Iranian intervention in Iraq (2014–present) | |||||||
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Part of international military intervention against the Islamic State, War in Iraq (2013–2017), IS insurgency in Iraq (2017–present) | |||||||
Territorial control (as of September 5, 2018) of Iraq, ISIL (gray), Iraqi Government (red), Rebel forces (green), Kurdish forces (yellow), Turkish forces (blue)[ dubious – discuss ] | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
Hezbollah Iraq Iraqi Kurdistan [1] al-Hashd al-Shaabi: Badr Organization [2] Muqawimun [3] Peace Brigades [4] Kata'ib al-Imam Ali [5] Islamic Resistance: Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq [2] Kata'ib Hezbollah [6] Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada [7] Sunni tribal militias: Christian militias: Kataib Rouh Allah Isa Ibn Mariam [10] | Naqshbandi Army [11] | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Izzat Ibrahim ad-Douri † Salah Al-Mukhtar | |||||||
Units involved | |||||||
Iranian Armed Forces | Military of ISIL | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
| Around 100,000 fighters (according to Kurdish Chief of Staff.) [19] At least a few hundred tanks [20] 3 drones [21] [22] [23] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
Hezbollah:
| Unknown |
The Iranian intervention in Iraq has its roots in the post-2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies, when the infrastructure of the Iraqi armed forces, as well as intelligence, were disbanded in a process called "de-Ba'athification" which allowed militias with close ties to Tehran to join the newly reconstituted army.
The intervention reached its peak following the advance of the Islamic State into northern Iraq in mid-2014. Iran began to provide military aid to counter the militant advance. Iran provided technical advisers to the Iraqi government and weapons to the Kurdish Peshmerga. Several sources, among them Reuters , believe that since mid-June 2014, Iranian combat troops are in Iraq, which Iran denies.
The Iraqi Shia militias Kata'ib Hezbollah ("Hezbollah Brigades") and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq ("League of the Righteous"), funded and trained by Iran, fought alongside the Iraqi Army and Peshmerga in retaking territory from ISIL.
After the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies, The Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the Iraqi military, security, and intelligence infrastructure of President Saddam Hussein and began a process of "de-Ba'athification". [26] [27] This move became an object of controversy, cited by some critics as the biggest American mistake made in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein [28] and as one of the main causes of the rise of the Islamic State. [29]
The Badr organisation, which fought alongside Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, was seen as a U.S. asset in the fight against Ba'athist partisans because of their opposition to Saddam Hussein. Shortly after the fall of Baghdad, Badr forces and other militias with close ties to Tehran reportedly joined the newly reconstituted army, police, and Interior Ministry in significant numbers. The Interior Ministry was controlled by SCIRI, and many Badr members became part of the Interior Ministry-run Wolf Brigade. The Iraqi Interior Minister, Bayan Jabr, was a former leader of the Badr Brigade militia.
The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and various other parties with military wings, all with close ties with Tehran, had pioneering role in forming the governments with close ties to Tehran.
According to the U.S. military and U.S. State Department, the Iraqi Shia militia Kata'ib Hezbollah ("Hezbollah Brigades"), which has existed since 2003, has received funding, training, logistics, guidance, and material support from the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps's Quds Force. Iran denies these claims. [6] [30]
Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq ("League of the Righteous"), another Iraqi Shia militia, formed in 2006, was assumed by Iraqi officials to have been receiving $2 million a month from Iran even before 2014, and assumed by The Guardian to be under the patronage of Qasem Soleimani. [31]
In 2019, protests broke out in Iraq demanding the end of corruption, nepotism, unemployment, and political sectarianism while also calling for an end to Iranian intervention in Iraqi affairs. [32] The Abdul-Mehdi government, backed by Iranian-backed militias used live bullets, marksmen, hot water, hot pepper gas, and tear gas against protesters, leading to many deaths and injuries. [33] [34] [35] [36]
The protests resulted in the resignation of Prime Minister Abdul-Mahdi and his government, and the appointment of Mustafa Al-Kadhimi. A new election law was also passed by the Council of Representatives.
