for 30 years (since the dissolution of the Soviet Union) the country "had been run on free market economic principles", such as the idea that if state does not intervene in the economy, the market will "self-regulate" with "invisible hand". Criticizing this theory, the video clip cited China and South Korea as examples of the "most successful development models", with them being "hybrid economies" in which the state runs and intervenes in the "strategic sectors", while otherwise allowing free entrepreneurship. The video clip credited this model for creating and developing "high-tech industries" in these countries, such as automotive industry, electronics industry and etc. The video clip also argued for increased protectionism against cheap foreign imports to boost local economy and negotiating with Russia to open up its market for Georgian products, which it argued would be crucial for the economic development. [214]

New Political Centre — Girchi

Girchi advocates for a range of economic policies intended to redistribute wealth, stimulate growth, and reduce poverty. One key proposal is the distribution of state-owned property to citizens. Currently, approximately 90% of Georgia's land and natural resources are owned by the state, including forests, rivers, universities, and other assets. Girchi proposes to distribute this property equally among citizens, allowing for greater individual wealth and ownership. Another major policy is the introduction of a Universal Basic Income of 500 lari per month for every citizen. Girchi argues that UBI would eliminate extreme poverty by replacing a variety of social welfare programs with a fixed monthly payment to all citizens. The system is designed to be simple, with fewer bureaucratic processes and reduced administrative costs.

Girchi also supports a multi-currency system, allowing the use of foreign currencies such as the US dollar and the euro alongside the Georgian lari. This policy aims to protect citizens from inflation and exchange rate fluctuations, giving people the choice of which currency to use for transactions. The party proposes the return of pension funds to citizens and the abolition of the current pension system, which it views as exploitative. Instead of mandatory pension contributions, Girchi suggests returning available pension funds to contributors. Girchi is also committed to reducing taxes that disproportionately affect the poor, including excise, property, and import taxes. The party aims to balance tax cuts without creating a budget deficit and proposes eliminating taxes on personal imports from abroad, such as the current 300 lari customs limit.

Another economic policy involves the redistribution of National Bank reserves to citizens. Girchi believes the National Bank's foreign currency reserves, accumulated through currency market interventions, should be equally distributed among the population, providing approximately $1,200 to each citizen. Girchi further advocates for full land ownership rights, extending property ownership from the current two-meter depth to a greater extent. This would give individuals full control over their land, including mineral and resource rights. The party proposes reforms in the automobile sector, advocating for less government interference in vehicle imports and usage. Under this policy, citizens would not be penalized for issues like tinted windows or lack of technical inspections as long as safety regulations are respected.

Girchi emphasizes reducing the role of government in everyday life. The party advocates for the dismantling of bureaucratic structures that, in its view, perpetuate poverty. Girchi proposes offering public sector employees who voluntarily leave their positions continued salary payments for three years, encouraging a transition to the private sector. Girchi calls for a great amnesty as a solution to Georgia's flawed judicial system, which still operates under outdated Soviet-era laws. The amnesty would reduce sentences for prisoners, with life sentences being commuted to 30 years, and administrative fines being written off entirely.

The Girchi MPs in parliament: Iago Khvichia, Vakhtang Megrelishvili, Sandro Rakviashvili, and Herman Szabo. Girchi in parliament.png
The Girchi MPs in parliament: Iago Khvichia, Vakhtang Megrelishvili, Sandro Rakviashvili, and Herman Szabo.

The party also advocates for elective judges and the expansion of the jury system. Under this system, judges of the first instance would be directly elected by the people, rather than appointed by politicians, in order to ensure judicial independence. Defendants would also have the right to choose trial by jury for criminal cases with potential prison sentences of six months or more. Girchi supports a reform of the Criminal Code, arguing that actions without a victim or complainant should not be considered crimes. The party seeks to humanize Georgia's criminal justice system by removing outdated or overly punitive laws.

Additionally, Girchi proposes the electability of local police chiefs, decentralizing control over law enforcement to local communities. This would enable municipalities to elect their own police leaders, who would be accountable to the local population rather than the central government. Girchi also envisions a Central Investigation Service, similar to the FBI in the United States, that would handle organized and serious crimes beyond the scope of local police forces. The party calls for the liberalization of drug policy, advocating for the decriminalization of all drugs and the regulation of cannabis and other drugs classified by the World Health Organization as less harmful than tobacco and alcohol.

Girchi supports the abolition of the common national curriculum, allowing schools to determine their own teaching methods and content. The party also advocates for legalizing home-schooling and removing state regulations from universities, including the elimination of national entrance exams. Girchi proposes transitioning to a professional volunteer army with higher pay and modern equipment, as opposed to the current system of mandatory conscription. The party supports increasing the defense budget to meet NATO standards and advocates for building strong partnerships with Western allies to improve military training and capability.

Girchi prioritizes NATO membership and deeper integration with the European Union to ensure Georgia's security and sovereignty. The party also advocates for free trade agreements with all countries and seeks to promote traditional human rights on the international stage. Girchi emphasizes decentralization as a key component of its platform. The party seeks to give greater autonomy to local governments by allowing municipalities to elect their own judges and police chiefs, and by permitting regions to set their own tax rates.

Girchi also supports lowering the parliamentary election threshold to a natural barrier of 0.67%, arguing that this would encourage the representation of smaller parties in parliament and foster political diversity. The party opposes the current system of public funding for political parties, advocating instead for parties to be funded by their supporters. Girchi views the return of Abkhazia as one of Georgia's most challenging tasks. The party believes this will only be achievable with strong international alliances, particularly with the United States and the European Union. Girchi advocates for a strong military to bolster peaceful negotiations and ensure that Georgia is respected on the international stage. The party also seeks to create an economic and political environment in Georgia that would encourage Abkhazian citizens to reintegrate with Georgia. [215] [216]

Labour Party

The Labor Party of Georgia emphasizes the importance of establishing fully free healthcare, including diagnosis, treatment, surgery, and rehabilitation, while advocating for state hospitals to be treated equally to private facilities. They argue that national wealth—encompassing resources such as gold, manganese, iron, energy, and the ports of Batumi and Poti—should be returned to state control through nationalization, with profits distributed among households to bolster the national budget for education, school meals, and pensions.

