2025 China–Japan diplomatic crisis

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Relations between China and Japan entered a state of crisis in November 2025, after Japanese prime minister Sanae Takaichi said in the Japanese parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could potentially constitute an "existential crisis" under the Legislation for Peace and Security, allowing Japan to take military action in collective self-defence. Following these remarks, the Chinese consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian, made threatening comments against Takaichi on X, triggering a diplomatic row between the countries. Both sides protested the other's remarks. In response to questions from Japanese parliamentarians, Takaichi refused to withdraw her remarks, arguing that they were consistent with the Japanese government's existing position on the issue. Japan requested that China take "appropriate measures" against Xue. China refused, demanded Takaichi retract her statements, and issued numerous retaliatory measures against Japan, including issuing a travel advisory, restricting travel and cultural exchanges, and cutting off seafood imports from the country.

Contents

Background

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi with Chinese President Xi Jinping during the APEC South Korea 2025, 31 October 2025 Japan-China Summit Meeting at the APEC South Korea 2025 (cropped).jpg
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi with Chinese President Xi Jinping during the APEC South Korea 2025, 31 October 2025

From 1895 to 1945, the island of Taiwan along with the Penghu islands was under Japanese colonial rule by the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in the aftermath of the First Sino-Japanese War. Following the surrender of Japan in the conclusion of World War II, Taiwan was handed over to the Republic of China (ROC) in 1945, but the ROC soon lost its mainland territory due to its defeat in the Chinese Civil War and retreated its government to Taiwan in 1949. Japan formally "renounced all right, title, and claim" to Taiwan in 1952, without naming the specific receiver of Taiwan's sovereignty, which began a long-standing geopolitical dispute.

Since 1947, under the auspices of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, the Japanese constitution has maintained a clause of Article 9, which prohibits the use of force to resolve international disputes. From the 1980s the Japanese government has taken the stance that protection of the sea lane between Japan and the Bashi Channel south of Taiwan is permissible as self-defence, [1] [2] [3] and that it would not constitute collective self-defence. [4] In 2015, Shinzo Abe's government passed legislation that allowed Japan to engage in collective self-defence in specific cases, such as if an ally like the United States came under attack. [5] In 2021, after his resignation, Abe said that a Chinese attack on Taiwan, or what he referred to as a "Taiwan emergency", would be an emergency for Japan and the US–Japan alliance. [6]

Sanae Takaichi, who was elected as the prime minister of Japan in October 2025, has been generally seen as pro-Taiwanese and hawkish on China. In April 2025, she visited Taiwan and met with President Lai Ching-te. She has repeated Abe's statement that a "Taiwan emergency is a Japan emergency." [7] Her election as Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leader also led Komeito, which maintains friendly ties with China, to break its coalition with the LDP. [8] Chinese president Xi Jinping made an unusual move by not sending a congratulatory telegram on the day Takaichi assumed the post of prime minister, but a Japan–China summit meeting between Xi and Takaichi took place on 31 October at the APEC South Korea 2025. However, after Takaichi held talks with Taiwan's former Vice Premier Lin Hsin-i on 1 November, China lodged a protest with Japan, and Japan counter-argued, leading to the deterioration of the relationship. [9]

Dispute

Chinese retaliatory measures

Military

On 15 November, the China Maritime Safety Administration announced that the People's Liberation Army would conduct live-fire exercises in the central Yellow Sea from 17 to 19 November, and that navigation in this area would be prohibited during this period. [41] The notice drew criticism from Taiwan, which accused Beijing of saber-rattling at Japan for political gain. [42] On 16 November, the China Coast Guard announced that a formation of its ships carried out a patrol within the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands, a territory disputed between China Japan, and Taiwan. [43] [44] The Japan Coast Guard said it drove the ships away. [45] On 2 December, Chinese and Japanese coastguard vessels engaged in a standoff over the islands. China said it had implemented "necessary control measures" and driven a Japanese fishing boat away from the islands, while Japan stated it had intercepted and driven away two Chinese coastguard vessels that approached the fishing boat. [46]

