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In late October 2025, UK defence secretary John Healey described the proposed force as a peacekeeping force, following a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, that would include air, land and sea components.[1] On 15 December 2025, a group of European leaders issued a statement declaring that the role of the force would be to "assist in the regeneration of Ukraine's forces, in securing Ukraine's skies, and in supporting safer seas, including through operating inside Ukraine", and that it would constitute one element of a six-point European proposal towards peace between Ukraine and Russia.[3][4]
Ceasefire condition
Official statements about the planned force typically stated that a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine would be required before deployment of the force.[1]
Plans
Discussions for creating the possible multinational force took place in 2025. In March, UK parliamentarian Ben Obese-Jecty referred to the force as "Multinational Force Ukraine".[5] In July, UK prime minister Keir Starmer stated that a command structure had been established.[6] Headquarters were set up at Fort Mont-Valérien near Paris,[7] with English as a 'primary working language' for three-star command; a British two-star military officer was assigned to lead two-star-level headquarters in Kyiv.[8] In October, UK defence secretaryJohn Healey stated that two million pounds had been "accelerated" for the possible force, and he predicted that the UK would contribute "well over" £100 million to the force.[1]
On 26 September, French president Emmanuel Macron stated that 26 states had committed to contribute to the force,using the term "Multinational Force Ukraine". Possible roles for the would-be force ranged from a rapid reaction force, a sky shield over part of Ukraine, shifting the training of Ukrainian forces to Ukrainian territory, or a peacekeeping force ranging from 5000 to 100,000 land soldiers, supported by air and sea forces.[9]As of October2025[update], plans included forces from 30 countries, initially led by a French general, with headquarters in Paris, with rotation to a British leader, based in London, a year later.[1][9]As of December2025[update], French and British forces were seen as the likely main components of the force. Two hundred people from the 30 likely countries were involved in military planning.[10] Countries expected to contribute to a lesser degree include Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and, possibly, Turkey.[9]
Per-country planning
United States
According to April and August 2025 proposals by the Trump administration, a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine would not have a US component.[11]
As of November 2025, Canadian politicians and the wider public were politically supportive of increased military support for Ukraine. The specific military resources of the Canadian Armed Forces available for the proposed multinational force were expected to be modest levels of mostly non‑combat functions such as training, demining, logistics, medical and intelligence support, and a few aircraft and ships.[13]
Czech Republic
The shift to a government led by ANO following the October 2025 Czech parliamentary election made it unlikely that Czech forces would contribute to the proposed multinational force in Ukraine.[14]
Denmark
Political and popular support for Ukrainian defence against the Russian in general, and for the creation of a multinational security force in particular, were strong in 2025. Practical possibilities of providing military forces were likely to be high per capita, but low in absolute terms, except if existing deployments such as Danish NATO deployments in Latvia were replaced by other forces. Contributions of staff to multinational units, such as military police, bomb disposal specialists, special forces, or other ancilliary staff, were seen as viable as of November 2025.[15]
Estonia
In April 205, the Estonian defence minister Hanno Pevkur stated that Estonia was ready to provide a company of soldiers to a multinational peacekeeping force in Ukraine.[16] In November 2025, Estonian support for a multinational force, conditional on a ceasefire, was seen as likely to be strong from the Estonian parliament. It would require a well-defined mission, including the mission's plan's for closure. In 2025, the Estonian public was in the majority (60%) opposed to contributing Estonian soldiers to the proposed force in Ukraine.[17]
Finland
As a state bordering Russia, it appeared in November 2025 that Finland would likely contribute little to a multinational force in Ukraine, since the benefit for deterrence would be unclear. Finland was seen as "committed to participating in some form", depending on the overall security context and operational plans.[18]
France
Main building of Forteresse du Mont-Valérien, where headquarters of a possible multinational force were located in late 2025.
