China–Philippines relations

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China-Philippines relations
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Chinese Embassy, Makati Philippine Embassy, Beijing
Envoy
Ambassador Huang Xilian Ambassador Jaime FlorCruz

Bilateral relations between China and the Philippines had significantly progressed since the 1990s, peaking during the Philippine presidencies of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Rodrigo Duterte. However, relations deteriorated due to territorial disputes in the South China Sea, particularly since the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff; in 2013, the Philippine government under President Benigno Aquino III in 2013 filed an arbitration case against China over China's maritime claims. The policy of current Philippine president Bongbong Marcos aims for distancing relations between the Philippines and China in favor of the country's relationship with the United States. The current policy of the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party aims for greater influence over the Philippines, and the region in general, while combating American influence.

Contents

During Rodrigo Duterte's presidency, the Philippines improved its relations and cooperation with China on various issues, developing a stronger and stable ties with the country, as well as a successful Code of conduct with China and the rest of ASEAN. [1] [2] China is the Philippines' top trading partner. [3] However, average trust view of Filipinos towards China is negative. [4] Relations deteriorated during the presidency of Bongbong Marcos due to increasing tensions over the South China sea dispute, [5] culminating in the Philippines' withdrawal from the Belt and Road initiative in 2023. [6]

Political relations

Bilateral meeting between the People's Republic of China and the Philippines at the East Hall, Great Hall of the People in 2011. China PH bilateral meeting.jpg
Bilateral meeting between the People's Republic of China and the Philippines at the East Hall, Great Hall of the People in 2011.

Imperial China and Precolonial Philippine States

Before Spain colonized the Philippines, Imperial China acknowledged the existence of several Precolonial Philippine kingdoms and the Chinese Emperor received embassies from Filipino Datus, Rajahs, and Sultans. [7]

Establishment of official diplomatic relations

After the Philippines became independent in 1946, it established diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government of China and continued on after it lost the mainland to the Chinese Communist Party which declared the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 that forced the Republic of China to relocate on the island of Taiwan, formerly a Japanese colony that the ROC received in 1945. During the Cold War, the two countries were part of the anti-communist camp that view the Chinese Communists as a security threat. [8] It began considering normalizing relations with the People's Republic at the start of the 1970s and the Philippines recognized the PRC on 9 June 1975, with the signing of the Joint Communiqué by leaders of the two countries. [9]

Major agreements

In 2009, the Philippines and China signed the Joint Action Plan for Strategic Cooperation, a five-year agreement to increase cooperation in all areas. [10] : 158 

In 2016, Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte and Chinese president Xi Jinping created the biannual Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea, a process allowing the two nations to peacefully manage disputes and strengthen their relations. [11] [12]

On 16 November 2017, the Philippines and China signed fourteen deals on a variety of issues, including transportation and military aid, worth approximately US$21.6 million. [10] : 169 

In July 2019, UN ambassadors of 37 countries, including Philippines, signed a joint letter to the United Nations Human Rights Council defending China's policies of persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. [13] The Philippines was one of 16 countries that defended China's policies in Xinjiang in 2019 but did not do so in 2020. [14]

Belt and Road Initiative

During the respective visits of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte to the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping's visit to the Philippines, the two agreed to a significant increase of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the People's Republic of China as part of Xi's Belt and Road Initiative. [15] However, concerns were soon raised over the terms and conditions of the ODA funding and the lack of transparency over the details of the details. [16] As of 2018, the delivery of that aid had also stalled, with few firm commitments put in place by the Xi administration. [15] [16] Despite this, the Duterte administration continued to make the relationship a major part of its economic agenda. [16] During the Marcos Jr. administration in 2023, the Philippines withdrew from the Belt and Road initiative. [6]

