| 2025 United States naval deployment in the Caribbean | |
|---|---|
| Part of Operation Southern Spear, the post–Cold War era, the war on cartels, the aftermath of the war on terror, the Mexican drug war, and the crisis in Venezuela | |
| An infographic for the conflict, including approximate locations of American forces and approximate locations of airstrikes | |
| Location | |
| Planned by | |
| Commanded by | Admiral Alvin Holsey |
| Objective | To combat drug trafficking; regime change |
| Date | August 2025 – present |
| Executed by | |
| Casualties | As of 15 November 2025, [2] [3] in the Caribbean Sea, 48 individuals [4] [5] [6] [7] (including a number of alleged narcoterrorists) killed |
In late August 2025, the United States began a naval buildup in the southern Caribbean with the stated goal being to combat drug trafficking. [8] [9] US President Donald Trump directed the United States Armed Forces to begin using military force against certain Latin American drug cartels, characterizing the smugglers as narcoterrorists. [10] [11] The first major increase came with the deployment of the USS Iwo Jima and its Amphibious Ready Group in August; the arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group in November marked the second increase. [3]
The first operation of the campaign was the 2 September strike and sinking of a vessel—coming from Venezuela and allegedly involving Tren de Aragua gang members carrying illegal drugs—killing 11 people. [12] The US deployed military assets to Puerto Rico, subsequent airstrikes destroyed other alleged drug-smuggling vessels, including those allegedly connected to the Colombian National Liberation Army, and the Dominican Navy engaged to recover drugs from one of the destroyed vessels. By early November, the deployment of assets to the Caribbean region had become the largest in decades. In mid-November, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced Operation Southern Spear would begin later in November, with a fleet using robotics and autonomous systems to target Latin American drug trafficking.
Experts, the Trump administration and Venezuelan opposition sources stated that a likely goal of the operation is to force the departure of top figures in the Nicolás Maduro government. [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] While most experts believe that a ground invasion of Venezuela is unlikely, [18] [19] [20] some have said that the US seeks to use targeted strikes to pressure Venezuelan leadership into handing over power. [13]
The militarization of the war on drugs—also known as the war on cartels—dates to 1989 during the presidency of George H.W. Bush, when Bush introduced a national drug control strategy that emphasized supply interdiction and allocated significant resources to involve the Department of Defense. This included the creation of the Office of National Drug Control Policy and formalized the use of military forces in detection operations, foreign force training, and support for law enforcement agencies. [21] On 18 September 1989, then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announced specific plans: a Caribbean counternarcotics task force with military aircraft and ships, deployment of forces along the Mexican border, expanded use of the North American Aerospace Defense Command to detect drug trafficking, and training of forces in South American countries such as Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Cheney emphasized that the military would not conduct arrests or raids but would expand its role in detection and logistical support, involving "a few hundred" troops in Latin America. [22] [23]
In 1989, president Bush ordered the invasion of Panama to depose the country's de facto dictator, Manuel Noriega. The invasion was condemned by the United Nations General Assembly as a "flagrant violation of international law". The US later provided intelligence about flights with civilians suspected of carrying drugs to Colombian and Peruvian officials; after several planes were shot down, the Clinton administration ceased its assistance in providing information. The United States Navy has intercepted ships believed to be used for drug smuggling operations. The United States Armed Forces broadly engage in joint anti-drug training exercises with other countries, including Colombia and Mexico. [24]
During the presidency of George W. Bush, the AUMF Act and the Specially Designated Global Terrorist designation in the context of the war on terror laid the groundwork for subsequent classifications. [25]
In January 2025, US President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 14157 that directed the US State Department to label certain Western Hemisphere drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists. [26] [24] [27] In February, [26] the Trump administration designated Tren de Aragua, a criminal organization from Venezuela; MS-13; and six Mexico-based groups as foreign terrorist organizations, [28] saying at the time they posed "a national-security threat beyond that posed by traditional organized crime." [24] In July, the US designated the Cartel of the Suns (Cartel de los Soles), a purported criminal organization that the US alleges has ties to Venezuelan leadership, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. [29] [30] At the time, the US State Department's Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs posted on X that it would use "all the resources at our disposal to prevent Maduro from continuing to profit from destroying American lives and destabilizing our hemisphere." [30] US intelligence assessments have contradicted claims made by the Trump administration in legal filings that Maduro controls Tren de Aragua. [31] The Trump administration asked for the assessment to be repeated, and it reached the same conclusion. [31]