The 2021 parliamentary election resulted in Pro-Iran parties losing seats in the newly elected Iraqi parliament and in turn led to 2021 Baghdad clashes. [37] [38] [39] [40]
In November 2021, Al-Kadhimi survived an assassination attempt via an explosive drone, two drones were shot down by the army while the last one targeted his residence in the heavily fortified Green Zone district of Baghdad. [41]
According to experts, the assassination attempt came as a response to pro-Iran parties losing seats in the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary election. [42]
Tehran's strategic objectives in its intervention in Iraq include keeping the Shia-led government in power and stabilising its border. [43] [44]
Iran has attempted to limit its overt military involvement in Iraq as a strategy geared toward avoiding the polarisation of Iraq's Sunni minority, creating a popular backlash against Iran among Iraqis, or deepening sectarian tensions. [44] The IRGC also attempted to create a more diversified model in Iraq, and began interacting more with Iraqi Turkmen and Feyli Kurds. [45] Most Iranian aid has thus far come in the form of technical assistance, the commitment of special forces troops, and air support. Iranian Brigadier-General Massoud Jazayeri stated that Iran could best help Iraq by providing it with direction on its "successful experiments in popular all-around defence" that included "mobilising masses of all ethnic groups." [46] Iran believes cooperation and unity among Iraq's fractious militias are essential in its battle against ISIL. [43] Ali Khamenei, in remarks delivered on 15 September 2014, credited "the people of Iraq, the Iraqi Armed Forces, and the popular forces" for halting the ISIL advance of the previous summer. [47]
The Washington Post reported that Iran has sent more than 1,000 military advisers to Iraq, and spent more than $1 billion on military aid. [48]
This section needs to be updated.(January 2022) |
In the week of 14 June, according to The Guardian , Iran's Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani was in Baghdad to organise an Iraqi counterattack against ISIL. [2] Press agency Reuters believes that since mid-June, Iran has had members of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fighting on the ground in Iraq against ISIL, though it does not give an estimate of their numbers. [49]
According to Iranian social media, ISIL troops on 19 June attacked two Iranian border guards near Iran's border city of Qasr Shirin, but this has not been confirmed by authoritative sources. [50]
American war correspondent David Axe, on his website 'War is Boring', asserted that on 21 June 2014 ", it appears Iran joined the air war" of Iraq and Syria against ISIL. [51]
By the end of June, according to American officials, Iran had established a control center at Al-Rasheed Air Base in Baghdad and was flying a small fleet of Ababil drones over Iraq, and an Iranian signals intelligence unit had been deployed at the airfield to intercept electronic communications between ISIL fighters and commanders. [52]
On 1 July, according to IISS, several Su-25 aircraft were sent by Iran to al-Rashid and, later, to the al-Muthanna air base. [53] The aircraft were supported by bi-national Iranian/Iraqi ground crews who had been trained in Iran. [15] (During the 1991 Gulf War, seven Su-25s had been flown by the Iraqi air force to Iran as a temporary safe haven, and Iran had kept them since; ironically, some of them may now have returned to Iraq. [53] )
On 5 July, Quds Force pilot Shojaat Alamdari was killed in Samarra, probably working there as a forward air controller. [15]
Iraqi Kurdish President Barzani and Iranian foreign minister Zarif said, at the end of August 2014, that Iran had been the first country to provide weapons and ammunition (at an unspecified date) to the Iraqi Kurdish forces (Peshmerga). Zarif said that Iran cooperated militarily with the Iraqi central government and the Kurds, but that it had "no military presence in Iraq". [1]
In contradiction to that Iranian denial, Business Insider , without naming its sources, contends that in early August, Iran's IRGC sent Quds Force personnel, attack aircraft, and drones to Iraq and that since early August Iran was operating its Su-25 aircraft (see July 2014) in combat against ISIL. [15]
But in early August, Qasem Soleimani, chief of the Iranian Quds Force, was indeed in Erbil advising Kurdish forces, an Iranian official admitted in early October 2014. [54]
On 21–22 August, according to Kurdish sources, hundreds of Iranian soldiers, allegedly from Iran's 81st Armored Division, [55] helped Peshmerga to take back Jalawla in Diyala Governorate from ISIL. Iran subsequently denied any military presence in Iraq. [56]