Trade and commerce

Since Song dynasty times in China and precolonial times in the Philippines, evidence of trade contact can already be observed in the chinese ceramics found in archaeological sites, like in Santa Ana, Manila. [17] During Ming and Qing dynasty times in China and Spanish colonial era in the Philippines, the Philippines through Manila has had centuries-long trade contacts with cities such as Quanzhou, Zhangzhou, Xiamen in Fujian province and Guangzhou and Macau in Guangdong province, especially as part of the Maritime Silk Road trade, then connected with the Manila-Acapulco Galleon Trade that ensured the export of Chinese trade goods, such as chinaware, across Spanish America and Europe in the Spanish colonial empire and the constant supply of Spanish silver into the economy of China as observed in the later dominance and widespread use of the Spanish silver dollar coins in the Ming and Qing dynasty coinage and its general acceptance as a de facto standard of trade across the Far East around the 16th to 19th century. In 1567, the Spanish trade port in the city of Manila in the Philippines as part of the Spanish colonial empire was opened which until the fall of the Ming dynasty brought over forty million Kuping Taels of silver to China with the annual Chinese imports numbering at 53,000,000 pesos (each peso being 8 real) or 300,000 Kuping Taels. During the Ming dynasty the average Chinese junk which took the voyage from the Spanish East Indies to the city of Guangzhou took with it eighty thousand pesos, a number which increased under the Qing dynasty as until the mid-18th century the volume of imported Spanish pesos had increased to 235,370,000 (or 169 460,000 Kuping Tael). The Spanish mention that around 12,000,000 pesos were shipped from Acapulco to Manila in the year 1597 as part of the Manila-Acapulco Galleon Trade while in other years this usually numbered between one and four million pesos. [18]

Bilateral trade volume in 2007 was US$30.62 billion. From January to October 2008, bilateral trade volume reached US$25.3 billion, an increase of 1.4% as compared with the same period last year. By the end of September 2008, the actually utilized value of accumulative investment from the Philippines to China reached US$2.5 billion. China's transformation into a major economic power in the 21st century has led to an increase of foreign investments in the bamboo network, a network of overseas Chinese businesses operating in the markets of Southeast Asia that share common family and cultural ties. [19] [20]

The Philippines and China signed an air rights agreement in 2010, significantly increasing flights between the two countries. [10] : 159 

In August 2011, the Philippines and China signed a five-year trade development program worth US$6 billion. [10] : 160 

On 17 September 2014, the Philippines and China signed a memorandum of understanding for the promotion of investment cooperation. [10] : 164 

In 2022 the Philippines became able to export fresh durian to China. Market access is sometimes used as a tool of Chinese diplomacy; banana exports from the Philippines have previously been restricted during times of geopolitical tension. [21]

Chinese Filipinos

Chinese Filipinos constitute one group of overseas Chinese. Chinese Filipinos are present within several commerce and business sectors in the Philippines and a few sources estimate companies which comprise a majority of the Philippine economy are owned by Chinese Filipinos, if one includes Chinese mestizos. [22] [23] [24] [25]

In view of the ongoing territorial dispute of China and the Philippines (such as Scarborough Shoal), Chinese-Filipinos prefer a peaceful solution through diplomatic talks while some view that China should not extend its claims to other parts of South China Sea. [26]

According to a 2023 report by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, Chinese Filipino tycoon George Siy's think tank, the Integrated Development Studies Institute, has been a major promoter of pro-Chinese government narratives in the Philippines. [27]

Sister city agreements

There are 24 pairs of sister cities or sister provinces between China and the Philippines:

Territorial disputes

Spratly Islands and the South China Sea

Territorial claims in the South China Sea South China Sea claims map.svg
Territorial claims in the South China Sea

The two countries have disputes over the sovereignty of some islands and shoals in the Spratly Islands. [43] These disputes are linked to other disputes in the South China Sea. China conducts grey-zone operations in these waters. Rising tensions has led the Philippines to invest further in its military forces, and to deepen cooperation with the United States and Japan. [44]

In 1734, the Spanish colonial government in the Philippines published the first edition of the Velarde map, detailing the territories under full sovereign control of Spanish Philippines, which included Scarborough Shoal (called Panacot in the indigenous language in the map) and the Spratly Islands (referred in the map as Los Bajos de Paragua). The 1734 Velarde map is the earliest map to showcase the sovereignty of a nation over Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands. [45] [46] In 1792, the Spanish colonial government of the territory of the Philippines launched the first ever survey of Scarborough Shoal on 4 May 1792. The survey, Plano de la Navigacion, was taken by Alessandro Malaspina aboard the Sta. Lucia, with Filipino comrades. [47] The official territories of the Philippines was again published in the 1808 Carita General del Archipelago Filipino and again in the 1875 Carita General del Archipelago Filipino. [48] [46] [49]