From 6 to 7 December, Liaoning aircraft carrier transited through the Miyako Strait between the islands of Okinawa and Miyakojima and began takeoff and landing drills with Shenyang J-15 jets; aircraft took off from and landed on the carrier roughly 100 times over two days. [47] On 7 December, Japanese defense minister Shinjirō Koizumi accused China of two incidents on 6 December in which J-15 jets from the Liaoning carrier at locking their fire-control radar at Japanese F-15 jets near the Miyako Strait. The Japanese government formally protested to the Chinese side. Takaichi also called the incident "extremely disappointing". [48] [49] Japanese vice foreign minister Takehiro Funakoshi summoned Chinese ambassador Wu Jianghao over the incident; for his part, Wu lodged "stern representation and strong protest" to Japan at the meeting. [50] The PLA Navy spokesperson Wang Xuemeng responded by accusing Japan of a "slander and smear campaign" and said the Liaoning was carrying "routine carrier-based fighter jet flight training". [51] He also said Japan Self-Defense Forces aircraft had repeatedly approached and disrupted its fighter jet training. [52] Japanese officials later said that their Chinese counterparts didn't answer the hotline during the incident. [47] Koizumi also said that while notified, Japan "did not receive sufficient information" regarding the drills, while Kihara said Japanese jets were far away from the Chinese jets while training. [53] The U.S. criticized the radar targeting of Japanese aircraft and reinforced the U.S. alliance with Japan. [54] A US State Department spokesperson also stated that "China’s actions are not conducive to regional peace and stability". [54]

The aircraft carrier group travelled northeast from their position east of Kikai Island following the incident. A Chinese naval Type 054 frigate also sailed through the Miyako Strait on 8 December, while another travelled through the Osumi Strait. [55] On 9 December, two Russian Tupolev Tu-95 bombers, two Chinese Xi'an H-6 bombers and four Chinese Shenyang J-16 fighter jets flew through the Miyako Strait into the Pacific Ocean as part of joint exercises. [56] On 10 December, two US B-52 bombers flew together with three Japanese F-35 jets and three F-15 jets, which Japanese defense ministry said "reaffirmed their strong resolve to prevent any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force". [57]

Cultural exchange

On 16 November, the Japanese think tank Genron NPO stated the 20th Tokyo-Beijing Forum and the release of the results of a joint Sino-Japanese opinion poll would be postponed after it received a request for cancellation from its Chinese partner, the China International Communications Group, in which it blamed Takaichi's remarks for undermining the atmosphere for normal exchanges between the two countries. [58] [59] A delegation from Xuzhou, Jiangsu cancelled its visit to its sister city, Handa, Aichi. [60] On 17 November, the release of Japanese films Crayon Shin-chan the Movie: Super Hot! The Spicy Kasukabe Dancers and Cells at Work! , which were originally scheduled to be released in China, were temporarily postponed. [61] The decision was made by the China Film Administration, which it said was based on a reassessment of the overall market outlook of Japanese film imports and sentiment of Chinese audiences, and that it had paused the approval process for new movies from Japan. [62] Hong Kong's public broadcaster RTHK also stopped airings of Cells at Work! [63] On the same evening, QQ Music announced the cancellation of a JO1 fan meeting that was scheduled to be held in Guangzhou. [64]

On 18 November, the 8th Japan–China Friendship Exchange Conference in the Western Japan Region event originally scheduled to be held by the Consulate General of China in Osaka in Hiroshima on 21 November was cancelled at its request due to security concern. Xue Jian was originally scheduled to attend the conference. [59] On 19 November, a concert by Kokia was cancelled after her band was denied access to their venue. [65] On 25 November, Hong Kong singer Ekin Cheng cancelled a planned performance in Tokyo in December. [66] On 28 November, Japanese singer Ayumi Hamasaki announced the cancellation of a concert in Shanghai scheduled for 29 November as part of the I Am Ayu Tour; [67] she later performed in front of an empty stage. [68] During an appearance in Shanghai, Japanese singer Maki Otsuki's performance was interrupted mid-song, when the lights and sound were cut, and was asked to leave the stage, followed by the cancellation of a Japanese anime event. [69] Japanese idol girl group Momoiro Clover Z also cancelled a planned performance. [70] [71] In the same day, South China Morning Post reported that China had cancelled youth exchange programs with Japan. [72] In December, CNN estimated that performances and fan meet-and-greets from at least 30 Japanese performers had been canceled. [73] In reporting on the cancellations of events in China featuring Japanese musicians, Reuters noted that the Chinese government had a history of using cultural boycotts against countries as a form of economic coercion during diplomatic disputes. [65]

On 6 December, Hong Kong's Leisure and Cultural Services Department cancelled the screening of three Japanese films – Kamome Shokudo , Tampopo and Sweet Bean – at the Food for Thought – A Cinematic Feast running from December 6 to January 18. [74] On 7 December, Chinese video game company miHoYo announced a two-week delay for a major update to their game Honkai: Star Rail , in which a new region widely teased to have Japanese influence was supposed to be released. [75] MiHoYo has apologized to players regarding the delay and issued in-game compensation. [76]