There were unconfirmed reports of clashes between ISIL forces and Revolutionary Guard Corps units near Urmia on 28 August. [57]
Between 31 August and 1 September, the Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militias Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib Hezbollah (see section Background) joined an Iraqi army and Kurdish Peshmerga assault to break the ISIL siege of Amerli in Saladin Governorate. The attack was supported by the U.S. Air Force at the request of the Iraqi army, according to a statement by the U.S. Central Command. [6] [58]
By early September, according to Business Insider , Iranian Quds Force personnel were deployed to Samarra, Baghdad, Karbala, and the former U.S. military post known as Camp Speicher. [15]
In late September, Iranian general Ahmad Reza Pourdastan threatened to "attack deep into Iraqi territory" should ISIL forces approach the Iranian border. [59] Earlier in the month, the Iranian government announced it had arrested Afghan and Pakistani nationals attempting to "cross Iran" to join ISIL. [60]
There have been sporadic reports of ISIL troops in Iranian Kurdistan. These claims are unverified. [61]
Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, chief of the Iranian Quds Force, was reportedly present on the battlefield during Operation Ashura. In early October, the Islamic Republic of Iran News Network (IRINN) published a picture of Soleimani, purportedly on some battlefield alongside Kurdish Peshmerga. [54] The Operation Ashura included Shi'ite paramilitary groups such as Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah and the Badr brigades along with their leader Hadi Al-Amiri. Hezbollah was also present to provide technical advice and combat support for the allied offensive against the town of Jurf al-Sakhr. [62]
On 14 November, it was reported that the army had taken full control of Baiji, forcing ISIL forces to withdraw, and on 18 November, the anti-terrorism force Mosul Battalion entered the refinery for the first time since June. However, this could not be confirmed independently. If confirmed, it would be a major victory for Iraqi forces. State television said that they had entered the gates of the refinery. [63] Meanwhile, it was confirmed that Iraqi forces were in full control of Baiji. Iraqi state television said Baiji's recapture was a "Graveyard for ISIS". [64] Later, the US Department of State congratulated the Iraqi forces for retaking the country's largest oil refinery, confirming the Iraqi victory. [65]
At the end of November, according to the Israeli website Haaretz , Al Jazeera broadcast a video showing Iranian F-4 Phantom jet-fighters bombing ISIL targets in northeastern Iraq, though Al Jazeera, in its report, alleged they were "Iraqi jet-fighters". [66] US rear Admiral John Kirby affirmed on 3 December that he had "indications that [Iran] did indeed fly air strikes with F-4 Phantoms" targeting ISIL positions in the eastern Iraqi province of Diyala. [67]
On 27 December, Iranian IRGC Brigadier General Hamid Taqavi was killed in Samarra, Iraq, reportedly by an ISIL sniper. [68] He is the highest ranking Iranian military official to die in Iraq since Iran's military intervention began, [69] other than Qasem Soleimani.
On 2 March, Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Iranian Quds Force, was directing Shia militia operations on the eastern flank during the surrounding of ISIL fighters, and was reportedly taking a leading role in the fighting of Iraqi forces and Shia militias against ISIL. [70] [71]
Jim Phillips of the American The Heritage Foundation in March described Suleimani's role in this war as: "he's Iran's viceroy for Iraq". [72]
American news website The Long War Journal states without revealing its sources that Iran has sent Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij members to fight ISIL in both Syria and Iraq. [73]
Jassem Nouri, a military commander of the IRGC, was killed on 28 May while fighting ISIL near Ramadi in Anbar province, according to Iranian sources. [73]
In late May, the American news website Vox characterised Qasem Soleimani as "leading Iraq's overall military strategy against ISIL". [74]
In late June 2014, three Iranian border guards were killed along the border in western Kermanshah province by an alleged "terrorist group", however it is unclear if the assailants were members of PJAK or ISIL. [75]
There are at least 13 confirmed Iranians killed in Iraq:
In late July 2014, it was reported that Ibrahim al-Haj, a Hezbollah "technical specialist involved in training" was killed near Mosul. [89] [90]
Iraq:
Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said, "We do respect this Iranian commander and our collaboration with him is not a secret", adding that Iran was quick in selling arms to Iraq and helping Baghdad when Islamic State captured large areas in the country.
