The Naval Academy was set up at Dalian on 22 November 1949, mostly with Soviet instructors. It then consisted of a motley collection of ships and boats acquired from the Kuomintang forces. The Naval Air Force was added two years later. By 1954, an estimated 2,500 Soviet naval advisers were in China—possibly one adviser to every thirty Chinese naval personnel—and the Soviet Union began providing modern ships.
With Soviet assistance, the navy reorganized in 1954 and 1955 into the North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet, and a corps of admirals and other naval officers was established from the ranks of the ground forces. In shipbuilding the Soviets first assisted the Chinese, then the Chinese copied Soviet designs without assistance, and finally the Chinese produced vessels of their own design. Eventually Soviet assistance progressed to the point that a joint Sino-Soviet Pacific Ocean fleet was under discussion.
Through the upheavals of the late 1950s and 1960s the Navy remained relatively undisturbed. Under the leadership of Minister of National Defense Lin Biao, large investments were made in naval construction during the frugal years immediately after the Great Leap Forward. During the Cultural Revolution, a number of top naval commissars and commanders were purged.
Naval forces were used to suppress a revolt in Wuhan in July 1967, but the service largely avoided the turmoil affecting the country. Although it paid lip service to Mao and assigned political commissars aboard ships, the Navy continued to train, build, and maintain the fleets as well the coastal defense and aviation arms, as well as in the performance of its mission.
1970s and 1980s
In the 1970s, when approximately 20 percent of the defense budget was allocated to naval forces, the Navy grew dramatically. The conventional submarine force increased from 35 to 100 boats, the number of missile-carrying ships grew from 20 to 200, and the production of larger surface ships, including support ships for oceangoing operations, increased. The Navy also began development of nuclear attack submarines (SSN) and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN).[citation needed]
In the 1980s, under the leadership of Chief Naval Commander Liu Huaqing, the navy developed into a regional naval power, though naval construction continued at a level somewhat below the 1970s rate. Liu Huaqing was an Army officer who spent most of his career in administrative positions involving science and technology. It was not until 1988 that the People's Liberation Army Navy was led by a naval officer. Liu was also very close to Deng Xiaoping as his modernization efforts were very much in keeping with Deng's national policies.[28]
While under his leadership Naval construction yards produced fewer ships than the 1970s, greater emphasis was placed on technology and qualitative improvement. Modernization efforts also encompassed higher educational and technical standards for personnel; reformulation of the traditional coastal defense doctrine and force structure in favor of more green-water operations; and training in naval combined-arms operations involving submarine, surface, naval aviation, and coastal defense forces.[28]
Examples of the expansion of China's capabilities were the 1980 recovery of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the Western Pacific by a twenty-ship fleet, extended naval operations in the South China Sea in 1984 and 1985, and the visit of two naval ships to three South Asian nations in 1985. In 1982 the navy conducted a successful test of an underwater-launched ballistic missile. The navy also had some success in developing a variety of surface-to-surface and air-to-surface missiles, improving basic capabilities.[28]
The PLA Navy was ranked in 1987 as the third largest navy in the world, although naval personnel had comprised only 12 percent of PLA strength. In 1987 the Navy consisted (as it does now) of the naval headquarters in Beijing; three fleet commands – the North Sea Fleet, based at Qingdao, Shandong; the East Sea Fleet, based at Ningbo; and the South Sea Fleet, based at Zhanjiang, Guangdong – and about 1,000 ships of which only approximately 350 are ocean going. The rest are small patrol or support craft.[citation needed]
The 350,000-person Navy included Naval Air Force units of 34,000 men, the Coastal Defense Forces of 38,000, and the Marine Corps of 56,500. Navy Headquarters, which controlled the three fleet commands, was subordinate to the PLA General Staff Department. In 1987, China's 1,500km coastline was protected by approximately 70[citation needed] diesel-powered Romeo- and Whiskey-class submarines, which could remain at sea only a limited time.