As of late November 2025, French authorities considered deployment of French forces in Ukraine[19] to require a ceasefire, but not require Russian agreement on deployment, nor require US military support.[20] French and British authorities started cooperating as co-leaders of a possible multinational force, setting up headquarters at Fort Mont-Valérien near Paris in late 2025.[7] A likely French contribution of land forces would be one brigade, "including two heavy armoured battlegroups". In the absence of a ceasefire, French air force contributions, such as a group of 16 combat aircraft, an airborne early warning and control aircraft, two aerial refueling aircraft, and a long-range anti-aircraft system, was proposed by researchers David Cadier and Elie Tenenbaum as a viable French air force contribution. If Turkish authorities agreed, Cadier and Tenenbaum expected that France could supply two frigates and a support ship on a one-month time scale.[20]
Latvia
In late 2025, Latvian public opinion was in the majority opposed to sending Latvian soldiers for a multinational force in Ukraine. Political and military leaders expected to provide training for Ukrainian soldiers, that they would prefer to be in a mission coordinated by NATO.[21]
Lithuania
In late 2025, Lithuanian public opinion was in the majority opposed to sending Lithuanian soldiers for a multinational force in Ukraine. In early December 2025, possible Lithuanian support included the sending of twenty instructors to the multinational force, "targeted deployment of small high-readiness units", and financial support.[22]
Netherlands
As of early December 2025, contributions from The Netherlands to a multinational force in Ukraine appeared to be possible, but unlikely.[23]
Norway
In November 2025, possible Norwegian contributions to a multinational force included extending air police contributions to Ukrainian territory,[24] shifting Camp Jomsborg[25] east into Ukraine, or providing sea contributions such as minesweepers.[24]
Sweden
As of late November, Swedish Air Force contributions such as air surveillance were suggested by the prime minister of Sweden. Naval contributions on inland waterways, were considered possible. Land force contributions would likely be limited to training, logistics support and demining.[26]
Turkey
Turkey, which has a naval role in the Black Sea under the Montreux Convention, and carried out mine-clearing operations in the Black Sea during the Russian invasion, is seen as a likely contibutor to a multinational peacekeeping force.[27][9]:3As of November2025[update], Turkey was considering providing members of the Turkey Armed Forces as peacekeepers in the proposed multinational force, but only after a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine.[28][27]
In November 2025, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) researcher Ed Arnold predicted a likely sustainable minimum British contribution of three brigades of about 5000 soldiers each, with one in theatre, one training, and one recovering, and "a lion's share [of] command and control". If the contribution in soldiers were to be long-term, then it would weaken British commitments to NATO.[29]
Ukraine: willingness and preferences
In July 2025, Ukrainian authorities were prepared to issue formal invitations for the proposed multinational force.[30]:18 In December 2025, due to the change in the forms of physical combat since the February 2022 full-scale Russian invasion, proposals for a ground-based multinational force in a combat role were viewed sceptically in Ukraine. The provision of technologically advanced aircraft, including 4.5-generation or fifth-generation fighters for destroying Russian guided-bomb carriers, or for complementary, non-combat, rear support, such as repair, logistics and medical aid already provided in Poland, were seen as contributions that would be useful.[31] On 14 December, Zelenskyy stated that "security guarantees" for Ukraine would have to be "legally binding and supported by the US Congress" in order for Ukraine to accept not to join NATO.[32]
Russian opposition to a European peacekeeping force
In March 2025, French president Emmanuel Macron stated that deploying the multinational force in Ukraine would not require Russian agreement, since it would be Ukraine's sovereign right to decide.[33] In September, a Russian foreign ministry spokesperson stated that the deployment of the force in Ukraine would be "fundamentally unacceptable" and would be a "security-undermining foreign intervention in Ukraine in any form, in any format".[34] In late November, The Guardian interpreted the mid-November 2025 28-point plan as "explicitly bann[ing]" the possible "deployment of western troops to Ukraine".[35]
Analysis
