29 November 2026 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
All 350 seats in the Congress of Deputies and 209 (of 267) seats in the Senate 176 seats needed for a majority in the Congress of Deputies | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Registered | 38,728,356 [1] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Constituencies for the Congress of Deputies | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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A general election will be held in Spain on 29 November 2026 to elect the members of the 16th Cortes Generales under the Spanish Constitution of 1978. All 350 seats in the Congress of Deputies will be up for election, as well as 209 of 267 seats in the Senate. [d]
Following the 2023 election, Pedro Sánchez was re-elected as prime minister of Spain and formed a third government—comprising the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and Sumar—with the support of Together for Catalonia (Junts), in exchange for a controversial amnesty law. Tensions with the opposition People's Party (PP) and far-right Vox dominated Sánchez's third term, as well as an unraveling international situation (with the ongoing war in Ukraine, the Gaza genocide, the tariff policy of the second Trump administration, and the 2026 Iran war and its economic impact), economic growth amid a rising cost of living, and a number of corruption probes affecting the government (mainly, the Koldo and Zapatero affairs). Also notable were the alleged mismanagements of a number of environmental disasters by PP-controlled administrations (particularly climate crisis-aggravated environmental disasters such as the 2024 Valencian floods and the 2025 and 2026 wildfires), sexual misconduct allegations affecting various parties and institutions, growing public outrage over the management of public services (particularly following the 2025 Iberian Peninsula blackout, and the 2026 Adamuz and Gelida train accidents), and immigration (with critical points in Torre-Pacheco and Ceuta). While Sánchez admitted to having twice hesitated whether to resign—in April 2024 amid a controversial judicial probe into his wife; then in July 2025 after the resignation of Santos Cerdán as PSOE's organization secretary over the Koldo affair—he voiced his intention to run for a new term as prime minister.
Amid major housing protests in the autumn of 2026 and the parliamentary defeat of his relief plans by PP, Vox and Junts, Sánchez dissolved parliament and called the election for 29 November. [4] [5] The member parties of Sumar (except for Podemos, which had split off in December 2023) launched a new alliance, the Broad Front, [6] with former Barcelona mayor Ada Colau replacing Yolanda Díaz as leading candidate. [7] [8] For the first time since 1977, a major left-wing alliance including the PSOE (Senate of Progress) was formed for the upper chamber, prompting PP and Vox to assess potential forms of electoral cooperation. Together with Vox, PP leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo pledged to carry out sweeping right-wing reforms, including on social issues and constitutional reform. [9] [10] [11] The 2026 Toledo train collision on 28 October led most parties but Vox to suspend their campaigns and prompted the resignation of Óscar Puente as minister of Transport and Sustainable Mobility.
The 2023 general election saw Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and his ruling coalition—formed by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and Sumar—re-elected with the support of Together for Catalonia (Junts), in exchange for a controversial amnesty law for those tried and convicted for events linked to the 2017–2018 Catalan crisis and the 2019 protests. [12] [13] This deal sparked widespread protests, some of them violent in the days before Sánchez's investiture, seeing clashes near the PSOE's national headquarters in Madrid and the involvement of far-right groups. [14] [15]
Sánchez's third term was marked by a booming economy and falling unemployment, but also by rising living costs and an affordable housing crisis. [16] [17] During this period, a constitutional reform in 2024 introduced people-first language, [18] and a bipartisan agreement ended the five-year blockade of the judiciary council. [19] Political tensions with the People's Party (PP) and far-right Vox intensified, with the government accusing both of "lawfare", disinformation and harassment campaigns. [20] [21] These tensions peaked in April 2024, when Sánchez briefly considered resigning after a controversial judicial investigation into his wife, Begoña Gómez, over alleged influence peddling and embezzlement accusations brought by the far-right-linked group Manos Limpias (Spanish for "Clean Hands"). [22] [23] [24] [25] The government also dealt with the 2025 Iberian Peninsula blackout, [26] [27] repeated failures in Spain's rail network (especially following the 2026 Adamuz and Gelida train accidents), [28] [29] [30] and the MV Hondius hantavirus outbreak. [31] [32]
On the international stage, Sánchez's government dealt with continued EU support for Ukraine in its war against Russia, [33] the tariff policy of the second Trump administration, [34] and the country's role within NATO amid a debate over the five-percent defense spending hike. [35] [36] [37] Its strong criticism of the Gaza genocide led Spain to recognize Palestine and worsened relations with Israel, [38] [39] [40] [41] sparking pro-Palestinian protests and calls to boycott Israeli participation in international competitions, such as the 2025 Vuelta a España, [42] and Spain's RTVE joining others' bid to withdraw from the Eurovision Song Contest 2026. [43] The 2026 Iran war saw Sánchez and U.S. President Donald Trump clash over the use of joint military bases at Rota and Morón, [44] [45] [46] reviving the "No to war" slogan previously used during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. [47] [48] At the same time, the Spanish government sought to address the war's economic impact by approving a €5-billion relief package. [49]