Inside this protective ring and within range of shore-based aircraft were destroyers and frigates mounting Styx anti-ship missiles, depth-charge projectors, and guns up to 130mm. Any invader penetrating the destroyer and frigate protection would have been swarmed by almost 900 fast-attack craft. Stormy weather limited the range of these small boats, however, and curtailed air support. Behind the inner ring were Coastal Defense Force personnel operating naval shore batteries of Styx missiles and guns, backed by ground force units deployed in depth.[citation needed]
1990s and 2000s
As the 21st century approached, the PLAN began to transition to an off-shore defensive strategy that entailed more out-of-area operations away from its traditional territorial waters.[29]:23–30 From 1990 to 2002, Jiang Zemin's military reforms placed particular emphasis on the Navy.[30]:261
Between 1989 and 1993, the training ship Zhenghe paid ports visits to Hawaii, Thailand, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India. PLAN vessels visited Vladivostok in 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996. PLAN task groups also paid visits to Indonesia in 1995; North Korea in 1997; New Zealand, Australia, and the Philippines in 1998; Malaysia, Tanzania, South Africa, the United States, and Canada in 2000; and India, Pakistan, France, Italy, Germany, Britain, Hong Kong, Australia, and New Zealand in 2001.[29]:114
Overall, between 1985 and 2006, PLAN naval vessels visited 18 Asian-Pacific nations, 4 South American nations, 8 European nations, 3 African nations, and 3 North American nations.[29]:115 In 2003, the PLAN conducted its first joint naval exercises during separate visits to Pakistan and India. Bi-lateral naval exercises were also carried out with exercises with the French, British, Australian, Canadian, Philippine, and United States navies.[29]:116
The demonstration was seen as a sign of the growing status of China, while the CMC chairman, Hu Jintao, indicated that China is neither seeking regional hegemony nor entering an arms race.[40] Predictions by Western analysts that the PLAN would outnumber the USN submarine force as early as 2011 have failed to come true because the PRC curtailed both imports and domestic production of submarines.[42]
Beginning in 2009, China ordered 4 Zubr-class LCAC from Ukraine and bought 4 more from the Hellenic Navy (Greece). These hovercraft/LCACs are built to send troops and armored vehicles (tanks, etc.) onto beaches in a fast manner, acting as a landing craft, and were viewed to be a direct threat to Taiwan's pro-independence movement as well as the conflict over Senkaku Islands. China is continually shifting the power balance in Asia by building up the Navy's Submarines, Amphibious warfare, and surface warfare capabilities.[citation needed]
Between 5–12 July 2013, a seven-ship task force from the North Sea Fleet joined warships from the Russian Pacific Fleet to participate in Joint Sea 2013, bilateral naval maneuvers held in the Peter the Great Bay of the Sea of Japan. To date, Joint Sea 2013 was the largest naval drill yet undertaken by the People's Liberation Army Navy with a foreign navy.[44]
On 2 April 2015, during the violent aftermath of a coup d'état in Yemen and amid an international bombing campaign, the PLAN helped ten countries get their citizens out of Yemen safely, evacuating them aboard a missile frigate from the besieged port city of Aden. The operation was described by Reuters as "the first time that China's military has helped other countries evacuate their people during an international crisis".[45]
China's participation in international maritime exercises is also increasing. In RIMPAC 2014, China was invited to send ships from their People's Liberation Army Navy; marking not only the first time China participated in a RIMPAC exercise but also the first time China participated in a large-scale United States-led naval drill.[46] On 9 June 2014, China confirmed it would be sending four ships to the exercise, a destroyer, frigate, supply ship, & hospital ship.[47][48] In April 2016, the People's Republic of China was also invited to RIMPAC 2016 despite the tension in South China Sea.[49]
PRC military expert Yin Zhuo said that due to present weaknesses in the PLAN's ability to replenish their ships at sea, their future aircraft carriers will be forced to operate in pairs.[50] In a TV interview, Zhang Zhaozhong suggest otherwise, saying China is "unlikely to put all her eggs in one basket" and that the navy will likely rotate between carriers rather than deploy them all at once.
