The philosophy of medicine is a branch of philosophy that explores issues in theory, research, and practice within the field of health sciences, [1] more specifically in topics of epistemology, metaphysics, and medical ethics, which overlaps with bioethics. Philosophy and medicine, both beginning with the ancient Greeks, have had a long history of overlapping ideas. It was not until the nineteenth century that the professionalization of the philosophy of medicine came to be. [2] In the late twentieth century, debates among philosophers and physicians ensued of whether the philosophy of medicine should be considered a field of its own from either philosophy or medicine. [3] A consensus has since been reached that it is in fact a distinct discipline with its set of separate problems and questions. In recent years there have been a variety of university courses, [4] [5] journals, [6] [7] [8] [9] books, [10] [11] [12] [13] textbooks [14] and conferences dedicated to the philosophy of medicine.
Self-described opponents of historical [[eugenics]] first and foremost, [lower-alpha 1] are known to insist on a particularly stringent treatment-enhancement distinction (sometimes also called divide or gap). This distinction, naturally, "draws a line between services or interventions meant to prevent or cure (or otherwise ameliorate) conditions that we view as diseases or disabilities and interventions that improve a condition that we view as a normal function or feature of members of our species". [18] Two proponents of the enhancement modality, in turn, define the supposed schism as follows:
An intervention that is aimed at correcting a specific pathology or defect of a cognitive subsystem may be characterized as therapeutic. An enhancement is an intervention that improves a subsystem in some way other than repairing something that is broken or remedying a specific dysfunction. [19]
And yet the adequacy of such a dichotomy is highly contested in modern scholarly bioethics. One simple counterargument is that it has already long been ignored throughout various contemporary fields of scientific study and practice such as "preventive medicine, palliative care, obstetrics, sports medicine, plastic surgery, contraceptive devices, fertility treatments, cosmetic dental procedures, and much else". [20] This is one way of conducting ostensively what has been coined the "moral continuum argument" by some of its critics. [21]
Others posit on more theoretical grounds that the notion of therapy is connected to presumptuous concepts such as "normality" or "health," which have been called "fishy", [22] and that, vice versa, "disease" is impossible to ever conclusively define, [23] i.e. a vague notion, and so much so that some consider it practically useless. [24] And yet others focus on the boundary between these therapeutic categories and related ones from discourses of enhancement, taking it to be, at best, "fuzzy" [25] or relative. [26] [lower-alpha 2]
Granting these assertions' validity, one may, once more, call this first and foremost a moral collapse of the therapy–enhancement distinction. Without such a clear divide, restorative medicine and exploratory eugenics also invariably become harder to distinguish; [lower-alpha 3] and accordingly might one explain the matter's relevance to ongoing transhumanist discourse.
Epistemology is a branch in the philosophy of medicine that is concerned with knowledge. [29] The common questions asked are "What is knowing or knowledge?", "How do we know what we know?", "What is it we know when we claim we know". [30] [ page needed ] Philosophers differentiate theories of knowledge into three groups: knowledge of acquaintance, competence knowledge, and propositional knowledge. The knowledge of acquaintance is to be familiar with an object or event. For example, a surgeon would need to know the human anatomy before operating on the body. Competence of knowledge is to use known knowledge to perform a task skillfully. The surgeon must know how to perform the surgical procedure before executing it. Propositional knowledge is explanatory; it pertains to certain truths or facts. If the surgeon is performing an operation on the heart they must know the physiological function of the heart before the surgery is performed. [31]
Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that examines the fundamental nature of reality including the relationship between mind and matter, substance and attribute, and possibility and actuality. [32] The common questions asked within this branch are "What causes health?" and "What causes disease?". There is a growing interest in the metaphysics of medicine, particularly the idea of causality. [33] Philosophers of medicine might not only be interested in how medical knowledge is generated, but also in the nature of such phenomena. Causation is of interest because the purpose of much medical research is to establish causal relationships, e.g. what causes disease, or what causes people to get better. [34] The scientific processes used to generate causal knowledge give clues to the metaphysics of causation. For example, the defining feature of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) is that they are thought to establish causal relationships, whereas observational studies do not. [35] In this instance, causation can be considered as something which is counterfactually dependent, i.e. the way RCTs differ from observational studies is that they have a comparison group in which the intervention of interest is not given.
There is a large body of work on the ontology of biomedicine, including ontological studies of all aspects of medicine. Ontologies of specific interest to the philosophy of medicine include, for instance: (1) the ontological revolution which made modern science, in general, possible, (2) Cartesian dualism which makes modern medicine, in particular, possible, (3) the monogenetic conception of disease which has informed clinical medicine for a century or so [36] [ page needed ] and also the chemical and biological pathways which underlie the phenomena of health and disease in all organisms, (4) the conceptualization of entities such as 'placebos' and 'placebo effects'.
