Process safety

Last updated

Process safety is an interdisciplinary engineering domain focusing on the study, prevention, and management of large-scale fires, explosions and chemical accidents (such as toxic gas clouds) in process plants or other facilities dealing with hazardous materials, such as refineries and oil and gas (onshore and offshore) production installations. Thus, process safety is generally concerned with the prevention of, control of, mitigation of and recovery from unintentional hazardous materials releases that can have a serious effect to people (onsite and offsite), plant and/or the environment. [1] [2] [3]

Contents

Definition and scope

The American Petroleum Institute defines process safety as follows:

A disciplined framework for managing the integrity of hazardous operating systems and processes by applying good design principles, engineering, and operating and maintenance practices. It deals with the prevention and control of events that have the potential to release hazardous materials or energy. Such events can cause toxic effects, fire or explosion and could ultimately result in serious injuries, property damage, lost production, and environmental impact. [4]

The definition given by the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (IOGP) is essentially the same. [2] The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) gives the following:

A discipline that focuses on the prevention of fires, explosions, and accidental chemical releases at chemical process facilities. [5]

Process safety scope is usually contrasted with occupational safety and health (OSH). While both domains deal with dangerous conditions and hazardous events occurring at work sites and/or while carrying out one's job duties, they differ at several levels. Process safety is primarily concerned with events which involve hazardous materials and are (or have the potential to escalate to) major accidents. A major accident is usually defined as an event causing multiple fatalities, extensive environmental impact, and/or significant financial consequences. The consequences of major accidents, while typically limited to the work site, can overcome the plant or installation boundaries, thus causing significant offsite impact. In contrast to this, occupational safety and health focuses on events that cause harm to a limited number of workers (usually one or two per event), have consequences limited to well within the work site boundaries, and do not necessarily involve unintended contact with a hazardous material. [6] Thus, for example, a gasoline storage tank loss of containment resulting in a fire is a process safety event, while a fall from height occurring while inspecting the tank is an OSH event. Although they may result in far higher impact to people, assets and the environment, process safety accidents are significantly less frequent than OSH events. The latter account for the majority of workplace fatalities. [7] However, the impact of a single major process safety event on such aspects as regional environmental resources, company reputation, societal perception of the chemical and process industries etc. can be very considerable and is usually given prominent visibility in the media.

The pivotal step in a process safety accident, around which a chain of accident causation and escalation can be built (including preventative and control/mitigative safety barriers), is generally the loss of containment of a hazardous material. [8] It is this occurrence that frees the chemical energy available for the harmful consequences to materialize. Inadequate isolation, overflow, runaway or unplanned chemical reaction, defective equipment, human error, procedural violation, inadequate procedures, blockage, corrosion, degradation of material properties, excessive mechanical stress, fatigue, vibration, overpressure, and incorrect installation are the usual proximate causes for such loss of containment. [9] If the material is flammable and encounters a source of ignition, a fire will take place. Under particular conditions, such as local congestion (arising for example from structures and piping in the area where the release occurred or the flammable gas cloud migrated), the flame front of a flammable gas cloud can accelerate and transition to an explosion, which can cause overpressure damage to nearby equipment and structures and harm to people. If the released chemical is a toxic gas or a liquid whose vapors are toxic, then a toxic gas cloud occurs, which may harm or kill people locally at the release source or remotely, if its size and the atmospheric conditions do not immediately result in its dilution to below hazardous concentration thresholds. Fires, explosions, and toxic clouds are the main types of accidents with which process safety is concerned. [10]

In the domain of offshore oil and gas extraction, production, and subsea pipelines, the discipline of process safety is sometimes understood to extend to major accidents not directly associated with hazardous materials processing, storage, or transport. In this context, the potential for accidents such as ship collisions against oil platforms, loss of FPSO hull stability, or crew transportation accidents (such as from helicopter or boating events), is analyzed and managed with tools typical of process safety. [11]

Process safety is usually associated with fixed onshore process and storage facilities, as well as fixed and floating offshore production and/or storage installations. However, process safety tools can and often are used (although to varying degrees) to analyze and manage bulk transportation of hazardous materials, such as by road tankers, rail tank cars, sea-going tankers, and onshore and offshore pipelines. Industrial domains that share similarities with the chemical process industries, and to which process safety concepts often apply, are nuclear power, fossil fuel power production, mining, steelmaking, foundries, etc. Some of these industries, notably nuclear power, follow an approach very similar to process safety's, which is usually referred to as system safety.