In 2017, PLAN hospital ship Peace Ark traveled to Djibouti (treating 7,841 Djiboutians), Sierra Leone, Gabon, Republic of Congo (treating 7,508 Congolese), Angola, Mozambique (treating 9,881 Mozambiquans), and Tanzania (treating 6,421 Tanzanians).[51]:284
The PLAN continued its expansion into the 2020s, increasing its operational capacity, commissioning new ships, and constructing naval facilities.[52] Observers note that the PLAN's ongoing modernization is intended to build up the Chinese surface fleet and fix existing issues that limit the capability of the PLAN. Observers have noted that the PLAN's expansion will allow it to project Chinese power in the South China Sea and allow for the navy to counter the USN's operations in Asia.[53] Chinese naval capability increased substantially in the 2010s and 2020s. According to the US-based think tank RAND Corporation, PLAN enjoyed major advantages in terms of naval technologies, missiles, and tonnage against regional rivals such as Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and India.[citation needed]
The PLAN is organized into several departments for purposes of command, control and coordination. Main operating forces are organized into fleets, each with its own headquarters, a commander (a Rear Admiral or Vice Admiral) and a Political Commisar. All PLAN headquarters are subordinate to the PLA Joint Staff Department and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission.
The navy has 240,000 personnel, including 15,000 marines.[30]:263
Fleets
The People's Liberation Army Navy is divided into three fleets:
The People's Liberation Army Surface Force consists of all surface warships in service with the PLAN. They are organised into flotillas spread across the three main fleets.[citation needed]
The PLAN Coastal Defence Force is a land-based branch of the PLAN in charge of coastal defence,[citation needed] with a strength of around 25,000 personnel. Also known as the coastal defense troops, they serve to defend China's coastal and littoral areas from invasion via amphibious landings or air attacks.
Between the 1950s and 1960s, the Coastal Defense Force was primarily assigned to repel any Kuomintang attempts to infiltrate, invade and harass the Chinese coastline. After the Sino-Soviet split and the abandonment of KMT's plans to recapture the Mainland, the Coastal Defense Force was focused on defending China's coast from a possible Soviet sea-borne invasion throughout the 1960s to 1980s.
With the fall of the Soviet Union, the threat of an amphibious invasion of China has diminished and therefore the branch is often considered to no longer be a vital component of the PLAN, especially as the surface warships of the PLAN continue to improve in terms of anti-ship and air-defence capabilities and the PLAN's power projection begins to extend beyond the first island chain.
Today the primary weapons of the coastal defense troops are the HY-2, YJ-82 and C-602 anti-ship missiles.
PLAN Marines of the 1st Marine Brigade and members of the USMC fire the Type 95 Assault Rifle during an exchange exercise in 2006.A PLAN marine with a boarding team assigned to the guided missile destroyerHaikou during a maritime operations exercise in RIMPAC 2014.
The PLAN Marine Corps was originally established in the 1950s and then re-established in 1979 under PLAN organisation. It consists of around 20,000 marines,[55] and is based in the South China Sea with the South Sea Fleet. The Marine Corps are considered elite troops, and are rapid deployment forces trained primarily in amphibious warfare and sometimes in air assaults to establish a beachhead or act as a spearhead during assault operations against enemy targets.
With the PLAN's accelerating efforts to expand its capabilities beyond territorial waters, it would be likely for the Marine Corps to play a greater role in terms of being an offshore expeditionary force similar to the USMC and Royal Marines.
The PLA Naval Air Force has traditionally operated from coastal air bases, and received older aircraft than the PLAAF with less ambitious steps towards mass modernization. Advancements in new technologies, weaponry and aircraft acquisition were made after 2000. With the introduction of China's first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, in 2012, the Naval Air Force is conducting carrier-based operations for the first time[56] with the goal of building carrier battle group-focused blue water capabilities.
The CMS performed mostly coastal and ocean search and rescue or patrols, and received quite a few large patrol ships that significantly enhanced their operations; while Customs, militia, Armed Police and Fishery Law Enforcement operated hundreds of small patrol craft. For maritime patrol services, these craft are usually quite well armed with machine guns and 37mm anti-aircraft guns. In addition, these services operated their own small aviation fleets to assist their maritime patrol capabilities, with Customs and CMS operating a handful of Harbin Z-9 helicopters, and a maritime patrol aircraft based on the Harbin Y-12 STOL transport.