Donald Trump's decision to designate drug cartels as "terrorist" organizations—including the Sinaloa Cartel, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, Cártel del Noreste, Tren de Aragua, MS-13, the Gulf Cartel, and La Nueva Familia Michoacana Organization [32] —established the foundation for US intervention. [33] In July, [34] Trump secretly signed an executive order directing the armed forces to invoke military action against cartels that had been declared as terrorist organizations. [24]
The Trump administration has accused President of Venezuela Nicolás Maduro of trafficking drugs into the US. Earlier in August, the Trump administration raised to $50 million a bounty for the arrest of Maduro over what it alleges to be his role in drug trafficking. Maduro was indicted in the US on drug charges including narcoterrorism in 2020. [28]
After authorizing the Pentagon to use military force against Latin American drug cartels, [34] the Trump administration doubled the reward for the capture of Maduro to $50 million. [35] At the time, an anonymous US official told Reuters that military action against those groups did not seem imminent; another official told Reuters that powers granted in the order included allowing the Navy to carry out sea operations including drug interdiction and targeted military raids. [36]
In August 2025, the US began deploying warships and personnel to the Caribbean, citing the need to combat drug cartels, [37] [38] although most of the fentanyl entering the US is over land via Mexico. [9] On 20 August, Trump ordered three Navy warships to the coast of South America. [39] [40] As of 29 August, seven US warships, along with one nuclear-powered fast attack submarine, were in and around the Southern Caribbean, bringing along more than 4,500 sailors and marines. [41]
The Central Intelligence Agency joined the military campaign after confirming that it would play a significant role in combating drug cartels, just as it is considering using lethal force against these criminal organizations. [42]
In response to this tension in United States–Venezuela relations, Venezuela said it would mobilize more than four million soldiers in the Bolivarian Militia of Venezuela. [43] On 26 August, Venezuela's defense minister announced a naval deployment around Venezuela's main oil hub. [8] Maduro said he "would constitutionally declare a republic in arms" if the country is attacked by forces that the US has deployed to the Caribbean. [44] [45]
According to The Economist , the US typically has "two or three American warships and Coast Guard cutters" on patrol in the southern Caribbean. [9] As of 25 September, the deployment included ten ships: the guided-missile destroyers USS Gravely, USS Stockdale [a] and USS Jason Dunham; the amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima and the amphibious transport docks USS San Antonio and USS Fort Lauderdale; the guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Erie; the littoral combat ship USS Minneapolis-Saint Paul; [47] [b] the nuclear fast attack submarine USS Newport News, [8] and the special operations ship MV Ocean Trader. [49] According to the Financial Times , "Five of the eight vessels are equipped with Tomahawk missiles, which can hit land targets." [8] On 25 September, Task & Purpose reported that the US had deployed special operations ship MV Ocean Trader to the Caribbean. [49]
The Iwo Jima, Fort Lauderdale, and San Antonio of the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group left Norfolk, Virginia on 14 August, [50] with more than 4,000 personnel, including the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, with 2,200 Marines. [c] According to the US Naval Institute this marked "the first time a US-based Amphibious Ready Group with embarked Marines has deployed since December." [50] Historian Alan McPherson stated that the naval buildup is the largest in the region since 1965. [15]
During a surprise trip on 8 September to Puerto Rico with US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dan Caine, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told sailors and Marines assigned to the area: "What you're doing right now – it's not training ... This is the real-world exercise on behalf of the vital national interests of the United States of America to end the poisoning of the American people." [53]
In response to the presence of Navy warships in Latin America, two Venezuelan BMA F-16 fighter jets flew over the USS Jason Dunham on 4 September. [54] The US Department of Defense called it "highly provocative" and deployed ten F-35 fighter jets [55] and two MQ-9 Reaper drones [56] to Puerto Rico. [57] That same day Marco Rubio, the US Secretary of State, met with Ecuadorian president Daniel Naboa in Quito; Rubio stated that Trump intended to "wage war" on those that have "been waging war on us for 30 years" and designated the gangs Los Lobos and Los Choneros as narco terrorists, in agreement with Noboa. [58] [59] Later on 23 September, the United States added the 18th Street gang to the designated foreign terrorists list, which is largely based in the Caribbean coastal nations of Guatemala and Honduras among others. [60]
The Venezuelan government stated on 12 September that a US destroyer had detained and boarded a tuna fishing boat with nine crew members. The destroyer eventually released the boat, and it was escorted away by the Venezuelan navy. Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs Yván Gil responded that this act was illegal and added that Venezuela would defend itself. [61]
