Convoy TM 1 was the name of an Allied convoy during the Second World War. Nine tankers, escorted by Royal Navy warships, sailed from Trinidad in the Caribbean for Gibraltar in the Mediterranean Sea. Apprehension in the British government about a shortage of fuel in Britain and the demands on stocks of the unexpected length of the campaign in Tunisia after Operation Torch (8–16 November 1942) led to the convoy being arranged to supply fuel direct to the Mediterranean.
Escort Group B5, the destroyer HMSHavelock and three Flower-classcorvettes, HMSGodetia, Pimpernel and Saxifrage protected the convoy that was attacked for several days during its passage through the Atlantic by a U-boat wolf pack (gruppe Delphin). The small number of escorts suffered failures of radar and high-frequency direction finding (Huff-Duff) sets that inhibited their effectiveness and despite the tankers's speed, the convoy was limited to about 8kn (15km/h; 9.2mph) because of the short range of the corvettes.
The effectiveness of the U-boat attacks were reduced when U-boats left the convoy to attack sinking and drifting ships but seven of the nine tankers were sunk in return for minor damage to two U-boats. A Court of Inquiry was convened in Gibraltar over allegations that the crew of Vanja sent homing signals to the U-boats and avoiding attack but these were dismissed. Complaints of indiscipline amongst the crew of Empire Lytton were upheld and blamed on the Ministry of War Transport for its crewing policy.
Background
British oil shortages
Map of the Atlantic Ocean
In 1942 1,664 Allied ships of 7,790,697GRT had been sunk, 1,160 of the ships (6,266,215 GRT) by U-boats. Imports into Britain had been reduced by a third of the peacetime rate to 34,000,000 long tons (35,000,000t) a year. The Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, formed and chaired a cabinet Anti-U-boat Warfare Committee on 4 November. By the end of the year there were only 300,000 long tons (300,000t) of bunker fuel in Britain with monthly consumption at 130,000 long tons (130,000t). The Admiralty had a reserve of 1,000,000 long tons (1,000,000t) but this was for emergencies.[1]
The unexpected delay in the capture of Tunisia after Operation Torch added to the drain on British fuel stocks as despatches of petroleum products to Tunisia for British forces in the theatre came from Britain. The need to begin convoys in US waters caused delays to taker sailings across the Atlantic and between 1 January and 31 December 1942, 218 tankers were sunk. Exceptionally stormy weather during the autumn and winter of 1942 was particularly damaging to tankers and by the end of the year, 1,700,000 DWT (25 per cent) of the British tanker fleet of 7,600,000 DWT was being repaired or out of service.[2]
Churchill was told by Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord "An ample reserve of fuel on this side of the Atlantic is the basis of all our activities". The convoy cycle in the Atlantic was lengthened from eight to ten days and the saving in escorts was diverted to the Caribbean to escort 18 CU–UC tanker convoys from Aruba to Britain on a twenty-day cycle, to deliver 1,200,000 long tons (1,200,000t) of petrol products in 1943. A new convoy route direct to the Mediterranean, Outward Trinidad (OT) and TO (the reciprocal north Africa to the Caribbean) was organised to limit the drain on stocks of oil in Britain. The OT–TO convoys were to consist only of "Greyhounds" capable of at least 14.5kn (26.9km/h; 16.7mph) and be escorted by modern United States Navy destroyers; other Greyhounds were to sail independently to Britain.[3]
U-boats in the Americas
Aruba outlined in red
