Multinational Force – Ukraine

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A multinational force in Ukraine was under discussion in 2025 as part of a possible peace process in relation to the 2022 full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine proposed by the coalition of the willing. [1] [2]

Contents

Conditions

The proposed force would be a peacekeeping force, requiring a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. [1]

Plans

Discussions for creating the possible multinational force took place in 2025. In March, UK parliamentarian Ben Obese-Jecty referred to the force as "Multinational Force Ukraine". [3] In July, UK prime minister Keir Starmer stated that a command structure had been established. [4] Headquarters were set up at Fort Mont-Valérien near Paris, [5] with English as a 'primary working language'; British two-star ranked general officer was assigned to Kyiv coordinating cell. [6] In October, UK defence secretary John Healey stated that two million pounds had been "accelerated" for the possible force, and he predicted that the UK would contribute "well over" £ 100 million to the force. [1]

On 26 September, French president Emmanuel Macron stated that 26 states had committed to contribute to the force,using the term "Multinational Force Ukraine". Possible roles for the would-be force ranged from a rapid reaction force, a sky shield over part of Ukraine, shifting the training of Ukrainian forces to Ukrainian territory, or a peacekeeping force ranging from 5000 to 100,000 land soldiers, supported by air and sea forces. [7] As of October 2025, plans included forces from 30 countries, initially led by a French general, with headquarters in Paris, with rotation to a British leader, based in London, a year later. [1] [7] As of December 2025, French and British forces were seen as the likely main components of the force. Two hundred people from the 30 likely countries were involved in military planning. [8] Countries expected to contribute to a lesser degree include Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and, possibly, Turkey. [7]

Per-country planning

United States

According to April and August 2025 proposals by the Trump administration, a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine would not have a US component. [9]

Belgium

In November 2025, agreement by the Belgian Federal Parliament for a Belgian Armed Forces contribution to the force was unclear due to the wide nature of the De Wever governmental coalition. A likely contribution was predicted by researchers to be a "handful" of F‑16 fighter jets. [10]

Canada

As of November 2025, Canadian politicians and the wider public were politically supportive of increased military support for Ukraine. The specific military resources of the Canadian Armed Forces available for the proposed multinational force were expected to be modest levels of mostly non‑combat functions such as training, demining, logistics, medical and intelligence support, and a few aircraft and ships. [11]

Czech Republic

The shift to a government led by ANO following the October 2025 Czech parliamentary election made it unlikely that Czech forces would contribute to the proposed multinational force in Ukraine. [12]

Denmark

Denmark has positioned itself as a frontrunner in supporting Ukraine, donating major weapon systems and hosting training initiatives while maintaining one of the highest aid levels relative to GDP. Political consensus and strong public backing ensure commitment to a European security force, though the scale of Denmark’s contribution will depend on task requirements. Years of defence underinvestment leave the Danish Defence forces with only modest or specialized contributions feasible. [13]

Estonia

Estonia has been among the strongest per‑capita supporters of Ukraine, contributing over 1.4% of GDP in military aid and consistently framing Ukraine’s security as inseparable from Europe’s. While the government has pledged a company‑sized unit and naval assets, Estonian Defence Forces participation is conditional on a ceasefire, parliament approval and a clear mandate. Public opinion remains cautious, but Estonia’s leadership sees involvement in MNF‑U as strategically vital NATO’s future balance. [14]

Finland

Analysts highlighted that Finland’s frontline realism, as outlined in a NUPI [15] policy brief, stressed the need for mandate clarity and rules of engagement before committing Finnish Armed Forces to MNF-U participation. [16]

France

France has taken a proactive leadership role in discussions on MNF‑U, with President Macron insisting that Western 'boots on the ground' should not be excluded. Paris frames such a force as reassurance for Ukraine and deterrence against Russia. Domestic politics and constitutional rules make French deployments comparatively easier, with limited parliamentary constraints and divided but not hostile public opinion. [17] Militarily, France can field air, maritime, and even ground components, though sustainability of the French Armed Forces under high‑intensity combat is uncertain. [18]

Germany

Germany participates in the coalition politically but has been hesitant to commit troops, reflecting internal political divisions led by Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who faces a domestic population wary of war. [19]

Germany refers to its substantial contributions to NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) and the EU’s Military Assistant Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM UA) to justify its reluctance for major Bundeswehr contributions to the MNF-U likely lines of operations. Germany is however present with personnel in the HQ in France. [20]