On 2 September, Trump said that the US had struck a boat carrying unspecified illegal drugs, alleging it was operated by the Tren de Aragua. Trump said that the strike killed 11 "narcoterrorists". [12] According to The Wall Street Journal , "The attack was the US military's first publicly acknowledged airstrike in Central or South America since the US invasion of Panama in 1989." [62] Trump hinted at further military action, stating: "There's more where that came from." [12] [63]
The following day, Hegseth stated that military actions against cartels in Venezuela would continue. [64] Rubio, speaking in Mexico City, said that further strikes would occur, adding that the US was aware of the identities of those on the destroyed boat, but did not provide evidence to authenticate their identity as Tren de Aragua members. [65]
Trump announced on 15 September that a second Venezuelan boat had been struck that morning, killing three people who were, according to him, "confirmed narco-terrorists". No evidence that the vessel was carrying drugs was provided. [66] [67] The Guardian reported in September that anonymous sources said that a "leading role" was taken in the decision to strike the boats by the newly empowered Homeland Security Council under its leader Stephen Miller, with many White House officials learning about the second strike just hours before it happened. [68]
Trump announced on 19 September that a third vessel allegedly carrying drugs had been destroyed in the Caribbean and that three men had been killed; Trump stated that the vessel was "affiliated with a Designated Terrorist Organization conducting narcotrafficking in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility". [69] [70] The Dominican Republic later announced that it had cooperated with the US Navy in a first-ever joint operation to locate the boat and salvage 377 packages of cocaine. [71]
On 3 October, Hegseth announced that a strike on a vessel near the coast of Venezuela killed four, [72] [73] [74] and two US officials later declared without approval that there were Colombians on at least one of the boats. [75] Trump posted a statement on Truth Social on 14 October that six more were killed in a strike near the coast of Venezuela. [76]
Reuters reported that another previously unannounced strike on 16 October had killed two and, for the first time, included two survivors who were being held on a Navy ship. [77] [78] By 19 October, both were repatriated to their respective countries of origin, Colombia and Ecuador. [79] [80] [81] On 17 October, three were killed in a strike on an alleged drug vessel operated by the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN); [5] [82] [83] the ELN denied involvement in any drug boat trafficking. [84] On 24 October, Hegseth announced "the first strike at night" occurred, against an alleged drug vessel operated by Tren de Aragua in the Caribbean, killing six people on board. [85] [6] A Caribbean strike on 2 November killed three, [7] a strike on 6 November killed three, [86] and a strike on 10 November killed four. [4]
On 30 September, Trump told reporters his administration would "look very seriously at cartels coming by land", which according to the Miami Herald "align[s] with recent media reports suggesting the administration is reviewing plans for targeted operations inside Venezuela." [87]
Trump formally declared to Congress on 1 October that the US was in a "non-international armed conflict" with "unlawful combatants" regarding drug cartels operating in the Caribbean. [88] [89] The Guardian stated that the memo to Congress referred to the cartels as "non-state armed groups" engaged in attacking the US. [90] [91] Andrew C. McCarthy stated in the National Review that this terminology refers to a conflict "that does not pit two sovereign nations against each other" [92] and means "armed hostilities conducted by a subnational entity that is not acting on behalf of a foreign sovereign", giving the example of Al-Qaeda and the attacks of 11 September. [93] The Miami Herald wrote that: "In an armed conflict, a country can lawfully kill enemy fighters even when they pose no threat." [94] The Washington Post stated: "Some lawmakers and experts have said the notification is a dubious legal justification for what have been unlawful military strikes on alleged civilian criminals". [95]
Vladimir Padrino López, Venezuela's Minister of Defense, stated on 2 October that five US "combat planes" had been detected flying near Venezuela at 35,000 feet (11,000 m) altitude, which he called a "provocation"; a government statement said the plane was 75 kilometers (47 mi) from the Venezuelan coast, which CNN states is outside of Venezuelan territory. [96]
The US Air Force participated amid the campaign on 15 October 2025 when airmen flew B-52 Stratofortress ("a long-range, heavy bomber that can carry precision-guided ordnance or nuclear weapons") north of Caracas for two hours, joining F-35B Lightning II from the Marines, in a "bomber attack demonstration mission", according to Task & Purpose . [97] On 23 October, at least two US Air Force B-1B Lancers from Dyess Air Force Base, supported by KC-135 tankers from MacDill Air Force Base and an unknown type variant of RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft, conducted a flyby reportedly within 50 miles (80 km) of the Venezuelan mainland. [98] [99] When asked at a press conference about the B-1 flyby, Trump denied that the event had occurred. [98] Also on 23 October, an Air Force E-11A Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) aircraft was observed operating near Puerto Rico. [98]