German Type IX and Type VIID minelayers, U-boats operating in American waters had sufficient endurance but were not suitable for convoy attacks or crash-diving to evade aircraft attacks. Admiral Karl Dönitz the Befehlshaber der U-Boote (BdU, commander of U-boats) sent six Type VII U-boats to patrol off Natal in Brazil to attack new Allied convoy routes. The boats sailed from 17 to 22 December as Wolfpack (gruppe) Delphin to rendezvous with U-463 a Milchkuh (milk cow) supply submarine. B-Dienst, the code-breaking branch of the German Naval Intelligence Service, notified Dönitz of a new UGS convoy route to the south of the Azores and gruppe Delphin was diverted to search to the south-west of the Azores. The search found nothing and on 2 January the boats were ordered to refuel from U-463 and resume the voyage to Natal.[4]
Prelude
Tankers
The convoy consisted of nine fast motor tankers, the British RFA Albert L. Ellsworth, British Dominion, British Vigilance, Cliona, Empire Lytton and Oltenia II, the Norwegian Minister Wedel and Vanja and the Panamanian Norvik.[5]
Escort Group B5
Western Approaches camouflage
Escort Group B5 (Commander Richard Boyle) had been on detachment to the Caribbean for six months and consisted of the H-class destroyerHMSHavelock and the Flower-classcorvettesHMSGodetia, Pimpernel and Saxifrage; the group had lost experience in Atlantic convoy operations. The US Eastern Sea Frontier commander had asked for the ships to be painted grey and there was no time to re-paint the ships in Western Approaches Command camouflage. Havelock and Saxifrage carried high-frequency direction finding apparatus (Huff-Duff) but the set on Havelock was unserviceable. The radar on Godetia failed on 2 January 1943 and after 8 January the set on Pimpernel lost efficiency.[6]
Larger convoys added columns, keeping a rectangular shape.[7] The convoy sailed from Port of Spain, Trinidad on 28 December for Gibraltar but without Godetia that was escorting two tankers that were catching up with the convoy.[6][a] The convoy was escorted by a Catalina flying boat and early on 29 December, the crew reported a surfaced U-boat (U-124) about 20nmi (37km; 23mi) behind the convoy. The Catalina attacked the U-boat with depth-charges and mousetrap bombs, forcing it to dive. Godetia conducted a search as it closed on the convoy, to no avail. The tankers were fast but eking out the fuel of the corvettes in the escort limited its speed to around 8kn (15km/h; 9.2mph), reduced further by headwinds and a contrary ocean current.[8]
Attempts to refuel by the escorts were hampered by lack of training and poor equipment but Cliona managed to pass some fuel across to the escorts. After the first U-boat sighting, all was quiet for three days; during the afternoon of 3 January, when Convoy TM 1 was about 1,050nmi (1,940km; 1,210mi) east of Trinidad, the convoy received a signal from the Admiralty that another U-boat was nearby and later on, the US Eastern Sea Frontier commander ordered a course change to just north of east. As night fell, a U-boat was spotted at long range and at 9:35 p.m.Havelock received an Asdic contact 3nmi (5.6km; 3.5mi) in front of the convoy.[8]
Battle
3–7 January
Example of a Raspberry manoeuvre by convoy escorts
On 3 January, having received an Asdic contact, Havelock accelerated towards a U-boat but then another one was detected by radar. At 9:46 p.m. the officer of the watch in British Vigilance spotted the outline of a U-boat ahead and then a torpedo hit the ship and its cargo of 11,000 long tons (11,000t) of petroleum caught fire, illuminating U-514 as it passed the ship down its port side. Every gun in the tankers that could bear opened fire on the U-boat, Empire Lytton, the second ship in the third column, tried to ram U-514 and claimed around 200 hits with its two 20 mm Oerlikon guns at 200–300yd (180–270m) before the U-boat went out of sight; the crew of the 4-inch gun on Oltenia II claimed a near-miss.[9]
Boyle ordered a Raspberry manoeuvre but only Pimpernel sighted anything, a disturbance in the water on the starboard side of the convoy that might have been from a submerging U-boat. Captain Evan Evans, the skipper of British Vigilance ordered abandon ship, he and 26 survivors went over the side and were picked up by Saxifrage. The other 27 crew were left on the wreck that drifted behind the convoy and burned out; three weeks later the hulk was sunk by U-105. The Huff-Duff set on Havelock was repaired and the escorts managed to take on fuel on 5 January, enabling several offensive sweeps but nothing was found until late evening of 8 January.[9]