Hadi al-Amiri, leader of the Badr Organization, said, "If it were not for the cooperation of the Islamic Republic of Iran and General Suleimani, we would not today have a government headed by Haider al-Abadi in Baghdad". [91] During the Second Battle of Tikrit, Hadi al-Amiri said US has failed to live up to its promises to help Iraq fight ISIL, unlike the "unconditional" assistance being given by Iran. [92]
On 31 December 2014, Defence Ministers of Iran and Iraq signed a military pact to combat ISIS. [93]
"Iranians will try to calm the fears of the Sunnis instead of persecuting them because the Iranian officials know that it is in their best interest to keep Iraq united," said Hadi Jalo, a Baghdad-based political analyst. "For the Iranians, it is easier to dominate one country instead of three separate states." [94]
United States - Following the introduction of Iranian troops into Iraq in June 2014, President Barack Obama said, "Iran can play a constructive role if it is helping to send the same message to the Iraqi government that we're sending." [95]
In July, Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel offered further explanation, "We are aware of the Iranian and Russian efforts to help the Iraqis, but we are not involved in coordinating any missions." [96]
In September 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry said the US "does not have any intention" of cooperating with Iran. [97] Nevertheless, later that month, Kerry met with Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in New York City where the two discussed ISIL. [98]
The US in December 2014 continued to deny cooperation with Iran with American Ambassador to Iraq Stuart E. Jones saying: "Let's face it, Iran is an important neighbour to Iraq. There has to be cooperation between Iran and Iraq. The Iranians are talking to the Iraqi security forces and we're talking to Iraqi security forces ... We're relying on them to do the deconfliction" in December 2014. [99]
At the end of March 2015, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff of the US Armed Forces, Gen. Martin Dempsey, stated that Iran's overt role in the Second Battle of Tikrit (March–April 2015) could be positive and could only become problematic if it descended into sectarianism. [100] [101]
At the same time as the Iranian intervention in Iraq, a parallel American-led intervention was occurring. Neither nation is known to have cooperated with the other in combating ISIL. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has dismissed U.S. involvement, noting that "Iran, from the very first moment, did not hesitate in fighting against terrorism. Other countries apparently had their doubts for quite some time ... they acted quite late in the game." [108] Rouhani went on to question the level of American commitment, noting that the U.S. had not committed ground troops, as Iran had [109] with, according to The Economist , Iranian officials boasting of being the ground force for America's air strikes. [110]
On 29 September, in response to a statement by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry that the United States wanted "to find out if they [Iran] will come on board" the American-led intervention, Ali Khamenei declared the U.S. position on ISIL as "absurd, hollow and biased." Nonetheless, Khamenei also noted that some Iranian government officials were "not against" cooperation with the United States, explaining that he had personally quashed the suggestion of joint action against ISIL. [47] In follow-up remarks, the Iranian-affiliated Kata'ib Hezbollah declared it would "not fight alongside the American troops under any kind of conditions whatsoever," adding that its only contact with the United States military would be "if we fight each other." [104]
At least one Hezbollah official has indicated the party will continue to operate independently, or in concert with Iraqi and Iranian forces, against ISIL and will not cooperate with the U.S.-led coalition concurrently operating against ISIL. Mohammad Raad dismissed the NATO-centred coalition as neither serious nor sufficient to counter ISIL and noted that Hezbollah had initiated military operations against the ISIL prior to United States involvement. [111]
Despite the cool reception given by Iran and its allies to the United States intervention, some observers believe the U.S. coalition will eventually be forced into brokering an alliance with Tehran. Eyal Zisser of Tel Aviv University has explained that "the West is helpless and does not know what to do against the Islamic State" and that it will ultimately conclude it has no choice but to ally with Iran. [112]
The Quds Force is one of five branches of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) specializing in unconventional warfare and military intelligence operations. U.S. Army's Iraq War General Stanley McChrystal describes the Quds Force as an organization analogous to a combination of the CIA and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in the United States. Responsible for extraterritorial operations, the Quds Force supports non-state actors in many countries, including Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthi movement, and Shia militias in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. According to Michael Wigginton et al., the Al-Quds Force is "a classic example of state-sponsored terrorism."
