127,695,183 people are eligible to vote in the election,[2] making it the "biggest democratic process of 2026".[3] 1,981 candidates will contest for the 300 seats in the election.[4] Major parties are expected to contest, however, the Awami League, the winner of the previous four elections, is currently suspended, and is not participating in the election.[5] This has made the election a "bipolar contest" between the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the 11 Party Alliance led by the Jamaat-e-Islami and the National Citizen Party (NCP).[6]
Key campaign issues and agendas include unemployment, corruption, extortionism, proportional representation (PR), and promises to the youth and the minority vote bank. According to Khan, the professor at SOAS University, the election will be decided "less by ideology and more by promises of governance".[6] This will be the first election in Bangladesh where postal votes would be used. The "No Vote" option is also reintroduced.[7]
The main opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, demanded that the government hand over power to a neutral caretaker government before the January 2024 elections.[12] This was rejected by Hasina, who vowed that "Bangladesh will never allow an unelected government again".[13] Hasina's resistance to a caretaker government arose following the 2006–2008 political crisis, during which a caretaker government assumed military-backed control of the country and arrested a number of political leaders, including Hasina and the former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia.[14] Khaleda Zia was sentenced to prison for five years on 8 February 2018, for her involvement in the Zia Orphanage corruption case.[15] The sentence was then modified to 10 years.[16] Zia's successor as chair of the party, her son Tarique Rahman, was also found guilty of criminal conspiracy and multiple counts of murder for a grenade attack in 2004 that injured Hasina and killed 24 people.[17] He was sentenced to life in prison. As such, he was barred from running for office.[18]
A petition demanding a ban on the Awami League & its associates of the Grand Alliance filed by the student agitators[25] had been turned down by the Appellate Division.[26] On 9 April 2025, The NCP, Jamaat-e-Islami & other Islamist organisations like the Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh staged a 2025 Shahbag protest in front of the Jamuna State Guest House, the residence of the Chief Adviser, demanding a ban on the Awami League.[27] On the following day, the interim government banned Awami League and all of its activities in cyberspace and elsewhere, under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2009. The ban would last until the International Crimes Tribunal completes the trial of the party and its leaders.[28][29] On 17 November 2025, the International Crimes Tribunal ruled that Hasina and her co-defendants were guilty of war crimes and sentenced her along with former home minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal to death.[30]
Khaleda Zia, former Bangladesh Prime Minister who was acquitted of all charges after the 2024 Bangladesh quota reform movement died on 30 December 2025 after a prolonged illness sparking a change in Bangladesh political landscape.[31]
Electoral system
The 350 members of the Jatiya Sangsad consist of 300 directly elected seats using first-past-the-post voting (FPTP) in single-member constituencies, and an additional 50 seats reserved for women. The reserved seats are elected proportionally by the elected members. Each parliament sits for a five-year term.[32]
2026 Bangladeshi general election and referendum postal ballot receiving envelope.2026 Bangladeshi general election and referendum postal ballot sending envelope.
The Interim government introduced reforms before the election, including reintroduction of "no vote" for the single candidate constituencies.[33] It would be the first general election in Bangladesh where expatriates will vote through postal ballot.[34]
Voters
According to the final voter list published by the Election Commission of Bangladesh, 127,695,183 people are eligible to vote in the election, 64,814,907 among whom are male, 62,879,042 are female, and 1,234 are third gender voters. The growth rate of the male voters was 2.29%, and the female voters was 4.16%.[2] With 804,333 voters, Gazipur-2 is the largest constituency by the number of voters, while Jhalokati-1 is at the lowest number with 227,431 voters.[35]
Campaign and electoral preparations
Major campaign issues
Unemployment
Unemployment has been a major problem for the Bangladeshi economy, especially affecting the youth. According to a Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics report, Bangladesh's overall youth unemployment rate stood at 4.48% in 2024, which was 4.15% in 2023.[36][37] In 2024, 87% of the unemployeds were educated, and 21% of them were graduates, showing the lack of job growth needed to accommodate the increasing workforce.[38] A 2024 study found that 55% of the Bangladeshi youth wished to leave the country due to the rising unemployment rate.[39] Unemployment was one of the core factor behind the July Revolution of 2024.[40]
Corruption