8/9 January
Photograph of HMS Godetia
U-381 made contact with the convoy on 8 January and the five other U-boats of gruppe Delphin closed on the convoy. Dönitz diverted U-511 and U-522, outbound type IX boats of gruppe Seehund. U-128 and U-134, returning from patrols the South Atlantic and U-181 a long-range Type IXD2 submarine returning from the Indian Ocean were directed to attack the convoy. The orders from Dönitz sent five Type IX, seven Type VII and a U-cruiser into the attack on the convoy but U-125, U-128 and U-514 were too far from the convoy to catch up.[10] At 9:35 p.m.Havelock was ahead of the convoy and off to port; a radar contact was obtained between it and the convoy. Havelock attacked at full speed, spotted a U-boat on the surface and attempted to ram but the U-boat submerged. An Asdic contact was picked up and five depth-charges were dropped.[11]
Explosions occurred in the convoy as Albert L. Ellsworth in position 1:1 (first ship, first column) and Oltenia II in position 6:1 (first ship, sixth column) were hit by torpedoes from U-436, Oltenia II exploding. As Albert L. Ellsworth dropped astern, blazing, the other ships nearby dodged round it and the crew abandoned the ship. Boyle got a radar contact at 1,000yd (910m) and fired star shell that illuminated a U-boat as it dived; at 9:47 p.m. an asdic contact led to a 14 depth-charge pattern being dropped, followed by another five at 10:10 p.m. before an underwater explosion was heard and contact was lost. Searching behind the convoy, Havelock found only the bodies of merchant sailors. Saxifrage kept watch as Havelock rescued 43 men from Oltenia II and all hands from Albert L. Ellsworth then returned to the convoy. The convoy commodore, Captain Laddle and 16 men of Oltenia II were killed and J. D. Miller of British Dominion became the new convoy commodore. Pimpernel spotted another U-boat on the starboard quarter (120° and 180° to starboard) of the convoy and attacked with its 4-inch gun then dropped ten depth-charges at 10:33 p.m. and the Asdic crew heard the sound of an underwater explosion. By 2:00 a.m. the escorts were back in position.[12]
9 January
Diagram of a Type VIIC U-boat
Around 5:15 a.m.U-575 hit Minister Wedel in position 9:1 and then Norvik in position 7:2, setting both alight. Havelock and Saxifrage turned round and U-575 was depth-charged by both and another underwater explosion was heard; Havelock lurked close to the tankers to ambush a U-boat if it tried to finish off the tankers. At the same time, as the convoy steered east-north-east at 9kn (17km/h; 10mph), Pimpernel and Godetia attacked Asdic contacts on the port side of the convoy. U-442 managed to hit Empire Lytton but the torpedo passed through the ship 7ft (2.1m) from the bows and took off the top of No. 1 tank.[13]
The tank was loaded with heavy oil which spilled over the front of the ship, coating the lifeboat launching rails before falling onto the sea and catching fire. The fumes knocked out the chief officer A. J. de Baughn; the captain, J. W. Andrews, ordered the ship abandoned, using the lifeboats at the rear. Many of the crew tried to save themselves in by launching the port lifeboat before the ship stopped moving and the boat smashed open, the crew going into the water and fuel oil. Andrews picked up 10 survivors and de Baughn who showed little sign of life; another 10–12 men could be seen in the water. Havelock left its ambush and depth-charged an Asdic echo the n returned to find Norvik sinking; the captain of Minister Wedel wanted to save the ship but reports of 6–7 U-boats nearby, Boyle decided to scuttle both ships. Saxifrage rescued 33 men from Empire Lytton and put Baughn onto Havelock, only for the ship's doctor to find him dead.[13]
9 January (afternoon−evening)