The Ontology of General Medical Science (OGMS) is an ontology of entities involved in a clinical encounter. It includes a set of logical definitions of very general terms that are used across medical disciplines, including disease, disorder, disease course, diagnosis, and patient. The scope of OGMS is restricted to humans, but many terms can be applied also to other organisms. OGMS provides a formal theory of disease that is elaborated further by specific disease ontologies which extend it, including the infectious disease ontology (IDO) and the mental disease ontology. [37] [ copyright violation? ]
René Descartes made ontological space for modern medicine by separating body from mind — while mind is superior to body as it constitutes the uniqueness of the human soul (the province of theology), body is inferior to mind as it is mere matter. Medicine simply investigated(s) the body as machine. While Cartesian dualism dominates clinical approaches to medical research and treatment, the legitimacy of the split between mind and body has been consistently challenged from a variety of perspectives. [38] [ page needed ] [39] [ page needed ]
Modern medicine, unlike Galenic medicine (which dealt with humours), is mechanistic. For example, when a bit of solid matter such as a poison or a worm impacts upon another bit of matter (when it enters the human body), this sets off a chain of motions, giving rise to disease, just as when one billiard ball knocks into another billiard, the latter is set in motion. When the human body is exposed to the solid pathogen, it falls ill, giving rise to the notion of a disease entity. Later in the history of modern medicine, particularly by the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in nosology (which is the classification of disease), the most powerful is the etiogically-defined approach as can be found in the monogenic conception of disease which covers not only infectious agents (bacteria, viruses. fungi, parasites, prions) but also genetics and poisons. While clinical medicine is concerned with the ill health of the individual patient when s/he has succumbed to disease, epidemiology is concerned with the pattern of diseases in populations in order to study their causes as well as how to manage, control, ameliorate the problems identified under study.
Clinical medicine, as presented above, is part of a reductionist approach to disease, based ultimately on Cartesian dualism which says that the proper study of medicine is an investigation of the body when the latter is viewed as machine. A machine can exhaustively be broken down into its component parts and their respective functions; in the same way, the dominant approach to clinical research and treatment assumes the human body can be broken down or analysed in terms of its component parts and their respective functions, such as its internal and external organs, the tissues and bones of which they are composed, the cells which make up the tissues, the molecules which constitute the cell, down to the atoms (the DNA sequences) which make up the cell in the body.
Placebos and placebo effects have generated years of conceptual confusion about what kinds of thing they are. [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] Example definitions of a placebo may refer to their inertness or pharmacological inactivity in relation to the condition they are given for. Similarly, example definitions of placebo effects may refer to the subjectivity or the non-specificity of those effects. [45] [ page needed ] These types of definitions suggest the view that when given a placebo treatment, one may merely feel better while not in fact being better.
The distinctions at work in these types of definition: between active and inactive or inert, specific and non-specific, and subjective and objective, have been problematized. [40] [46] [47] For instance, if placebos are inactive or inert, then how do they cause placebo effects? More generally, there is scientific evidence from research investigating placebo phenomena which demonstrates that, for certain conditions (such as pain), placebo effects can be both specific and objective in the conventional sense. [48] [ page needed ]
Other attempts to define placebos and placebo effects therefore shift focus away from these distinctions and onto therapeutic effects that are caused or modulated by the context in which a treatment is delivered and the meaning that different aspects of treatments have for patients. [49] [50]
The problems arising over the definition of placebos and their effects may be said to be the heritage of Cartesian dualism, under which mind and matter are understood as two different substances. Furthermore, Cartesian dualism endorses a form of materialism which permits matter to have an effect on matter, or even matter to work on mind (epiphenomenalism, which is the raison d'être of psychopharmacology), but does not permit mind to have any effect on matter. This then means that medical science has difficulty in entertaining even the possibility that placebo effects are real, exist and may be objectively determinable and finding such reports difficult if not impossible to comprehend and/or accept. Yet such reports which appear to be genuine pose a threat to Cartesian dualism which provides the ontological underpinning for biomedicine especially in its clinical domain. [36]
Evidence-based medicine (EBM) is underpinned by the study of the ways in which knowledge can be gained regarding key clinical questions, such as the effects of medical interventions, the accuracy of diagnostic tests, and the predictive value of prognostic markers. EBM provides an account of how medical knowledge can be applied to clinical care. EBM not only provides clinicians with a strategy for best practice, but also, underlying that, a philosophy of evidence.
