In computer science, approximate string matching is the technique of finding strings that match a pattern approximately. The problem of approximate string matching is typically divided into two sub-problems: finding approximate substring matches inside a given string and finding dictionary strings that match the pattern approximately.
In mathematics, economics and computer science, particularly in the fields of combinatorics, game theory and algorithms, the stable-roommate problem (SRP) is the problem of finding a stable matching for an even-sized set. A matching is a separation of the set into disjoint pairs ("roommates"). The matching is stable if there are no two elements which are not roommates and which both prefer each other to their roommate under the matching. This is distinct from the stable-marriage problem in that the stable-roommates problem allows matches between any two elements, not just between classes of "men" and "women".
Alvin Eliot Roth is an American academic. He is the Craig and Susan McCaw professor of economics at Stanford University and the Gund professor of economics and business administration emeritus at Harvard University. He was President of the American Economic Association in 2017.
Market design is an interdisciplinary, engineering-driven approach to economics and a practical methodology for creation of markets of certain properties, which is partially based on mechanism design. In market design, the focus is on the rules of exchange, meaning who gets allocated what and by what procedure. Market design is concerned with the workings of particular markets in order to fix them when they are broken or to build markets when they are missing. Practical applications of market design theory has included labor market matching, organ transplantation, school choice, university admissions, and more.
The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), also called The Match, is a United States–based private non-profit non-governmental organization created in 1952 to place U.S. medical school students into residency training programs located in United States teaching hospitals. Its mission has since expanded to include the placement of U.S. citizen and non-U.S. citizen international medical school students and graduates into residency and fellowship training programs. In addition to the annual Main Residency Match that in 2021 encompassed more than 48,000 applicants and 38,000 positions, the NRMP conducts Fellowship Matches for more than 60 subspecialties through its Specialties Matching Service (SMS). The NRMP is sponsored by a board of directors that includes medical school deans, teaching hospital executives, graduate medical education program directors, medical students and residents, and one public member.
In mathematics, economics, and computer science, the Gale–Shapley algorithm is an algorithm for finding a solution to the stable matching problem. It is named for David Gale and Lloyd Shapley, who published it in 1962, although it had been used for the National Resident Matching Program since the early 1950s. Shapley and Alvin E. Roth won the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics for work including this algorithm.
In computational complexity theory, CC (Comparator Circuits) is the complexity class containing decision problems which can be solved by comparator circuits of polynomial size.
Top trading cycle (TTC) is an algorithm for trading indivisible items without using money. It was developed by David Gale and published by Herbert Scarf and Lloyd Shapley.
Daniel Mier Gusfield is an American computer scientist, Distinguished Professor of Computer Science at the University of California, Davis. Gusfield is known for his research in combinatorial optimization and computational biology.
The rural hospitals theorem (RHT) is a fundamental theorem in the theory of stable matching. It considers the problem of matching doctors to hospitals for residency, where each doctor is matched to a single hospital but each hospital has several positions for doctors. The total number of positions is larger than the total number of doctors, so some hospitals inevitably remain with unfilled positions. Usually, rural hospitals are less wanted than urban hospitals, so they often remain with many empty positions. This raised the question of whether the mechanism used to match doctors to hospitals can be changed in order to help these rural hospitals.
Stable marriage with indifference is a variant of the stable marriage problem. Like in the original problem, the goal is to match all men to all women such that no pair of man and woman who are unmarried to each other, would simultaneously like to leave their present partners and pair with each other instead.
In mathematics, economics, and computer science, the lattice of stable matchings is a distributive lattice whose elements are stable matchings. For a given instance of the stable matching problem, this lattice provides an algebraic description of the family of all solutions to the problem. It was originally described in the 1970s by John Horton Conway and Donald Knuth.
In mathematics, economics, and computer science, the stable matching polytope or stable marriage polytope is a convex polytope derived from the solutions to an instance of the stable matching problem.
Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis is a book on matching markets in economics and game theory, particularly concentrating on the stable marriage problem. It was written by Alvin E. Roth and Marilda Sotomayor, with a preface by Robert Aumann, and published in 1990 by the Cambridge University Press as volume 18 in their series of Econometric Society monographs. For this work, Roth and Sotomayor won the 1990 Frederick W. Lanchester Prize of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences.
Course allocation is the problem of allocating seats in university courses among students. Many universities impose an upper bound on the number of students allowed to register to each course, in order to ensure that the teachers can give sufficient attention to each individual student. Since the demand for some courses is higher than the upper bound, a natural question is which students should be allowed to register to each course.
In economics, stable matching theory or simply matching theory, is the study of matching markets. Matching markets are distinguished from Walrasian markets in the focus of who matches with whom. Matching theory typically examines matching in the absence of search frictions, differentiating it from search and matching theory. In 2012, the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded to Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd Shapley for their work on matching theory.
In economics and social choice theory, a no-justified-envy matching is a matching in a two-sided market, in which no agent prefers the assignment of another agent and is simultaneously preferred by that assignment.
The Marriage Pact is an annual matchmaking activity that takes place on American college campuses, by which students fill out compatibility surveys in order to find a partner among fellow participants, who they agree will be their backup "safety" spouse in the future in case they are then unmarried.
In mechanism design, a regret-free truth-telling mechanism is a mechanism in which each player who reveals his true private information does not feel regret after seeing the mechanism outcome. A regret-free mechanism incentivizes agents who want to avoid regret to report their preferences truthfully.
The Aphrodite Project is an annual matchmaking event that takes place on university campuses in Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United States. Students fill out a questionnaire built on psychology research to be matched with their most ideal date on campus using classical and machine learning algorithms.