Italy

Italy categorically rejects deploying troops to Ukraine under the coalition of the willing (CoW), limiting its role to monitoring and training outside Ukrainian territory. This reflects Meloni government prioritisation of 'transatlantic alignment', with prime minister Meloni and defence minister Crosetto stressing loyalty to US preferences. Domestic politics and public opinion further constrain options. Consequently, Italian Armed Forces contribution would likely be modest, focusing on air protection or training missions rather than sizeable ground forces. [21]

Latvia

Despite strong political will, Latvia's modest force size and proximity to Russia limit the scope of potential MNF‑U contributions. As a result, Latvian National Armed Forces are expected to focus on training missions under a NATO‑led framework rather than deploying frontline troops. [22]

Lithuania

President Gitanas Nausėda has described the reassurance force concept as “a necessity”. As of December 2025, Lithuania's conditions for participation include US backing, a clearly defined mission mandate, and the existence of a peace agreement or a 'stabilized ceasefire'. Only 15 percent of those polled support Lithuanian Defence Forces deployment if allied forces also participate, and further 15% back sending troops solely for the purpose of training Ukrainian Armed Forces. [23]

Lithuania is considering deploying "roughly twenty" instructors across different levels of command to assist the MNF-U. [23]

Netherlands

The Netherlands has emerged as a major donor and supporter of Ukraine, linking its position to international law, European security, and the legacy of MH17. Yet Netherlands Armed Forces participation in MNF‑U is contingent on US involvement, parliamentary consensus, and the limits of its recovering military capabilities. [24]

Norway

The Norwegian parliament has not yet approved the deployment of the Norwegian Armed Forces into the MNF-U, cautiously approaching its military involvement starting February 2025. [25] However, Norway has been participating in planning and has provided training to Ukrainian forces. The Norwegian Chief of Defence and his staff are involved in the planning of the multinational force, suggesting likely engagement in the military aspects of the coalition. [26]

Poland

Poland positioned itself as the coalition’s logistical backbone in MNF‑U, [27] pledging infrastructure and coordination while firmly ruling out Polish Armed Forces combat troop deployments. [28] [29]

Sweden

The Swedish Prime Minister has suggested that Sweden could potentially participate with air surveillance or naval forces, and the Minister of Defence has not ruled out military options for involvement in Ukraine. In contrast, Swedish Armed Forces have limited capacity to contribute to a future MFU mission. [30]

Turkey

As of November 2025, Turkey has been considering Turkey Armed Forces as peacekeepers to be stationed within MNF-U, but only after ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine necessarily in effect for "any talks" on troop deployment to start. [31] [32] According to NUPI research, "Turkey’s willingness to be part of the coalition" is important because of its role in the maritime battlespace guarding the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits per the Montreux Convention. [7]

United Kingdom

The UK under Starmer premiership has positioned itself as a political leader of the Coalition of the willing, alongside France, to support Ukraine as US commitment wanes. Parliamentary and public backing ensures this position, though opinion narrows when asked about long‑term support "until Ukraine wins." [33]

London, with France, has already established a multinational headquarters in Paris, preparing detailed plans for potential deployments despite uncertainty over mission conditions. According to NUPI brief, the UK could contribute a British Armed Forces brigade and command assets, but sustaining such a force would strain its army and NATO commitments. This highlights the tension between Britain's ambition to lead and the practical limits of its expeditionary capacity. [34]

Ukraine

According to Ukraine's prime minister's office statement on 10 July 2025, Ukraine is ready to issue an invitation to the force and enter into formal agreements with participating nations as and when necessary. [35] : 21 

According to NUPI brief, Ukraine's operational needs include high end of the air domain – 'Strategic Aircraft and Air Defence Systems' – a sector where Ukrainian capabilities are overmatched by the adversary, and the necessity for support is urgent. There, MNF-U partners possess both the 'technical capacity and the moral legitimacy' to intervene, in light of the violations of their own airspace. [36] In contrast, as brief authors state, coalition partner nations lack 'the doctrine, organization, and capability' to wage current type of war. However, allies could provide land-based contributions, such as the 'counter-mine capacity from ashore that several states are positioned to offer'. In authors' opinion, the functional scope of future mission will be limited to strategic non-combat rear support (intelligence, air defense, demining, and logistics). [36]

Russian opposition to a European peacekeeping force

Russia rejects the deployment of European peacekeepers in Ukraine to monitor and enforce any peace agreement, calling it "demonstrably unviable". [37] In September 2025, Russian authorities stated that any Western military presence in Ukraine would be "fundamentally unacceptable." [38]