According to a visual investigation report by The New York Times, satellite imagery and other data revealed the US began operating aircraft out of El Salvador in mid-October; the three aircraft identified included the Air Force's AC-130J Ghostrider, which is "designed to destroy targets on the ground or at sea using missiles or barrages from its cannons and machine guns" along with a P8–A Poseidon operated by the Navy, and a C-40 Clipper, about which little is known. [100] The report stated that "the deployment ... is likely to be the first time a foreign country has hosted US planes that may be involved in military strikes in the region". [100] According to The War Zone, the P-8 is the "most advanced maritime patrol aircraft in the world and is specifically capable of collecting multiple types of intelligence to find small targets in vast bodies of water". [101]
Reuters reported in November that the US military began construction to renovate Roosevelt Roads, a naval base in Puerto Rico that was abandoned in 2004. Upgrades include taxiway improvements that "would enable use by fighter jets as well as cargo planes", according to analysts. Changes were also observed at Rafael Hernandez Airport in Puerto Rico and Henry E. Rohlsen Airport, a civilian airport on the nearby island of St. Croix. [102]
Prior to the US naval deployment, Richard Grenell, Trump's special envoy to Venezuela, had been working towards a deal with Maduro's administration. After extended talks, Maduro's aides had reportedly offered American companies preference in contracts and access to all oil and gold ventures within the country, and to sharply reduce export ties with China, Iran, and Russia. Maduro knew that "loosening those alliances was an inevitable price for avoiding American military intervention", a source told The New York Times. [103] Some concessions were made as talks continued; in May 2025, Venezuela agreed to release Joseph St. Clair, a US Air Force veteran who had been "wrongfully detained" by Venezuelan security forces, according to the US State Department. [104] Chevron's license to operate in Venezuela under US sanctions, revoked by Trump in February, was reinstated in July 2025. Preliminary efforts to allow Shell to restart work in Venezuela also began. Rubio strongly opposed Grenell's "resource diplomacy" approach, stating that "Chevron's continued operations in Venezuela legitimize and enable Maduro's grip on power". [103] [104]
On 6 October, Trump directed Grenell to shut down all diplomatic talks with Venezuela amid growing tensions and frustrations with Venezuelan political dialogue. [105] Since at least April 2025, [106] Qatar had acted as a political go between, attempting to maintain communications between the two nations through back channel diplomacy. [107]
Sources told the Miami Herald that Qatar, which "has close ties to the Venezuelan government", had "played a key role as intermediary" between Maduro officials and siblings, Delcy and Jorge Rodríguez, in promoting Delcy and the unrelated Miguel Rodríguez Torres to lead a transition as "a 'more acceptable' alternative to Nicolás Maduro's regime", with the aim of "preserving political stability without dismantling the ruling apparatus". [106] The Associated Press confirmed the report, [108] and stated that an anonymous official said the proposal was that Maduro be replaced by Delcy through the end of his term in 2031; the AP reported that Washington "rejected the proposal because it continues to question the legitimacy of Maduro's rule". [109] Maduro and Delcy Rodriguez labeled the information as fake news. [109] Delcy Rodríguez said the report was part of a psychological warfare operation. [108]
Following increased criticism by Colombian President Gustavo Petro over US strikes on vessels and support for Israel during his visit to the September session of the UN General Assembly, [110] the US Department of State revoked Petro's visa on 27 September, stating on X that: "Earlier today, Colombian president (Gustavo Petro) stood on a NYC street and urged U.S. soldiers to disobey orders and incite violence." [111]
On 18 October, Petro stated that the 16 September strike announced by Trump had killed a Colombian fisherman; [112] other sources said he was referring to the 15 September strike. [82] Petro said the vessel was not involved in drug trafficking, and accused the US of murder. [82] The US labeled the charged "baseless". [113] Trump responded calling Petro an "illegal drug leader", who was "low rated" and not helping diminish production of drugs, stating that the US would end the large subsidies it provided to Colombia. [82] [83]
In October 2025, the United States Department of the Treasury announced sanctions against Petro and Interior Minister Armando Benedetti, citing their alleged involvement in illicit drug trafficking activities. These measures marked a significant deterioration in bilateral relations, with the Colombian government condemning the decision as politically motivated and labeling it "an act of aggression" against its sovereignty. Analysts described the move as one of the most severe diplomatic escalations between Bogotá and Washington in recent years. [114]
Initially positioned as a mission to stop narcotics traffic to the US, by mid-October, Venezuelan opposition figures and independent analysts confirmed a shift in US objectives toward regime change, [13] [115] with Trump acknowledging the possibility of strikes within Venezuelan territory. [116]