At 2:30 p.m.Vanja dodged a torpedo and gunners on British Dominion fired on a periscope. Godetia was able to prevent U-boats persisting with attacks and by 3:30 p.m. they had drawn off to wait for dark, the convoy now reduced to British Dominion, Cliona and Vanja.[14]U-620, following the convoy during the evening of 9 January sank the wrecks of Norvik and Minister Wedel. U-442 finished off Empire Lytton and U-436 sank Albert L. Ellsworth with shells from the deck gun. U-511 sank William Wilberforce, a merchant ship sailing independently.[15] During the night, Havelock and Saxifrage gained Huff-Duff contacts in front and behind the convoy but there were no attacks by the time dawn broke. The Admiralty Tracking Room reported (mistakenly) that only one U-boat was still in contact with the convoy, four more were within 90nmi (170km; 100mi) and 4–5 were within 150nmi (280km; 170mi).[14]
10 January
Location map of Madeira (and Portugal)
During 10 January, a sunny day, the convoy steered north-east towards Madeira and morale in the remnants of the convoy rose. During the night a diversion to a course of east-south-east was made but Saxifrage attacked a contact on the starboard quarter at 7:23 p.m. and dropped a ten depth-charge pattern and then after another 20 minutes returned to its station. At 11:30 p.m. the convoy resumed its course to the north-east. At 11:41 p.m.British Dominion was hit on its port side by three torpedoes from U-522, its 9,000 long tons (9,100t) of aviation fuel caught fire and lit up the vicinity, exposing the U-boat between British Dominion and Vanja. British Dominion suffered 37 men killed.[16]
The captain, J. D. Miller got 15 of the crew away in a lifeboat, to be picked up by Godetia. Vanja swerved to the left and its gunners opened fire with the 4-inch gun and machine-guns but U-522 escaped. Boyle ordered a Raspberry and as the escorts turned and fired star shell, three U-boats were spotted in a few minutes. Lookouts on Havelock, Saxifrage and Pimpernel saw U-522 that dived at 11:43 p.m. and Godetia attacked another U-boat that dived out of the way. Havelock attacked the third U-boat that was tracked by Asdic and depth-charged. The U-boat was heard blowing its tanks and then a big explosion was heard, more depth-charges were dropped but around 00:39 a.m. contact was lost.[16]
11−14 January
The destroyer HMASQuiberon arrived during the morning and Catalina escort accompanied the convoy, later on two Flower-class corvettes, HMSPentstemon and Samphire, joined but there were only two tankers left to escort into Gibraltar, arriving on 14 January.[16][b] On 24 January, the hulk of British Vigilance, torpedoed by U-514 on 3 January, was discovered by U-105 and sunk.[18]
Aftermath
Analysis
Clay Blair wrote in 2000 that it was hard for the BdU to assess the result of the operation against Convoy TM 1 but the U-boats had claimed hits on 25 ships, 15 having been sunk. Despite obvious over-claiming when U-boats had fired at the same ships Dönitz allowed the claims. Admiral Erich Raeder sent congratulations to Dönitz and the crews of gruppe Delphin. The propaganda machine claimed 15 ships of 142,000 long tons (144,000t) against seven tankers of nine being sunk for 56,453 long tons (57,359t) that with the addition of William Wilberforce came to 61,457 long tons (62,443t). The attack on Convoy TM 1 led to substantial changes in the December U-boat deployment plan. None of the U-boats intended for the Americas arrived; the patrol of gruppe Delphin to Natal was cancelled along with two U-boats intended for the West Indies. U-511 and U-522 had fired so many torpedoes and used so much fuel that they could not operate with gruppe Seehund due for Cape Town and the Indian Ocean. Gruppe Delphin with the four Type IX boats that had participated, U-125, U-511, U-514 and U-522 and five Type VII U-boats that sailed in January stayed near the Azores, taking the place of the defunct gruppe Westwall.[19]