Corruption remains a major issue in the country. Bangladesh ranked 151st out of 180 countries in the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index in 2024, slipping from 149 in 2023.[41] The issue of corruption took a central stage in election campaigns.[42][43]
A Shushashoner Jonno Nagorik opinion poll conducted on 1,373 person between May and July 2025 found that 71% people in the country support PR in the proposed upper house of the Jatiya Sangsad.[55]
Eight parties led by Jamaat-e-Islami organized mass demonstrations in Dhaka in support of PR on 11 November 2025.[56] It's leaders also warned general election not to take place before a referendum on July Charter.[57]
Youth vote bank
Nearly 56 million of the 127 million registered voters are aged between 18 and 37, constitute about 44 percent of the electorate, large portion of them belong to Generation Z, the main demographic contributor to the July Revolution. Due to three previously one-sided elections, this election is expected to be first competitive election to the cohort. According to the Al Jazeera, these young voters are unified "less by ideology than by a shared suspicion of institutions, which, for most of their adult lives, have failed to represent them". The youth vote bank have been a focal point of party campaigns, and is widely considered to be the turning factor in the election.[58]
Hindu and Awami League vote bank
A large number of Hindus voted for the Awami League in the previous general elections. Due to absence of the party in the 2026 election, parties like the BNP and the Jamaat-e-Islami actively conducted programmes to attract the Hindu voters.[59][60] The BBC Bangla reported that the BNP maintains a stronghold amongst the Hindu voters,[60] and the party promised to create special tribunal and security cell to prevent communal violence against the religious minorities.[61] Two leaders of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad were nominated from the BNP. On the other side, Jamaat-e-Islami established committees including minorities and nominated a Hindu candidate.[62] The CPB filled 17 minority candidates in the election, which is the highest among the competing parties.[63]
Besides, BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami have also taken strategies to attract former voters of Awami League and it's allies, which include recruiting former AL politicians, promising legal protections etc.[62] Analysing an October–November youth survey by the Bangladesh Youth Leadership Center (BYCL), which showed that a surprisingly large number of Awami League voters switched to the Jamaat-e-Islami, the British journalist David Bergman provided two possible reasons for this shift, first, due to the punitive stance of the BNP towards the AL at the local level, Jamaat-e-Islami is came to be viewed as the "lesser of two evils" by those AL supporters; and secondly, Jamaat-e-Islami's victory may be sought to a group of AL supporters as a "vindication", that the AL's claim to have been the "only true barrier preventing Bangladesh from sliding toward a religious state" was valid.[64]
Party campaigns and preparations
Bangladesh Nationalist Party
Bangladesh Nationalist Party's campaign for 2026 Bangladeshi general election
The BNP's primary candidates selection started in late-September 2025.[65] The party sources reported that the candidates in approximately 200 seats were finalized by mid-October. However, the party was facing difficulties to determine candidates for 60–70 seats in due to internal conflicts and multiple strong candidates.[66]
The BNP announced their candidacy list for 237 constituencies on 3 November 2025. It's incumbent chairperson and former prime minister of Bangladesh, Khaleda Zia, would compete from three constituencies.[67] However, serious dissatisfaction arose over the nomination in more than 40 seats, leading to frequent protests by the supporters of several nomination seekers. Party leaders feared that this might weaken the party unity in several electorates.[68]
In the second phrase, the BNP declared candidacy list for 36 seats, including seats of many leaders of the allied parties. This created dissatisfaction among the allied parties, which even led to the conclusion of Bangladesh Labour Party's 18-year-long alignment with the party,[69] while two allied parties, the Liberal Democratic Party (Bangladesh) and the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Rab), declared contesting in the election independently.[70] On the other hand, the Bangladesh Liberal Democratic Party and the Bangladesh Jatiya Dal merged with the BNP.[71][72]
However, due to the failure to get the nomination, many politicians who are hoping for the BNP nomination are contesting the election as independent candidates, who have been identified as "rebel" candidates by the party. According to a report in Prothom Alo, efforts are being made from the top levels of the party to convince them, and action has been announced against them if they do not comply. Some leaders, including Rumeen Farhana, have already been expelled from the party for the same reason.[77]
Tarique Rahman, the acting chairman of the BNP, returned to Bangladesh on 25 December 2025, after 17 years in exile.[78][79]BBC Bangla reported that the BNP's electoral campaign would revolve around the personality of Tarique. However, experts think that it may create challenges for the BNP due to his controversial legacy involving the Hawa Bhaban and corruption.[80] The party is trying to position itself in the centre, and it's recent rhetoric provided a "liberal mantle" and preservation of the legacy of the Liberation War.[81][82] The party also aimed to appeal to the center-left voters.[82]