In terms of energy, the party supports nationalization, asserting that a state monopoly on electricity generation and distribution will lead to lower costs for consumers. They propose banning the construction of dams, advocating instead for a shift toward solar energy. The Labor Party proposes establishing a minimum hourly wage of 10 lari, introducing unemployment compensation, and penalizing companies for exploitative labor practices. They also plan to raise pensions to European standards, Additionally, the party promises a one-time assistance payment of 10,000 lari for every newborn, aiming to encourage population growth. To support local agriculture, the Labor Party intends to restrict agricultural imports through high customs tariffs, making domestic production more profitable and subsidizing the harvests of various crops. They also pledge to limit access to online casinos and betting to mitigate social issues associated with gambling.

In education, the Labor Party commits to providing free schooling at all levels, offering two meals a day for students, and ensuring personal computers and internet access for children from first to twelfth grades. They aim to facilitate job placements for students and offer scholarships for higher education abroad, contingent upon their return to Georgia. The party also plans to align teachers' salaries with judges' salaries, emphasizing the role of education in reducing crime and fostering social harmony. The Labor Party seeks to transition from mandatory military service to a contract-based system, viewing compulsory service as a potential source of corruption. They aim to dismantle oligarchic influence in politics, advocating for a European-style socialism with a Nordic model to prevent wealthy individuals from leveraging their resources for political gain. The party also criticizes the Georgian Dream for adopting controversial laws, viewing this as a betrayal that threatens the country's European aspirations. [217]

Conduct

On election day, a polling station was closed in Marneuli after footage emerged of ballot stuffing being conducted there, during which an election observer was attacked while trying to film the incident. [218] The CEC said that a criminal investigation had been opened and all results originating from the precinct would be declared invalid. [219] Two people were hospitalized after Georgian Dream supporters attacked the offices of the UNM. Election observers also noted cases of voter intimidation and ballot stuffing nationwide. [220] Observers from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe said that the election took place amid a "climate of hatred and intimidation", while European Parliament monitors accused Georgian Dream of utilizing "anti-Western and hostile rhetoric ... promoted Russian misinformation, manipulations, and conspiracy theories" while claiming to promote European integration at the same time. [221]

Electoral system

The Parliament of Georgia is composed of 150 members who are elected for a four-year term. As stipulated by constitutional amendments that were adopted on 26 September 2017, the 2024 election will mark the move to a fully proportional system. The 150 members of parliament are elected by closed list on a single national constituency, with a 5% electoral threshold to be awarded seats. [222] [223] [5] To determine the number of seats obtained by a political party, the number of votes it has obtained is multiplied by 150 and divided by the sum of votes received by all those that received at least 5% of the valid votes cast in the elections. If the seats obtained by the political parties is less than 150, the remaining seats are successively awarded to the political parties having better results. [224] On 6 February 2023, the Central Election Commission of Georgia (CEC) adopted a decree introducing an electronic voter registration and voting system at most of the polling stations. [225]

On 4 April 2024, Georgia's Parliament swiftly abolished mandatory gender quotas, with 85 MPs voting in favor and 22 against. Previously, the law required that at least one in every four candidates on a party list be a woman. The decision was part of a deal between the ruling Georgian Dream party and the opposition Girchi party: Georgian Dream supported Girchi's proposal to abolish the quotas, while Girchi agreed to back the Georgian Dream candidate for CEC Chairperson. [226] [227] On 27 August 2024, president Salome Zourabichvili signed a decree setting 26 October as the date for the parliamentary elections. [228]

On 20 February 2024, the Georgian Parliament passed amendments to the electoral code with 81 votes in the third reading. These amendments change how the chairman and "professional members" of the CEC are elected and abolish the deputy chairman role, traditionally reserved for an opposition representative. Under the new law, the Speaker of Parliament, instead of the president, nominates and opens the competition for the election of the CEC Chairman and professional members. Parliament requires a 3/5 majority (90 votes) in the first round to elect candidates. If unsuccessful, a simple majority (76 votes) can be used in the next round, with two attempts allowed. If both attempts fail, the president gains the authority to appoint the CEC chairperson/member. The law also stipulates that CEC members serve a full five-year term, even if elected with a lower quorum. The CEC is composed of 17 members: 7 nominated by the Speaker of Parliament and appointed by Parliament, and 9 nominated by opposition parties. The opposition and civil society organizations argue that these changes increase political pressure on the CEC and compromise its neutrality, violating the European Commission's conditions [229] and ignoring the Venice Commission's recommendations against these amendments. [230]

On 30 May, the Parliament adopted further amendments to the electoral code, including changes to the CEC's operational rules and the abolition of the CEC advisory group, which included representatives from the Public Defender and selected national and international experts. The ruling Georgian Dream party justified these changes by claiming that the advisory group was not functional due to the lack of participation from monitoring organizations. Another significant amendment is the change in the CEC's decision-making process. Previously, decisions required a two-thirds majority. Now, if a decision cannot be passed in a CEC meeting, it will be subject to a revote at the same meeting and will be considered passed if it receives a majority vote. The ruling party defends this as an anti-deadlock mechanism. [231] On 16 August, the CEC issued a decree requiring the chairman of each precinct election commission to draw lots to assign duties among commission members one week before the election, instead of on election day. Critics argue this change gives authorities time to influence the election process and threatens transparency. The opposition has challenged this decree in court, but the Tbilisi City Court upheld the CEC's decision. Independent watchdogs and opposition parties remain concerned that these changes undermine the election process's fairness and transparency, particularly ahead of the critical elections in October. [232]