Travel

On 14 November, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism advised Chinese citizens to avoid traveling to Japan; [77] [78] China is the largest source of tourists to Japan. [79] Air China (including its subsidiary Air Macau), China Southern Airlines, China Eastern Airlines, Hainan Airlines, Sichuan Airlines, and XiamenAir subsequently announced that tickets for flights to Japan with travel dates before 31 December could be refunded or changed free of charge. [80] [81] [82] On 5 December, they extended this policy for another three months. [83] News reports stated that Nanjing Lukou International Airport required all passengers going to Japan to use the manual channel and be questioned by customs officers. [84] On 16 November, both Hong Kong and Macau updated their travel safety guidelines, reminding those who planned to go to or were already in Japan to be vigilant. [85] [82] On the same day, the Ministry of Education warned Chinese citizens to be cautious about going to Japan to study; [86] China is the largest source of foreign students in Japan. [79] On 18 November, Financial Times reported that several state-owned enterprises restricted their employees from travelling to Japan. [87] In reaction to the travel warning, tourism agencies in China received a large number of cancellation requests for group tours to Japan, while others announced the suspension of sales of related tourism products. [88] Some hotels and attractions in Japan received notices of cancellation of reservations by Chinese tourists. [89] On 19 November, the Chinese cruise ship Adora Mediterranea cancelled its planned stop at Hirara Port on Miyako Island on 20 November. [90] On 8 December, the Jian Zhen Hao ferry from Shanghai to Osaka and Kobe was cancelled following a request from the Chinese. [91]

The Nikkei 225 of the Tokyo Stock Exchange fell on the morning of 17 November, with Fast Retailing, which is related to the Chinese market, and Mitsukoshi Isetan, which is related to overseas tourist spending, experiencing significant declines. [92] [93] Travel statistics cited by The Washington Post , Sankei Shimbun and Bloomberg News estimated that about 543,000 airline tickets from China to Japan – representing around 40% of total Chinese airline bookings and 20% of China-Japan flight routes – were cancelled by 20 November and that around 30% of the 1.44 million planned trips from China to Japan through the end of December had been cancelled. [79] [94] [95] The outlets also cited economic analyses which estimated a loss of $500 million–$1.2 billion to the Japanese economy as a result of the cancellations; if the travel boycotts persisted, they said those loses could rise from $9 billion to over $11 billion (¥1.79 trillion yen, equivalent to 0.29% of Japan's GDP). [79] [94] [95] On 24 November, Yicai reported that Chinese airlines had cancelled 41 flights across the 12 routes. [96] On 25 November, Bloomberg News reported that Chinese government instructed airlines to reduce the number of flights to Japan through March 2026. [97] By 29 November, Nikkei Asia estimated Chinese airlines had canceled 904 flights for December, 16% of the initial total of 5,548, which was equivalent to around 156,000 seats. [98] On 1 December, the China Central Television reported that more than 1,900 flights from mainland China to Japan for December, representing 40% of the total flights, had been cancelled. [99] In reporting on the travel warning issued by the Chinese government, NHK pointed out that China often used economic pressure as a means of diplomatic friction, such as the boycott of Japanese goods in 2012 and the ban on Korean entertainment in 2017. [100]

Trade

On 17 November, the mayor of Shimonoseki cancelled his planned business trip to Suzhou after receiving a request for postponements from Chinese officials the day before. [101] On 19 November, Kyodo News and other media reported that China informed Japan through diplomatic channels that it would temporarily halt imports of Japanese seafood. Sources told Kyodo News that China stated it was necessary to monitor the testing procedures for the treated water at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. However, China did not state how long it would take for the "improvements to be completed". [102] Spokesperson Mao Ning also confirmed the news, but did not mention that it was for the purpose of boycott. She only said that, to her knowledge, it was because China had not yet received technical data from Japan. She added that under the current circumstances, there was "no market" for Japanese seafood imports. [103] On the same day, Kyodo News reported that intergovernmental consultations to resume Japanese beef exports to China were suspended. [104]