Earlier in the 2025, both President Macron and Prime Minister Starmer have said that the deployment of allied forces in Ukrainian territory was "not up to Russia to accept or not". [39] [40] On November 25, both reiterated their position. [41] However, Russia has explicitly rejected these again, warning that any future deployment of Western troops — specifically those under the Franco-British 'coalition of the willing' — would be unacceptable. President Putin affirmed Russia’s maximalist demands in November 2025, demanding that any final peace deal must include an "explicit ban" on the deployment of Western forces. [42]

Analysis

Max Bergmann of the Center for Strategic and International Studies stated that the deployment of the force would be a de facto implementation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Bergmann argued that the likely lack of US support would make deployment of the proposed force too risky, since it would risk a war between European forces without US backing against Russian forces. [8]

A Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) policy brief Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine by researchers John Karlsrud and Yf Reykers expect that the proposed force would be primarily led by the UK and France, with logistic support in Poland, as a land, sea and air force. They saw competing military resource needs for countries contributing to the force: "maintaining national defence readiness, preserving NATO's strategic reserve, sustaining troops deployments on NATO's eastern flank, and contributing to a Multinational Force Ukraine". [7]

See also

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 Dan Sabbagh (20 October 2025). "UK peace force for Ukraine would cost 'well over £100m', says defence secretary". The Guardian . ISSN   0261-3077. Wikidata   Q137300856. Archived from the original on 23 October 2025.
  2. ↑ AFP/MIRO (17 November 2025). "Macron et Zelensky signent un accord en vue de l'acquisition de 100 avions Rafale par l'Ukraine" [Macron and Zelensky sign agreement for the acquisition of 100 Rafale aircraft by Ukraine]. RTS Radio Télévision Suisse, a branch of the Swiss Radio and Television Corporation (in French). Archived from the original on 10 December 2025. Retrieved 17 November 2025. Après cette visite à Villacoublay, Emmanuel Macron et Volodymyr Zelensky se rendent au mont Valérien, à l'ouest de Paris, visiter l'état-major de la "force multinationale Ukraine" que Paris et Londres préparent pour qu'elle puisse être déployée dans le cadre d'un accord de cessez-le-feu et des "garanties de sécurité" à fournir à Kiev. Mis en place par la "coalition de volontaires", à laquelle participent, selon l'Elysée, 35 pays en incluant l'Ukraine, cet état-major "fonctionne" et est "dès à présent" capable "de déployer une force dès le lendemain d'un cessez-le-feu", assure-t-on côté français.[After this visit to Villacoublay, Emmanuel Macron and Volodymyr Zelensky are going to Mont Valérien, west of Paris, to visit the headquarters of the "multinational force Ukraine" that Paris and London are preparing so that it can be deployed as part of a ceasefire agreement and "security guarantees" to be provided to Kyiv. Set up by the "coalition of the willing", in which, according to the Elysée, 35 countries participate, including Ukraine, this general staff "works" and is "as of now" capable of "deploying a force the day after a ceasefire", according to the French side.]
  3. ↑ Obese-Jecty, Ben; Pollard, Luke (1 April 2025). "Ukraine: Peacekeeping Operations" [by Ben Obese-Jecty: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment he has made of the ability of the Armed Forces to contribute to the Multinational Force Ukraine.]. UIN 42031. Archived from the original on 2025-12-10. Retrieved 26 November 2025. Elements of UK Armed Forces remain ready to respond to all challenges including deployment to Ukraine in order to support a Coalition of the Willing. Discussions continue around military planning of air, sea and land forces that would be required to support a just and lasting peace in Ukraine.
  4. ↑ "Starmer confirms western peacekeeping force in Ukraine includes land element–Europe live". The Guardian . 17 July 2025. Archived from the original on 10 December 2025. Retrieved 17 July 2025. Most importantly, and often the most difficult, we've got a command structure in place so that the plans can move from the plan stage to being operationalized very quickly.
  5. ↑ Sylvie Corbet (17 November 2025), Ukraine plans to buy up to 100 Rafale warplanes and air defense systems from France, Associated Press, Wikidata   Q137324203, archived from the original on 10 December 2025
  6. ↑ Allison, George (6 September 2025). "UK to lead headquarters of Multinational Force Ukraine". UK Defence Journal. Archived from the original on 7 September 2025. Retrieved 10 December 2025. as consistent with "usual protocols for international collaboration."