Several political scandals affected the PSOE government during this period, including the Koldo affair (a kickback-for-contract scheme linked to José Luis Ábalos—a former transport minister—and party official Santos Cerdán), [50] [51] the Zapatero affair (involving the lobbying activity of the former prime minister), [52] [53] and judicial probes into Sánchez's brother (for alleged cronyism) [54] [55] and the Spanish Attorney General, Álvaro García Ortiz (for an alleged data leak). [56] Other probes into alleged irregularities in public procurement affected the SEPI holding company and ADIF (Spain's railway infrastructure manager), leading to arrests and police raids. [57] [58] The PP was also hit by scandals, including several affecting the Madrilenian president, Isabel Díaz Ayuso (an investigation into her partner for alleged tax fraud, forgery and organized crime; [59] the controversial purchase of a luxury penthouse using public funds, [60] [61] and unjustified travel expenses); [62] [63] renewed attention on corruption cases during Rajoy's premiership such as the Montoro and Kitchen affairs (alleged cash-for-favours, influence peddling and deep state networks); [64] [65] as well as a resume padding controversy. [66] [67] Sexual misconduct allegations between 2024 and 2026 shook various parties and institutions and led to multiple resignations and dismissals, with the political backlash often compared to the MeToo movement. [68] [69]
Relations between the PP and Vox remained ambivalent, as the two parties competed electorally while still depending on each other to govern. [70] The alleged mismanagement by PP-controlled administrations—including climate crisis-aggravated environmental disasters, [71] [72] such as the 2024 Valencian floods (seeing Carlos Mazón's resignation as regional president) [73] [74] and major wildfires in August 2025 and July 2026; [75] [76] as well as public outrage over an Andalusian Health Service's mishandling of breast cancer screening [77] —was seen as contributing to Vox’s rise in opinion polls, helped by growing anti-political sentiment, denialism, conspiracist ideation and fake news. [78] [79] [80] These issues and immigration (with high points in the 2024 unaccompanied migrant minors' distribution dispute, [81] the 2025 Torre-Pacheco unrest, [82] and the government's 2026 immigration amnesty) [83] [84] further pushed the PP closer to Vox's agenda, [85] [86] with PP's Alberto Núñez Feijóo embracing Santiago Abascal's nativist "national priority" in exchange of support for regional pacts. [87] [88] [89] Concurrently, Vox purged several high-profile figures as it tried to broaden its appeal among working-class voters. [90] [91]
Changes in the political landscape of Catalonia—with Salvador Illa's Socialists' Party taking over the regional government in 2024 and the rise of the far-right Catalan Alliance—saw Junts withdrawing its support from the Spanish government in October 2025, [92] [93] but it remained uncommitted to support a no-confidence motion to oust Sánchez that would require the agreement of both PP and Vox. [94] [95] [96] Throughout late 2025 and early 2026, the PP tried to capitalize on discontent with Sánchez's government by calling early regional elections in Extremadura and Aragon (together with regularly-scheduled ones in Castile and León and Andalusia), [97] [98] but this strategy backfired as the regional PP branches ended up relying even more on Vox to remain in power, [99] [100] while seeing a rise for regionally-based left-wing parties (such as Chunta Aragonesista and Adelante Andalucía). [101] [102] The political space to the PSOE's left fragmented amid Podemos's split from Sumar in December 2023, [103] [104] and Yolanda Díaz's announcement in February 2026 to not run for re-election, [7] with attempts to reorganize it into a broad front of left-wing parties ahead of the general election still ongoing. [105] [106]
The issues of immigration and housing came to a head in the last few months of the government's tenure, amid the 2026 Ceuta migrant crisis [107] [108] and widespread protests across Spain following the high-profile eviction of an 87-year-old by a real estate company in September 2026. [109] [110] [111] Sánchez's attempt to pass a housing relief package through parliament failed due to Junts's opposition, [112] prompting him to dissolve the chambers and call a snap election for 29 November. [5] [113] [114]
Under the 1978 Constitution, the Spanish Cortes Generales are conceived as an imperfect bicameral system. [115] [116] The Congress of Deputies holds greater legislative power than the Senate, having the ability to grant or withdraw confidence from a prime minister and to override Senate vetoes by an absolute majority. [117] Nonetheless, the Senate retains a limited number of specific functions—such as ratifying international treaties, authorizing cooperation agreements between autonomous communities, enforcing direct rule, regulating interterritorial compensation funds, and taking part in constitutional amendments and in the appointment of members to the Constitutional Court and the General Council of the Judiciary—which are not subject to override by Congress. [118]
The term of each chamber of the Cortes Generales—the Congress and the Senate—expired four years from the date of their previous election, unless they were dissolved earlier. [119] The election decree was required to be issued no later than 25 days before the scheduled expiration date of parliament and published on the following day in the Official State Gazette (BOE), with election day taking place 54 days after the decree's publication. [120] The previous election was held on 23 July 2023, which meant that the chambers' terms would have expired on 23 July 2027. The election decree was required to be published in the BOE no later than 29 June 2027, setting the latest possible date for election day on 22 August 2027. [121] [122]
The prime minister had the prerogative to propose the monarch to dissolve both chambers at any given time—either jointly or separately—and call a snap election, provided that no motion of no confidence was in process, no state of emergency was in force and that dissolution did not occur before one year after a previous one. [123] Additionally, both chambers were to be dissolved and a new election called if an investiture process failed to elect a prime minister within a two-month period from the first ballot. [124] Barring this exception, there was no constitutional requirement for simultaneous elections to the Congress and the Senate. [125] Still, as of 2026, there has been no precedent of separate elections taking place under the 1978 Constitution.
Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez repeatedly voiced his will for the next general election to be held when due in 2027, [126] [127] particularly following corruption allegations in June 2025 that led to the resignation of his party's organization secretary, Santos Cerdán. [128] [129] However, his government's political strategy, uncertainty over the General State Budget, as well as Sánchez having previously promised to exhaust legislative terms before ultimately calling snap elections—in 2019 and 2023—led to speculation that an early election could not be ruled out. [130] [131] Uncertainty over Junts's support to Sánchez was commented as a possible trigger of a snap election, [132] [133] while the outbreak of war in Iran fueled comments of a "Super Sunday" in June 2026, together with the regularly scheduled Andalusian election. [134] [135] [136] Following that regional election, speculation emerged that the election would be held concurrently with the local and regional elections in May 2027, [137] but this was promptly rejected by Sánchez in June 2026, [138] who then hinted at the possibility of a general election in February or March 2027. [139] Amid the autumn 2026 housing protests and the parliamentary defeat of Sánchez's housing plans on 2 October, the government acknowledged that it was weighting whether to call a snap election for 29 November. [4] [140] [141] [142] By the night of 4 October, multiple media were reporting on Sánchez's intention to call a snap election the next day and recover his housing relief plans, [143] [144] [145] with him confirming the election date of 29 November. [5]
The Cortes Generales was officially dissolved on 6 October 2026 with the publication of the corresponding decree in the BOE, setting election day for 29 November and scheduling for both chambers to reconvene on 23 December. [146]
Voting for each chamber of the Cortes Generales is based on universal suffrage, comprising all Spanish nationals over 18 years of age with full political rights, provided that they have not been deprived of the right to vote by a final sentence. [147] [148]
The Congress of Deputies has a minimum of 300 and a maximum of 400 seats, with electoral provisions fixing its size at 350. Of these, 348 are elected in 50 multi-member constituencies corresponding to the provinces of Spain—each of which is assigned an initial minimum of two seats and the remaining 248 distributed in proportion to population—using the D'Hondt method and closed-list proportional voting, with a three percent-threshold of valid votes (including blank ballots) in each constituency. The remaining two seats are allocated to Ceuta and Melilla as single-member districts elected by plurality voting. [149] The use of this electoral method may result in a higher effective threshold depending on district magnitude and vote distribution. [150]
As a result of the aforementioned allocation, each Congress multi-member constituency was entitled the following seats: [151]
| Seats | Constituencies |
|---|---|
| 38 | Madrid (+1) |
| 32 | Barcelona |
| 16 | Valencia |
| 12 | Alicante, Seville |
| 11 | Málaga |
| 10 | Murcia |
| 8 | A Coruña, Balearic Islands, Biscay, Cádiz (−1), Las Palmas |
| 7 | Asturias, Granada, Pontevedra, Zaragoza, Santa Cruz de Tenerife |
| 6 | Almería, Córdoba, Gipuzkoa, Girona, Tarragona, Toledo |
| 5 | Badajoz, Cantabria, Castellón, Ciudad Real, Huelva, Jaén, Navarre, Valladolid |
| 4 | Álava, Albacete, Burgos, Cáceres, La Rioja, León, Lleida, Lugo, Ourense, Salamanca |
| 3 | Ávila, Cuenca, Guadalajara, Huesca, Palencia, Segovia, Teruel, Zamora |
| 2 | Soria |
209 Senate seats are elected using open-list [e] partial block voting: voters in constituencies electing four seats can choose up to three candidates; in those with two or three seats, up to two; and in single-member districts, one. Each of the 47 peninsular provinces is allocated four seats, while in insular provinces—such as the Balearic and Canary Islands—the districts are the islands themselves, with the larger ones (Mallorca, Gran Canaria and Tenerife) being allocated three seats each, and the smaller ones (Menorca, Ibiza, Formentera, Fuerteventura, La Gomera, El Hierro, Lanzarote and La Palma) one each. [d] Ceuta and Melilla elect two seats each. Additionally, autonomous communities may appoint at least one senator each and are entitled to one additional seat per million inhabitants. [152] [153]
The law does not provide for by-elections to fill vacant seats; instead, any vacancies arising after the proclamation of candidates and during the legislative term are filled by the next candidates on the party lists or, when required, by designated substitutes. [154]