Japanese guests and media were prohibited from the biannual Aero Asia show of the Zhuhai International Airshow Center starting on 27 November. [105] On 28 November, Japan Business Federation Chairman Tsutsui Yoshinobu met with Chinese ambassador Wu Jianghao, telling him Japanese businesses hoped to promote smooth exchanges with China and build good relations. [106] On 30 November, The Nikkei reported that Liu Jinsong visited a major Japanese manufacturer in Dalian to assure the company to feel safe while conducting business. [107] On 7 December, Yomiuri Shimbun reported that Japanese companies had faced delays in securing the approval process for importing rare earths from China. [108]

Security

On 15 November, the Ministry of State Security announced that it recently "cracked a series of espionage cases involving Japanese intelligence agencies infiltrating and stealing secrets from China" and criticized Takaichi for "persisting in her erroneous remarks without remorse despite repeated solemn representations from China". [109] According to Changanjie Zhishi, a social media account run by the Beijing Daily , the MSS has been actively taking action against the frequent cases of Japanese espionage in recent years. [110]

Japanese measures

On 17 November, the Japanese Embassy in China reminded Japanese people in China to take safety precautions and avoid crowded places where Japanese people are gathered. [111] On 18 November, Japan's Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology issued a notice requiring Japanese schools in China to ensure the safety of children, students and international students. [112] Japan's chief cabinet secretary Kihara said the advisories were made in response to a surge in anti-Japanese sentiment in the Chinese media. [113]

Reactions in China and Japan

China

Government

On 10 November, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lin Jian protested Takaichi's remarks, saying China had lodged a complaint with Japan over her remarks and that Japan needed to reflect on its historical crimes and stop interfering in China's internal affairs. [114] He also defended Xue's post by saying it was a personal one and that China would not tolerate any foreign interference when it came to Taiwan. [115] [116] Citing the Mukden Incident of 1931, the Chinese embassy in Japan noted that Japan had invaded its neighbours including China under the pretext of "existential crisis". [117] The embassy also stated on 21 November that China could invoke the enemy state clauses in the UN Charter, implying possible military action against Japan. [118] [119] On 14 November, Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Jiang Bin said that if Japan intervened in a war between China and Taiwan, then it would suffer a crushing defeat by the People's Liberation Army. [120] Each of PLA's five theater commands have also released statements condemning Takaichi. [121] On 16 November, foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said Premier Li Qiang had no plans to meet with Takaichi during the upcoming G20 summit in South Africa; Japan had reportedly tried to arrange a Takaichi-Li meeting on the sidelines of the summit to reduce tensions between the two countries. [20] While citing the 1972 Japan–China Joint Communiqué, Mao further called on Japan to abide by its commitment to China over Taiwan and for Takaichi to retract her comments. [122]

On 20 November, China's Ministry of Commerce spokesperson He Yongqian said trade cooperation with Japan had been "severely damaged" and urged Takaichi to retract her comments. [123] On the same day, Mao announced the cancellation of a meeting between culture ministers that was scheduled for November with South Korea and Japan. [124] On 22 November, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Takaichi's comments crossed a red line which demanded a resolute response from China and that all countries had a responsibility to prevent the resurgence of Japanese militarism. [125] [126] He additionally said that China would never allow Japanese right-wing forces to turn back the tide of history, foreign forces to encroach on China's Taiwan area, and a revival of Japanese militarism, which was picked by Chinese state media as the "Three Never Allows". [127] On 24 November, Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu criticized Takaichi's remarks and said they had caused his government to cast doubt on the value of exchanges between China and Japan. [128] Hong Kong also halted exchanges with Japan's consulate and canceled several official events with the country. [128] In addition to statements made in person or on a government website, Chinese officials made posts on X targeting Japan and Takaichi. [129] The X accounts of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense issued warnings in both English and Japanese to Japan. [130]

On 24 November, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and President Trump held a phone call, where Xi said "China and the United States once fought side by side against fascism and militarism, and should now work together to safeguard the outcomes of World War II" and that the transfer of Taiwan was an "integral part of the post-World War II international order", while the Chinese readout stated Trump "understands how important the Taiwan question is to China." [131] [132] During a call with French presidential policy advisor Emmanuel Bonne on 27 November and a talk with United Kingdom security advisor Jonathan Powell on 28 November, Foreign Minister Wang Yi called on both countries to abide by the one-China principle and called on them to "safeguard the outcomes" of World War II. Wang also condemned Takaichi's statement during his talk with Bonne and elaborated China's position on Japan-related issues to Powell. [133] On 9 December, Wang told German foreign minister Johann Wadephul that Takaichi was "trying to exploit the Taiwan question – the very territory Japan colonized for half a century, committing countless crimes against the Chinese people – to provoke trouble and threaten China militarily", which he said was "completely unacceptable". [134]