Concerns have been raised about the voting rights of Georgian emigrants. Despite the significant economic impact of Georgian emigrants through remittances, their participation in national elections remains limited. Official statistics indicate that over 125,000 people left Georgia in the past year, while estimates suggest that the number of Georgian emigrants could be as high as 1.6 million. The current voting procedures for Georgians abroad are criticized for being cumbersome, with few polling stations often located only in major cities, making it challenging for emigrants residing in more remote areas to vote. As a result, voter turnout among emigrants has been relatively low; for instance, only 66,217 registered to vote in the 2020 parliamentary elections, with just 12,247 actually participating. Various stakeholders, including opposition parties, non-governmental organizations, and president Salome Zourabichvili, advocate for more accessible voting options, such as additional polling stations, electronic voting, or extended voting periods. However, the government, led by the ruling Georgian Dream party, has been slow to respond, citing bureaucratic and logistical challenges. Critics argue that the reluctance to reform the voting process may stem from a political strategy to limit the influence of emigrants, who are perceived as a potentially opposition-leaning electorate. [233] [234] [235] In September 2024, the CEC said that it would open 60 polling stations in 42 countries. [236]

Opinion polls

Prior to the election, polls were being conducted by a number of pollsters in Georgia. The Edison Research polls were commissioned by the pro-opposition Formula TV, while another pro-opposition channel Mtavari Arkhi commissioned ISSA and Savanta to conduct the polls. [237] [238] The polls by Georgian Opinion Research Business International (GORBI) were conducted on behalf of pro-government Imedi TV company. [239] [240] The IRI published its results without allocating the number of undecided voters.

Georgia2024pollingavg.svg
Local regression trend line of poll results (excluding undecideds and abstentions) since the last parliamentary election to the present day, with each line corresponding to a political party.

Parties in bold pass the (5%) threshold.

DateSample sizePollster GD Unity For Georgia Coalition for Change Strong Georgia NPC-Girchi GLP APG No partyOthersN/ALead
GD PP UNM SA EG FG CP Girchi-MF Droa Ahali RPG Lelo FP FS Citizens APG CM/Alt Info GI
12–21 October 20241,704 GORBI 60.215.42.993.32.821.92.544.8
11–20 October 20241,520 Savanta 35168199323516
1–18 October 20241,200 Edison Research 3418111410453116
29 September–8 October 20241,561 Savanta 361410188323618
18–30 September 20241,700 GORBI 59.513.63.810.34.52.72.53.145.9
17–29 September 20241,200 Edison Research 3319111312443114
10–22 September 20241,200 Edison Research 322011.911.99.94.753.6112
1–15 September 20241,200 Edison Research 32.32010.510.99.365.13.62.312.3
29 August–8 September 20241,000 Edison Research 3419.210.69.19.95.95.133.314.8
24 July–4 August 20241,700 GORBI 59.313.12.24.85.55.82.134.246.2
11–24 July 20241,000 Edison Research 32.417.31.911.29.912.82.25.23.32.61.315.1
June–July 20242,000 ISSA 34.40.816.94.46.95.112.482.31.61.91.82.10.90.317.5
1–10 April 20241,601 ISSA 37.40.618.82.35.21.713.80.44.71.82.21.72.70.62.23.918.6
11–18 March 20241,711 GORBI 60.412.64.53.731.6 [g] 4.70.61.40.60.9647.8
1–22 December 20231,500 Edison Research 36.62.521.50.78.856.73.71.72.94.71.730.515.1
20 October–6 November 20231,000 Edison Research 373211945434423116
30 September–20 October 20231,212 GORBI 552033441122535
14 September–14 October 20231,200 IRI [h] 25116<1422223211171239
7–24 September 20231,500 Edison Research 3732211044424413<115
25 May–14 June 20231,500 Edison Research 3722531642432351212
22 April–7 May 20231,212 GORBI 5319422322132734
4–23 March 20231,500 IRI [h] 19<1142133122222<1116<1275
17–30 November 20222,024 GORBI 52-23331332213429
13 September–2 October 20221,500 IRI [h] 2512133212122211722313
4–24 March 20221,486 IRI [h] 311624122212111521915
2020 election 48.2227.183.153.790.163.151.332.891.003.140.435.5421.04

Results

The Georgian Dream managed to secure victory in the election, garnering more than 53.93 percent of the vote, while the four major opposition coalitions which agreed on not cooperating with the Georgian Dream in the parliament through the Georgian Charter, received 37.78% in total. Georgian Dream was strongest in the rural areas but lost the capital Tbilisi and also Rustavi to the opposition, while being relatively close to losing other major cities as well. Georgian Dream was strongest in the Samtskhe-Javakheti, Kvemo Kartli, Svaneti, Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti, Guria and Adjara regions. In the capital, it received 42% of the vote, while the four major opposition coalitions combined received 46% plus 5.3% of the libertarian Girchi party. Georgian Dream also dramatically lost to the opposition among in the overseas districts among the Georgian diaspora. In Mingrelia, where the opposition parties, particularly the UNM, were strongest in the 2021 Georgian local elections and managed to secure victories in some districts, Georgian Dream managed to turn the tide and won all districts. In contrast to the 2020 parliamentary election, the UNM-led Unity – National Movement coalition declined dramatically, losing half of its votes, partly to the new Coalition for Change alliance, which was established few months prior to the election by former UNM members. The Lelo-led Strong Georgia coalition also managed to improve its results due to inclusion of various small parties in its alliance. [33] Despite this, Georgian Dream failed to attain a supermajority in parliament that would enable them to pass amendments to the constitution banning the main opposition parties. [241] The results were officially certified by the CEC on 16 November. [242]