After the Spanish-American War, Spain lost and ceded the territory of the Philippines to the United States through the 1898 Treaty of Paris. The 1898 Treaty of Paris created a treaty line, where Scarborough Shoal, the Spratly Islands, and parts of Tawi-tawi continued to be under Spanish sovereignty. This led to talks between Spain and the United States, which ended upon the signing of the 1900 Treaty of Washington, which rectified retroactively the 1898 Treaty of Paris. Under the 1900 Treaty of Washington, "all islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago, lying outside the lines described in Article III" were also ceded to the United States as part of the territory of the Philippines, where Scarborough Shoal, the Spratly Islands, and the rest of Tawi-tawi was included. [50] [51] [52] From 1899 to 1902, the United States war department in the territory of the Philippines republished and reissued four times the 1875 Carita General del Archipelago Filipino with the addition of military telegraph lines, military cable lines, eastern cable company lines, and military department boundaries. The official map of the entire Philippine territory under Spanish rule was effectively adopted as the entire Philippine territory under American rule. [53] During the 1928 Islas Palmas international case, the United States, as representative of the territory of the Philippines, reiterated in a court memorandum that the 1875 Carta General del Archipielago Filipino "is both an American official and a Spanish official map" of Philippine territory, bounding the United States on its recognition of the Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands as Philippine territory. [54] [55] In 1930, the United States and the United Kingdom signed a treaty, where the United Kingdom recognized the territory of Philippines which included Scarborough Shoal and the Spratlys, effectively bounding the United Kingdom's successor countries as well, such as Malaysia and Brunei but there has been disagreement with a Philippines view that the treaty covers the waters within the Treaty Limits by at least the United States and Britain. [56] In 1932, China sent a Note Verbale to France, declaring that China's southernmost territory was the Paracels. [57] [58] [59]

After rounds of consultations to address territory disputes, both sides agreed to strive for a solution through bilateral friendly consultation. In October 2004, Chinese Maritime Safety Administration and Philippine Coast Guard conducted a joint sand table rescue exercise for the first time. China National Offshore Oil Corp. and Philippine National Oil Company signed the "Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking on Certain Areas in the South China Sea" on 1 September 2004. In May 2005, Vietnam agreed to join the Sino-Philippine cooperation. Oil companies from three countries signed the "Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking on Certain Areas in the South China Sea" in March 2005.[ citation needed ]

Due to the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, relations between the two countries significantly worsened. [60] On 8 April 2012, a Philippine navy vessel cornered several Chinese fishing vessels in the Scarborough Shoal lagoon, suspecting the fishing vessels of illegal fishing. [61] : 267  Two China Maritime Surveillance vessels arrived shortly thereafter, placing themselves between the Chinese fishing vessels and the Philippine navy vessel to prevent the Philippine navy from making an arrest. [61] : 267  A two-month standoff followed. [61] : 267  During the initial phase of the standoff, the Philippines withdrew the navy vessel and replaced it with a coast guard vessel and a Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Vessel. [61] : 268  China responded by reinforcing its presence, first with the advanced fisheries patrol ship Yuzheng 310 and later other ships to reach a total of 14 vessels in the area by 3 May. [61] : 268  An approaching typhoon caused all participants in the standoff to disperse. [61] : 268  Chinese ships returned to the area shortly thereafter and maintained a regular presence there until October 2016. [61] : 268 

In October 2012, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying visited Manila in an effort to persuade the Philippines to continue bilateral discussions to address the South China Sea territorial disputes and to avoid involving the United States or taking the dispute to an international forum. [61] : 122  The Philippines responded by initiating an arbitration against China. [61] : 122 

2013-2016 South China Sea arbitration

In January 2013, the Philippines formally initiated arbitration proceedings against China's claim on the territories within the nine-dash line that includes Spratly Islands, which it contended was unlawful under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). [62] [63] An arbitration tribunal was constituted under Annex VII of UNCLOS and it was decided in July 2013 that the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) would function as registry and provide administrative duties in the proceedings. [64]

On 12 July 2016, the arbitrators agreed with the Philippines on most of its contentions. [61] : 123  They concluded in the award that there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or resources, hence there was "no legal basis for China to claim historic rights" over the nine-dash line. [65] Accordingly, the PCA tribunal decision is ruled as final and non-appealable by either countries. [66] [67] The tribunal also criticized China's land reclamation projects and its construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, saying that it had caused "severe harm to the coral reef environment". [68] It also characterized Taiping Island and other features of the Spratly Islands as "rocks" under UNCLOS, and therefore are not entitled to a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone. [69] China however rejected the ruling, calling it "ill-founded". [70] Taiwan, which currently administers Taiping Island, the largest of the Spratly Islands, also rejected the ruling. [71]