State media

Chinese state media criticized Takaichi's remarks intensively. Starting on November 12, the China Media Group's Yuyuan Tantian published two commentaries on its Chinese social media account where it criticized Sanae Takaichi's remarks with insults. [135] [136] On the same day, Hu Xijin, former editor-in-chief of the Global Times, called Takaichi, on X, an evil witch who had ignited a new round of mutual hatred between the Chinese and Japanese people, [137] though he later said on 25 November that state media used harsh language that does not reflect the actual situation when criticizing Takaichi and Japan and warned against "exaggerated" and "superficial" information. [138] On 14 November, the People's Daily published an editorial under the pseudonym "Zhong Sheng", used to represent the Party's official view on foreign policy issues, which called Takaichi's statement "utterly isolating political nonsense" and said its aim was "breaking through the restraints of the peaceful constitution" and "seeking a pretext for Japanese military expansion". [127]

On 15 November, Beijing Daily compared Takaichi's comments to those which Japan gave to justify its invasion of Manchuria. [139] On 16 November, the People's Liberation Army Daily published an article which said that if Japan intervened in a war between China and Taiwan, then its government would be tying its nation to a chariot of self-destruction. [139] Through an account that it operated on Chinese social media, the daily had on 13 November released posters in both Chinese and Japanese which compared Japan's intervention in Taiwan Strait affairs to Japan's invasion of China in World War II. [140] On 17 November, the People's Daily published another editorial under "Zhong Sheng", warning that "Japan risks universal condemnation if it insists on tying itself to the cart of breaking up China, [and] it will inevitably suffer the results of its own evil actions". [127] On 18 November, Xinhua News Agency published an article saying Takaichi's statements were summoning militarist demons. [141] The Global Times published an editorial on 19 November which questioned Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa. [142] On 22 November, the People's Daily published an editorial which accused Takaichi of propagating the 'China threat theory' and described her words and actions as warmongering that would eventually lead Japan to its demise. [143]

Censorship

On November 25, The Asahi Shimbun reported that censors appeared to be removing comments and videos on Chinese social media platforms which expressed views supportive of Japan or that deviated from the government's official line on Takaichi's remarks. [144]

Japan

Government

On 10 November, Japanese chief cabinet secretary Minoru Kihara, [145] foreign minister Toshimitsu Motegi, [146] and Takayuki Kobayashi, chairman of the Policy Research Council of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), all stated that Xue Jian's remarks were inappropriate. [147] On 11 November, the LDP held a joint meeting of its Foreign Affairs Committee and the Foreign Affairs Research Committee, where the participants agreed to require the government to expel Xue Jian as a persona non grata. [148] On 13 November, former Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba said that Takaichi's remarks were not conducive to enhancing Japan's deterrence capabilities and that successive Japanese cabinets avoided directly responding to questions regarding situations involving Taiwan. [149] On November 15, in response to China's travel advisory against Japan, Kihara asked China to take appropriate actions and said communication between the two countries was essential. [150] On the same day, the three parties in the Osaka City Council, namely the LDP, Komeito, and Osaka Restoration Association, proposed a resolution demanding that Xue Jian apologize, which passed without objection. [151]

On 16 November, LDP acting policy research committee chairman Norihisa Tamura stated Takaichi had not provided sufficient background information during her remarks and that she should not make such statements in the future. Tamura also criticized Xue Jian's remarks, believing that they encouraged terrorism. [152] On November 18, in response to questions about China's travel advisory against Japan, Kimi Onoda, Japan's economic security minister, said the country needed to see the dangers of economic dependence on China given its willingness to use economic coercion in order to settle disputes. [153] On the same day, Hirofumi Yoshimura, leader of the Japan Innovation Party, condemned Xue Jian's remarks, saying that "a red line has been crossed." [148] He also said that preparations should be made to reduce the economic risks brought about by the decrease in Chinese tourists. [154]