Georgian Parliamentary Election results, October 2024.svg
PartyVotes%Seats+/–
Georgian Dream [i] 1,120,05353.9389–1
Coalition for Change [j] 229,16111.0319+17
Unity – National Movement [k] 211,21610.1716–23
Strong Georgia [l] 182,9228.8114+8
Gakharia For Georgia [m] 161,5217.7812New
New Political Centre – Girchi 62,2233.000–4
Alliance of Patriots of Georgia [n] 50,5992.440–4
Georgian Labour Party 15,1030.730–1
Change Georgia12,5280.600New
European Democrats 7,9550.380New
Georgian Unity4,5000.220New
Free Georgia 4,1450.2000
Party of Georgian Unity and Development3,8920.1900
Sakartvelo2,7800.1300
Chven 2,5930.120New
Tribune2,4830.1200
Our United Georgia1,8450.090New
Left-wing Alliance1,2600.060New
Total2,076,779100.001500
Registered voters/turnout3,508,294
Source: Election Administration of Georgia, Radio Liberty, Interpressnews

By constituency

ConstituencyTurnout GD CfC UNM SG GFG Girchi APG/ALT GLP OthersLead
Mtatsminda 41.5115.417.0214.4910.914.912.980.9426.1
Vake 38.0416.126.7415.9312.036.032.540.7821.9
Saburtalo 39.7715.536.8814.2711.845.962.931.0224.2
Krtsanisi 48.8612.879.669.819.114.162.770.9035.9
Isani 45.3113.488.4710.6410.694.723.121.0731.8
Samgori 44.9213.358.9910.0310.894.333.421.2931.6
Chughureti 44.2613.917.2512.5510.685.282.931.0530.4
Didube 42.0814.936.8212.6511.655.982.971.0427.2
Nadzaladevi 42.6314.186.8011.9411.395.653.571.3228.5
Gldani 40.7615.697.8311.2211.575.313.641.3825.1
Sagarejo 65.544.8511.786.664.441.572.590.7253.6
Gurjaani 62.288.059.348.414.931.522.720.6552.9
Sighnaghi 62.516.2711.058.684.451.692.830.6951.5
Dedoplistskaro 66.325.419.898.003.781.672.820.5556.4
Lagodekhi 62.346.7914.617.353.521.461.590.4347.7
Kvareli 57.156.7214.738.954.531.573.730.5142.4
Telavi 54.838.1915.568.894.651.993.010.8739.3
Akhmeta 56.2510.0914.487.854.291.922.390.6241.8
Tianeti 61.829.196.137.766.042.084.140.8752.6
Rustavi 41.4114.1411.2410.2910.594.943.191.2227.3
Gardabani 67.964.6513.014.654.171.352.160.5354.9
Marneuli 79.621.6412.493.841.000.240.430.0667.1
Bolnisi 81.432.567.753.291.900.851.180.1973.7
Dmanisi 75.382.2614.983.121.490.611.080.2160.4
Tsalka 71.558.8310.682.542.650.920.550.1060.9
Tetritskaro 66.946.048.198.294.881.292.030.5258.7
Mtskheta 58.118.778.098.467.892.633.071.0349.3
Dusheti 59.238.635.109.467.612.164.161.6749.8
Kazbegi 72.543.782.686.665.992.024.290.6365.9
Kaspi 59.707.649.738.956.252.143.120.7249.9
Gori 56.868.809.758.737.652.243.130.7147.1
Kareli 60.917.4910.687.886.131.492.710.5650.2
Khashuri 52.339.1910.5210.378.172.823.300.7941.8
Borjomi 61.347.477.677.796.262.293.740.8153.5
Akhaltsikhe 61.6410.4710.856.384.971.791.540.3850.8
Adigeni 66.076.8111.087.493.251.111.440.2654.9
Aspindza 69.885.6211.036.203.590.851.120.3358.8
Akhalkalaki 87.782.755.322.030.710.120.130.1082.5
Ninotsminda 88.193.755.540.330.740.130.150.0282.7
Oni 61.487.935.4112.616.011.992.940.3548.9
Ambrolauri 63.839.345.318.275.051.673.910.6454.5
Tsageri 62.978.387.3411.124.691.151.870.5351.9
Lentekhi 75.433.744.967.593.891.481.510.2467.8
Mestia 72.525.355.857.045.050.882.220.1765.5
Kharagauli 65.075.1610.258.425.061.372.330.3654.8
Terjola 55.6010.2912.498.814.841.923.050.4843.1
Sachkhere 84.342.352.183.793.311.551.340.2180.5
Zestaponi 56.5110.089.638.496.802.562.420.6346.4
Baghdati 57.6611.5811.858.044.141.941.790.4845.8
Vani 69.458.638.256.073.190.961.170.36'60.8
Samtredia 62.467.869.888.435.081.582.220.4652.6
Khoni 64.657.1411.884.794.341.692.690.4852.8
Chiatura 65.767.387.927.294.351.723.190.3357.8
Tkibuli 59.018.4213.348.144.711.812.140.3645.7
Tskaltubo 57.6010.1213.417.144.401.772.330.6244.2
Kutaisi 47.2814.2110.509.487.993.942.791.0533.1
Ozurgeti 64.756.729.127.025.511.772.380.5555.6
Lanchkhuti 61.017.078.728.656.352.542.460.6852.3
Chokhatauri 67.047.167.087.914.201.282.270.3759.1
Abasha 61.899.0912.644.556.041.071.990.8449.3
Senaki 52.1812.9914.345.02410.311.381.690.3437.8
Martvili 55.4714.1712.673.349.211.571.590.1841.3
Khobi 58.0313.1811.416.455.621.291.570.3344.8
Zugdidi 50.9219.8112.914.926.471.621.110.2431.1
Tsalenjikha 48.0210.0617.597.7511.941.231.470.2730.4
Chkhorotsqu 53.1411.1713.974.6912.711.101.360.1739.2
Poti 51.7014.939.856.479.093.351.680.5336.8
Batumi 49.6811.6312.937.6311.272.641.330.4236.7
Keda 67.853.7013.836.045.480.660.830.1554.0
Kobuleti 62.915.4616.094.485.791.291.540.2546.8
Shuakhevi 62.937.1614.945.705.690.710.710.1747.9
Khelvachauri 60.245.6415.735.047.871.381.480.2544.5
Khulo 67.155.2213.874.355.740.590.380.1253.2
AbroadN/A13.4933.2619.8914.899.014.051.701.5319.8
Source:

Reception

Foreign

Pre-election

European Union

On 6 October, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) adopted a resolution on Georgia at its Congress in Estoril, Portugal, condemning "democratic regression and persecution of opposition" under the Georgian Dream government. The resolution called for sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili and his family, opposed the Foreign Agents and anti-LGBT laws, and emphasized the need for free and fair elections and democratic reforms in line with the EU's criteria. It also criticized "political persecution, violence against opposition, and disinformation campaigns", urging the EU to support civil society, strengthen election monitoring, and impose sanctions on "those undermining democracy". ALDE also supported the initiation of EU accession negotiations following democratic reforms. [243]

On 9 October, the European Parliament adopted the resolution "On the Decline of Democracy and Threats to Political Pluralism in Georgia" with 495 votes in favor and 73 against. The resolution urged the European Union to freeze aid to the Georgian government, impose sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili and other individuals responsible for the "erosion of democracy", and ensure that "anti-democratic laws are aligned with the criteria for visa liberalization". [244] Additionally, the draft resolution called on the Georgian government to halt its campaign of "opposition intimidation and anti-Western disinformation, impose sanctions on Russia, release former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds, and ensure a peaceful transfer of power based on electoral outcomes". [245] [246]

A number of MEPs made supporting statements in favor of resolution. A member of Volt Netherlands, Reinier van Lanschot said that the upcoming elections "will define Georgia for generations". He said that the democracy in Georgia has been being "attacked" by the Georgian Dream party, which had been "creating a Russian nightmare". He called the Georgian Dream "being afraid of democracy" because "good democracy deals corrupt leaders". He stated that "a new generation of young leaders who can build an open culture and parliamentary democracy" in Georgia "count on our support". [247] MEP Markéta Gregorová said that Georgia was being "taken over" by Russia and urged Europe not to be "too late to the fight". She urged to suspend the EU candidate status and the visa liberalisation for Georgia, while aiding the Georgians who "to lead to fight" against the government. [248]

A number of MEPs criticized the resolution. MEP Nacho Sánchez Amor, a member of Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, criticized the resolution on grounds that it posed a "risk of being accused of interference" by the Georgian government and Russia, with the resolution serving as a proof. [27] MEP Thierry Mariani, a member of National Rally, said that the resolution was aimed to influence the Georgian elections, and possibly causing Maidan in Georgia in case of Georgian Dream victory, while noting that only Georgians should decide their future without the interference either from Brussels or Kremlin. Mariani said that the resolution would destabilize the democracy in Georgia in favor of foreign interests. [249] MEP Petar Volgin, a member of Revival party, said that Georgia was being threatened with sanctions for refusing to be a "Euro-Atlantic puppet" and "colony". He said that the same mechanism was working in other countries too, including in his home country Bulgaria, to undermine a national state and promote globalist doctrines. [250] MEP Danilo Della Valle, a member of Five Star Movement, said that it was wrong to attempt to manipulate Georgian elections by the EU and USA. He also spoke against "an attempt to impose a certain geopolitical vision on countries, such as Georgia, dictated by NATO and the United States" amid the war in Ukraine. [28]

Germany

On 10 October, the German Bundestag adopted resolution called "A European future for Georgia", initiated by the Alliance 90/The Greens and Free Democratic Party. The resolution highlited the "authoritarian tendencies in the country ahead of crucial elections" and called the German Federal Government to ensure "no further progress occurs in Georgia's EU accession process" until the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence is in place, "take note of any violations that could lead to targeted sanctions" against the Georgian government and advocate for "free and fair parliamentary elections". The CDU/CSU, Alternative for Germany and Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance voted against, while The Left abstained. [251] In response to the resolution, AfD initiated a motion which "opposes regime change policy in Georgia". [252]

Russia

Russia claimed that there were "unprecedented attempts at Western interference" in the election and accused Western countries of "trying to twist Georgia's hand" and "dictate terms". [253]

United States
Proposed MEGOBARI Act

On 11 July 2024, the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed the MEGOBARI Act (Mobilizing and Enhancing Georgia's Options for Building Accountability, Resilience, and Independence Act), [254] with a vote of 41 to 6. Initiated by Republican Congressman Joe Wilson, the Act—named after the Georgian word for "friend" (Georgian :მეგობარი, romanized:megobari)—addresses "democratic and human rights issues in Georgia" and outlines specific measures for support and oversight. The MEGOBARI Act emphasizes "the U.S. commitment to upholding democratic values, human rights, and the rule of law" in Georgia. It acknowledges the progress made by Georgian civil society and stresses the need to "strengthen democracy for regional stability and U.S. interests". [255]

The Act responds to recent "democratic backsliding" by calling for increased scrutiny of the Georgian government's actions, particularly "its ties to Russia and other authoritarian regimes". [256] To ensure accountability, the Act mandates several reports on issues such as "corrupt practices that support Russian interests and evade sanctions, Russian intelligence activities, and potential Chinese cooperation". It also includes sanctions and travel bans on "individuals undermining Georgian democracy". A Democracy Monitoring Task Force will be established to "oversee democratic practices", especially during elections, to "ensure fairness". [257] Should "significant democratic progress be confirmed", the MEGOBARI Act provides for additional U.S. assistance, including a more preferential trade agreement with Georgia, enhanced people-to-people exchanges and visa simplification, an economic modernization package, and security and defense support against Russian aggression. [258] The Act received strong bipartisan support, with committee members highlighting its importance for "supporting Georgia's democratic aspirations and countering Russian influence". [259] [260] [261] Secretary of State Antony Blinken also announced visa restrictions for those "undermining Georgian democracy", further demonstrating U.S. commitment. [262] [263]