China's response was to ignore the arbitration result and to continue pursuing bilateral discussions with the Philippines. [61] : 128  The day after the ruling, China's Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin stated at a press conference that China had "taken note of the positive attitude of the new Philippine government under President Duterte toward resuming dialogue with China and progressing bilateral relationships from various aspects. We welcome this initiative with open arms." [61] : 128 

On 8 August 2016, the Philippines dispatched former president Fidel V. Ramos to Hong Kong to mitigate tensions following the arbitration result. [61] : 129  Ramos met with Fu Ying (chair of China's Foreign Affairs Committee for the National People's Congress) and Wu Shicun (president of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies). [61] : 129  Ramos conveyed the Philippines' willingness to engage in formal discussions with China. [61] : 129  The three issued a statement in their personal capacities emphasizing cooperation and dialogue between the two countries. [61] : 129 

On 20 October 2016, Duterte visited China where he and Xi Jinping resumed bilateral discussions on the South China Sea dispute. [61] : 129  In an effort to demonstrate its cooperative approach, following the visit China allowed Filipino fisherman to return to the area of Scarborough Shoal. [61] : 129 

Other incidents

In April 2019, international satellites and local reports revealed that Chinese ships have swarmed Philippine-controlled areas in the South China Sea through a cabbage strategy. [72] [73] [74] Later reports showed that endangered giant clams under Philippine law protection were illegally being harvested by Chinese ships. [75] [76] The swarming continued for the entirety of April, with the Philippine foreign affairs secretary, Teddy Locsin Jr., expressing dismay over the incident and calling it an intentional "embarrassment" aimed against the Philippines. [77] A few days before the 2019 Philippine independence day, President Duterte stated that the country may go to war with China if China claims disputed resources. [78]

On 9 June 2019, a Chinese ship, Yuemaobinyu 42212, rammed and sank a Philippine fishing vessel, F/B Gem-Ver, near Reed Bank, west of Palawan. The fishermen were caught by surprise as they were asleep during the said event. The Chinese ship afterwards left the sank Philippine vessel, while the Filipino fishermen were adrift in the middle of sea and left to the elements, in violation of a rule under UNCLOS. [78] [79] The 22 Filipino fishermen were later rescued by a ship from Vietnam. [80] [81]

The government responded a day later, stating that they may cut ties with China if the culprits are not punished by the Chinese. [82] [83] China has stated that the event was an ordinary maritime accident, [84] which was later backed up by investigations from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. [85]

The Chinese crew was later criticized for failing to undertake measures to avoid colliding with the F/B Gem-Ver and abandoning the stricken boat's crew, in violation of maritime laws. [86] [87]

In 2020, Facebook took down a Chinese network which was part of a disinformation campaign against the Philippines. The campaign used fake profiles in an attempt to influence public opinion, particularly related to politics and the South China Sea. [88] [89]

Increasing escalations under Bongbong Marcos

The election of Philippine president Bongbong Marcos in 2022 saw the onset of worsening Philippine-China relations and frequent skirmishes in the South China Sea. [90] [91] Marcos' decision to increase the number of Philippine bases the United States military troops can use under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement from five to nine met vehement opposition from the Chinese government. [92] Marcos made overt signals that the Philippines would inevitably get involved in the event of a Taiwan-China conflict, [93] prompting China to warn the Philippines against "playing with fire". [94] Under Marcos, the Philippine Coast Guard began a strategy of publicizing China's aggressive actions in the South China Sea by inviting journalists during territorial encounters and releasing the photographs and videos thereafter in an attempt to gain international support. [90] [91] Among the escalations since 2023 include China Coast Guard's firing on Philippine military ships in the Spratly Islands waters; [95] the Philippines accusing China of parking its navy and coast guard vessels near Scarborough Shoal in an apparent attempt to block Philippine vessels from passing through the area; [96] the Philippine Coast Guard accusing China Coast Guard ships of jamming their automatic identification system (AIS); [97] and, amidst Chinese and Philippine military operations around the disputed Scarborough Shoal in August 2024, the Armed Forces of the Philippines accusing China of "dangerous and provocative actions" after two Chinese Air Force aircraft dropped flares in the path of a Philippines' plane that China claimed was "illegally intruding" into its airspace. [98] Additionally, in May 2024, the Philippines' Department of Foreign Affairs said it would probe Chinese diplomats' activities around wiretapping after reports surfaced of a recording of an agreement between a Philippine military official and Chinese officials over the South China Sea. [99]