The tables below show the composition of the parliamentary groups in both chambers at the time of dissolution. [155] [156]
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Spanish citizens with the right to vote may run for election, provided that they have not been criminally imprisoned by a final sentence or convicted—whether final or not—of offenses that involve loss of eligibility or disqualification from public office (such as rebellion, terrorism or other crimes against the state). Additional causes of ineligibility apply to the following officials: [163]
Other ineligibility provisions also apply to a number of territorial officials in these categories within their areas of jurisdiction, as well as to employees of foreign states and members of regional governments. [163]
Incompatibility rules include those of ineligibility, and also bar running in multiple constituencies or lists, holding office if the candidacy is later declared illegal (by a final ruling), and combining legislative roles (deputy, senator, and regional lawmaker) with each other or with: [164]
The electoral law allows for parties and federations registered in the interior ministry, alliances and groupings of electors to present lists of candidates. Parties and federations intending to form an alliance are required to inform the relevant electoral commission within 10 days of the election call, whereas groupings of electors need to secure the signature of at least one percent of the electorate in the constituencies for which they seek election, disallowing electors from signing for more than one list. Concurrently, parties, federations or alliances that have not obtained a mandate in either chamber of the Cortes at the preceding election are required to secure the signature of at least 0.1 percent of electors in the aforementioned constituencies. [165] Amendments in 2024 required a balanced composition of men and women in the electoral lists through the use of a zipper system. [166]
A special, simplified process is provided for election re-runs, including a shortening of deadlines, electoral campaigning, the lifting of signature requirements if these had been already met for the immediately previous election and the possibility of maintaining lists and alliances without needing to go through pre-election procedures again. [167]
Below is a list of the main parties and alliances which will contest the election: [168] [169]
The 2024 European Parliament election in Spain saw the electoral breakthrough of social media personality Luis "Alvise" Pérez who, running on a right-wing populist platform with his Se Acabó La Fiesta party (Spanish for "The Party is Over", SALF), secured 4.6% of the share. [211] Alvise announced in July 2024 that he was considering to run in the next general election, [212] but his public standing was damaged by an internal party crisis—which saw the defection of SALF's two other MEPs, amid accusations of bullying and blackmail [213] [214] —and several legal cases against him, including allegations of illegal financing, data leakage and harassment, which were the subject of ongoing investigations by the Supreme Court. [215] [216] [217] Alvise formally launched his general election run in October 2025, [218] [219] confirming it upon the election call the next year. [208]
The political space to the left of the PSOE—which had broken up in December 2023 following Podemos's split and was commented as a key element in securing any prospective re-election of Sánchez's government [184] [220] —reorganized into the Broad Front (FA) brand, [6] [221] with former Barcelona mayor Ada Colau becoming prime ministerial candidate following Yolanda Díaz's renounce in February 2026. [7] [178] [222] Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC)'s spokesperson in Congress, Gabriel Rufián, had proposed a broad front of left-wing parties (either directly or through coordination) that also included peripheral nationalists such as ERC, EH Bildu and the Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG); [223] ultimately, his party reached an alliance with Podemos to run in Catalan provinces after he was re-confirmed as ERC candidate on 11 October 2026. [189] [190] FA and Podemos failed to reach a nationwide agreement, though regional agreements were signed. [224] Chunta Aragonesista announced on 21 October that they would not run in the province of Teruel to avoid "voter dispersion", though this was opposed by the United Left branch in the province. [225]