  7. 1 2 3 4 5 John Karlsrud; Yf Reykers (1 December 2025). "Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine: A Multinational Force in the Making" (PDF). Multinational Force Ukraine (26). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-4. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2025-12-09. Retrieved 7 December 2025.
  8. 1 2 Max Bergmann (5 December 2025), United States: Europe with Eyes Wide Shut (PDF), Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Wikidata   Q137301854, archived (PDF) from the original on 9 December 2025
  9. ↑ Hynek, Nik; Šenk, Michal (16 November 2025). "Ukraine–Russia peace plans: historical lessons, operationalising criteria, and comparative assessment". Peacebuilding . Taylor & Francis: 1–22. doi:10.1080/21647259.2025.2585235 . Retrieved 9 December 2025.
  10. ↑ Yf Reykers; Michelle Haas; Tim Haesebrouck (2025-11-10). "Belgium: Committed in Principle, Constrained in Practice". Multinational Force Ukraine. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. p. 1-2. Archived from the original on 12 December 2025.
  11. ↑ Justin Massie (2025-11-26). "Canada: Willing but Unable". Multinational Force Ukraine. 2025 (16). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. Archived from the original on 11 December 2025.
  12. ↑ Vojtěch Bahenský (2025-11-27). "The Czech Republic: From a High-Profile Supporter to a Low-Profile Abstainer?". Multinational Force Ukraine. 2025 (22). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. Archived from the original on 11 December 2025.
  13. ↑ Peter Viggo Jakobsen (2025-08-29). "Denmark: High on will, low on military capabilities" (PDF). Multinational Force Ukraine. 2025 (12). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 November 2025.
  14. ↑ Helena Eglit; Kristi Raik (2025-10-05). "Estonia: Strong and Early Support, but Conditions Apply" (PDF). Multinational Force Ukraine. 2025 (20). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 November 2025.
  15. ↑ Joel Linnainmäki; Tyyne Karjalainen. Dr. John Karlsrud; Research Professor (eds.). "Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine Tracker". NUPI. Archived from the original on 8 December 2025. Through a series of policy briefs, leading experts from 16 participating countries assess the coalition's readiness to contribute to a Multinational Force Ukraine.
  16. ↑
    1. Joel Linnainmäki; Tyyne Karjalainen (26 November 2025). "Finland: Capable but Informed by Frontline Realism". Multinational Force Ukraine. 2025 (18). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. Archived from the original on 2025-11-28. Another central question is whether the MFU would resemble an international peace operation or rather a battlegroup that might have to fight alongside Ukraine against Russia. A key factor distinguishing the two scenarios is the solidity of a ceasefire or peace agreement established prior to deployment.
    2. Shaun Walker (20 September 2025). "Security guarantees for Ukraine require readiness to fight Russia, says Finland's president". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 20 September 2025.
  17. ↑ Ian Johnston (27 November 2025). "Emmanuel Macron to relaunch French military service". The Financial Times. Archived from the original on 28 November 2025.
  18. ↑ David Cadier; Elie Tenenbaum (2025-09-10). "France: Able, willing, and leading?" (PDF). Multinational Force Ukraine. 2025 (15). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 November 2025.
  19. ↑ Alison O'Leary (1 December 2025). "The Proposed 2025 Ukraine Peace Deal: How NATO's Security Architecture Is Being Rewritten". Archived from the original on 5 December 2025 – via GovFacts.org.
  20. ↑ Niklas Ebert; Claudia Major (1 December 2025). "Germany:heavy on funding, light on force". Multinational Force Ukraine. 2025 (25). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. Archived from the original (PDF) on 8 December 2025.
  21. ↑ Fabrizio Coticchia; Matteo Mazziotti di Celso (2025-09-01). "Italy: Transatlantic Loyalty First" (PDF). Multinational Force Ukraine. 2025 (13). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 November 2025.
  22. ↑ Māris Cepurītis; Kārlis Bukovskis (2025-09-15). "Latvia: Strongly Committed, Modestly Equipped" (PDF). Multinational Force Ukraine. 2025 (17). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 November 2025.
  23. 1 2 Margarita Šešelgytė (1 December 2025). "Germany:heavy on funding, light on force Lithuania: Balancing Ambition with Capacity". Multinational Force Ukraine. 2025 (27). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. Archived from the original (PDF) on 8 December 2025.
  24. ↑ "The Netherlands: Unyielding support with some uncertainty" (PDF). Multinational Force Ukraine. 2025 (23). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. 2025-10-29. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 November 2025.
  25. ↑ NRK Urix (18 February 2025). "Eksperter: Urealistisk med europeisk fredsstyrke i Ukraina" [Experts: Unrealistic to deploy European peace force in Ukraine]. NRK. Retrieved 2 December 2025.