In April 2024, the Philippine Coast Guard deployed one of its key patrol ships, the BRP Teresa Magbanua, to the Sabina Shoal area after Filipino scientists discovered submerged piles of crushed corals in its shallows, raising suspicions that the Chinese may be preparing to build a structure on the site. In August 2024, two separate collisions involving ships from the Chinese Coast Guard and the Philippine Coast Guard occurred near the Sabina Shoal, resulting in significant damage to Philippine vessels, including the BRP Teresa Magbanua. In response, Commodore Jay Tarriela of the Philippine Coast Guard announced that the Magbanua would not withdraw from the Sabina Shoal area "despite the harassment, bullying activities, and escalatory action of the Chinese coast guard". [100] Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning described the Philippines' anchoring of the vessel in the shoal as a strategy to "permanently occupy the area". [101]

The United States' deployment of the Typhon missile system in northern Philippines in April 2024 prompted condemnation from China and Russia, which respectively accused the US of threatening regional peace and stoking an arms race. Initially, the Philippine government reassured the public that the missile system shall remain only in the Philippines until September 2024; nearing the specified deadline, however, plans on extending its stay in the country were announced, with a senior Philippine government official remarking it would help deter China and "give them sleepless nights". [102] [103]

Benham Rise

In March 2017, Chinese ships were spotted in the Benham Rise, a protected food supply exclusive zone of the Philippines. The Philippines, through its ambassador to Beijing has officially asked China to explain the reported presence of one of its vessels in Benham Rise in the Pacific. [104] [105] A week later, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement saying that China is honoring the Philippines' sovereign rights over Benham Rise, and that the ship was passing by. However, the ship was revealed to have been on the area for about three months. [106] In May 2017, Philippine president Duterte revealed that the Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping made an unveiled threat of war against the Philippines over the islands in the South China Sea during a meeting in Beijing. [107]

In January 2018, the Department of Foreign Affairs approved the Chinese Institute of Oceanology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences to perform a scientific survey of the Rise, with the approval of President Rodrigo Duterte. [108] In February, Duterte ordered the halting of all foreign researches in the Benham Rise; [109] however, the research being conducted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences was already finished before the halt order.[ citation needed ] Duterte later signed an executive order renaming the Benham Rise to Philippine Rise and stressing that the rise is subject to sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Philippines. [110]

The International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) of the UNESCO have rules wherein the entity that first discovers unnamed features underwater have the right to name those features, prompting Filipino officials to realize that China was after, not just research, but also the naming rights over the underwater features of the Philippine Rise which will be internationally recognized through UNESCO. [111] It was later clarified by the Philippine government that all researches ongoing at the time the halting was made were officially cancelled, but the government still allows research activities in the Rise. Foreign researchers may still do research within the Rise if they apply for research activities through the Philippine government. [112] The government is also maintaining that the Rise belongs to the Philippines. [113] On 12 February 2018, the International Hydrographic Organization approved the names proposed by China for five features in the Philippine Rise after China submitted to the organization its research findings on the area. The Chinese naming of the features met public protests in the Philippines. [114] [115]

COVID-19 pandemic

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte (center) with Chinese Ambassador Huang Xilian during the ceremonial turnover of CoronaVac vaccines in Villamor Air Base, Pasay City on 28 February 2021. LOZANO 02282021-2.jpg
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte (center) with Chinese Ambassador Huang Xilian during the ceremonial turnover of CoronaVac vaccines in Villamor Air Base, Pasay City on 28 February 2021.