On 15 October, Trump confirmed he had authorized the CIA to conduct lethal ground operations inside Venezuela and elsewhere around the Caribbean, and that military officials were drafting options for strikes on Venezuelan territory. [31] Trump related the decision to illegal immigration to the United States and narcotraffic saying: "Number one, they have emptied their prisons into the United States of America. They came in through the, well, they came in through the border ... And the other thing are drugs, we have a lot of drugs coming in from Venezuela." [117] The New York Times reported the next day that Alvin Holsey would retire as head of USSOUTHCOM, with anonymous sources reporting tension between Holsey and the Trump administration over Venezuela. [118]
The Gravely destroyer arrived on 26 October 2025 to spend four days in Trinidad and Tobago, where their country's forces would jointly train with US Marines. [119] [120] Trinidad and Tobago announced additional joint training drills with US Marines in November. [121] As of 31 October, Gettysburg (CG-64), another guided missile cruiser, had joined the fleet. [122]
Hegseth ordered the supercarrier USS Gerald R. Ford deployed to Latin America on 24 October. [120] According to The Washington Post , it is "the world's largest aircraft carrier" and its deployment "signaled a major expansion of [the] military campaign against 'Transnational Criminal Organizations' in Latin America". [120] The New York Times reported it "carries about 5,000 sailors and has more than 75 attack, surveillance and support aircraft, including F/A-18 fighters". [123] [124] The Ford's full air wing is reportedly embarked. [125] Though its escort typically includes five Arleigh Burke class destroyers—USS Winston S. Churchill, USS Bainbridge, USS Mahan, USS Forrest Sherman and USS Mitscher—as of 8 November the USS Forrest Sherman and Mitscher were still operating independently in other areas of the globe (such as the Red Sea). [101]
On 26 October, a Russian Il-76 transport aircraft under US sanctions landed in Venezuela "after a circuitous route over Africa to avoid Western airspace, according to Flightradar24". [126] The aircraft carried Pantsir-S1 and Buk-M2E air defense systems, according to a Russian official. [127] The Washington Post wrote that Maduro had written to Russia's Vladimir Putin, asking for help with "defensive radars, military aircraft repairs and potentially missiles", and that Maduro had contacted "China and Iran, soliciting military assistance and equipment to strengthen the country’s defenses". [126] A Russian tanker, sanctioned by the European Union and the UK, attempting to deliver naphtha (a product necessary to help export Venezuela's heavy crude) to Venezuela was forced several times by USS Stockdale to turn back towards Cuba, [128] although it eventually reached Venezuela. [129]
At the direction of the US Department of Defense, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) banned flights in an area around Ceiba, Puerto Rico for "special security reasons" from 1 November 2025 to 31 March 2026. [130] [131] On 21 November, the FAA urged airlines flying over Venezuela at any altitude to exercise caution due to the "worsening security situation and heightened military activity in or around Venezuela". [132] [133] As of 25 November, at least 11 airlines have temporarily suspended flights to Venezuela. [134] [135] [136] On 24 November, Venezuela threatened to permanently suspend the clearances of all airlines that didn't resume flights within 48 hours. [137] [138]
As of 28 October, the number of US troops in the Southern Caribbean and Puerto Rico had expanded to 10,000, with about half in Puerto Rico and half on vessels. [123] US military assets in the region are insufficient for an invasion. [139] [18] [19] The forces included elements of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment which provides helicopter aviation support for special operations forces. [140] Venezuela's armed forces are estimated at 125,000 as of October 2025, with experts saying its military is "in shambles" according to The Wall Street Journal, which wrote on 17 October that Venezuela had issued a call to arms, and "cranked up its propaganda machine", announcing that the US wanted its oil wealth, as Venezuela was moving troops to the coast and prepared to "repel any invasion". [140]
With the 11 November arrival of USS Gerald R. Ford and its escorts to the USSOUTHCOM region, the US had about 15,000 personnel in the area, described by The Washington Post as "a stunning military presence in a region that historically has seen only one or two Navy vessels assisting the U.S. Coast Guard on routine drug-interdiction missions". [141]
Reuters reported on 2 November 2025 that: "The military buildup in the region is the largest unrelated to disaster relief since 1994, when the United States sent two aircraft carriers and more than 20,000 troops to Haiti" during Operation Uphold Democracy. [142]
Hegseth had announced on 10 October the formation of a new counternarcotics joint task force, to operate in Latin America, the Western hemisphere, and the area of the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), to be headed by the II Marine Expeditionary Force, intended "to crush the cartels, stop the poison and keep America safe". [143] [144] On 13 November 2025, Hegseth announced the unveiling of Operation Southern Spear, led by Joint Task Force Southern Spear and using a fleet with robotics and autonomous systems to target Latin American drug trafficking, with operations to begin later in November. [145] [146]
A US official told a reporter in November that Hegseth's 13 November unveiling was "a formal operation naming for what the Joint Task Force Southern Spear ... and Southcom have already been doing in theater". [147]