History

In the early chemical industry, processes were relatively simple and societal expectations regarding safety were low by today’s standards. As chemical technology evolved and increased in complexity, and, simultaneously, societal expectations for safety in industrial activities increased, it became clear that there was a need for increasingly specialized expertise and knowledge in safety and loss prevention for the chemical industry. [12] Organizations in the process industries originally had safety reviews for processes that relied on the experience and expertise of the people in the review. In the mid 20th century, more formal review techniques began to appear. These included the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) review, developed by ICI in the 1960s, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), checklists and What-If reviews. These were mostly qualitative techniques for identifying the hazards of a process. [13]

Quantitative analysis techniques, such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA, which had been in use by the nuclear industry), Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA, also referred to as Quantitative Risk Analysis), and Layers of protection analysis (LOPA) also began to be used in the process industries in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Modeling techniques were developed for analyzing the consequences of spills and releases, explosions, and toxic exposure. [13]

The expression "process safety" began to be used increasingly to define this engineering field of study. It was generally understood to be a branch of chemical engineering, as it primarily relied on the understanding of industrial chemical processes, as exemplified in the HAZOP technique. In time, it absorbed a range of elements from other disciplines (such as chemistry and physics for mathematical modelling of releases, fires and explosions, instrumentation engineering, asset management, human factors and ergonomics, reliability engineering, etc.), thus becoming a relatively interdisciplinary engineering domain, although at its core it remains strongly connected with the understanding of industrial process chemical technology. "Process safety" gradually prevailed over alternative terms; for example, Frank P. Lees in his monumental work Loss Prevention in the Process Industries [14] either used the titular expression or "safety and loss prevention", and so did Trevor Kletz, [15] a central figure in the development of this discipline. One of the first publications to use the term in its current sense is the Process Safety Guide by the Dow Chemical Company. [16]

By the mid to late 1970s, process safety was a recognized technical specialty. The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) formed its Safety and Health Division in 1979. [13] In 1985, AIChE established the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), partly in response to the Bhopal tragedy occurred the previous year. [17]

Lessons learnt from past events have been key in determining advances in process safety. Some of the major accidents that shaped it as an engineering discipline are: [10]

Topics in process safety

The following is a list of topics covered in process safety. [10] There are some overlaps with equivalent domains from other disciplines, especially occupational safety and health (OSH), although the focus in process safety will always be specifically on the loss of control in the handling of hazardous materials at industrial scale.

Strictly related to process safety, although for historical reasons usually not considered to belong to its domain, is the design of the following systems (note however that their selection is often the responsibility of a specialized process safety engineer):

Management

Companies whose business heavily relies on the extraction, processing, storage, and/or transport of hazardous materials, usually integrate elements of Process Safety Management (PSM) within their health and safety management system. PSM was notably regulated by the United States' OSHA in 1992. [19] The OSHA model for PSM is still widely used, not only in the US but also internationally. Other equivalent models and regulations have become available since, notably by the EPA, [20] the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), [21] and the UK's Energy Institute. [22]

PSM schemes are organized in 'elements'. Different schemes are based on different lists of elements. This is the CCPS scheme for risk-based process safety, which can be reconciled with most other established PSM schemes: [21]

While originally designed eminently for plants in their operations phase, elements of PSM can and should be implemented through the entire lifecycle of a project, wherever applicable. This includes design (from front-end loading to detailed design), procurement of equipment, commissioning, operations, material and organizational changes, and decommissioning.

A common model used to represent and explain the various different but connected systems related to achieving process safety is described by James T. Reason's Swiss cheese model. [8] [23] In this model, barriers that prevent, detect, control and mitigate a major accident are depicted as slices, each having a number of holes. The holes represent imperfections in the barrier, which can be defined as specific performance standards. The better managed the barrier, the smaller these holes will be. When a major accident happens, this is invariably because all the imperfections in the barriers (the holes) have lined up. It is the multiplicity of barriers that provide the protection.