Every coastal province has 1 to 3 Coast Guard squadrons:
The ranks in the People's Liberation Army Navy are similar to those of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force, Air Force and the Rocket Force. The current system of officer ranks and insignia dates from 1988 and is a revision of the ranks and insignia used from 1955 to 1965. The rank of Hai Jun Yi Ji Shang Jiang (First Class Admiral) was never held and was abolished in 1994. With the official introduction of the Type 07 uniforms all officer insignia are on either shoulders or sleeves depending on the type of uniform used. The current system of enlisted ranks and insignia dates from 1998.
The People's Liberation Army Navy has become more prominent in recent years owing to a change in Chinese strategic priorities. The new strategic threats include possible conflict with the United States and/or a resurgent Japan in areas such as the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. As part of its overall program of naval modernization, the PLAN has a long-term plan of developing a blue water navy. Robert D. Kaplan has said that it was the collapse of the Soviet Union that allowed China to transfer resources from its army to its navy and other force projection assets.[58]
China is constructing a major underground nuclearsubmarine base near Sanya, Hainan. In December 2007 the first Type 094 submarine was moved to Sanya.[59]The Daily Telegraph on 1 May 2008 reported that tunnels were being built into hillsides which could be capable of hiding up to 20 nuclear submarines from spy satellites. According to the Western news media the base is reportedly to help China project seapower well into the Pacific Ocean area, including challenging United States naval power.[60][61]
During a 2008 interview with the BBC, Major General Qian Lihua, a senior Chinese defense official, stated that the PLAN aspired to possess a small number of aircraft carriers to allow it to expand China's air defense perimeter.[62] According to Qian the important issue was not whether China had an aircraft carrier, but what it did with it.[62] On 13 January 2009, Adm. Robert F. Willard, head of the U.S. Pacific Command, called the PLAN's modernization "aggressive," and that it raised concerns in the region.[63] On 15 July 2009, Senator Jim Webb of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee declared that only the "United States has both the stature and the national power to confront the obvious imbalance of power that China brings" to situations such as the claims to the Spratly and Paracel islands.[64]
Ronald O'Rourke of the Congressional Research Service wrote in 2009 that the PLAN "continues to exhibit limitations or weaknesses in several areas, including capabilities for sustained operations by larger formations in distant waters, joint operations with other parts of China’s military, C4ISR systems, anti-air warfare (AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), MCM, and a dependence on foreign suppliers for certain key ship components."[65]
In 1998 China purchased the discarded Ukrainian ship Varyag and began retrofitting it for naval deployment. On 25 September 2012, the People's Liberation Army Navy took delivery of China's first aircraft carrier, the CNS Liaoning.[66] The 60,000-ton ship can accommodate 33 fixed wing aircraft. It is widely speculated that these aircraft will be the J15 fighter (the Chinese version of Russia's SU-33).[67]
In September 2015, satellite images showed that China may have started constructing its first indigenous Type 002 aircraft carrier. At the time, the layout suggested to be displacement of 50,000 tons and a hull to have a length of about 240m and a beam of about 35m.[68] On 28 April 2017 the carrier was launched as the CNS Shandong.
Japan has raised concerns about the PLAN's growing capability and the lack of transparency as its naval strength keeps on expanding.[69] China has entered into service the world's first anti-ship ballistic missile called DF-21D. The potential threat from the DF-21D against U.S. aircraft carriers has reportedly caused major changes in U.S. strategy.[70]
On 28 June 2017 China launched the first of a new type of large destroyer, the Type 055 destroyer. The destroyer – the CNS Nanchang – is, with its length of 180 m and at over 12,000 tons fully loaded, the second largest destroyer class in the world after the American Zumwalt-class destroyer.[71] Eight destroyers to this design, rated by the United States Navy as "cruisers", have been built or are under construction.
