PQ 13 was a British Arctic convoy that delivered war supplies from the Western Allies to the USSR during the Second World War. The convoy was subject to attack by German air, U-boat and surface forces and suffered the loss of five ships, plus one escort vessel. Fifteen ships arrived safely.
In October 1941, after Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the USSR, which had begun on 22 June, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, made a commitment to send a convoy to the Arctic ports of the USSR every ten days and to deliver 1,200 tanks a month from July 1942 to January 1943, followed by 2,000 tanks and another 3,600 aircraft more than already promised.[1][a] The first convoy was due at Murmansk around 12 October and the next convoy was to depart Iceland on 22 October. A motley of British, Allied and neutral shipping loaded with military stores and raw materials for the Soviet war effort would be assembled at Hvalfjordur, Iceland, convenient for ships from both sides of the Atlantic.[3] By late 1941, the convoy system used in the Atlantic had been established on the Arctic run; a convoy commodore ensured that the ships' masters and signals officers attended a briefing before sailing to make arrangements for the management of the convoy, which sailed in a formation of long rows of short columns. The commodore was usually a retired naval officer, aboard a ship identified by a white pendant with a blue cross. The commodore was assisted by a Naval signals party of four men, who used lamps, semaphore flags and telescopes to pass signals, coded from books carried in a bag, weighted to be dumped overboard. In large convoys, the commodore was assisted by vice- and rear-commodores who directed the speed, course and zig-zagging of the merchant ships and liaised with the escort commander.[4][b]
Following Convoy PQ 16 and the disaster to Convoy PQ 17 in July 1942, Arctic convoys were postponed for nine weeks and much of the Home Fleet was detached to the Mediterranean for Operation Pedestal, a Malta convoy. During the lull, Admiral John Tovey concluded that the Home Fleet had been of no great protection to convoys beyond Bear Island, midway between Spitsbergen and the North Cape. Tovey would oversee the operation from Scapa Flow, where the fleet was linked to the Admiralty by landline, immune to variations in wireless reception. The next convoy should be accompanied by sufficient protection against surface attack; the longer-range destroyers of the Home Fleet could be used to augment the close escort force of anti-submarine and anti-aircraft ships, to confront a sortie by German ships with the threat of a massed destroyer torpedo attack. The practice of meeting homeward-bound QP convoys near Bear Island was dispensed with and QP 14 was to wait until Convoy PQ 18 was near its destination, despite the longer journey being more demanding of crews, fuel and equipment. The new escort carrierHMSAvenger (Commander Anthony Colthurst) had arrived from the United States and was added to the escort force, to give the convoy air cover.[6]
The British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based at Bletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers and traffic analysts. By June 1941, the German Enigma machine Home Waters (Heimish) settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed but German ships and the U-boats in Arctic waters continued with the older Heimish (Hydra from 1942, Dolphin to the British). By mid-1941, British Y-stations were able to receive and read LuftwaffeW/T transmissions and give advance warning of Luftwaffe operations. [7][8]
In 1941, naval Headache personnel, with receivers to eavesdrop on Luftwaffe wireless transmissions, were embarked on warships and from May 1942, ships gained RAF Y computor parties, which sailed with cruiser admirals in command of convoy escorts, to interpret Luftwaffe W/T signals intercepted by the Headaches. The Admiralty sent details of Luftwaffe wireless frequencies, call signs and the daily local codes to the computors, which combined with their knowledge of Luftwaffe procedures, could glean fairly accurate details of German reconnaissance sorties. Sometimes computors predicted attacks twenty minutes before they were detected by radar.[9]
The rival German Beobachtungsdienst (B-Dienst, Observation Service) of the KriegsmarineMarinenachrichtendienst (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to help Kriegsmarine ships elude British forces and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941, B-Dienst read signals from the Commander in Chief Western Approaches informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones.[10]B-Dienst had broken Naval Cypher No 3 in February 1942 and by March was reading up to 80 per cent of the traffic, which continued until 15 December 1943. By coincidence, the British lost access to the Shark cypher and had no information to send in Cypher No 3 which might compromise Ultra.[11]
Prelude
Luftflotte 5 tactics
As soon as information was received about the assembly of a convoy, Fliegerführer Nord (West) would send long-range reconnaissance aircraft to search Iceland and northern Scotland. Once a convoy was spotted, aircraft were to keep contact as far as possible in the extreme weather of the area. If contact was lost its course at the last sighting would be extrapolated and overlapping sorties would be flown to regain contact. All three Fliegerführer were to co-operate as the convoy moved through their operational areas. Fliegerführer Lofoten would begin the anti-convoy operation east to a line from the North Cape to Spitzbergen Island, whence Fliegerführer Nord (Ost) would take over using his and the aircraft of Fliegerführer Lofoten, that would fly to Kirkenes or Petsamo to stay in range. Fliegerführer Nord (Ost) was not allowed to divert aircraft to ground support during the operation. As soon as the convoy came into range, the aircraft were to keep up a continuous attack until the convoy docked at Murmansk or Arkhangelsk. [12]
The Luftwaffe Sea Rescue Service (Seenotdienst) along with the Kriegsmarine, the Norwegian Society for Sea Rescue (RS) and ships on passage, recovered aircrew and shipwrecked sailors. The service comprised Seenotbereich VIII at Stavanger covering Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim and Seenotbereich IX at Kirkenes for Tromsø, Billefjord and Kirkenes. Co-operation was as important in rescues as it was in anti-shipping operations if people were to be saved before they succumbed to the climate and severe weather. The sea rescue aircraft comprised Heinkel He 59 floatplanes, Dornier Do 18 and Dornier Do 24 seaplanes.[13]
Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL, the high command of the Luftwaffe) was not able to increase the number of search and rescue aircraft in Norway, due to a general shortage of aircraft and crews, despite Stumpff pointing out that coming down in such cold waters required extremely swift recovery and that his crews "must be given a chance of rescue" or morale could not be maintained. After the experience of Convoy PQ 16, Stumpff gave the task to the coastal reconnaissance squadrons, whose aircraft were not usually engaged in attacks on convoys. They would henceforth stand by to rescue aircrew during anti-shipping operations.[13]
Convoy
PQ 13 comprised 19 merchant ships; seven British, four American, one Polish, four of Panamanian and one of Honduran registry. It was commanded by Commodore D. A. Casey in River Afton. The convoy was escorted for the first stage of its voyage, from Scotland to Iceland, by a Local Escort Group, of two destroyers and an ASW Trawler. For the second stage, from Iceland to the Soviet Union, the Ocean escort was two destroyers and two trawlers, augmented by three whalers being transferred to the Soviet Navy. The Ocean escort was commanded by Capt. L. S. Saunders, in the cruiser HMSTrinidad.