On 19 November, The Asahi Shimbun reported that Takaichi privately told people around her that she "went a bit too far" and "gave an answer without fully checking what the fallout would be". [155] The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) stated that as of 20 November, more than 20 Sino-Japanese business-related events had been cancelled. [156] On 21 November, when asked whether she would retract her comments, Takaichi refused, saying Japan's stance remained consistent and that her government would decide whether an event reached a survival-threatening threshold when the time came. [157] On November 22, Transport Minister Yasushi Kaneko said the decline in tourism numbers from China was not something to worry about given the increase in arrivals from other countries. [158] On November 25, in response to a question about Trump's public silence on Japan's dispute with China, Motegi said it has never been the case that the White House or the State Department has commented on every issue that could affect it. [159] On 26 November, Takaichi told the parliament regarding her comments that she "did not want to go into specifics", but "simply repeated the government’s previous answers over and over, there was a risk that the Budget Committee could be stalled". She also said Japan was "not in a position to recognize Taiwan's legal status". [160] On 1 December, a cross-party delegation from the Japan–China Friendship Parliamentarians' Union led by secretary-general Yūko Obuchi of the LDP met with Chinese ambassador Wu Jianghao. The group, which included both LDP and opposition party members, expressed their hope to visit China later this year. [161]

On 3 December, Takaichi stated to the Japanese parliament that the "Japanese government's basic position regarding Taiwan remains as stated in the 1972 Japan–China Joint Communiqué, and there has been no change to this position". The position is that "the government of the People’s Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China" and that Japan "fully understands and respects this stand" and "firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration". [162] China refused Takaichi's explanation, with Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stating Takaichi is "still prevaricating by claiming that the Japanese side’s position remains unchanged" and demanded a full retraction of Takaichi's 7 November statement. [163] In the same day, LDP vice president Tarō Asō said Takaichi's 7 November statement was "not problematic", saying that she "simply stated her consistent stance in more detail". [164] Several news agencies reported that Japan had expressed its concerns to France about China's possible participation in the 2026 G7 summit, where French president Emmanuel Macron was reportedly considering inviting Chinese leader Xi Jinping. [165] [166]

Opposition parties

On 11 November, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), Komeito and the Democratic Party For the People (DPFP) issued protests against Xue Jian's comments. [148] CDP Secretary-General Jun Anzumi criticized them as not beneficial to bilateral relations while DPFP leader Yuichiro Tamaki said they had crossed the bottom line and hinted that Xue might be asked to leave Japan. [148] On the same day, Renhō, a CDP councillor who was born a citizen of Taiwan, posted on X that Xue's comments damaged trust between Japan and China. [167] On 13 November, Komeito leader Tetsuo Saito questioned Takaichi's position on a Taiwan emergency and said he would submit questions to the government to clarify its stance on the matter. [168] On November 11, Saito had expressed concern to the Chinese Embassy in Japan that Xue's actions were inconsistent with his status as a diplomat. [148] On November 15, Japanese Communist Party (JCP) policy committee member Taku Yamazoe called on Takaichi to retract her comments. [169] On the same day, former prime minister and CDP leader Yoshihiko Noda said that Takaichi's remarks had a significant impact and needed to be taken seriously. [170] On November 16, Tomofumi Honjo, the policy research chairman of the CDP, said that Sanae Takaichi did not have a sufficient understanding of the relevant security legislation or of China's stance on the Taiwan issue. [152] He also said that he hoped Japan would proceed with calm dialogue. [171]

On 19 November, Motohisa Furukawa, acting representative of the DPFP, said that the Japanese government needed to ask China to explain its response and, if necessary, ask it to withdraw Xue's comments. [171] On the same day, Social Democratic Party leader Mizuho Fukushima, called on Takaichi to retract her remarks, arguing they were causing economic damage to Japanese society. [171] Conservative Party of Japan leader Naoki Hyakuta said that the statement was justified and that it does not have to be retracted. He also congratulated the fall in the number of Chinese tourists. [172] On 23 November JCP Chair Tomoko Tamura said in an interview that Takaichi should retract her remarks on Taiwan, as otherwise relations with China would deteriorate further. [173] On 26 November, CDP leader Yoshihiko Noda argued that Takaichi not mentioning any specific examples regarding Taiwan during the parliament meeting amounted to a "de facto retraction", an explanation which Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun refused by saying "Ceasing to mention the remarks and retracting them are two entirely different matters". [174] JCP Central Committee chairman Kazuo Shii also said he did not believe that Takaichi had retracted her statement. [175] On 10 December, Komeito leader Tetsuo Saito said that held one in-person meeting and multiple phone calls with Chinese ambassador Wu Jianghao since Takaichi's remarks, continuing by saying he hoped to visit China in 2026 and would be willing to take a letter on Takaichi's behalf if requested. [176]