PSOE and Sumar probed prospective forms of cooperation to help take seats away from the PP and Vox, especially in smaller constituencies. [226] A civil society initiative ("Senators for Democracy") pushed for negotations between left-wing parties for a joint candidacy in the Senate, [227] [228] [229] with talks in the Valencian Community also including Compromís. [230] Concurrently, Més per Mallorca and Geroa Bai considered joint lists with the PSOE in the Senate constituencies of Mallorca and Navarre. [231] [232] Negotiations between PSOE and FA ultimately resulted in both allying in 49 Senate constituencies under the Senate of Progress umbrella (SDP). [202] Further considerations were made on whether FA should run in smaller Congress constituencies, in order to optimize the vote among left-wing parties. [233] [234] The SDP alliance prompted both PP and Vox to also explore a potential coordination to prevent splitting their votes in the Senate, without ruling out the possibility of fielding joint candidacies, [235] [236] [237] which Feijóo acknowledged. [238] [239] [240] Vox allegedly requested the PP to ensure it had a parliamentary group of its own in the Senate, also requesting the PP to not field candidates in some provinces. [241] On 26 October, both parties announced a Senate agreement under which Vox would not run in six provinces (the Balearic Islands, Cádiz, Castellón, Las Palmas, Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Valencia) and would field only one candidate in a further 14 (Álava, Alicante, Asturias, Badajoz, Cáceres, Cuenca, Granada, Huelva, Huesca, Jaén, Navarre, Pontevedra Seville and Zaragoza); in exchange, the PP would not run in Gipuzkoa, Girona and Tarragona, and would include independent candidates proposed by Vox—placed second or third—on its lists in the six provinces from which the latter would withdraw. [242] FA responded to the PP–Vox alliance by withdrawing its Senate candidacies in Girona and Tarragona, as well as Lleida, in support of the Socialists' Party of Catalonia. [243]
Catalan Alliance, [244] Popular Unity Candidacy, [245] Leonese People's Union, [246] Jaén Merece Más [247] and For Ávila [248] all withdrew from running in the election, while the Regionalist Party of Cantabria discarded running again (having last participated in 2019). [249]
In the years going into the election, PP and Vox openly embraced election denial theories by questioning the integrity of the electoral process. [250] [251] [252] [253] One of the most common theories involved casting doubts on postal voting, [254] stirring up the hoax that Sánchez's government was intent on rigging the election. [255] [256] [257] Starting in June 2025, former prime minister José María Aznar claimed that Sánchez could try to tamper with the electoral procedure, [258] with PP leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo immediately joining this accusation by claiming that the mail-in voting system had "loopholes". [259] [260]
After the election call in October 2026, the PP got tangled up in the statements made by its own leaders, as regional premiers such as Jorge Azcón and Isabel Díaz Ayuso initially questioned mail-in voting and urged people to vote in person, [261] [262] while others such as PP national spokesperson Borja Sémper claimed that the system was ensured through "a series of controls". [257] [263] On 7 October, Feijóo himself joined the conspiracy theories on mail-in voting and announced additional measures to be proposed to the Central Electoral Commission (JEC) to guarantee its integrity, claiming that he trusted "mail carriers" but not "the executives of Correos" (the state-owned postal service). [264] [265] On 16 October, the JEC replied to PP and Vox that, during elections, Correos already implemented secure and transparent measures for the custody of ballots in accordance with the law; that it could only take action in response to complaints regarding specific, individual cases—which had not been provided in the parties' complaints—and that any change to such procedure would require a legislative reform. [266] [267]
Sánchez's government blasted the accusations by claiming that postal voting was "a right that has been exercised for years", depicting them as a right-wing misinformation campaign "out of fear of losing the election". [257] [268] The episode drew comparisons to the election denial movement in the United States. [269] [270] [271]