Attempts have been made to compare PLAN's firepower with the USN. A 2019 review found the USN fleet was able to deploy more "battle force missiles" (BFMs), defined as those missiles that contribute to battle missions, than the PLAN: USN fleet could deploy 11,000 BFMs, compared to 5250 BFMs for PLAN and 3326 BFMs for the Russian Navy.[73] A 2016 review concluded that PLAN's missiles had higher firepower than the USN's, measured in terms of "strike-mile", the ability to delivery a warhead using anti-ship missiles (ASM) across a given distance.[74] The review used the following formula for every ASM the navy had in its inventory:
Total strike-miles=(Range of an ASM × Warhead weight of an ASM) × Number of such missiles carried by a warship × Number of such warships in the navy
It concluded the total firepower of the PLAN was 77 million strike-miles compared to 17 million strike-miles of the USN.[74]
The Spratly Islands dispute is a territorial dispute over the ownership of the Spratly Islands, a group of islands located in the South China Sea. States staking claims to various islands are Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and People's Republic of China. All except Brunei occupy some of the islands in dispute. The People's Republic of China conducted naval patrols in the Spratly Islands and established a permanent base.
On 14 March 1988, Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces clashed over Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands, which involved three PLAN frigates.[citation needed]
In February 2011, the Chinese frigate Dongguan fired three shots at Philippine fishing boats in the vicinity of Jackson Atoll[zh]. The shots were fired after the frigate instructed the fishing boats to leave, and one of those boats experienced trouble removing its anchor.[75][76] In May 2011, the Chinese patrol boats attacked and cut the cable of Vietnamese oil exploration ships near Spratly islands. The incidence sparked several anti-China protests in Vietnam. In June 2011, the Chinese navy conducted three days of exercises, including live fire drills, in the disputed waters. This was widely seen as a warning to Vietnam, which had also conducted live fire drills near the Spratly Islands. Chinese patrol boats fired repeated rounds at a target on an apparently uninhabited island, as twin fighter jets streaked in tandem overhead. 14 vessels participated in the maneuvers, staging antisubmarine and beach landing drills aimed at "defending atolls and protecting sea lanes."[citation needed]
In May 2013, the Chinese navy's three operational fleets deployed together for the first time since 2010. This combined naval maneuvers in the South China Sea coincided with the ongoing Spratly Islands dispute between China and the Philippines as well as deployment of the U.S. Navy's Carrier Strike Group Eleven to the U.S. Seventh Fleet.[citation needed]
Senkaku Islands dispute
The Senkaku Islands dispute concerns a territorial dispute over a group of uninhabited islands known as the Diaoyu Islands in China, the Senkaku Islands in Japan,[77] and Tiaoyutai Islands in Taiwan.[78] Aside from a 1945 to 1972 period of administration by the United States, the archipelago has been controlled by Japan since 1895.[79] The People's Republic of China disputed the proposed U.S. handover of authority to Japan in 1971[80] and has asserted its claims to the islands since that time.[81] Taiwan also has claimed these islands. The disputed territory is close to key shipping lanes and rich fishing grounds, and it may have major oil reserves in the area.[82]
On some occasions, ships and planes from various mainland Chinese and Taiwanese government and military agencies have entered the disputed area. In addition to the cases where they escorted fishing and activist vessels, there have been other incursions. In an eight-month period in 2012, over forty maritime incursions and 160 aerial incursions occurred.[83] For example, in July 2012, three Chinese patrol vessels entered the disputed waters around the islands.[84]
Military escalation continued in 2013. In February, Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera claimed that a Chinese frigate had locked weapons-targeting radar onto a Japanese destroyer and helicopter on two occasions in January.[85][86] A Chinese Jiangwei II class frigate and a Japanese destroyer were three kilometers apart, and the crew of the latter vessel went to battle stations.[87] The Chinese state media responded that their frigates had been engaged in routine training at the time.[88]
In May 2013, a flotilla of Chinese warships from its North Sea Fleet deployed from Qingdao for training exercises western North Pacific Ocean.[89] It is not known if this deployment is related to the ongoing islands dispute between China and Japan.[citation needed]