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Safety engineering</span> Engineering discipline which assures that engineered systems provide acceptable levels of safety

Safety engineering is an engineering discipline which assures that engineered systems provide acceptable levels of safety. It is strongly related to industrial engineering/systems engineering, and the subset system safety engineering. Safety engineering assures that a life-critical system behaves as needed, even when components fail.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Safety</span> State of being secure from harm, injury, danger, or other non-desirable outcomes

Safety is the state of being "safe", the condition of being protected from harm or other danger. Safety can also refer to the control of recognized hazards in order to achieve an acceptable level of risk.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Safety-critical system</span> System whose failure would be serious

A safety-critical system or life-critical system is a system whose failure or malfunction may result in one of the following outcomes:

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Flixborough disaster</span> Industrial accident in North Lincolnshire, England (1974)

The Flixborough disaster was an explosion at a chemical plant close to the village of Flixborough, North Lincolnshire, England, on 1 June 1974. It killed 28 and seriously injured 36 of the 72 people on site at the time. The casualty figures could have been much higher if the explosion had occurred on a weekday, when the main office area would have been occupied. A contemporary campaigner on process safety wrote "the shock waves rattled the confidence of every chemical engineer in the country".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Chemical hazard</span> Non-biological hazards of hazardous materials

Chemical hazards are typical of hazardous chemicals and hazardous materials in general. Exposure to certain chemicals can cause acute or long-term adverse health effects. Chemical hazards are usually classified separately from biological hazards (biohazards). Main classifications of chemical hazards include asphyxiants, corrosives, irritants, sensitizers, carcinogens, mutagens, teratogens, reactants, and flammables. In the workplace, exposure to chemical hazards is a type of occupational hazard. The use of protective personal equipment (PPE) may substantially reduce the risk of damage from contact with hazardous materials.

Process Safety Managementof Highly Hazardous Chemicals is a regulation promulgated by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). It defines and regulates a process safety management (PSM) program for plants using, storing, manufacturing, handling or carrying out on-site movement of hazardous materials above defined amount thresholds. Companies affected by the regulation usually build a compliant process safety management system and integrate it in their safety management system. Non-U.S. companies frequently choose on a voluntary basis to use the OSHA scheme in their business.

A chemical accident is the unintentional release of one or more hazardous chemicals, which could harm human health and the environment. Such events include fires, explosions, and release of toxic materials that may cause people illness, injury, or disability. Chemical accidents can be caused for example by natural disasters, human error, or deliberate acts for personal gain. Chemical accidents are generally understood to be industrial-scale ones, often with important offsite consequences. Unintended exposure to chemicals that occur at smaller work sites, as well as in private premises during everyday activities are usually not referred to as chemical accidents.

On 25 September 1998 a catastrophic industrial accident occurred at the Esso natural gas plant at Longford, Australia. A pressurised vessel ruptured producing a violent outburst of hydrocarbons followed by a severe fire that burned for two days.

A hazard analysis is used as the first step in a process used to assess risk. The result of a hazard analysis is the identification of different types of hazards. A hazard is a potential condition and exists or not. It may, in single existence or in combination with other hazards and conditions, become an actual Functional Failure or Accident (Mishap). The way this exactly happens in one particular sequence is called a scenario. This scenario has a probability of occurrence. Often a system has many potential failure scenarios. It also is assigned a classification, based on the worst case severity of the end condition. Risk is the combination of probability and severity. Preliminary risk levels can be provided in the hazard analysis. The validation, more precise prediction (verification) and acceptance of risk is determined in the risk assessment (analysis). The main goal of both is to provide the best selection of means of controlling or eliminating the risk. The term is used in several engineering specialties, including avionics, food safety, occupational safety and health, process safety, reliability engineering.

In the chemical and process industries, a process has inherent safety if it has a low level of danger even if things go wrong. Inherent safety contrasts with other processes where a high degree of hazard is controlled by protective systems. As perfect safety cannot be achieved, common practice is to talk about inherently safer design. “An inherently safer design is one that avoids hazards instead of controlling them, particularly by reducing the amount of hazardous material and the number of hazardous operations in the plant.”