BNP's key campaign pledge include "family card", issued to 4 million households which would provide a necessary amount of money to support monthly income of a family, and "farmer card", which would provide subsidized services to the farmers. The party also promised to create 10 million jobs within 18 months. Other promises include "one teacher, one tab" initiative, reopening mid-day meal services to the schools, expansion of deregulation of commerce, recruitment of 1 million healthcare workers etc.[83]
For the first time, since the 1991 general election, the BNP has decided to participate the elections on its own, without being in formal/informal alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami. The BNP general secretary Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir confirmed the conclusion of its alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami in August 2025.[84] Political analyst Faisal Mahmud suggested that the split maybe driven by the BNP's attempt to "appropriate the moral vocabulary of secular nationalism" in order to occupy the "void" left by the AL. According to him, the split can reshape Bangladesh's future political landscape "dramatically".[81]
Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami
Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami's campaign for 2026 Bangladeshi general election
Jamaat-e-Islami also tried to unify these parties into an electoral alliance,[86] however, later it was decided to form an electoral convenience. Prothom Alo reported that they were also tying to contanct with NCP, AB Party and GOP.[87] On 28 December 2025, Jamaat-e-Islami announced the electoral alliance with the Liberal Democratic Party and the National Citizen Party.[88] Bangladesh Labour Party also joined the alliance on 24 January 2025.[89] On the other hand, Islami Andolan Bangladesh, a founding member of Like-minded 8 Parties, left the alliance after failing to compromise seats.[90]
Prothom Alo also reported that approximately 80% candidates of the Jamaat-e-Islami's primary nomination list are new, who have no pior experience of contesting a general election. The party sources say that it's an attempt to bring young leadership to the forefront.[86]
The Jamaat-e-Islami is trying to position itself as the "vanguard of the July uprising" and a "viable alternative to established political parties, such as Awami League and BNP", both of which have controversial records in governance.[82] According to the political analyst Saleh Uddin Ahmad, the party has succeeded creating an image of a relatively corruption free and a modest party, which may give them a strategic upper hand in the election. Despite this, he also pointed out that the party's religious ideology and historical legacy may work as a hindrance for the party's electoral campaign.[91]
Jamaat-e-Islami's campaign promises heavily concentrated on interest-free loans and tax cuts. The party pledged to introduce "smart social security card", which would bring all the government services under a single umbrella. The party also promised to train 10 million youth and to develop 1.5 million entrepreneurs and 500,000 million freelancers within five years. Other pledges include interest-free student loans, extensive consumer tax cuts, freezing industrial utility tarrifs for three years, reopening closed factories under public private ownership for with 10% allocation for the workers, free healthcare for the older citizens and children etc.[83]
Jamaat-e-Islami Emir Shafiqur Rahman promised not to implement sharia law if they form government.[92] According to The Washington Post, the US has expanded engagement with the Jamaat-e-Islami. In a leaked recording, an American diplomat reportedly said that the US does not believe that the party is able to implement Sharia, and if they attempt to make move concerning to the US, then the US "would have 100 percent tariffs put on them the next day".[93]
National Citizen Party
National Citizen Party's campaign for 2026 Bangladeshi general election
The NCP published their "Manifesto of New Bangladesh" on 3 August 2025 at Central Shaheed Minar, Dhaka. Although not a formal electoral manifesto, it outlined their party policies and agenda if they form government. The manifesto promises a new constitution, state recognition of the July Revolution and massacre, minimization of the role of black money in politics, introduction of "whistleblower protection law" and "Village Parliament", dissolution of the Rapid Action Battalion, introduction of universal healthcare, increased state funding on STEM education, artificial intelligence and biotechnology research, increase of women reserved seats in the Jatiya Sangsad to 100, recognition of houseworks in the GDP, establishment of a "Permanent Labor Commission", green technology, strong foreign & defence policy and bilateral solutions to the issues like deaths along the Bangladesh–India border, water sharing of transboundary rivers and Rohingya refugee crisis.[94]