Georgian opposition representatives have expressed their gratitude to Congressman Wilson for his support, praising the Acts focus on Georgia's sovereignty, democracy, and Euro-Atlantic integration. They urged Congress and the Senate to pass the legislation quickly and requested additional resources and congressional visits to monitor the October parliamentary elections, given the critical nature of this support. [264] [265] Conversely, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze criticized the MEGOBARI Act, labeling it as blackmail. He argued that the Act could harm Georgia-U.S. relations and criticized the approach of using sanctions and threats. Instead, he called for more constructive and pragmatic discussions to improve bilateral relations. [266] [267] The ruling Georgian Dream party issued a statement, saying that the MEGOBARI Act constituted a "blackmail, intimidation" against the independent Georgian policy and "especially cynical" in light of the Georgian celebration of Independence Day two days before. The party condemned the threat of sanctions against legislators for "voting in favor of a law" and added that this was against the spirit of cooperation between sovereign nations. The party rejected the possibility of following the MEGOBARI Act, saying that "we do not intend to trade on our country's sovereignty and security, and no blackmail whatsoever can force us to go against our country". [268]

Sanctions

On 16 September 2024, the US Department of State announced visa restrictions for 60 "Georgian government officials and others who have undermined Georgia's democracy and the human rights of the Georgian people". These included senior government officials, municipal figures, business leaders, law enforcers, lawmakers and etc. [269] Additionally, the United States Department of the Treasury imposed financial sanctions on 4 Georgian citizens under Magnitsky Act for "undermining fundamental freedoms". Namely, the Chief of Special Task Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia Khareba Kharazishvili and his deputy Mileri Lagazauri were sanctioned, along with the leaders of the Conservative Movement/Alt-Info party Zura Makharadze and Konstantine Morgoshia. [270] Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze called the sanctions on Georgian officials an "insult to Georgian state". [271] On 3 October, the US embassy to Georgia confirmed that Bidzina Ivanishvili was not sanctioned by the US government. [272]

On 20 September, Voice of America (VoA) reported that the U.S. State Department and Treasury are preparing sanctions against Bidzina Ivanishvili. According to a high-level anonymous source, this marks a significant shift, as the sanctions package is now ready for implementation. However, it is still unclear when these sanctions will be enacted, potentially before or after the elections. One official stated that Ivanishvili had taken steps to deepen ties with Russian oligarchs and worked to increase Russia's influence in Georgia's market, actions allegedly done under the guidance of Russian intelligence. The sanctions would target these activities under Executive Order 14024, which allows for sanctions related to "harmful foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation". An additional anonymous source familiar with the discussions told VoA that the administration's efforts serve as a signal to the Georgian government, stressing that the U.S. is serious about its concerns. "The Biden people are trying to convey the seriousness and hope that somebody in the Georgian government is listening in a serious way," the source explained. While it remains unknown when the sanctions will be implemented, the necessary preparations are in place, with the administration continuing to hope for a shift back toward a more democratic course in Georgia. [273]