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Explosives safety</span>

Explosives safety originated as a formal program in the United States in the aftermath of World War I when several ammunition storage areas were destroyed in a series of mishaps. The most serious occurred at Picatinny Arsenal Ammunition Storage Depot, New Jersey, in July, 1926 when an electrical storm led to fires that caused explosions and widespread destruction. The severe property damage and 19 fatalities led Congress to empower a board of Army and Naval officers to investigate the Picatinny Arsenal disaster and determine if similar conditions existed at other ammunition depots. The board reported in its findings that this mishap could recur, prompting Congress to establish a permanent board of colonels to develop explosives safety standards and ensure compliance beginning in 1928. This organization evolved into the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) and is chartered in Title 10 of the US Code. The DDESB authors Defense Explosives Safety Regulation (DESR) 6055.9 which establishes the explosives safety standards for the Department of Defense. The DDESB also evaluates scientific data which may adjust those standards, reviews and approves all explosives site plans for new construction, and conducts worldwide visits to locations containing US title munitions. The cardinal principle of explosives safety is expose the minimum number of people for the minimum time to the minimum amount of explosives.

In functional safety a safety instrumented system (SIS) is an engineered set of hardware and software controls which provides a protection layer that shuts down a chemical, nuclear, electrical, or mechanical system, or part of it, if a hazardous condition is detected.

A job safety analysis (JSA) is a procedure which helps integrate accepted safety and health principles and practices into a particular task or job operation. In a JSA, each basic step of the job is to identify potential hazards and to recommend the safest way to do the job. Other terms used to describe this procedure are job hazard analysis (JHA), hazardous task analysis (HTA) and job hazard breakdown.

The Institute for Occupational Safety and Health of the German Social Accident Insurance is a German institute located in Sankt Augustin near Bonn and is a main department of the German Social Accident Insurance. Belonging to the Statutory Accident Insurance means that IFA is a non-profit institution.

A process hazard analysis (PHA) (or process hazard evaluation) is an exercise for the identification of hazards of a process facility and the qualitative or semi-quantitative assessment of the associated risk. A PHA provides information intended to assist managers and employees in making decisions for improving safety and reducing the consequences of unwanted or unplanned releases of hazardous materials. A PHA is directed toward analyzing potential causes and consequences of fires, explosions, releases of toxic or flammable chemicals and major spills of hazardous chemicals, and it focuses on equipment, instrumentation, utilities, human actions, and external factors that might impact the process. It is one of the elements of OSHA's program for Process Safety Management.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Hazard</span> Situation or object that can cause damage

A hazard is a potential source of harm. Substances, events, or circumstances can constitute hazards when their nature would allow them, even just theoretically, to cause damage to health, life, property, or any other interest of value. The probability of that harm being realized in a specific incident, combined with the magnitude of potential harm, make up its risk, a term often used synonymously in colloquial speech.

Chemical safety includes all those policies, procedures and practices designed to minimize the risk of exposure to potentially hazardous chemicals. This includes the risks of exposure to persons handling the chemicals, to the surrounding environment, and to the communities and ecosystems within that environment. Manufactured chemicals, either pure or in mixtures, solutions and emulsions, are ubiquitous in modern society, at industrial, occupational and private scale. However, there are chemicals that should not mix or get in contact with others, as they can produce byproducts that may be toxic, carcinogenic, explosive etc., or can be dangerous in themselves. To avoid disasters and mishaps, maintaining safety is paramount.