The NCP's campaign is heavily concentrated on constituent assembly election and new constitution, which was decided in a party meeting on 13–14 August. Their unofficial slogans include "This time people, want constituent assembly election" and "Solution to Bangladesh, a new constitution".[95]
The NCP became the first party to issue nomination forms from 6 November 2025. Notably, they kept 80% discounts for labour-peasants and injured protesters of the July Revolution.[96] The party interviewed more than 1,000 nomination seekers among ordinary citizens nationwide over two days in November. Its leaders moved from booth to booth for suitable candidates.[97] According to the Daily Jugantor, approximately 60% candidates primarily nominated by the NCP were non-NCP members.[98] The party declared their primary candidacy list for 125 seats on 10 December 2025, including the seats of major leaders.[99]
AB Party chairman Mojibur Rahman Monju hinted a possible alliance consisting of the NCP, his party, the Gono Odhikar Parishad and the 6 member parties of the Ganatantra Manch alliance in October 2025.[100][101] The NCP, GOP, AB Party, Rastro Songskar Andolan, Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Rab), and United People's Bangladesh expressed interest to join the alliance. However, the NCP's opposition to the inclusion of UP Bangladesh, a splinter faction of the party, and GOP's internal disputes hampered the formation of the alliance.[102] On 7 December 2025, "Democratic Reform Alliance" was established consisting the NCP, the AB Party, and the Rastro Songskar Andolan. The NCP leader Nahid Islam described it as "not only an electoral alliance – but also a political alliance".[103]
Initially, Jamaat-e-Islami and NCP, close and supportive on the issues related to constitutional and electoral reforms, had shown difference and distance on electoral activities. NCP was seen as uninterested to go into any electoral alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamist parties. According to BBC Bangla, the leftist politicians of NCP were pressuring the party leadership for this.[104] However, from late-December, NCP's alliance with Jamaat-e-Islami suddenly reemerged, creating significant discussion. On 28 December, Jamaat-e-Islami confirmed its electoral alliance with the NCP.[88] Protesting the decision, NCP leaders Tasnim Jara and Tasnuva Jabeen resigned from the party,[105][106] while Mahfuj Alam, former adviser who had previously expressed interest of joining the NCP, retracted from the decision.[107]
NCP declared their electoral manifesto on 30 January 2026. Their manifesto, named the "Manifesto of Youth and Dignity", contained 36 points (signifying the July 36). Their key pledges include lowering the voting age to 16, creating 10 million "dignified" jobs over the next five years, eradicating extortion to bring the political cost of doing business down to zero, and facilitating "reverse brain drain" by bringing talented professionals back to the country through one-off funding mechanisms, etc.[108]
Jatiya Party (Ershad)
Since Hussain Muhammad Ershad's lifetime, the Jatiya Party had been divided into three factions — the Quader faction (led by Ghulam Muhammad Quader), the Raushan faction (led by Raushan Ershad, and the Anisul faction (led by Anisul Islam Mahmud). According to the Daily Manab Zamin significant dispute is ongoing among these factions over the party's electoral symbol plough. Each of factions want to the symbol over their own nominated candidates.[109]
On 8 December 2025, National Democratic Front, led by the Anisul faction and the Jatiya Party (Manju), was launched including 18 parties.[110][111] On 23 December, the alliance declared candidates for 119 constituencies on 23 December, including the seats of top leaders of the member parties.[112] On the other side, the Quader faction declared their final candidacy list on 26 December.[113]
Communist Party of Bangladesh
Communist Party of Bangladesh campaign for 2026 Bangladeshi general election
On 29 November 2025, Democratic United Front (DUF) was announced at a national coalition, jointly organised by the CPB-led Left Democratic Alliance and the BJSD.[115] The convention adopted a seven‑point political proposal outlining the coalition's ideological commitments and electoral strategy. Leaders called for uniting left‑wing, progressive, democratic, and "pro–Liberation War forces". The DUF declared their electoral manifesto on 23 January 2026, where emphasis were placed on the freedom of speech and expression, literary, cultural and democratic ambitions, development of youth power, and reorganization of educational system.[116]
Timeline
Poll Event
Schedule
Official declaration from the chief adviser
5 August 2025
Declaration of the schedule
11 December 2025
Application deadline for candidates
29 December 2025
Scrutiny of nomination
30 December 2025 – 4 January 2026
Last date for withdrawal of nomination
20 January 2026
Symbol allocation
21 January 2026
Postal voting
22 January – 12 February 2025
Start of campaign period
22 January 2026
End of campaign period
10 February 2026
Date of poll
12 February 2026
Date of counting of votes
12 February 2026
Date of reserved seats Poll
13 February 2026
Pre-poll