Qasem Soleimani was an Iranian military officer who served in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). From 1998 until his assassination by the United States in 2020, he was the commander of the Quds Force, an IRGC division primarily responsible for extraterritorial and clandestine military operations, and played a key role in the Syrian Civil War through securing Russian intervention. He was described as "the single most powerful operative in the Middle East" and a "genius of asymmetric warfare." Former Mossad director Yossi Cohen said Soleimani's strategies had "personally tightened a noose around Israel's neck."
Special Groups (SGs) is a designation given by the United States military to the cell-based Shi'a paramilitary organizations operating within Iraq, According to the United States these groups are funded, trained, and armed by the Iranian Quds Force, part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Kata'ib Hezbollah, also known as the Hezbollah Brigades, is a radical Iraqi Shiite paramilitary group which is a part of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), staffing the 45th, 46th, and 47th Brigades. During the Iraq War (2003–11), the group fought against Coalition forces. It has been active in the War in Iraq (2013–2017) and the Syrian Civil War. The group was commanded by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis until he was killed in a US drone attack in 2020. Thereafter, Abdul Aziz al-Muhammadawi became the new leader of the PMF. The group seeks to establish an Iran-aligned government in Iraq, expel American forces from the country, and advance the regional and international interests of Iran in Iraq and the region. The group is responsible for killing hundreds of U.S. soldiers and takes a central part in carrying out attacks against U.S. targets in Iraq and acts as part of the Axis of Resistance. Kata'ib Hezbollah has received extensive training, funding, logistic support, weapons, and intelligence from the IRGC's overseas military-intelligence service Quds Force.
The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic are close strategic allies, and Iran has provided significant support for the Syrian government in the Syrian civil war, including logistical, technical and financial support, as well as training and some combat troops. Iran sees the survival of the Syrian government as being crucial to its regional interests. When the uprising developed into the Syrian Civil War, there were increasing reports of Iranian military support, and of Iranian training of the National Defence Forces both in Syria and Iran. From late 2011 and early 2012, Iran's IRGC began sending tens of thousands of Iranian troops and foreign paramilitary volunteers in coordination with the Syrian government to prevent the collapse of the Syrian Arab Army; thereby polarising the conflict along sectarian lines.
The Northern Iraq offensive began on 4 June 2014, when the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, assisted by various insurgent groups in the region, began a major offensive from its territory in Syria into Iraq against Iraqi and Kurdish forces, following earlier clashes that had begun in December 2013 involving guerillas.
The departure of US troops from Iraq in 2011 ended the period of occupation that had begun with the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003. The time since U.S. withdrawal has been marked by a renewed Iraqi insurgency and by a spillover of the Syrian civil war into Iraq. By 2013, the insurgency escalated into a renewed war, the central government of Iraq being opposed by ISIL and various factions, primarily radical Sunni forces during the early phase of the conflict. The war ended in 2017 with an Iraqi government and allied victory, however ISIL continues a low-intensity insurgency in remote parts of the country.
The siege of Amirli was a siege of the predominantly Shi'ite Turkmen town of Amirli in Iraq by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) during the War in Iraq. The town was besieged by ISIL forces for 50 days from June 2014, lacking access to food, electricity, and water. Most of the residents are Shia Turkmen, who had organized local self-defense militias to fight against ISIL. On August 31, the Iraqi military reportedly broke the siege and entered the town. It has been described as "Iraq's biggest victory against ISIS", as of September 2014.
On 15 June 2014 U.S. President Barack Obama ordered United States forces to be dispatched in response to the Northern Iraq offensive of the Islamic State (IS), as part of Operation Inherent Resolve. At the invitation of the Iraqi government, American troops went to assess Iraqi forces and the threat posed by ISIL.
Liberation of Jurf Al Sakhar, codenamed Operation Ashura, was a two-day military operation by Iraqi government forces and Iranian-backed PMU forces beginning on 24 October 2014, aimed at retaking the strategic city of Jurf Al Sakhar near Baghdad from ISIL. The operation was mainly aimed at preventing ISIS militants from reaching the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf, where ISIS threatened to carry out attacks against the millions of Shia visitors commemorating the Day of Ashura.