The convoy sailed from Loch Ewe in Scotland on 10 March 1942 and arrived in Reykjavík on 16 March. After the departure of three ships, bound from Loch Ewe to Reykjavík only and the first stage escort, collecting a further three ships bound from Reykjavík to Murmansk and the close escort for the voyage, Convoy PQ 13 left Reykjavík on 20 March. The voyage was uneventful until 24 March, when the convoy was struck by a four-day storm, that scattered the convoy. The ships were dispersed over a distance of 150nmi (280km; 170mi). Over the next few days the ships coalesced into two groups, of eight and four, with four others proceeding independently.
Example of a German Type 1936-class (Narvik class) destroyer
On 28 March the ships were sighted by German aircraft, and attacked, Raceland and Empire Ranger being sunk. Three Type 1936A-classdestroyers (Narvik-class to the British) Z24, Z25 and Z26 (Kapitän zur See G. Ponitz), sortied from Kirkenes. The German destroyers intercepted and sank Bateau on the night of 28/29 March, before falling in with Trinidad and Fury in the early hours of 29 March. Z26 was badly damaged by the cruiser Trinidad, sinking later after an attack by Oribi, Eclipse and the Soviet destroyer Sokrushitelny. Trinidad was hit by her own torpedo (its gyroscope froze).[14] The remaining German ships broke off the action and Trinidad, escorted by Fury and Eclipse, limped into Kola Inlet, arriving midday on 30 March.
The ships of Convoy PQ 13 came under U-boat attack. Induna was sunk by U-376, and Effingham by U-435. The destroyer Fury obtained an asdic contact, thought to be a U-boat, attacked it and was credited with the destruction of U-585 but post-war analysis found that U-585 was lost elsewhere. By 30 March most ships had arrived at Murmansk; the last stragglers came in on 1 April. Six ships were lost from the convoy. The Germans sank five freighters and on 1 April the whalerHMSSulla was sunk by U-436; Trinidad, was damaged. A German destroyer had been sunk. Fourteen ships had arrived safely, more than two-thirds of the convoy. The freighter Tobruk was credited with shooting down one bomber and another probable on 30 April.[15]
On 27 March, the convoy was joined by the Soviet ships Gremyashchiy and Sokrushitelny On 28 March the convoy was joined by HMSHarrier, HMSHussar, HMSGossamer and HMSSpeedwell of the Sixth Minesweeping Flotilla (Commander E.P. Hinton) that sailed on 28 April for a patrol. On 29 March Harrier searched for survivors of the Empire Ranger and Speedwell attempted to intercept Harpalion but failed to find her. HMSOribi found abandoned boats of Empire Ranger on 29 March which indicated they were picked up by other boats. (A German wireless claimed prisoners from a merchant ship, it was obvious they were from Empire Ranger. On 30 March, Gossamer found Scottish American, Effingham and Dunboyne; Gossamer received orders to proceed to the position of the torpedoed Indua but failed to find her. Hussar made contact with a group of nine ships of Convoy PQ 13 and a whaler, escorted by two Russian destroyers and a trawler. Oribi sighted the whaler Silja who had run out of fuel. Oribi was ordered to go to the aid of River Afton which was reported to have been hit by a U-boat. Harrier took Silja in tow and Speedwell escorted them. On 1 April, HMSNiger (also of the Sixth Minesweeping Flotilla) sailed to search for Sulla but returned on 3 April, having failed to find her.
After SSBallott had been attacked on 28 March 1942, 16 members of the crew launched a lifeboat, were taken on board by Silja and then transferred to Induna.
↑ In October 1941, the unloading capacity of Archangel was 300,000 long tons (300,000t), Vladivostok 140,000 long tons (140,000t) and 60,000 long tons (61,000t) in the Persian Gulf ports.[2]
↑ By the end of 1941, 187 Matilda II and 249 Valentine tanks had been delivered, comprising 25 percent of the medium-heavy tanks in the Red Army, making 30–40 per cent of the medium-heavy tanks defending Moscow. In December 1941, 16 percent of the fighters defending Moscow were Hawker Hurricanes and Curtiss Tomahawks from Britain and by 1 January 1942, 96 Hurricane fighters were flying in the Soviet Air Forces (Voyenno-Vozdushnye Sily, VVS). The British supplied radar apparatus, machine tools, Asdic and commodities.[5]
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