The health and safety hazards of nanomaterials include the potential toxicity of various types of nanomaterials, as well as fire and dust explosion hazards. Because nanotechnology is a recent development, the health and safety effects of exposures to nanomaterials, and what levels of exposure may be acceptable, are subjects of ongoing research. Of the possible hazards, inhalation exposure appears to present the most concern, with animal studies showing pulmonary effects such as inflammation, fibrosis, and carcinogenicity for some nanomaterials. Skin contact and ingestion exposure, and dust explosion hazards, are also a concern.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Cyber PHA</span>

A cyber PHA is a safety-oriented methodology to conduct a cybersecurity risk assessment for an Industrial Control System (ICS) or Safety Instrumented System (SIS). It is a systematic, consequence-driven approach that is based upon industry standards such as ISA 62443-3-2, ISA TR84.00.09, ISO/IEC 27005:2018, ISO 31000:2009 and NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-39.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Domino effect accident</span> Accident that causes one or more consequential accidents

A domino effect accident is an accident in which a primary undesired event sequentially or simultaneously triggers one or more secondary undesired events in nearby equipment or facilities, leading to secondary accidents more severe than the primary event. Thus, a domino effect accident is actually a chain of multiple events, which can be likened to a falling row of dominoes. The term knock-on accident is also used.

References

  1. CCPS. "Process Safety FAQs". AIChE. Retrieved 2023-06-20.
  2. 1 2 IOGP. "Process safety". IOGP. Retrieved 2023-06-20.
  3. Stand Together for Safety (2016). Process Safety - A Good Practice Guide (PDF). Stand Together for Safety. p. 37.
  4. API (2016). API Recommended Practice 754 - Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and Petrochemical Industries (2nd ed.). American Petroleum Institute. p. 8.
  5. CCPS (2012). Guidelines for Engineering Design for Process Safety (2nd ed.). Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons. p. xxviii. ISBN   978-0-470-76772-6.
  6. Hume, Alastair (2021-09-27). "The Definition of Process Safety". blog.safetysolutions.co.nz. Retrieved 2023-06-20.
  7. Hopkins, Andrew (2007). Thinking About Process Safety Indicators. Canberra: Australian National University. p. 3.
  8. 1 2 CCPS; Energy Institute (2018). Bow Ties in Risk Management: A Concept Book for Process Safety. New York, N.Y. and Hoboken, N.J.: AIChE and John Wiley & Sons. ISBN   9781119490395.
  9. Collins, Alison; Keeley, Deborah (2003). Loss of Containment Incident Analysis (PDF). HSL/2003/07. Sheffield: Health and Safety Laboratory.
  10. 1 2 3 Mannan, Sam (2012). Lees' Loss Prevention in the Process Industries (4th ed.). Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. ISBN   978-0-12-397189-0.
  11. Khan, Faisal, ed. (2018). Methods in Chemical Process Safety. Vol. 2 - Offshore Process Safety. Cambridge, Mass.: Academic Press.
  12. Hendershot, Dennis C. (2009). "A History of Process Safety and Loss Prevention in the American Institute of Chemical Engineers". Process Safety Progress . 28 (2): 105–113. doi:10.1002/prs.10318.
  13. 1 2 3 CCPS (2016). Introduction to Process Safety for Undergraduates and Engineers. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons. ISBN   978-1-118-94950-4.
  14. Lees, Frank P. (1980). Loss Prevention in the Process Industries (1st ed.). Butterworth-Heinemann. ISBN   9780750615228.
  15. Kletz, Trevor A. (1999). "The Origins and History of Loss Prevention". Process Safety and Environmental Protection. 77 (3): 109–116. doi: 10.1205/095758299529938 . ISSN   0957-5820.
  16. Dow Chemical Company (1964). Dow’s Process Safety Guide (1st ed.).
  17. CCPS (2012-04-12). "History". AIChE. Retrieved 2023-06-21.
  18. OECD (2022). The Impact of Natural Hazards on Hazardous Installations (PDF). Paris: OECD . Retrieved 2023-06-26.
  19. "Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29, Subtitle B, Chapter XVII, Part 1910, Subpart H § 1910.119". eCFR. 2023-06-15. Retrieved 2023-06-20.
  20. EPA (2013-10-29). "Risk Management Program (RMP) Rule Overview". EPA. Archived from the original on 2023-06-18. Retrieved 2023-06-22.
  21. 1 2 CCPS (2007). Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons. ISBN   978-0-470-16569-0.
  22. Energy Institute (2010). High Level Framework for Process Safety Management (1st ed.). London: Energy Institute. ISBN   978 0 85293 584 2.
  23. Reason, James (1990). Human Error. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.