News media

On November 10, Yomiuri Shimbun 's English-language newspaper The Japan News said that Xue's comment was inappropriate and that it was natural for the Japanese government to lodge a protest against it. [177] Follow up editorials which it published on November 18 and 20 criticized China's pressure campaign against Japan and called on Japan to continue its protests against China's actions and to make efforts to explain itself. [178] [179] On November 14, The Japan Times said Xue's comments were both offensive and in bad taste and a follow up editorial on November 21 called on Japan not to bend to China's campaign of economic coercion. [180] [181]

On November 11, The Mainichi said Takaichi's comments left the door open to dangerous over-interpretation and revealed a lack of awareness of the serious way that the Taiwan contingency scenario had impacted Japan-China relations. [182] An initial follow up editorial on November 18 called for de escalation from both Japan and China while a second follow up on November 21 called for Japan to continue engaging in dialogue with China in spite of the countermeasures it had imposed on Japan which the publication described as anti-Japan in nature. [183] [184] On the same day, Chunichi Shimbun criticized her remarks as reckless and careless and said she should be more careful with her words in the future. [185] An initial follow up editorial on November 18 called for the two countries to continue communicating while a second follow up on November 24 described Takaichi's remarks as a provocation to China and said the opposition parties must not hesitate to criticize her government's policies and actions. [186] [187]

On November 15, The Nikkei said that although China's response to Takaichi's remarks indicated it had lost its composure, the two countries nevertheless needed to talk in order to prevent conflict escalation. [188] A follow up editorial on November 25 said Japan-U.S. solidarity was essential to countering China's propaganda offensive against Japan. [189] On November 18, The Asahi Shimbun said Takaichi needlessly heightened tensions with her choice of words while also expressing doubts about the logic of China's response. [190]

Public opinion

According to a poll published by Kyodo News after Takaichi's remarks, 48.8% of respondents supported activating collective self-defense in the event of a conflict over Taiwan, while 44.2% opposed it. The poll also showed that the latest approval rating of the Takaichi Cabinet was 69.9%, an increase of 5.5 percentage points from October. [191] According to a Nikkei/TV Tokyo survey conducted from 28 to 30 November, 55% of respondents believed Takaichi's comments were appropriate and 30% called it inappropriate. The survey also showed the approval rating of the Takaichi Cabinet was 75%. [192] According to a Japan News Network opinion poll in December, 27% of respondents said they believed Takaichi's statement was a problem, while 55% said they did not. Additionally, 51% said they were anxious about the future of relations between China and Japan, while 46% said they were not. [193]

International reactions

Taiwan

On November 10, Presidential Office spokesperson Karen Kuo said Xue's remarks exceeded diplomatic etiquette and that the government took them seriously. [194] On 11 November, Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that "Republic of China (Taiwan) is a sovereign, independent nation" and said it was not subordinate to the PRC. [127] On November 14, Mainland Affairs Council Deputy Minister Shen Yu-chung said China was ignoring international appeals for peace in the Taiwan Strait and was instead threatening countries that expressed pro-Taiwan sentiments. [195] On November 15, National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu said China chose to continue using humiliating rhetoric against Japan instead of reflecting on the insulting nature of Xue's remarks. [42] On November 16, former president Ma Ying-jeou, a member of the Kuomintang, accused Takaichi of "reckless adventurism", saying cross-strait relations were an "internal matter" that Japan should not intervene in. [196] Former Kuomintang chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu also criticized Takaichi's remarks, saying that Taiwan was "no longer Japan’s colony" and that Takaichi was "overreaching" and "reckless". [197] In response, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislator Rosalia Wu criticized the Kuomintang for "failing to distinguish between friend and foe" while Chen Kuan-ting, also a DPP legislator, accused Ma of echoing Beijing's view of the crisis. [198] [199]

On November 17, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te described China's measures against Japan as a hybrid attack that undermined regional peace and stability and called on the country to exercise restraint. [200] Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung said Takaichi's statements were consistent with those made by Shinzo Abe that had linked Taiwan's security directly to Japan's. [197] On the same day, Kuomintang chairwoman Cheng Li-wun accused Lai of inflaming tensions and said leaders should instead show caution and restraint. [197] On November 18, in response to a question about changes in relations between Japan and China stemming from Xue's comments, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Hsiao Kuang-wei called on China to stop taking provocative actions and that Taiwan would continue to work with like-minded countries to uphold regional stability and security. [201] On 20 November, Lai published pictures of himself eating Japanese-sourced sushi in a show of support to Japan. [202] On the same day, Foreign Minister Lin said more people from Taiwan should travel to Japan and buy its products as a show of support for the country. [203] On November 21, the Ministry of Health and Welfare announced that Taiwan would lift all import control measures on Japanese food products. [204] Several DPP politicians including Wang Yi-chuan visited Japan as a show of support. [205]