Post-election

  • Flag of Hungary.svg  Hungary: Before the election results were even published, [274] Prime Minister Viktor Orbán had already congratulated Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze on "overwhelming victory" in the election. [275] Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó wrote that "in Georgia, the election was won not by Brussels or the liberal mainstream, but by the ruling party that prioritizes sovereignty, peace, and family — placing national interests first." [276] He vowed Hungarian support for Georgia's integration into the European Union. [277] On 28 October, Orban paid a visit to Georgia, [278] which President Zourabichvili dismissed as a "political play", adding that Orbán was a "special friend" of Georgian Dream. [279]
  • Flag of Russia.svg  Russia: On 27 October, Grigory Karasin, head of the Committee on International Affairs of the Federation Council said: "According to reports from Tbilisi, the parliamentary elections in Georgia took place in a calm atmosphere. The high voter turnout of about 58% is another indicator of civic activity. The nearly 53% of the vote received by the ruling Georgian Dream, as well as the entry of four opposition parties into Parliament, promises an active period in the country's domestic politics. We trust that it will be conducted in a predictable and civilized manner. This is in the interest not only of Georgia, but of the entire Caucasus region." [280] On 28 October, Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev called for the arrest of Zourabichvili for "calling for a coup." [281]
  • Flag of Turkey.svg  Turkey: On 29 October, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan congratulated Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, saying: "I sincerely congratulate you on the Georgian Dream's winning the October 26, 2024 parliamentary elections with your leadership and securing the first place". [282]
  • Flag of Azerbaijan.svg  Azerbaijan: President Ilham Aliyev congratulated Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze and Georgian Dream on their victory in the election. [283] Aliyev hailed "citizens' support for stability and traditional values" in the elections. [284]
  • Flag of Armenia.svg  Armenia: Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan congratulated Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze and the Georgian Dream party on their victory in the election. [285]
  • Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg  China: On 29 October, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian stated that the elections were held "smoothly", noting that "China always respects the choice of the Georgian people" and "sincerely hopes for stability and prosperity in Georgia". He also said that China was willing to work for pushing forward relations with Georgia. [286]
  • Flag of Europe.svg  European Union: In a joint statement on 27 October, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell called on the Central Election Commission of Georgia to "swiftly, transparently and independently investigate and adjudicate electoral irregularities and allegations thereof". [287] The same day, the President of the European Council Charles Michel stated that the allegations of irregularities "must be seriously clarified and addressed". [288] On 27 October, a joint statement signed by the chairmen of the committees on foreign and European affairs of Germany, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Ireland, Ukraine, Poland and Canada, as well as the Third Deputy Speaker of the Riksdag of Sweden Kerstin Lundgren and MEP Rihards Kols, urged the European Union not to recognize the results, deeming them "neither free nor fair", while also reiterating support for Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili. [289] [290]
  • Flag of France.svg  France: France called for an investigation into the alleged irregularities reported in the election. [291]
  • Flag of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.svg NATO Parliamentary Assembly Monogram.png Flag of the Council of Europe.svg European Parliament logo.svg In a joint report published by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and its Parliamentary Assembly, the parliamentary assemblies of the Council of Europe and NATO and the European Parliament, the elections were criticized for presence of vote-buying, widespread climate of pressure and party-organized intimidation and pressure on voters, exercised particularly on public sector employees and in rural areas, raising concerns about the ability of some voters to cast their vote without fear of retribution and undermining trust in the outcome of the elections. At the same time, high engagement of Georgian citizens and presence of citizen and party observers and diversity of choices on the ballot was praised. While legal framework was also accepted as adequate for holding democratic elections, recent amendments undermined its stability and "raised concerns about the potential for misusing the changes to gain political benefit", while "effectiveness of campaign finance oversight was undermined by limited enforcement and concerns over the impartiality and political instrumentalization of the oversight body". [292] [293] In its own report, the delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also reported cases of vote buying and double voting before and during elections, especially in the rural areas, while the head of the delegation Iulian Bulai stated that "the presence of cameras of the ruling party in the polling stations and people in front of polling stations tracking and possibly controlling voters led to a widespread climate of pressure and party-organized intimidation and the feeling of 'Big Brother is watching you'". [294] [295] PACE's claims of double voting were supported by observers from the European Parliament. [296]
  • Flag of the United States.svg  United States: On 28 October, Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that "while international and local observers agreed that election day was generally well administered, we note reports of irregularities and sporadic violence. International observers have not declared the result to be free and fair. We condemn all contraventions of international norms and join calls from international and local observers for a full investigation of all reports of election-related violations". [297] The same day State Department spokesman Matthew Miller highlighted "misuse of state resources, vote buying and voter intimidation" during the elections, adding that the Department of State joins the calls "for a full investigation". Regarding the results of the election, he stated that "at the moment we do not have a final assessment of the results, we want an investigation to be conducted. We want to see an investigation into the process". [298] On 29 October, U.S. President Joe Biden issued a statement from the White House in response to the elections in Georgia, asserting that independent, internationally recognized, and local observers deemed the October 26 elections neither free nor fair. He urged the Georgian government to transparently investigate all electoral violations and to initiate a dialogue with all political forces. [299] [300]
  • Flag of Sweden.svg  Sweden: On October 28, Swedish Minister for Development Cooperation and Foreign Trade, Benjamin Dousa, announced that the Swedish government would suspend cooperation with Georgia. As one of Georgia's largest donors, Sweden has provided nearly $19 million in aid annually. Dousa stated that cooperation could be resumed if Georgia recommitted to its EU path. [301]
  • Flag of Canada (Pantone).svg  Canada: On October 28, Global Affairs Canada released a statement regarding the parliamentary elections in Georgia, announcing a reassessment of relations and urging an investigation into the violations reported by international observers on election day in coordination with G7 and European partners. The Government of Canada also called on Georgian authorities to respect the rights of peaceful demonstrators and commended the Georgian people for their active participation in the elections. [302]
  • Edison Research, which had forecasted a win for a coalition of four opposition alliances through its exit poll, noted that the gap between its predictions and the official results went beyond typical statistical variation, hinting at possible manipulation at the local level. Following a review of the exit poll, the research organisation expressed concerns about the integrity of the reported outcomes. The findings were later echoed by competitor HarrisX. [303]
  • Europe Elects, an internationally respected election monitoring group, conducted an independent analysis of data from the central election commission and confirmed signs of irregularities benefiting the ruling party. The group highlighted a statistical pattern often seen in Russian elections, known as the "Russian tail," indicating a suspicious surge in voter distribution. This finding, coupled with other electoral violations reported by observers, led Europe Elects to conclude that the results of the 2024 Georgian parliamentary election show evident signs of tampering. [304]

Domestic

Aftermath

Opposition protest against the "rigged elections". Tbilisi - election protests 28 October 2024 - Tinatin Bokuchava (UNM).jpg
Opposition protest against the "rigged elections".

Protests against the election result went ahead in front of the Georgian Parliament building along Rustaveli Avenue in Tbilisi on 28 October, during which tens of thousands were estimated to have participated. [320] [321] Another protest was held on 4 November. [322]

On 29 October, the CEC announced a recount of ballots at five polling stations randomly selected in each election district, equivalent to 14% of all precincts. [323] On 30 October, the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia opened an investigation into allegations of electoral fraud following a request by the CEC and summoned President Zourabichvili as part of the procedure. However, opposition parties expressed doubt over the independence of the investigation, citing the agency's chief being appointed by the Georgian Dream-controlled parliament. [324] Zourabichvili refused to attend the summons. [325]

The opposition announced that it was going to boycott the new parliament, thereby depriving it of a quorum. [35]

On 4 November, opposition parties staged another rally outside the Georgian parliament, unveiling a strategy to contest the election results. Opposition leaders announced that protests would be daily and would intensify over time and urged supporters to gather across Tbilisi in large numbers to obstruct parliament access and maintain visible pressure on authorities. The opposition's action plan includes demands for repeat elections, non-recognition of the new parliament's legitimacy, and the launch of a coordinated resistance movement that will begin in Tbilisi and expand nationwide. [326]

On 15 November, a court in Tbilisi dismissed 11 lawsuits filed by opposition parties and civil society groups questioning the conduct of the election, during which the CEC was named as the defendant. [327] As the CEC officially certified the result the next day, its chair, Giorgi Kalandarishvili, was doused with black paint by CEC commissioner David Kirtadze, a UNM member who said that the official results of the vote did not reflect the electorate’s "true choice". [328] On 17 November, protesters calling for new elections established a tent camp in downtown Tbilisi, which was dismantled by police on 19 November. [329]