Trump said on 22 October that he planned to also order strikes on land targets. [150]
The Wall Street Journal reported on 30 October 2025 that, according to US officials, the US had identified land "targets that sit at the nexus of the drug gangs and the Maduro regime", including facilities such as ports and airstrips that the Venezuelan military allegedly uses for drug trafficking. [116] Trump denied [151] [152] a 31 October Miami Herald report that the "Trump Administration [had] made the decision to attack military installations inside Venezuela". [153] Newsweek reported on the same day that US ships were positioned near the Venezuelan military base at La Orchila Island, "within immediate operational range for amphibious or precision strike missions". [154] The US Southern Command posted videos of live-fire drills by US Marines; satellite imagery confirmed the location to be the USS Iwo Jima, situated less than 200 kilometres (120 mi) off the coast of Venezuela and accompanied by two other USS destroyers. [155]
Rubio announced on 16 November that the US State Department would designate Cartel of the Suns—which the US says is headed by Maduro—as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, effective 24 November 2025. [156] [157] Rubio stated that cartels are "responsible for terrorist violence throughout our hemisphere as well as for trafficking drugs into the United States and Europe"; Maduro denies the US allegation that he is "complicit with armed criminal gangs that smuggle drugs" to the US, according to CBS News. [156] The Miami Herald wrote: "The designation would effectively label Maduro and senior officials, including Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello and Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, as terrorists." [158] According to CNN, congress had until 23 November to block the designation, which the Trump administration says "allows the US military the ability to target Maduro's assets and infrastructure inside Venezuela". [159] [160]
Trump said on 16 November that though the terrorist designation would allow it, the decision to conduct land strikes had not been made. He added: "We may be having some discussions with Maduro, and we’ll see how that turns out." He noted: "They would like to talk." [159]
On 18 August, Maduro said the US "has gone mad and has renewed its threats to Venezuela's peace and tranquility". [28] He "announced the planned deployment of more than 4.5 million militia members" around Venezuela, per The Associated Press , [28] and started militia enrollment on 23 August. The Economist was skeptical of the announcement, stating, "Election receipts show he received fewer than 3.8m votes last year; it is improbable that more people would fight to defend him than would vote for him." [9] The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated the militia had 343,000 members as of 2020. [43] The BBC reported that many of the recently mobilized militia are "mostly made up of volunteers from poor communities, although public sector workers have reported being pressured into joining them as well." [18] On 25 August, Maduro "said 15,000 'well armed and trained' men had been deployed to states near the Colombian border," per The Economist. [9]
Following the 2 September strike, Maduro said that the US was "coming for Venezuela's riches". [161] Maduro stated that "Venezuela is confronting the biggest threat that has been seen on our continent in the last 100 years." [44] In a display of its military strength, Venezuela initiated large-scale military exercises in the Caribbean on 17 September. The maneuvers, involving naval and air forces, were intended to bolster the nation's defense capabilities and demonstrate its readiness to protect its sovereign waters. [162] Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López announced Caribe Soberano (Sovereign Caribbean) 200 would take place on La Orchila Island. López stated that the operation "seeks to strengthen defensive capabilities and protect national sovereignty" in direct response to "the threatening and vulgar deployment of U.S. ships in the Caribbean". [163] Following another airstrike, on 15 October 2025, Maduro declared new military exercises in Caracas shantytowns and nearby states. [164] On 22 October, Maduro warned the US that the National Bolivarian Armed Forces had over 5,000 Russian-made Igla-S man-portable surface-to-air-missile systems in "... key anti-aircraft defense positions to guarantee peace, stability, and tranquility". [165]
According to Reuters, the Venezuelan military is considering two strategies in preparation for a US attack. The first strategy, referred to as "prolonged resistance" on state television, would involve several small military units carrying out sabotage and other guerrilla-style tactics, according to sources. The second strategy, "anarchization", which was not officially mentioned, aims to "make Venezuela ungovernable for foreign forces" by creating disorder in the capital, Caracas. The approach, labeled an acknowledgement of Venezuela's "debilitated" military, would be unlikely to succeed, as noted by sources. [166]
After USS Gravely arrived in Trinidad and Tobago on 26 October, Venezuela condemned that country's joint drills with the US, referring to them as a "military provocation", [167] and withdrew from an energy agreement it had established with the island nation in 2015. [168] Vice President Delcy Rodríguez claimed without evidence that Venezuela had captured a group of mercenaries "with direct information of the American intelligence agency" whose goal was to carry out a false flag attack in the region. [167] Venezuela's Minister of the Interior Diosdado Cabello said on 27 October the captured cell was four members "financed by the CIA" who had plans to blame Venezuela for an attack on the Gravely. [169] No specifics on the captured were given; Agence France-Presse stated that: "Venezuela regularly claims to have arrested US-backed mercenaries working to destabilize Maduro's administration." [169]