On November 23, an assessment produced by the National Security Bureau said the crisis would accelerate Japan's efforts at implementing security reforms. [206] On 25 November, Taiwanese Premier Cho Jung-tai said that "reunification" with China was "not an option". [127] On 27 November, several members of the New Party protested in front of the Japan–Taiwan Exchange Association. [207] On 5 December, during a meeting with Japan's representative in Taiwan Shuzo Sumi, Cho said that Takaichi's statements "moved us all very, very much. They represent justice and peace" and welcomed Japanese performance groups and pop idols to Taiwan. [208]

United States

On 12 November, the United States State Department issued a statement to Nikkei Asia which said the country was committed to maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and opposed any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side. [209] When asked during a November 10 Fox News interview whether China could not be considered a friend of the United States due to Xue's threatening comments about Takaichi, US president Donald Trump did not offer support for Takaichi, [210] and said that "Well, a lot of our allies aren’t our friends, either. Our allies took advantage of us on trade more than China did". [211] [212] [213]

Bloomberg News noted that Trump and high-ranking US government officials did not offer public support for Takaichi, while lower-level officials including US ambassador to Japan George Edward Glass spoke out on her behalf. [214] The Global Taiwan Institute also noted that the US government has largely refrained from any public involvement. [127] Financial Times noted the US had given little public support other than statements made by Glass. [210] On November 10, Glass said in a post on X that Xue's comment threatened Takaichi and the Japanese people. [21] From November 15 to 16, Glass posted two messages on X: the first one thanked China for helping Japan and the United States deepen their ties [215] while the second, which contained a photo of Sanae Takaichi and Trump on the same stage at the USS George Washington , said Japan and the United States remained committed to maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. [216] On November 20, after a meeting with Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, Glass called China's ban on Japanese seafood a case of economic coercion and reaffirmed the country's obligation to defend Japan, which he said included the Senkaku islands. [217] On the same day, the State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott said America's treaty commitment to Japan's security was unwavering and that it opposed any unilateral attempts to change the regional status quo; [218] the Financial Times reported that the US officials had promised to give a strong statement of support for Japan but that Japanese officials were "disappointed" to learn that statement was a post by Pigott. On 7 December, Financial Times reported that according to Japanese officials, there was "deep disappointment" in the Japanese government over the lack of public support from US top officials, adding that Japanese ambassador to the US Shigeo Yamada had urged the Trump administration for public support. [210]

On November 24, President Trump held back to back calls with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi. [219] [220] Both China and the United States said Trump initiated the calls. [220] In a post on Truth Social, Trump said he had a very good telephone call with Xi Jinping and that U.S.-China relations were "extremely strong", adding they had discussed many topics, including the war in Ukraine, America's fentanyl crisis, and Chinese purchases of U.S. farm products; [219] [220] the post did not mention Japan or Taiwan. [219] [220] On November 25, Trump said Xi had during their call more or less agreed to his request that China accelerate and increase purchases of American goods. [221] Trump subsequently held a call with Takaichi to brief her on his call with Xi. [222] According to The Wall Street Journal and Reuters, Trump advised Takaichi to not escalate tensions and not to provoke China on the question of Taiwan's sovereignty. [223] [224] In reference to this reporting, Japanese chief cabinet secretary Minoru Kihara said on 27 November that Trump had given no such advice. [225] In the same day, Kyodo News also reported Trump urged Takaichi to avoid escalating tensions with China. [226] On 3 December, Shūkan Bunshun quoted a Japanese government official saying Trump had used even harsher language during the call than previously reported, telling Takaichi something along the lines of "don’t meddle in the Taiwan issue". [227]

Other countries

See also

Notes

  1. Original Japanese text: [13] 先ほど有事という言葉がございました。それはいろいろな形がありましょう。例えば、台湾を完全に中国、北京政府の支配下に置くようなことのためにどういう手段を使うか。それは単なるシーレーンの封鎖であるかもしれないし、武力行使であるかもしれないし、それから偽情報、サイバープロパガンダであるかもしれないし、それはいろいろなケースが考えられると思いますよ。だけれども、それが戦艦を使って、そして武力の行使も伴うものであれば、これはどう考えても存立危機事態になり得るケースであると私は考えます。
  2. Original Japanese text: [16] 勝手に突っ込んできたその汚い首は一瞬のちゅうちょもなく斬ってやるしかない。覚悟ができているのか

References

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