Notes

  1. People's Power is running its candidates on GD's party list.
  2. Republican Party, who got 2 seats last election as part of SU coalition is running its candidates on CfC's party list.
  3. The United National Movement in 2020 ran as a part of Strength is in Unity coalition getting 25 seats (with 8 being listed as non-partisan candidates). Progress and Freedom and Victorious Georgia were also a part of the Strength is in Unity coalition getting 4 and 1 seats respectively. Strategy Aghmashenebeli and Law and Justice together under the same bloc gaining 3 and 1 seat respectively, whilst European Georgia ran independently getting 5 seats.
  4. The Conservative Party of Georgia is running its candidates on FG's party list.
  5. In 2020, Lelo got 4 seats while Citizens got 2.
  6. As part of Strength is in Unity coalition
  7. The Ahali party was not mentioned in the answers, the results of the party are based on the answers given spontaneously by the respondents.[ clarification needed ]
  8. 1 2 3 4 The results are shown without allocating undecided voters.
  9. People's Power is running its candidates on GD's party list.
  10. Consists of Ahali, Girchi – More Freedom, Droa, and Republicans.
  11. Consists of United National Movement, Strategy Aghmashenebeli and European Georgia.
  12. Consists of Lelo, For the People, Citizens and Freedom Square
  13. Conservative Party of Georgia is running its candidates on For Georgia's party list.
  14. Conservative Movement/Alt-Info, Georgian Idea and Christian-Democratic Movement are running their candidates on APG's party list.

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">United National Movement</span> Liberal political party in Georgia

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Free Democrats (Georgia)</span> Liberal political party in Georgia

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">2012 Georgian parliamentary election</span>

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Georgian Dream</span> Populist political party in Georgia

Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia (GD), also colloquially known as the Kotsebi, is a populist political party in Georgia. It is currently the ruling party in Georgia. Irakli Garibashvili serves as the party chairman, while the former chairman Irakli Kobakhidze has served as the Prime Minister since February 2024. Bidzina Ivanishvili, widely considered the de facto leading person of the party, serves as its honorary chairman.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">State for the People (political party)</span> Defunct liberal political party in Georgia

State for the People was a liberal political party in Georgia. It was founded by the Georgian operatic bass Paata Burchuladze in 2016 participating in the election held the same year in a bloc of the same name. The coalition failed to cross 5% after which Burchuladze left the party, with Nika Machutadze becoming the chairman.

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United National Movement – United Opposition "Strength is in Unity" Faction was a politican coalition and a parliamentary faction in Georgia. It was led by United National Movement, the largest party within the bloc, and additionally included Progress and Freedom and Victorious Georgia parties. It was one of the two factions in the 10th Parliament of Georgia, serving in the opposition to the Georgian Dream government.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2019 protests in Georgia (country)</span> 2019 protests in Georgia

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Lelo for Georgia is a liberal political party in Georgia. It was established in 2019 by two businessmen Mamuka Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze. Soon after its founding, it attracted a number of prominent political figures and political parties with Development Movement and the New Rights Party merging to form a single political entity.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Girchi – More Freedom</span> Georgian political party

Girchi — More Freedom is a pro-Western libertarian political party in Georgia. It was in late 2020 founded by Zurab Japaridze, former leader of the New Political Center – Girchi, following the party split. The party was a part of Coalition for Change electoral alliance for the 2024 parliamentary election, receiving 3 seats in the Georgian parliament.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">For the People (Georgia)</span> Georgian political party

For the People is a centre-left political party in Georgia. It was founded in 2021 by the former Deputy Minister of Defence Ana Dolidze and participated in the 2021 local elections. It is currently a part of the Strong Georgia coalition taking part in the 2024 parliamentary election.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Droa</span> Liberal political party in Georgia

Droa! is a liberal political party in Georgia founded by Elene Khoshtaria in 2021, after her split from the European Georgia party. It was a part of the Coalition for Change alliance for the 2024 parliamentary election, receiving 2 seats in the Georgian parliament.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Iago Khvichia</span> Georgian politician

Iago Khvichia is a Georgian politician who served as a member of Parliament from 2020 to 2024. He is the chairman of New Political Center — Girchi, a right-libertarian political party.

Events in the year 2024 in Georgia.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ahali</span> Liberal political party in Georgia

Ahali is a liberal pro-European political party in Georgia. It was founded in 2024 by Nika Melia, former chairman of United National Movement, and Nika Gvaramia, former CEO of Mtavari Arkhi TV channel. It was a part of Coalition for Change political alliance for the 2024 parliamentary election, receiving 10 seats in the Georgian parliament.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Georgian Dream (political coalition)</span> 2012–2016 big tent Georgian coalition

Georgian Dream was a catch-all political alliance in Georgia formed around Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia party in opposition to the then-ruling United National Movement (UNM) party. The coalition was formed in 2012 with it winning the parliamentary election held in the same year. The alliance was dissolved in 2016 after which GD – DG went on to win 2016 and 2020 parliamentary elections independently.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Coalition for Change (Georgia)</span> 2024 liberal Georgian political coalition

Coalition for Change is an informal political coalition of pro-Western liberal political parties in Georgia. The coalition includes Ahali, Girchi – More Freedom, Droa, and Republican parties and Activists for the Future movement. It was created prior to the 2024 parliamentary election, in which it received 11.03% and finished on second place.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Unity – National Movement</span> Political party in Georgia

Unity – National Movement is an informal politician coalition of pro-Western political parties in Georgia. The coalition includes United National Movement, Strategy Aghmashenebeli, and European Georgia. It was created prior to the 2024 Georgian parliamentary election, in which it received 10.2% and finished on 3rd place.

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