Government officials announced in late October that surveillance cameras would be deployed at a large scale, and VenApp, an application used during the 2024 Venezuelan political crisis to facilitate citizens reporting on each other's activities, would be reactivated to allow reporting to authorities of "everything they see and everything they hear, 24 hours a day". [170] [171]
Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado said the deployment encouraged "tens and tens of thousands" of Venezuelans to join an underground movement aiming to overthrow Maduro. Machado said that the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election gave a mandate for regime change, though she said that regime change was the responsibility of Venezuelans rather than of the US. [172]
Gustavo Petro, President of Colombia, initially suggested that any attack on Venezuela would equal an attack on Latin America and the Caribbean, and thus Colombia's armed forces could support Venezuela; he later moderated his position. [8] On 23 September, he addressed the UN General Assembly to call for a "criminal process" to be opened against Donald Trump for US strikes in the Caribbean. [173]
Colombia convened an extraordinary virtual meeting of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States in September 2025, which concluded with an expression of "deep concern" over foreign intervention in the region. [174] [175] Over Guatemala's objection that procedures were not followed, the group issued a statement saying the region must remain a "Zone of Peace" based on "... the prohibition of the threat or use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the promotion of dialogue and multilateralism, unrestricted respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and the inalienable right of peoples to self-determination." [174] Guatemala's president Bernardo Arévalo said Guatemala was included in the list of 21 countries (of the 33 members) approving the text, although it did not sign, nor did Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, and El Salvador. [176]
In August, when the initial three ships were deployed, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago Kamla Persad-Bissessar offered the US military access to the Trinidad nation for the US to protect Guyana amid the Guyana–Venezuela crisis. [177] [178] Maduro responded that Bisessar's offer was tantamount to declaring war on Venezuela, and threatened both countries with retaliation if Trinidad went through with its offer. [177] [179] Bisessar later praised the deployment and the 2 September strike, saying "the US military should kill [all drug traffickers] violently." Foreign Minister of Barbados Kerrie Symmonds said that foreign ministers in CARICOM wrote to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio asking that military operations in the Caribbean not be conducted without prior notice or explanation. [180] The deployment was endorsed by the government of Guyana, two-thirds of its territory being claimed by Venezuela, with Guyana's vice president and former president Bharrat Jagdeo telling The Financial Times "You cannot trust Maduro." [8] According to Havana Times , the deployment "reignited tensions and divided positions in the region", with "the Cuba–Venezuela–Nicaragua axis" calling it an "imperialist offensive", and other countries "harden[ing] their stance against Maduro and the Cartel of the Soles." [181]
In addition to Trinidad and Tobago, on 19 November, CNN described Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guyana, Panama, and Puerto Rico as supportive of the US military effort, and Argentina, Ecuador and Paraguay as having "shown political support". [182] Foreign Policy magazine stated that a poll conducted across Latin America (and including US and Canada) in October 2025 showed "fairly strong levels of support among people in the region for a U.S. military intervention in Venezuela to depose Maduro and his government", adding that people in Latin America were more "likely to support such a scenario" than US respondents. [183] [184]
The Commander of the Cayman Islands Coast Guard, Robert Scotland, stated that the US strikes would "send a very clear message to those entities who have been designated as narco-terrorists, and should serve as a strong deterrent to anyone who seeks to engage in the illicit trafficking of drugs and firearms within our region". The Office of the Cayman Island's Governor stated that the British government "recognizes the importance of regional security and is committed to providing advice and capacity building to our Cayman law-enforcement partners", highlighted the mutual defense alliance between the British and American governments, and emphasized organized crime as a common threat. [185]
The United States maintains two Forward Operating Locations (FOL) on the Dutch territories of Aruba and Curaçao, stemming from a 2000 treaty. [186] In response to escalating tensions between Venezuela and the US, the Dutch have taken a neutral position, but say treaties must be honored. [187] [188] [189] Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans stated that the treaty "permits flights from Curaçao solely for surveillance, monitoring, and the detection of drug shipments. This consent applies only to unarmed flights". According to the Curacao Chronicle, the minister indicated that the approximate 1,000 soldiers in the Dutch Antilles, as well as the Dutch Caribbean Coast Guard and accompanying aircraft, could be used "if the situation escalates". [190] On 19 September, Prime Minister Gilmar Pisas of Curaçao stated it would renew its treaty for the Curaçao-based FOL until at least 2 November 2026. [187]