On 22 July 2011, following its Vietnam port-call, the Indian amphibious assault vessel Airavat was reportedly contacted 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast in the disputed South China Sea by a party identifying itself as the Chinese Navy and stating that the Indian warship was entering Chinese waters.[90][91] According to a spokesperson for the Indian Navy, since there were no Chinese ships or aircraft were visible, the INS Airavat proceeded on her onward journey as scheduled. The Indian Navy further clarified that "[t]here was no confrontation involving the INS Airavat. India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in accordance with accepted principles of international law. These principles should be respected by all."[90]
On 11 July 2012, the Chinese frigate Dongguan ran aground on Hasa Hasa Shoal (pictured) located 60 nmi west of Rizal, which was within the Philippines' 200 nmi-EEZ.[92] By 15 July, the frigate had been refloated and was returning to port with no injuries and only minor damage.[93] During this incident, the 2012 ASEAN summit took place in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, amid the rising regional tensions.[93]
2008 anti-piracy operations
On 18 December 2008, Chinese authorities deployed People's Liberation Army Navy vessels to escort Chinese shipping in the Gulf of Aden.[94] This deployment came after a series of attacks and attempted hijackings on Chinese vessels by Somali pirates. Reports suggest two destroyers (Type 052C 171 Haikou and Type 052B 169 Wuhan) and a supply ship are the ones being used.[citation needed]
This move was welcomed by the international community as the warships complement a multinational fleet already operating along the coast of Africa. Since this operation PLAN has sought the leadership of the ‘Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE)' body, which would require an increase in the number of ships contributing to the anti-piracy fleet. This is the first time Chinese warships have deployed outside the Asia-Pacific region for a military operation since Zheng He's expeditions in the 15th century.[citation needed]
Since then more than 30 People's Liberation Army Navy ships has deployed to the Gulf of Aden in 18 Escort Task Groups.
Escort Task Group/Task Group
Sailors (including Navy and Marine or special forces personnel)
In the lead-up to the 2011 Libyan Civil War, the Xuzhou (530) was deployed from anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden to help evacuate Chinese nationals from Libya.[129]
Yemen conflict
During the Yemen conflict, in 2015, the Chinese Navy diverted frigates carrying out anti-piracy operations in Somalia to evacuate at least 600 Chinese and 225 foreign citizens working in Yemen. Among the non-Chinese evacuees were 176 Pakistani citizens, with smaller numbers from other countries, such as Ethiopia, Singapore, the UK, Italy, and Germany. Despite the evacuations, the Chinese embassy in Yemen continued to operate.[130]
In July 2019, The Wall Street Journal revealed that US officials had seen a secret agreement that allowed the People's Liberation Army Navy exclusive access to about one-third of the Ream naval base for up to 30 years.[131][132] It would give Beijing a new southern flank on the South China Sea, and only its second overseas naval foothold after a base in Djibouti. Such hosting of foreign armed forces would be against the Cambodian constitution as well as the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements that ended the Cambodian Civil War.[133][134][135] The existence of the agreement was denied by Cambodian authorities who called it "fake news".[133] But in 2021, the Cambodian defence minister admitted that China was helping build infrastructure at Ream and continued to maintain that there were no strings attached.[136]
Equipment
PLANS Xiamen (DDG-154) 20180420
China's navy is the second-largest in the world in terms of tonnage.[30]:263
As of 2018, the Chinese navy operates over 496 combat ships and 232 various auxiliary vessels and counts 255,000 seamen in its ranks. The Chinese Navy also employ more than 710 naval aircraft, including fighters, bombers and electronic warfare aircraft. China has large amount of artillery, torpedoes, and missiles included in their combat assets.[citation needed]
As of 2024[update] China has the capacity to build more ships in one month than the United States builds in a year, with commercial vessels being built alongside warships and constructed to include military specifications.[137] Experts have compared the country's grip on the shipping industry as similar to Japan's in the mid-1900s.[138]
As of 2024, the navy has an overall battle force of more than 350 ships and submarines.[30]:263–264
All ships and submarines currently in commission with the People's Liberation Army Navy were built in China, with the exception of the Sovremenny-class destroyers, Kilo-class submarines and the aircraft carrier Liaoning. Those vessels were either imported from or originated in Russia.