Max Bergmann of the Center for Strategic and International Studies stated that the deployment of the force would be a de facto implementation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Bergmann argued that the likely lack of US support would make deployment of the proposed force too risky, since it would risk a war between European forces without US backing against Russian forces.[10]
A Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) policy brief Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine by researchers John Karlsrud and Yf Reykers expect that the proposed force would be primarily led by the UK and France, with logistic support in Poland, as a land, sea and air force. They saw competing military resource needs for countries contributing to the force: "maintaining national defence readiness, preserving NATO's strategic reserve, sustaining troops deployments on NATO's eastern flank, and contributing to a Multinational Force Ukraine".[9]
↑AFP/MIRO (17 November 2025). "Macron et Zelensky signent un accord en vue de l'acquisition de 100 avions Rafale par l'Ukraine"[Macron and Zelensky sign agreement for the acquisition of 100 Rafale aircraft by Ukraine]. Radio Télévision Suisse (in French). Archived from the original on 10 December 2025. Retrieved 17 November 2025. ... Emmanuel Macron et Volodymyr Zelensky se rendent au mont Valérien, à l'ouest de Paris, visiter l'état-major de la "force multinationale Ukraine" que Paris et Londres préparent pour qu'elle puisse être déployée dans le cadre d'un accord de cessez-le-feu et des "garanties de sécurité" à fournir à Kiev. Mis en place par la "coalition de volontaires", à laquelle participent, selon l'Elysée, 35 pays en incluant l'Ukraine, cet état-major "fonctionne" et est "dès à présent" capable "de déployer une force dès le lendemain d'un cessez-le-feu", assure-t-on côté français.[... Emmanuel Macron and Volodymyr Zelenskyy are going to Mont Valérien, west of Paris, to visit the headquarters of the "multinational force Ukraine" that Paris and London are preparing so that it can be deployed as part of a ceasefire agreement and "security guarantees" to be provided to Kyiv. Set up by the "coalition of the willing", in which, according to the Elysée, 35 countries participate, including Ukraine, this general staff "works" and is "as of now" capable of "deploying a force the day after a ceasefire", according to the French side.]
↑Justin Massie (2025-11-26). "Canada: Willing but Unable". Multinational Force Ukraine. 2025 (16). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. Archived from the original on 11 December 2025.
12David Cadier; Elie Tenenbaum (2025-11-26). "France: Able, willing, and leading?"(PDF). Multinational Force Ukraine (15). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. Archived from the original(PDF) on 28 November 2025.
↑Stanislav Boiko; Lesia Ogryzko (5 December 2025). "Ukraine: Sobered after Four Years of Indecision"(PDF). Multinational Force Ukraine. 2025 (29). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: 1-2. Archived from the original on 14 December 2025.
Defence Secretary statement on war in Ukraine (Speech). Defence Secretary, John Healey MP, provided an update to the House of Commons on the war in Ukraine. 17 July 2025. Retrieved 19 July 2025– via GOV.uk. More than 200 military planners from 30 nations have worked intensively for weeks, with Ukraine and including reconnaissance in Ukraine, led by UK personnel. [...] a future Multinational Force for Ukraine [...] will include a 3-star multi-national command headquarters in Paris, rotating to London after 12 months.
Ben Obese-Jecty; Luke Pollard (1 April 2025). "Ukraine: Peacekeeping Operations"[by Ben Obese-Jecty: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment he has made of the ability of the Armed Forces to contribute to the Multinational Force Ukraine]. UIN 42031, tabled on 27 March 2025. Retrieved 26 November 2025. [...]including deployment to Ukraine in order to support a Coalition of the Willing.
Luke Pollard (5 September 2025). "Ukraine: Peacekeeping Operations". UK Parliament. UIN 69949, tabled on 22 July 2025. Retrieved 26 November 2025.
Luke Pollard (2025-09-05). "Ukraine: Peacekeeping Operations – Written Question 69950"[by James Cartlidge]. TheyWorkForYou. UK Parliament. UIN 69950 tabled on 22 July 2025. Retrieved 2025-11-26. Under current plans, the two star military commander in Kyiv will be an Army officer.
Luke Pollard (5 September 2025). "Ukraine: Peacekeeping Operations". UK Parliament. UIN 69956 tabled on 22 July 2025. Retrieved 7 November 2025.
Jenny Chapman (31 October 2025). "Ukraine". Hansard. 849. UK Parliament. Archived from the original on 8 December 2025. Retrieved 8 December 2025. [...]that includes the deployment of a multinational force to help secure Ukraine's skies and seas and regenerate Ukraine's armed forces once hostilities have ceased
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