In a televised address to the nation on 6 June 2025, Yunus declared the general election would be held on any day of the first half of April 2026.[117] The BNP and Jatiya Party (Ershad) opposed holding elections in mid-2026, and demanded that the date be moved forward to December 2025, citing Kalbaisakhi storms and Ramadan.[118] Later on 5 August, Yunus said in a televised broadcast that he would write to the Election Commission to request the election be held in February 2026 before the Ramadan, which will begin as early as 17 February.[119][120]
On 22 December, Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus inaugurated ten campaigning trucks named "Super Caravan", whose work will be to agitate public consciousness on election and informations about referendum.[122]
A total of 3,407 nomination papers were collected for the 300 constituencies, and 2,582 papers were submitted.[123] 28% of the submitted nominations were declined by the returning officers.[124] 645 appeals were made against the nomination invalidation to the Election Commission.[125] The election witnessed a significant increase of the number of female candidates, particularly from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and National Citizen Party (NCP).[126] With 15 candidates, Dhaka-12 is the constituency with the highest number of running candidates, while Pirojpur-1 is the lowest with only two candidates.[35]
The EU is conducting an election observation mission at the invitation of the interim government and the EC.[131] The mission was launched on 11 January 2026, one month before the election.[132] It is led by chief observer Ivars Ijabs.[133] On 17 January, 56 long-term observers were deployed across the country.[134] At full strength, the mission will include 200 observers from all 27 EU member states, as well as Canada, Norway, and Switzerland.[135] They will release a preliminary report on the election two days after it takes place.[136]
By the end of January 2026, the Human Rights Support Society (HRSS) reported at least 62 election-related clashes nationwide since the election schedule was announced. In the same period, since 11 December, at least 16 political activists were killed, raising concerns over renewed political violence. While none of the deaths has been officially classified as politically motivated, local media and rights groups report that BNP leaders and activists account for 13 of the fatalities.[145] Cocktails and bombs were found being made to sabotage elections in incidents reported in January and December.[146]
On 12 December 2025, Osman Hadi, leader of Inqilab Moncho and an independent candidate for the Dhaka-8 constituency, was shot by Awami League-backed assailants riding motorcycles while conducting an election campaign in the Paltan area of Dhaka. He was later taken to the hospital in critical condition, where he fell into a coma.[147][148][149] He died on 18 December while undergoing treatment in Singapore General Hospital.[150]
Previously, Michael Kugelman, senior fellow with the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, expressed concerns of violent actions from the Awami League in reaction to the verdict of the Trial of Sheikh Hasina ahead of the general election.[151] Kugelman's concerns were elaborated on by geopolitical analyst Bahauddin Foizee, who noted in The Diplomat that multiple layers of conflict were likely, including between the government and the Awami League, and between the Awami League and other political parties.[152][153][154][155][156] Foizee pointed out that the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, both historically united in opposition to Hasina, are now vying for dominance in the post-Hasina political landscape, which could lead to violent confrontations between the two.[157][158][159][160][156] He also highlighted the danger of intra-party conflicts within the BNP and Jamaat, noting that such internal struggles, long embedded in Bangladesh's political culture, could spill over into public unrest, further deepening instability.[161][162][163][164][156]
Misinformation
A BBC Bangla report found that artificial intelligence generated misinformation could impact the general election. Started by the Jamaat-e-Islami supporters, it quickly spread among the BNP and the NCP supporters, which shows fake campaign and voter base of the respective party. According to Dhaka University professor Saiful Alam Chowdhury, such "information disorder" risks post-election riots like Brazil in Bangladesh.[165]
Reports from several fact-checking organizations found that the deepfake and cheepfake contents were prevailing before the elections. Fact-checkers, analysts, and law-enforcing officials identified various techniques of spreading misinformation through these media, which include adding misleading captions, cutting out parts of original statements or changing the context to create different meanings, using fabricated statements in the name of a person; presenting old information as recent events etc. Some identified people behind these works include some "detected" foreign individuals, Awami League supporters, and internet "bot armies", which work on behalf of various political parties.[166]
A report by Dismiss Lab found that between 16 December 2025 and 15 January 2026, election-related misinformation grew 41% than previous month. Key topics of misinformation include alliance, seat convenience and opinion polls.[167]
1234Bobby Hajjaj of the NDM and AZM Fariduzzaman Farhad of the NPP are only allied candidates from the respective parties, and both of them are contesting with the BNP's ticket.