China employs a wide range of Navy combatants including aircraft carriers, amphibious warfare ships, and destroyers. The Chinese Navy is undergoing modernization rapidly with nearly half of Chinese Navy combat ships built after 2010. China's state-owned shipyards have built 83 ships in just eight years with unprecedented speed. China has its own independent maritime missile defense and naval combat system similar to US Aegis.[139]
China operates carrier-based fighter aircraft to secure land, air and sea targets. The Chinese Navy also operates a wide range of helicopters for battlefield logistics, reconnaissance, patrol and medical evacuation.
In early February 2018, pictures of what is claimed to be a Chinese railgun were published online. In pictures the gun is shown mounted on the bow of a Type 072III-class landing shipHaiyangshan. Media is suggesting that the system is or soon will be ready for testing.[142][143] In March 2018, it was reported that China had confirmed that it had begun testing its electromagnetic rail gun at sea.[144][145]
Geographic boundaries of the First and Second Island Chains
The PLAN's ambitions include operating out to the first and second island chains, as far as the South Pacific near Australia, and spanning to the Aleutian islands, and operations extending to the Straits of Malacca near the Indian Ocean.[146] The future PLAN fleet will be composed of a balance of combatant assets aimed at maximising the PLAN's fighting effectiveness.[147]
On the high end, there would be modern destroyers, such as stealth guided missile destroyers equipped with long-range air defense missiles and anti-submarine capabilities (Type 055). There would be modern destroyers equipped with long-range air defense missiles (Type 052B, Type 052C, Type 052D and Type 051C, and destroyers armed with supersonic anti-ship missiles (Sovremenny class).[147]
There would be advanced nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines (Type 093, Type 095, Type 094, Type 096), advanced conventional attack submarines (Kilo and Yuan classes), aircraft carriers (Type 001, Type 002 and Type 003), and helicopter carriers (Type 075) and large amphibious warfare vessels (Type 071) capable of mobilizing troops at long distances.[147]
On the medium and low end, there would be more economical multi-role capable frigates and destroyers (Luhu, Jiangwei II and Jiangkai classes), corvettes (Jiangdao class), fast littoral missile attack craft (Houjian, Houxin and Houbei classes), various landing ships and light craft, and conventionally powered coastal patrol submarines (Song class). The obsolete combat ships (based on 1960s designs) will be phased out in the coming decades as more modern designs enter full production.[147]
Between 2001 and 2006 there was a rapid building and acquisition program,[146] a trend which continued. There were more than a dozen new classes of ships built in those five years,[146] totaling some 60 brand new ships (including landing ships and auxiliaries).[146] Simultaneously, dozens of other ships have been either phased out of service or refitted with new equipment.
Submarines play a significant role in the development of the PLAN's future fleet. This is made evident by the construction of a new type of nuclear ballistic missile submarine, the Type 094 and the Type 093 nuclear attack submarine. This will provide the PLAN with a more modern response for the need of a seaborne nuclear deterrent. The new submarines will also be capable of performing conventional strike and other special warfare requirements.[citation needed]
Assert or defend China's claims in maritime territorial disputes and China's interpretation of international laws relating to freedom of navigation in exclusive economic zones (an interpretation at odds with the U.S. interpretation);
Protect China's sea lines of communications to the Persian Gulf, on which China relies for some of its energy imports.[148]
Following the construction of its two smaller aircraft carriers, China began building the improved Type 003 carrier, which is expected to displace 83,000 tonnes and enable CATOBAR operations by 2022.[149]
The PLAN may also operate from Gwadar or Seychelles for anti-piracy missions and to protect vital trade routes which may endanger China's energy security in the case of a conflict. In 2016, China established her first overseas naval base in Djibouti, which provided necessary support for Chinese fleet and troops.
The Pentagon's name for the Chinese sea based militia is the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia. Their future role is unknown, but war planners have been aware of their history and potential use in naval conflict.[151]
As of 2024[update], China's shipbuilding workforce services over 7,000 vessels and is estimated to be nearly five times that of the United States.[137]
A cruiser is a type of warship. Modern cruisers are generally the largest ships in a fleet after aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships, and can usually perform several operational roles from search-and-destroy to ocean escort to sea denial.