In June 2026, both PP and Vox accused Sánchez of trying to alter the electoral roll through the so-called "Grandchildren Law" (Spanish: ley de nietos), a 2022 legal provision within the Democratic Memory Law allowing the naturalisation of descendants of Spanish Republican exiles, and which PP leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo previously campaigned in support of. [272] [273] The controversy focused on an instruction issued days after the law's approval, interpreting it by presuming all Spaniards who had left the country between 18 July 1936 and 31 December 1955 as exiles, without requiring specific evidence regarding the circumstances that led them to leave Spain. [274] [275] The Iustitia Europa and Vox parties appealed the instruction to the JEC and then to the Spanish Supreme Court, [276] [277] the latter of which decided in September 2026 to temporarily suspend the voting rights of non-resident citizens registered by virtue of its provisions—pending a final ruling—in order to "safeguard the transparency of the electoral process and the trust of citizens in its results" in light of the "magnitude" of the census increase since 2023 (from 2.3 to 2.7 million, as of 1 July 2026). [278] [279] [280] The decision was contested by the Spanish government as "excessive", considering circumstances such as the very low turnout of non-resident citizens (which accounted for just 0.8% of voters in the 2023 election), and that seat changes resulting from this type of vote had actually benefitted the PP in recent times (granting them one additional seat in Biscay in November 2019, and another one in Madrid in 2023). [281] [282] [283]
Upon the election call in October 2026, the Supreme Court set a 48-hour deadline for receiving arguments and appeals before ruling on the Grandchildren Law's suspension, in order to determine whether naturalised citizens would be able to vote on 29 November. [284] Both the Solicitor General's Office and the Prosecution Ministry requested that the law's suspension be lifted for the 2026 election, citing the practical impossibility of reviewing all the files in time and the severity of the measure. [285] [286] On 9 October, the National Statistics Institute released data on registered voters for the election, totaling 38.7 million (an increase of 1.3 million since 2023, or 3.4%), of whom 2.8 million were non-resident citizens (an increase of 420,000, or 19%). [1] [287] The Supreme Court rejected the appeals on 12 October and confirmed the suspension for the 2026 election. [288] The intention of several associations of descendants of Spaniards to challenge the suspension was disputed by Iustitia Europa, [289] [290] while the Spanish Ombudsman appealed the decision to the Constitutional Court, [291] which was rejected on 21 October as untimely. [292] The JEC decided to send voting documentation to the 2.7 million registered voters living abroad, with a warning to the 163,000 affected individuals under the Grandchildren Law that their case was still pending resolution. [293]
On 21 October, a Spanish court agreed to hear a criminal complaint filed by Hazte Oír against Sofía Puente—the author of the 2022 instruction and sister of Minister Óscar Puente—regarding an alleged offense of administrative prevarication in connection with the Grandchildren's Law. [294]
The key dates are listed below. All times are CET, while the Canary Islands use WET (UTC+0) instead. [295] [296]
| Party or alliance | Original slogan | English translation | Ref. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PP | « Por fin » | "At last" | [299] | |
| PSOE | « La fuerza de la gente » | "The power of the people" | [300] | |
| Vox | ||||
| FA | ||||
| Podemos | « Paz, casa y trabajo » | "Peace, home, and work" | [301] | |
| Compromís–FV | ||||
| ERC | ||||
| Junts | ||||
| EH Bildu | ||||
| EAJ/PNV | ||||
| BNG | « Co BNG, Galiza gaña » | "With the BNG, Galicia wins" | [302] | |
| CCa | ||||
| UPN | ||||
As in every election, several media groups offered to host debates between the prime ministerial candidates: Mediaset (which offered a face-to-face debate between Feijóo and Sánchez), [303] Atresmedia (a four-way debate including Vox and Sumar/FA on 18 November, and a face-to-face debate on 23 November), [304] RTVE (a face-to-face debate on 17 November and a four-way debate on 26 November, as well as an eight-way debate with other minor parties on 23 November) [305] and the newly-established La Séptima (a face-to-face debate). [306] On 9 October, Feijóo accepted the Mediaset face-to-face debate and the Atresmedia four-way debate (proposing to hold them on 16 and 26 November, respectively), but limited his participation in RTVE to in-house interviews, a decision allegedly directed at excluding interviewers such as Silvia Intxaurrondo (with whom Feijóo had a tense exchange in the 2023 campaign, commented as having been a decisive factor in the right-wing bloc's defeat). [307] [308] On 22 October, Sánchez accepted the face-to-face debate in Mediaset on 16 November, but proposed that the four-way debate was the RTVE one on 26 November, which the PP rejected. [309]