The Second Battle of Tikrit was a battle in which Iraqi Security Forces recaptured the city of Tikrit from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Iraqi forces consisted of the Iraqi Army and the Popular Mobilization Forces, receiving assistance from Iran's Quds Force officers on the ground, and air support from the American, British, and French air forces.
The Salahuddin Campaign was a military conflict in the Saladin Governorate, located in north-central Iraq, involving various factions fighting against a single common enemy, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. The province exited Iraqi government control during ISIL's Northern Iraq offensive when large swathes of the north of the country were captured by the militant group with the Iraqi national army quickly disintegrating in the path of its advance. In light of the sweeping gains of the militants, Nouri Al-Maliki, the Prime Minister of Iraq at that time, attempted to declare a state of emergency though the Iraqi Parliament blocked his efforts to do so.
The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), also known as the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), is an Iraqi state-sponsored paramilitary network composed of about 67 armed factions of primarily Iranian-backed Shi'ite groups, but also include Sunni Muslim, Christian, and Yazidi groups. The PMF were formed in 2014 and fought in nearly every major battle during the War in Iraq (2013-17) against Islamic State. Many of its main militias that belong to the Shia faction, trace their origins to the "Special Groups", Iranian-sponsored Shi'ite groups that previously fought in the Iraqi insurgency against the United States and the Coalition forces, as well as a sectarian conflict against Sunni Jihadist and Ba'athist insurgents. It has been labeled the new Iraqi Republican Guard after it was fully reorganized in early 2018 by its then-Commander Haider al-Abadi, Prime Minister of Iraq from 2014 to 2018, who issued "regulations to adapt the situation of the Popular Mobilization fighters".
Jamal Ja'far Muhammad Ali Al Ibrahim, known by the kunyaAbu Mahdi al-Muhandis was an Iraqi commander of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). At the time of his death, he was deputy chief of the PMF and regarded as one of Iraq's most powerful men.
Iran is an opponent of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), fighting the group in Syria and Iraq.
Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, officially the 12th Brigade, is a radical Iraqi Shi'ite paramilitary group that is especially active in Syria and Iraq. It was established in 2013 by Akram al-Kaabi to support Bashar al-Assad in Syria against Islamist rebels. The group is supported by the IRGC's Quds Force, which provides the funding, weapons, and training of its members.
The Russia–Syria–Iran–Iraq coalition, also referred to as 4+1, is a joint intelligence-sharing cooperation between opponents of the Islamic State (IS) with operation rooms in Syria's Damascus and Iraq's Green Zone in Baghdad. It was formed as a consequence of an agreement reached at the end of September 2015 between Russia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic to "help and cooperate in collecting information about the terrorist Daesh group" (ISIL) with a view to combatting the advances of the group, according to the statement issued by the Iraqi Joint Operations Command. The statement also cited "the increasing concern from Russia about thousands of Russian terrorists committing criminal acts within ISIS."
In early 2014, the jihadist group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant captured extensive territory in Western Iraq in the Anbar campaign, while counter-offensives against it were mounted in Syria. Raqqa in Syria became its headquarters. The Wall Street Journal estimated that eight million people lived under its control in the two countries.
The Baqir Brigade, is a Syrian pro-government militia originating in the Aleppo Governorate that fights in the Syrian Civil War. The militia is one of the most prominent and largest pro-government militias from the Aleppo area and part of the "Local Defence Forces" network. Its members mostly consists of tribesmen from the al-Baggara tribe that traditionally supported the rule of the al-Assad family despite being mostly Sunni Muslim. Though the militia's fighters thus come from a largely Sunni background, many of them have converted to or are at least strongly influenced by Shia Islam. The Baqir Brigade has also been noted for its strong connections to the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran, and various Shiite Iraqi militias, and is thus generally considered to be a Shia or "Shi'ified" fighting force.
On 3 January 2020, Qasem Soleimani, an Iranian major general, was killed by an American drone strike near Baghdad International Airport, Iraq, while travelling to meet Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi.
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