The US expressed interest in establishing a temporary military radar base at Maurice Bishop International Airport, Grenada in October. [191] The Grenadian government under Prime Minister Dickon Mitchell responded that it would take the request under review. Critics urged the Mitchell administration to deny the request, as they feared that the US strikes were a pretext for war with Venezuela, a nation that they say "has not done ... anything" to Grenada. [192] [193] The following week Admiral Alvin Holsey traveled to Antigua and Barbuda to make a similar request, but was denied. [194] [195] The Grenadian government—working with CARICOM—later stated that decisions would be deferred until "all technical and legal assessments are completed", accounting for national and public interests. [196] In November Mitchell said that there was a non-disclosed deadline for approval of the radar station. [197]
Iran said that US military action in the Caribbean was provocative, destabilizing, and a threat to regional and global peace. Several Iranian officials, including Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei, stated that US military actions such as attacks on Venezuelan ships, break the UN Charter and international law. Iran has also turned to the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary-General to act quickly. [198] [199]
Russia's Foreign Ministry called the deployment "excessive military force" and spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that Russia "confirms our firm support for the Venezuelan leadership in defending its national sovereignty". [200]
The Miami Herald reported on 2 October 2025 that sources said the US effort had "effectively shut down" the busy "Caribbean route" for estimated 2024 annual shipments of between 350 and 500 tons of cocaine coming from Venezuela. [201] According to the Miami Herald, the campaign's "goal is financial: cutting off the drug revenue that sustains loyalty among Venezuela's senior military and police commanders, many of whom are accused of profiting directly from narcotrafficking." [201] Trafficking through older air and land routes from Colombia are more costly than maritime shipments, and sources said that Venezuelan "cash flow from trafficking is under direct threat, and that puts the cohesion of the military elite at risk", with "authorities [turning] to heavier taxation and extortion of businesses to keep the state's security apparatus afloat." [201]
According to The Economist, "Few ... think drugs are the sole or even the main focus" of the operation, noting that fentanyl, the drug that causes the most deaths in the US, is almost entirely "synthesized in Mexico and trafficked north over land" and that "the hardware"—e.g. destroyers—"doesn't match the task" of drug policing. According to The Economist, "All this makes the most sense if the principal intent is to rattle Mr Maduro, give succour to Venezuela's opposition or even stir an uprising within the Venezuelan armed forces—encouraged perhaps by that recently doubled reward." [9] Experts speaking to Reuters and the BBC described the deployment as gunboat diplomacy [14] [15] and Trump administration sources stated a likely goal was to pressure the Maduro administration. [16] [17] James G. Stavridis, a former US Navy admiral, characterized the strike and other US military activity around the same time as gunboat diplomacy intended to demonstrate the vulnerability of Venezuelan oil rigs and materiel. He wrote that drug interdiction was likely not the sole reason for the increased US military activity. [202] The New York Times reported that a group of officials, led by US National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, was pushing for a military campaign that would drive Maduro from power. [203] Members of Venezuela's opposition told the New York Times they have coordinated with the Trump administration on a plan for the first hundred hours after Maduro's deposition. [203] [204]
PBS News reported that Trump was using the military to counter cartels he blamed for trafficking fentanyl and other illicit drugs into the US and for fuelling violence in American cities, stating that the government had "not signaled any planned land incursion" [20] —similarly, The Guardian stated that "many experts are skeptical the US is planning a military intervention" in Venezuela. [205]
The Financial Times wrote that the strikes were intended to pressure members of the Venezuelan government into resigning or arranging a handover of power by demonstrating the US military's capability to capture or kill them through targeted strikes. [13]
According to The New York Times , "specialists in the laws of war and executive power" stated that Trump had "used the military in a way that had no clear legal precedent or basis". [206]
David Smilde, a Venezuela expert at Tulane University, said the military moves appeared to be an effort to pressure the Maduro government. 'I think what they are trying to do is put maximum pressure, real military pressure, on the regime to see if they can get it to break ... It's gunboat diplomacy. It's old-fashioned tactics'
These consultations led to the deployment of an additional Dutch naval vessel in the Caribbean.