| Date | Organizer(s) | Moderator(s) | P Present [w] S Surrogate [x] NI Not invited I Invited A Absent invitee | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PP | PSOE | Vox | FA | ERC | Junts | EH Bildu | PNV | Audience | Ref. | |||
| TBC | Cadena SER [y] | TBC | I Bravo | I Rodríguez | NI | NI | NI | NI | NI | NI | [310] | |
| 10 November | laSexta (laSexta Debate) | Ana Pastor | I TBC | I Cuerpo | I Figaredo | I Bustinduy | NI | NI | NI | NI | [311] [312] | |
| 16 November | Mediaset | Carlos Franganillo Alba Lago | I Feijóo | I Sánchez | NI | NI | NI | NI | NI | NI | ||
| 23 November | RTVE [z] | TBC | I Muñoz | I López | I Millán | I Martínez | I Rufián | I Nogueras | I Matute | I Vaquero | [305] | |
| 26 November | Atresmedia | TBC | I Feijóo | I Sánchez | I Abascal | I Colau | NI | NI | NI | NI | ||
| 26 November | RTVE | TBC | I Feijóo | I Sánchez | I Abascal | I Colau | NI | NI | NI | NI | ||
| Polling aggregator | Last update | | | | | | SALF | | | Lead |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Economist [313] | 1 Nov 2026 | 31.0 | 27.0 | 19.0 | [aa] | 3.0 | – | 6.0 | 4.0 | |
| Demócrata [314] | 1 Nov 2026 | 30.8 133 | 27.3 108 | 18.9 67 | [aa] | 2.7 1 | 1.6 0 | 6.4 9 | 3.5 | |
| PolitPro [315] | 25 Oct 2026 | 30.6 | 26.1 | 18.8 | [aa] | 2.8 | 1.6 | 5.9 | 4.5 | |
| Electocracia [316] | 28 Oct 2026 | 31.1 130 | 26.7 108 | 19.5 69 | [aa] | 2.7 1 | 1.8 0 | 6.8 11 | 4.4 | |
| Onda Cero [317] | 26 Oct 2026 | 31.9 | 26.6 | 18.9 | [aa] | 2.8 | 1.8 | 7.5 | 5.3 | |
| Politico [318] | 26 Oct 2026 | 31.0 | 27.0 | 19.0 | [aa] | 3.0 | 2.0 | 8.0 | 4.0 | |
| El Periódico [319] | 26 Oct 2026 | 30.5 132 | 27.5 110 | 18.8 67 | [aa] | 3.0 2 | 1.4 0 | 6.2 8 | 3.0 | |
| Electomanía [320] | 26 Oct 2026 | 31.3 133 | 26.7 109 | 19.1 64 | [aa] | 2.0 1 | 1.5 0 | 6.0 9 | 1.1 3 | 4.6 |
| RTVE [321] | 26 Oct 2026 | 31.5 133 | 26.7 107 | 19.1 66 | [aa] | 2.5 1 | 1.8 0 | 7.0 12 | 4.8 | |
| El Confidencial [322] | 25 Oct 2026 | 31.6 | 26.4 | 19.1 | [aa] | 2.7 | 2.1 | 6.5 | 5.2 | |
| Europa Press [323] | 25 Oct 2026 | 31.0 | 26.9 | 19.1 | [aa] | 2.5 | – | 6.7 | 4.1 | |
| Europe Elects [324] | 24 Oct 2026 | 33.2 | 28.4 | 20.4 | [aa] | – | – | 7.0 | 4.8 | |
| elDiario.es [325] | 21 Oct 2026 | 32.1 133 | 26.3 105 | 18.6 65 | [aa] | 2.9 1 | 1.7 0 | 5.4 7 | 1.3 3 | 5.8 |
| El Debate [326] | 14 Oct 2026 | 31.7 133 | 25.9 104 | 18.9 66 | 6.7 10 | 2.9 2 | 1.8 0 | – | – | 5.8 |
| El País [327] | 9 Oct 2026 | 32.6 135 | 26.7 107 | 18.6 64 | 5.8 9 | 3.1 3 | 1.6 0 | – | – | 5.9 |
| 2023 election | 23 Jul 2023 | 33.1 137 | 31.7 121 | 12.4 33 | 12.3 31 | [ab] | – | – | – | 1.4 |
The table below shows registered voter turnout during the election. Figures for election day do not include non-resident citizens, while final figures do.
| Region | Time (Election day) | Final | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 14:00 | 18:00 | 20:00 | ||||||||||
| 2023 | 2026 | +/– | 2023 | 2026 | +/– | 2023 | 2026 | +/– | 2023 | 2026 | +/– | |
| Andalusia | 42.06% | 53.19% | 69.02% | 66.61% | ||||||||
| Aragon | 42.08% | 52.56% | 73.02% | 70.71% | ||||||||
| Asturias | 39.04% | 54.11% | 71.14% | 62.90% | ||||||||
| Balearic Islands | 37.27% | 48.58% | 63.56% | 61.32% | ||||||||
| Basque Country | 37.20% | 52.43% | 67.62% | 65.09% | ||||||||
| Canary Islands | 28.90% | 45.40% | 63.59% | 58.18% | ||||||||
| Cantabria | 43.00% | 60.45% | 75.37% | 69.94% | ||||||||
| Castile and León | 41.37% | 54.85% | 74.44% | 69.41% | ||||||||
| Castilla–La Mancha | 44.70% | 56.28% | 74.42% | 72.99% | ||||||||
| Catalonia | 36.79% | 48.72% | 65.43% | 62.68% | ||||||||
| Extremadura | 45.16% | 55.81% | 73.71% | 71.67% | ||||||||
| Galicia | 39.01% | 55.97% | 73.15% | 61.41% | ||||||||
| La Rioja | 45.76% | 57.12% | 74.86% | 70.19% | ||||||||
| Madrid | 40.83% | 53.70% | 74.15% | 69.66% | ||||||||
| Murcia | 44.24% | 55.09% | 70.79% | 68.68% | ||||||||
| Navarre | 41.28% | 51.77% | 69.86% | 66.37% | ||||||||
| Valencian Community | 46.24% | 57.93% | 73.64% | 71.50% | ||||||||
| Ceuta | 27.44% | 39.30% | 55.66% | 53.19% | ||||||||
| Melilla | 23.30% | 31.94% | 49.81% | 45.24% | ||||||||
| Total | 40.48% | 53.13% | 70.41% | 66.59% | ||||||||
| Sources [328] | ||||||||||||
| Parties and alliances | Popular vote | Seats | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Votes | % | ±pp | Total | +/− | ||
| People's Party (PP)1 | ||||||
| Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) | ||||||
| Vox (Vox) | ||||||
| Broad Front (FA) | n/a | |||||