A carrier battle group (CVBG) is a naval fleet consisting of an aircraft carrier capital ship and its large number of escorts, together defining the group. The CV in CVBG is the United States Navy hull classification code for an aircraft carrier.
The Type 052C destroyer is a class of guided-missile destroyers in the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy Surface Force (PLAN). The Type 052C introduced both fixed active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and vertically launched surface-to-air missiles into PLAN service, making it the first Chinese warship with area air defence capability.
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, abbreviated JMSDF, also simply known as the Japanese Navy, is the maritime warfare branch of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, tasked with the naval defense of Japan. The JMSDF was formed following the dissolution of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) after World War II. The JMSDF has a fleet of 154 ships, 346 aircraft and 50,800 personnel.
The People's Liberation Army Navy Surface Force is the surface warfare branch of China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), consisting of all surface vessels in operational service with the PLAN. The PLAN Surface Force operates 661 ships organized into three fleets: the North Sea Fleet, the East Sea Fleet and the South Sea Fleet.
The People's Liberation Army Navy Submarine Force (PLANSF) is the submarine service of the People's Liberation Army Navy. It consists of all types of submarines in operational service organized into three fleets: the North Sea Fleet, the East Sea Fleet, and the South Sea Fleet. Submarines have long been one of the three focuses of the People's Liberation Army Navy, and when the decision was made in late 2006 to concentrate on building other principal surface combatants to strengthen the air defense and to further delay the construction of aircraft carriers due to insufficient air cover, submarines will continue to play the lead dominant role in the assault force for the PLAN. Currently, PLANSF operates a fleet of 66 submarines which include nuclear as well as conventional submarines.
Lanzhou is the lead ship of the Chinese Type 052C destroyers. The ship was laid down in late 2002, launched on 29 April 2003, and commissioned in July 2004. The destroyer is active with the People's Republic of China's South Sea Fleet.
Haikou is a Chinese Type 052C destroyer. The ship was laid down in 2002, launched on 30 October 2003, and commissioned in late 2005. The destroyer is active with the People's Republic of China's South Sea Fleet.
The South China Sea raid was an operation conducted by the United States Third Fleet between 10 and 20 January 1945 during the Pacific War of World War II. The raid was undertaken to support the liberation of Luzon in the Philippines, and targeted Japanese warships, supply convoys and aircraft in the region.
Changchun (150) is a Type 052C destroyer of the People's Liberation Army Navy. She was commissioned on 31 January 2013.
Jinan (152) is a Type 052C destroyer of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). She was commissioned on 22 December 2014.
Guangzhou (168) is the lead ship of Type 052B destroyer of the People's Liberation Army Navy. She was commissioned on 15 July 2004.
Wuhan (169) is the second ship of Type 052B destroyer of the People's Liberation Army Navy. She was commissioned in December 2004.
Ma'anshan (525) is a Type 054 frigate of the People's Liberation Army Navy. She was commissioned on 18 February 2005.
Zhoushan (529) is a Type 054A frigate of the People's Liberation Army Navy. She was commissioned on 3 January 2008.
Qiandaohu (886) is the lead ship of the Type 903 replenishment ship of the People's Liberation Army Navy.
Huangshan (570) is a Type 054A frigate of the People's Liberation Army Navy. She was commissioned on 13 May 2008.
Yuncheng (571) is a Type 054A frigate of the People's Liberation Army Navy. She was commissioned in December 2009.
Hengshui (572) is a Type 054A frigate of the People's Liberation Army Navy. She was commissioned on 26 December 2012.
References
Citations
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1 2 Lin, Jian; Li, Hao (17 September 2019). Liu, Qiuli (ed.). "第三十二、三十三批护航编队在亚丁湾会合"[32nd and 33rd Escort Task Group Rendezvoused at Golf of Aden]. People's Liberation Army Daily. Retrieved 22 September 2019.
↑ Peter Dobbie and Al Jazeera reporters. (1 May 2021). "Video: How China came to dominate the South China Sea". Al Jazeera English website Retrieved 2 May 2021.
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