  26. ↑ Karsten Friis (26 November 2025). "Norway: Solid political engagement, military reluctance" (PDF). Multinational Force Ukraine. 2025 (21). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 November 2025.
  27. ↑ "How Poland emerged as a leading defence power". The Economist. 22 January 2025. Archived from the original on 3 June 2025.
  28. ↑ Monika Sus (27 November 2025). "Poland as the Coalition's logistical backbone: Powering the front" (PDF). Multinational Force Ukraine. 2025 (24). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 November 2025.
  29. ↑ Marta Prochwicz Jazowska (8 September 2025). "Home and away: Why Poland is fighting a war on two fronts". European Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on 2025-08-27.
  30. ↑ Calle Håkansson and Jan Frelin; Calle Håkansson and Jan Frelin (1 December 2025). "Sweden: Politically Willing, but Militarily Constrained". Multinational Force Ukraine. 2025 (19). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. Archived from the original (PDF) on 8 December 2025.
  31. ↑ not named (27 November 2025). "'Ceasefire between Russia, Ukraine necessary before any talks on troop deployment' – Türkiye". TRT World. Retrieved 28 November 2025.
  32. ↑ Alper Coşkun (27 November 2025). "Turkey Stakes its Claim in the Ukraine Peace Process". Carnegie Europe. Archived from the original on 28 November 2025.
  33. ↑ Staff Writer (17 February 2025). "Could a multinational troop deployment in Ukraine succeed as a peacekeeping force?". National Security News. Archived from the original on 28 November 2025.
  34. ↑ Ed Arnold (2025-09-05). "UK: Leading politically but militarily questionable" (PDF). Multinational Force Ukraine. 2025 (14). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 November 2025.
  35. ↑ Mills, Claire (30 October 2025). "Military assistance to Ukraine: What has changed in 2025? - Research Briefing" (PDF). Commons Library Research. UK Parliament. CBP-10308. Retrieved 9 November 2025. Through Multinational Force Ukraine Ukrainian land forces will be "regenerated by providing logistics, armament and training experts", while Ukraine's skies will be secured by coalition aircraft providing a similar level of support that is currently used for NATO's air policing missions. The Black Sea taskforce will also be strengthened with additional specialist teams.
  36. 1 2 Stanislav Boiko; Lesia Ogryzko (1 December 2025). "Ukraine: Sobered after Four Years of Indecision". Multinational Force Ukraine. 2025 (29). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. Archived from the original (PDF) on 8 December 2025.
  37. ↑ "Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on statements by British officials regarding the Ukrainian conflict". The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 18 August 2025. Retrieved 9 November 2025.
  38. ↑ Al Jazeera News (4 September 2025). "Russia says it will not discuss foreign troops in Ukraine in 'any format'". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 2 December 2025.
  39. ↑ Stacey, Kiran (20 March 2025). "Starmer warns Putin of 'severe consequences' if he breaches peace deal: UK leader says Russia cannot veto how Ukraine defends itself as western military officials meet to draft security plans". The Guardian . Retrieved 9 November 2025.
  40. ↑ "Macron says Putin has no say in whether Western troops are deployed to 'sovereign' Ukraine". The Associated Press. 17 March 2025. Retrieved 9 November 2025– via The Independent.
  41. ↑
    1. "Britain still planning for multinational force in Ukraine". Reuters. 25 November 2025. Retrieved 25 November 2025– via British PM Starmer's spokesperson.
    2. "France's Macron: working with EU countries on Ukraine financing solution". Ibidem. The Coalition will launch a working group led by France and Britain with close involvement from Turkey and, for the first time, the United States to hammer out security guarantees for Ukraine once a peace deal has been reached, he said.
  42. ↑
    1. "Putin insists Ukraine has to surrender territory for any deal to be possible". The Guardian. 27 November 2025. Retrieved 28 November 2025. Speaking to reporters[...] Putin said Russia would halt its offensive only if Ukrainian forces withdrew from unspecified areas currently under Kyiv's control. "If Ukrainian troops leave the territories they occupy, then we will stop fighting," he said. "If they don't, we will achieve our aims militarily."... Kyiv would also be expected to accept reductions or a halt to US military assistance, while any future deployment of western troops to Ukraine – including those envisioned under the Franco-British "coalition of the willing" – would be explicitly banned.
    2. "Putin says US peace plan could form basis for end to Ukraine war – as it happened". The Guardian. 27 November 2025. Retrieved 28 November 2025.

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