In 2004, Richard Woodman wrote that the conduct of Convoy TM 1 had been a disaster. The Germans thought that they inflicted fewer losses than was the case, claiming 15 tankers. In 1989 G. Hessler wrote that "The convoy escort...was unpractised and lacked perseverance".[17] At the same time,
Preoccupation with torpedoed tankers and enemy depth-charge attacks soon caused many...to drop astern, so that after the second day only four boats were still in touch, and the pursuit was abandoned on the [sic] 11 January near Madeira.[17]
The four drifting wrecks were sunk but none of the U-boats that sank tankers lasted long and this has been used to criticise Boyle and his escorts but this did not take account of the weakness of the escort and the trouble that RN crews were still having in refuelling at sea.[17]
Court of Inquiry
The Admiralty put Captain W. G. Parry of HMSRenown in charge of an inquiry. The tanker Vanja had allegedly given cause for suspicion with poor station-keeping and for being distant from ships that were torpedoed. The wireless operator in British Dominion claimed that he had heard homing signals on 500 kHz, supposedly from Vanja and an officer on Narvik mentioned a rumour that his wireless operator had also heard the signals. The implications of the allegations for a crew of Norwegian emigrés, was difficult to contemplate. The suspicions were confounded by the captain of Cliona who explained that Vanja was suffering from engine-trouble due to a cracked cylinder. Allegations of indiscipline on Empire Lytton were considered, whose captain, J. W. Andrews gave evidence that "he had never sailed with such a bad crew. Their behaviour when torpedoed was disgusting...". The Ministry of War Transport was blamed for crewing vessels from a common pool, denying captains a choice of men. Parry concluded that Vanja had trouble station-keeping because of the engine-trouble and that the insubordinate crew of Empire Lytton could not be blamed on the captain and officers. The inquiry blamed the inadequate number of escorts, made worse by the radar sets failing in Godetia and Pimpernel.[20]
↑Convoys had a standard formation of short columns, number 1 to the left in the direction of travel. Each position in the column was numbered; 11 was the first ship in column 1 and 12 was the second ship in the column; 21 was the first ship in column 2.[7]
↑In Woodman's account the later escorts to arrive were destroyers, HMSPenn and Pathfinder.[17]
Blair, Clay (2000) [1999]. Hitler's U-Boat War: The Hunted 1942–1945. Vol.II (pbk. repr. Cassell, Londoned.). London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. ISBN0-304-35261-6.
Hague, Arnold (2000). The Allied Convoy System 1939–1945: Its Organisation, Defence and Operation. London: Chatham. ISBN1-86176-147-3.
Jordan, Roger W. (2006) [1999]. The World's Merchant Fleets 1939: The Particulars and Wartime Fates of 6,000 Ships (2nded.). London: Chatham/Lionel Leventhal. ISBN978-1-86176-293-1.
Mitchell, W. H.; Sawyer, L. A. (1990). The Empire Ships (2nded.). London, New York, Hamburg, Hong Kong: Lloyd's of London Press Ltd. ISBN1-85044-275-4.
Parkin, Simon (2019). A Game of Birds and Wolves: The Secret Game that Won the War. London: Sceptre (Hodder & Stoughton). ISBN978-1-52-935305-1.
Rohwer, Jürgen; Hümmelchen, Gerhard (2005) [1972]. Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two (3rd rev.ed.). London: Chatham. ISBN978-1-86176-257-3.
Ruegg, R.; Hague, A. (1993) [1992]. Convoys to Russia: Allied Convoys and Naval Surface Operations in Arctic Waters 1941–1945 (2nd rev. enl.ed.). Kendal: World Ship Society. ISBN0-905617-66-5.
Woodman, Richard (2004). The Real Cruel Sea: The Merchant Navy in the Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1943 (1sted.). London: John Murray. ISBN0-7195-6403-4.
Further reading
Darman, Peter (2007). A Day-By-Day History: World War II. New York: Barnes & Noble. ISBN978-1-84999-045-5.
Morison, Samuel Eliot (1947). The Battle of the Atlantic 1939–1943. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol.I. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. OCLC1466840948.
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