Interest in the EBM philosophy of evidence has led philosophers to consider the nature of EBM's hierarchy of evidence, which rank different kinds of research methodology, ostensibly, by the relative evidential weight they provide. While Jeremy Howick provides a critical defense of EBM, [11] most philosophers have raised questions about its legitimacy. Key questions asked about hierarchies of evidence concern the legitimacy of ranking methodologies in terms of the strength of support that they supply; [51] [52] how instances of particular methods may move up and down a hierarchy; [53] as well as how different types of evidence, from different levels in the hierarchies, should be combined. Critics of medical research have raised numerous questions regarding the unreliability of medical research. [54] [ page needed ]
Additionally the epistemological virtues of particular aspects of clinical trial methodology have been examined, mostly notably the special place that is given to randomisation, [55] [56] [57] the notion of a blind experiment and the use of a placebo control.
Some forms of assistive reproduction previously seen as enhancement are now considered to be treatments. This vagueness in therapy is mirrored in the classification of interventions. Vaccination can be seen as a form of prevention, but also as an enhancement of the immune system. To distinguish between laser eye surgery and contact lenses or glasses appears artificial. [27]
Because a flexible definition of health relates to a flexible definition of the disabled, any attempt to prohibit access to enhancement technology can be challenged as a violation of disability rights. Presented this way, disability rights are the gateway for the application of transhumanism. Any attempt to identify a moral or natural hazard associated with enhancement technology must also include some limitation of disability rights, which seems to go against the entire direction of human rights legislation over the last century. [28]
Casuistry is a process of reasoning that seeks to resolve moral problems by extracting or extending abstract rules from a particular case, and reapplying those rules to new instances. This method occurs in applied ethics and jurisprudence. The term is also used pejoratively to criticise the use of clever but unsound reasoning, especially in relation to ethical questions. It has been defined as follows:
Study of cases of conscience and a method of solving conflicts of obligations by applying general principles of ethics, religion, and moral theology to particular and concrete cases of human conduct. This frequently demands an extensive knowledge of natural law and equity, civil law, ecclesiastical precepts, and an exceptional skill in interpreting these various norms of conduct....
Evidence-based medicine (EBM) is "the conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients. ... [It] means integrating individual clinical expertise with the best available external clinical evidence from systematic research." The aim of EBM is to integrate the experience of the clinician, the values of the patient, and the best available scientific information to guide decision-making about clinical management. The term was originally used to describe an approach to teaching the practice of medicine and improving decisions by individual physicians about individual patients.
A placebo can be roughly defined as a sham medical treatment. Common placebos include inert tablets, inert injections, sham surgery, and other procedures.
Bioethics is both a field of study and professional practice, interested in ethical issues related to health, including those emerging from advances in biology, medicine, and technologies. It proposes the discussion about moral discernment in society and it is often related to medical policy and practice, but also to broader questions as environment, well-being and public health. Bioethics is concerned with the ethical questions that arise in the relationships among life sciences, biotechnology, medicine, politics, law, theology and philosophy. It includes the study of values relating to primary care, other branches of medicine, ethical education in science, animal, and environmental ethics, and public health.
Medical ethics is an applied branch of ethics which analyzes the practice of clinical medicine and related scientific research. Medical ethics is based on a set of values that professionals can refer to in the case of any confusion or conflict. These values include the respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice. Such tenets may allow doctors, care providers, and families to create a treatment plan and work towards the same common goal. These four values are not ranked in order of importance or relevance and they all encompass values pertaining to medical ethics. However, a conflict may arise leading to the need for hierarchy in an ethical system, such that some moral elements overrule others with the purpose of applying the best moral judgement to a difficult medical situation. Medical ethics is particularly relevant in decisions regarding involuntary treatment and involuntary commitment.
Applied philosophy is a branch of philosophy that studies philosophical problems of practical concern. The topic covers a broad spectrum of issues in environment, medicine, science, engineering, policy, law, politics, economics and education. The term was popularised in 1982 by the founding of the Society for Applied Philosophy by Brenda Almond, and its subsequent journal publication Journal of Applied Philosophy edited by Elizabeth Brake. Methods of applied philosophy are similar to other philosophical methods including questioning, dialectic, critical discussion, rational argument, systematic presentation, thought experiments and logical argumentation.
In philosophy and neuroscience, neuroethics is the study of both the ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience of ethics. The ethics of neuroscience concerns the ethical, legal, and social impact of neuroscience, including the ways in which neurotechnology can be used to predict or alter human behavior and "the implications of our mechanistic understanding of brain function for society... integrating neuroscientific knowledge with ethical and social thought".