China played an important role in the early months of the Philippines' response to COVID-19. [116] In February 2021, China became the first country to send the Philippines COVID-19 vaccines, [117] following President Rodrigo Duterte's request for assistance from President Xi Jinping in securing vaccines. [118]

A June 2024 Reuters investigative report later revealed that the United States allegedly launched at the height of the pandemic a clandestine campaign to undermine China's growing influence in the Philippines and to erode Filipinos' public trust on China's Sinovac vaccine, face masks, and testing kits, thereby causing economic damage and putting innocent lives at risk. [119]

National security concerns in the Philippines

Amid escalating tensions in the South China Sea during the Bongbong Marcos administration in April 2024, the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency and the National Bureau of Investigation announced that they would investigate an influx of over a thousand Chinese students enrolled in private universities in Cagayan, a province facing Taiwan, most of whom were not attending classes, according to the Bureau of Immigration. [120] [121] [122] Several universities and colleges in Cagayan rejected the allegations, and called the national security concerns regarding the Chinese students influx as a "blatant display of racism and Sinophobia". [123] The Commission on Higher Education later stated that most foreign students in the Philippines were Indians and not Chinese, adding that most Chinese students in the country as of Academic Year 2022–2023 were in the National Capital Region, followed by Cagayan Valley. [124] Bloomberg News reported that the Chinese government has invested heavily in Cagayan and attempted to woo local political elites. [125]

In May 2024, the mayor of Bamban, Tarlac, Alice Guo, faced a senate inquiry after she was linked to an earlier Philippine Offshore Gaming Operator (POGO) raid; [126] she was also suspected by Senator Risa Hontiveros of being a "Chinese asset", [127] and was described by President Bongbong Marcos as not being known to most politicians in Tarlac. [128] [129] In June 2024, the National Bureau of Investigation confirmed that the fingerprints of Alice Guo matches with Chinese national Guo Hua Ping. [130] In July 2024, the Senate of the Philippines issued an arrest order for Guo and some of her family members for failing to attend a second consecutive hearing. [131] Guo subsequently fled the country, but was subsequently captured in Indonesia and returned to the Philippines. [132] [133] The same month, Romeo Brawner Jr. stated that China is using a united front strategy to attempt to "influence various sectors in our society, including the education sector, business, even the media, and local government units." [134] He cited POGOs as an aspect of that strategy. [134] On 22 July 2024, President Marcos announced the nationwide ban of POGOs in his State of the Nation Address due to numerous security concerns. [135] [136] In August 2024, Rappler reported that the Manila bureau chief of Wenhui Bao from 2021 until 2024, Zhang "Steve" Song, was an undercover Ministry of State Security (MSS) operative who worked closely with Huawei and gathered intelligence about the internal dynamics and politics of key personalities in the country's defense and security sectors. [137]

See also

China

Philippines

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Timeline of the South China Sea dispute</span>

The article covers events relevant to the ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Even before the common era, maritime trading networks had already been established in the high seas of the region. Prior to World War II, China, France, and Japan disputed over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. After the war, Brunei, Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam became involved in the conflict.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Efforts to impeach Rodrigo Duterte</span> Political efforts to impeach Rodrigo Duterte during his presidency from 2016 to 2022

Efforts to impeach Rodrigo Duterte began in March 2017 when several opposition figures filed an impeachment complaint against Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte for his role in the war on drugs and other issues.

The exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, per the mandate of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), consists of four subzones. It covers 2,263,816 square kilometers (874,064 sq mi) of sea. The Philippines has 7,641 islands comprising the Philippine archipelago. The zone's coordinates are between 116° 40', and 126° 34' E longitude and 4° 40' and 21° 10' N latitude. It is bordered by the Philippine Sea to the east and north, the South China Sea to the west, and the Celebes Sea to the south.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2019 Reed Bank incident</span>

The 2019 Reed Bank incident occurred when F/B Gem-Ver, a Philippine fishing boat anchored in Reed Bank in the South China Sea, sank after it was rammed by a Chinese vessel, Yuemaobinyu 42212, during the early morning hours of 9 June 2019. The stricken vessel's crew was later rescued by a Vietnamese fishing vessel.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Whitsun Reef incident</span> Diplomatic incident

On March 22, 2021, a diplomatic incident started after the Philippines filed a diplomatic protest against China due to the presence of more than 200 Chinese fishing vessels at Whitsun Reef as early as March 7, 2021. The reef is part of the contested Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Atin Ito Coalition</span>

The West Philippine Sea – Atin Ito is a civilian-led initiative to deliver donated goods to Filipino troops stationed in the Spratly Islands, a feature claimed by several countries including the Philippines and China. The organization supports the Philippines' sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.

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