↑The survey was conducted only on people between the ages of 18 to 35.
↑1.5% for "Other Islamic Parties", and 0.0% for "Other Leftist Parties".
↑The survey was conducted only on people between the ages of 15 to 35.
↑4.44% for "Other Islamist parties", and 0.55% for "Others".
↑NCP was not formed during the survey. Respondents were asked if they are going to support student led party.
↑In a separate question, 40% of the respondents said that they'll vote for a student-led platform if its launched, while 44% said they will not endorse it. Among the rest 9% were undecided and 8% did not give any answer.
↑3% for "other Islamic groups", 2% for "a new political party formed by politicians", and 4% for "others".
↑"Bangladesh's Pivotal Election and Referendum Has a Date. Will Unrest Follow?". The Diplomat. Retrieved 2025-12-17. As the country moves closer to the upcoming elections, tensions are growing on multiple fronts. There is the potential for clashes not only between the Awami League and law enforcement agencies, but also between the Awami League and other political parties, particularly the BNP, JI, and NCP.
↑"Bangladesh Politics Could Get Uglier". International Policy Digest. Retrieved 2025-12-17. Foizee underscores the danger of large-scale protests and street violence...confrontations could escalate not only between the Awami League and the state, but also between rival contenders who see the transitional moment as their best shot at power.
↑"Bangladesh Election: Foizee Warns of Unrest, Yet Hope Remains". South Asia Journal. In The Diplomat, geopolitical analyst Bahauddin Foizee highlights the deeply fractured nature of Bangladesh's political landscape. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), ..., and the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaat), ..., are both positioning themselves as heirs to the post-Hasina order. Though united in their opposition to Hasina, the two parties are now competing with each other for electoral constituencies in the coming election.
↑"Bangladesh's Pivotal Election and Referendum Has a Date. Will Unrest Follow?". The Diplomat. Retrieved 2025-12-17. ...with Hasina's Awami League barred from participating in the election, the resulting political vacuum could lead to heightened confrontations between the BNP and JI, two parties with a long history of animosity toward the Awami League. Although in the past they often found common ground in their opposition to Hasina, these parties are now competing for power and influence. The rivalry between the BNP and JI could exacerbate political instability as they vie for dominance in the post-Hasina landscape. Moreover, internal divisions within the BNP and JI may further fuel unrest.
↑"Bangladesh Politics Could Get Uglier". International Policy Digest. Foizee's analysis also emphasizes ... both parties were historically opposed to Hasina; now they are trying to dominate the post-Hasina landscape, and to claim the mantle of democratic restoration without surrendering their own partisan ambitions.
↑"Expert Forecast on Bangladesh's Path to the 2026 Election". CounterCurrents. 2025-12-14. Retrieved 2025-12-17. Foizee's analysis, presented in the style of a risk intelligence report, emphasizes the high risk of large-scale protests and street violence. With Hasina's party banned, the political vacuum could escalate confrontations, particularly between the BNP and Jamaat, who are already locked in their own power struggle.
↑Kumari, Rupa. "Bangladesh Politics Could Get Uglier". International Policy Digest. Retrieved 2025-12-17. The problem, Foizee suggests, is not simply rivalry between parties, but rivalry within them. Internal divisions...inside both the BNP and Jamaat could further fuel unrest, as leaders fight for nominations, constituencies, and the authority to speak for the party as a whole...these intra-party contests can spill outward, transforming organizational disputes into public confrontations...
↑"Expert Forecast on Bangladesh's Path to the 2026 Election". CounterCurrents. 2025-12-14. Retrieved 2025-12-17. Foizee notes that such intra-party conflicts will exacerbate broader unrest and undermine efforts to present a united front within each party.
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