Arthur L. Caplan is an American ethicist and professor of bioethics at New York University Grossman School of Medicine.
Human genetic enhancement or human genetic engineering refers to human enhancement by means of a genetic modification. This could be done in order to cure diseases, prevent the possibility of getting a particular disease, to improve athlete performance in sporting events, or to change physical appearance, metabolism, and even improve physical capabilities and mental faculties such as memory and intelligence. These genetic enhancements may or may not be done in such a way that the change is heritable.
New eugenics, also known as liberal eugenics, advocates enhancing human characteristics and capacities through the use of reproductive technology and human genetic engineering. Those who advocate new eugenics generally think selecting or altering embryos should be left to the preferences of parents, rather than forbidden. "New" eugenics purports to distinguish itself from the forms of eugenics practiced and advocated in the 20th century, which fell into disrepute after World War II.
Medical humanities is an interdisciplinary field of medicine which includes the humanities, social science and the arts and their application to medical education and practice.
Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh was a German analytic philosopher of medicine of Iranian descent. He was the first ever professor of philosophy of medicine at a German university and has made significant contributions to the philosophy, methodology, and logic of medicine since 1970.
The Declaration of Helsinki is a set of ethical principles regarding human experimentation developed originally in 1964 for the medical community by the World Medical Association (WMA). It is widely regarded as the cornerstone document on human research ethics.
Julian Savulescu is an Australian philosopher and bioethicist. He is Chen Su Lan Centennial Professor in Medical Ethics and director of the Centre for Biomedical Ethics at National University of Singapore. He was previously Uehiro Chair in Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford, Fellow of St Cross College, Oxford, director of the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, and co-director of the Wellcome Centre for Ethics and Humanities. He is visiting professorial fellow in Biomedical Ethics at the Murdoch Children's Research Institute in Australia, and distinguished visiting professor in law at Melbourne University since 2017. He directs the Biomedical Ethics Research Group and is a member of the Centre for Ethics of Pediatric Genomics in Australia. He is a former editor and current board member of the Journal of Medical Ethics, which is ranked as the No.2 journal in bioethics worldwide by Google Scholar Metrics, as of 2022. In addition to his background in applied ethics and philosophy, he also has a background in medicine and neuroscience and completed his MBBS (Hons) and BMedSc at Monash University, graduating top of his class with 18 of 19 final year prizes in Medicine. He edits the Oxford University Press book series, the Uehiro Series in Practical Ethics.
A hierarchy of evidence, comprising levels of evidence (LOEs), that is, evidence levels (ELs), is a heuristic used to rank the relative strength of results obtained from experimental research, especially medical research. There is broad agreement on the relative strength of large-scale, epidemiological studies. More than 80 different hierarchies have been proposed for assessing medical evidence. The design of the study and the endpoints measured affect the strength of the evidence. In clinical research, the best evidence for treatment efficacy is mainly from meta-analyses of randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Systematic reviews of completed, high-quality randomized controlled trials – such as those published by the Cochrane Collaboration – rank the same as systematic review of completed high-quality observational studies in regard to the study of side effects. Evidence hierarchies are often applied in evidence-based practices and are integral to evidence-based medicine (EBM).
Henry Knowles Beecher was a pioneering American anesthesiologist, medical ethicist, and investigator of the placebo effect at Harvard Medical School.
Donal O'Mathuna is an associate professor within the College of Nursing at The Ohio State University.
Françoise Elvina BaylisFISC is a Canadian bioethicist whose work is at the intersection of applied ethics, health policy, and practice. The focus of her research is on issues of women's health and assisted reproductive technologies, but her research and publication record also extend to such topics as research involving humans, gene editing, novel genetic technologies, public health, the role of bioethics consultants, and neuroethics. Baylis' interest in the impact of bioethics on health and public policy as well as her commitment to citizen engagement]and participatory democracy sees her engage with print, radio, television, and other online publications.
Franklin G. Miller is an American bioethicist and senior faculty member at the National Institutes of Health (NIH).
Jeremy Howick is a Canadian-born, British residing clinical epidemiologist and philosopher of science. He researches evidence-based medicine, clinical empathy and the philosophy of medicine, including the use of placebos in clinical practice and clinical trials. He is the author of over 100 peer-reviewed papers, as well as two books, The Philosophy of Evidence-Based Medicine in 2011, and Doctor You in 2017. In 2016, he received the Dawkins & Strutt grant from the British Medical Association to study pain treatment. He publishes in Philosophy of Medicine and medical journals. He is a member of the Sigma Xi research honours society.