| Now More–Broad Front (Aramés–EU–MS)4 | ||||||
| We Can (Podemos)2 | n/a | |||||
| Commitment: Valencian Front (Compromís–EUPV–Podem–ERPV)5 | ||||||
| Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) | ||||||
| Together for Catalonia (JxCat) | ||||||
| Basque Country Gather (EH Bildu) | ||||||
| Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ/PNV) | ||||||
| Animalist Party with the Environment (PACMA) | ||||||
| Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG) | ||||||
| Canarian Coalition–Municipalists Canaries First (CCa–1º CAN) | ||||||
| Workers' Front (FO) | ||||||
| For a Fairer World (M+J) | ||||||
| Blank Seats to Leave Empty Seats (EB) | ||||||
| Communist Party of the Workers of Spain (PCTE) | ||||||
| Teruel Exists (TE) | ||||||
| Yes to the Future (GBai) | ||||||
| Soria Now! (SY) | ||||||
| Forward Andalusia (Adelante Andalucía) | ||||||
| Spanish Phalanx of the CNSO (FE de las JONS) | ||||||
| Humanist Party (PH) | ||||||
| Self-employed Party (Partido Autónomos) | ||||||
| Regionalist Party of the Leonese Country (PREPAL) | ||||||
| Federation of Independents of Aragon (FIA) | ||||||
| Seniors in Action (3e) | ||||||
| State of Spain Unionist Party (PUEDE) | ||||||
| The Party is Over (SALF) | New | |||||
| Democracy for the 21st Century (D21) | New | |||||
| Justice Europe (IE) | New | |||||
| Drago Canaries Party (DRG) | New | |||||
| At the Same Time (Alhora) | New | |||||
| Feminists to the Congress (PFAC) | New | |||||
| European Retirees Social Democratic Party (PDSJE) | New | |||||
| New Extremennism–Forward Extremadura (NEx) | New | |||||
| Malagenian Alternative (29) | New | |||||
| Sunflower (Eguzkilore) | New | |||||
| Canarian Liberation (LIB) | New | |||||
| Convergents (CNV) | New | |||||
| United Valencia (VLC) | New | |||||
| Rebirth (RRB) | New | |||||
| Valencian Agenda (Agenda Valenciana) | New | |||||
| Nationalist Party of Castile and León–Citizen Reformist Union (PANCAL–URCI) | New | |||||
| Blank ballots | ||||||
| Total | 350 | ±0 | ||||
| Valid votes | ||||||
| Invalid votes | ||||||
| Votes cast / turnout | ||||||
| Abstentions | ||||||
| Registered voters | 38,728,356 | |||||
| Sources | ||||||
Footnotes:
| ||||||
| Parties and alliances | Popular vote | Seats | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Votes | % | ±pp | Total | +/− | ||
| People's Party (PP)1 | ||||||
| Spanish Socialist Workers' Party–Broad Front (PSOE–FA) | ||||||
| Canarian People's Unity (NC–BC, Podemos, IU, Sumar)6 | ||||||
| Vox (Vox) | ||||||
| Republican Left of Catalonia–Basque Country Gather (ERC–EH Bildu) | ||||||
| Basque Country Gather (EH Bildu) | ||||||
| Together for Catalonia (JxCat) | ||||||
| Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ/PNV) | ||||||
| Animalist Party with the Environment (PACMA) | ||||||
| Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG) | ||||||
| Canarian Coalition–Municipalists Canaries First (CCa–1º CAN) | ||||||
| Communist Party of the Workers of Spain (PCTE) | ||||||
| For a Fairer World (M+J) | ||||||
| Blank Seats to Leave Empty Seats (EB) | ||||||
| Teruel Exists (TE) | ||||||
| Yes to the Future (GBai) | ||||||
| Forward Andalusia (Adelante Andalucía) | ||||||
| Spanish Phalanx of the CNSO (FE de las JONS) | ||||||
| Soria Now! (SY) | ||||||
| Gomera Socialist Group (ASG) | ||||||
| Regionalist Party of the Leonese Country (PREPAL) | ||||||
| Federation of Independents of Aragon (FIA) | ||||||
| Independent Herrenian Group (AHI) | ||||||
| Seniors in Action (3e) | ||||||
| State of Spain Unionist Party (PUEDE) | ||||||
| Herrenian Assembly (AH) | ||||||
| We Can (Podemos) | New | |||||
| Democracy for the 21st Century (D21) | New | |||||
| Justice Europe (IE) | New | |||||
| Drago Canaries Party (DRG) | New | |||||
| The Union of Formentera (PP–CompromísFormentera) (Sa Unió) | New | |||||
| European Retirees Social Democratic Party (PDSJE) | New | |||||
| New Extremennism–Forward Extremadura (NEx) | New | |||||
| Together for Extremadura (JUEx) | New | |||||
| Formentera Alive (Formentera Viva) | New | |||||
| Forward Proyect (PAlantre) | New | |||||
| Malagenian Alternative (29) | New | |||||
| Sunflower (Eguzkilore) | New | |||||
| Initiative for La Gomera (IxLG) | New | |||||
| Convergents (CNV) | New | |||||
| Valencian Agenda (Agenda Valenciana) | New | |||||
| Nationalist Party of Castile and León–Citizen Reformist Union (PANCAL–URCI) | New | |||||
| Blank ballots [ac] | ||||||
| Total | 209 | +1 | ||||
| Valid votes | ||||||
| Invalid votes | ||||||
| Votes cast / turnout | ||||||
| Abstentions | ||||||
| Registered voters | 38,728,356 | |||||
| Sources | ||||||
Footnotes:
| ||||||
Legislation
Other