The Pinkerton liability rule was pronounced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Pinkerton v. United States , [1] in 1946. Walter and Daniel Pinkerton were brothers who were charged with one count of conspiracy and ten substantive counts under the Internal Revenue Code. A jury found each of them guilty of the conspiracy and several of the substantive counts. The main issue arose from the fact that there was no evidence to show that Daniel Pinkerton participated directly in the commission of the substantive offenses, although there was evidence showing that these substantive offenses were committed by Walter Pinkerton in furtherance of the unlawful agreement or conspiracy existing between the brothers. [1]
The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) is the highest court in the federal judiciary of the United States. Established pursuant to Article III of the U.S. Constitution in 1789, it has original jurisdiction over a narrow range of cases, including suits between two or more states and those involving ambassadors. It also has ultimate appellate jurisdiction over all federal court and state court cases that involve a point of federal constitutional or statutory law. The Court has the power of judicial review, the ability to invalidate a statute for violating a provision of the Constitution or an executive act for being unlawful. However, it may act only within the context of a case in an area of law over which it has jurisdiction. The court may decide cases having political overtones, but it has ruled that it does not have power to decide nonjusticiable political questions.
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), is a case in the Supreme Court of the United States. The case enunciated the principle of Pinkerton liability, a prominent concept in the law of conspiracy.
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC), formally the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, is the domestic portion of federal statutory tax law in the United States, published in various volumes of the United States Statutes at Large, and separately as Title 26 of the United States Code (USC). It is organized topically, into subtitles and sections, covering income tax, payroll taxes, estate taxes, gift taxes, and excise taxes; as well as procedure and administration. Its implementing agency is the Internal Revenue Service.
The question was submitted to the jury on the theory that each brother could be found guilty of the substantive offenses if it were found that, at the time those offenses were committed, the brothers were parties to an unlawful conspiracy and that the substantive offenses were committed in furtherance of it. Daniel Pinkerton was not indicted as an aider or abettor, nor was his case submitted to the jury on that theory.
Daniel argued United States v. Sall [2] in support of his contention that participation in the conspiracy was not in itself enough to sustain a conviction for the substantive offenses, even though they were committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Sall held that, in addition to evidence that the offense was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, evidence of direct participation in the commission of the substantive offense or other evidence from which participation might fairly be inferred was necessary.
The Supreme Court took a different view. It noted that the facts showed a continuous conspiracy with no evidence that Daniel had attempted to withdraw from it. Therefore, he continued to offend. So long as the partnership in crime continues, the partners act for each other in carrying it forward, and an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act. The criminal intent to do an illegal act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the unlawful project is established by the formation of the conspiracy. Each conspirator instigates the commission of the crime. The unlawful agreement contemplated what was done in the substantive acts, and the substantive crimes were performed in the execution of the enterprise. [1]
In criminal law, an overt act is the one that can be clearly proved by evidence and from which criminal intent can be inferred, as opposed to a mere intention in the mind to commit a crime. Such an act, even if innocent per se, can potentially be used as evidence against someone during a trial to show participation in a crime. For instance, the purchase of a ski mask, which can conceal identity, is generally a legal act but may be an overt act if it is purchased in the planning of a bank robbery.
Similar to the rule of aiding and abetting, the overt acts of one partner in a conspiracy are attributable to all partners. The Supreme Court concluded that if an overt act that is an essential ingredient in a conspiracy can be supplied by one conspirator, then the same or other acts in furtherance of the conspiracy should be attributable to the others for the purpose of holding them responsible for the substantive offense(s).
Aiding and abetting is a legal doctrine related to the guilt of someone who aids or abets in the commission of a crime. It exists in a number of different countries and generally allows a court to pronounce someone guilty for aiding and abetting in a crime even if they are not the principal offender.
The Supreme Court noted that a different result would arise if the substantive offense committed by one of the conspirators was not done in furtherance of the conspiracy, did not fall within the scope of the unlawful project, or was merely a part of the ramifications of the plan that could not be reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.
The Pinkerton liability rule does service where the conspiracy is one to commit offenses of the character described in the substantive charges. [3] Aiding and abetting has a broader application. It makes a defendant a principal when he consciously shares in any criminal act, whether or not there is a conspiracy. If a conspiracy is also charged, it makes no difference, so far as aiding and abetting is concerned, whether the substantive offense is done pursuant to the conspiracy. Pinkerton is narrow in its scope. Aiding and abetting rests on a broader base. It states a rule of criminal responsibility for acts that one assists another in performing. The fact that a particular case might conceivably be submitted to the jury on either theory is irrelevant. It is sufficient if the proof adduced and the basis on which it was submitted were sufficient to support the verdicts.
United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States clarified standards for conspiracy liability under a federal drug conspiracy statute. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that government prosecutors need not prove evidence of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy when prosecuting individuals under the drug conspiracy statute codified at 21 U.S.C. § 846. Justice O'Connor wrote that Congress intended to "adopt the common law definition" of conspiracy for section 846, which did not require an overt act as a precondition of liability. Justice O'Connor's opinion also compared the drug conspiracy statute to the general conspiracy statute, which requires that a conspirator commit an over act in furtherance of the conspiracy, noting that "[i]n light of this additional element in the general conspiracy statute, Congress' silence in § 846 speaks volumes."
In law, attendant circumstances are the facts surrounding an event.
In criminal law, incitement is the encouragement of another person to commit a crime. Depending on the jurisdiction, some or all types of incitement may be illegal. Where illegal, it is known as an inchoate offense, where harm is intended but may or may not have actually occurred.
An accessory is a person who assists in the commission of a crime, but who does not actually participate in the commission of the crime as a joint principal. The distinction between an accessory and a principal is a question of fact and degree:
Criminal jurisdiction is a term used in constitutional law and public law to describe the power of courts to hear a case brought by a state accusing a defendant of the commission of a crime. It is relevant in three distinct situations:
In criminal law, a conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime at some time in the future. Criminal law in some countries or for some conspiracies may require that at least one overt act be undertaken in furtherance of that agreement, to constitute an offense. There is no limit on the number participating in the conspiracy and, in most countries, no requirement that any steps have been taken to put the plan into effect. For the purposes of concurrence, the actus reus is a continuing one and parties may join the plot later and incur joint liability and conspiracy can be charged where the co-conspirators have been acquitted or cannot be traced. Finally, repentance by one or more parties does not affect liability but may reduce their sentence.
A civil conspiracy or collusion is an agreement between two or more parties to deprive a third party of legal rights or deceive a third party to obtain an illegal objective. A conspiracy may also refer to a group of people who make an agreement to form a partnership in which each member becomes the agent or partner of every other member and engage in planning or agreeing to commit some act. It is not necessary that the conspirators be involved in all stages of planning or be aware of all details. Any voluntary agreement and some overt act by one conspirator in furtherance of the plan are the main elements necessary to prove a conspiracy. A conspiracy may exist whether legal means are used to accomplish illegal results, or illegal means used to accomplish something legal. "Even when no crime is involved, a civil action for conspiracy may be brought by the persons who were damaged."
Dunlop v R, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 881 is the leading decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on participating in a criminal act by aiding and abetting. The Court held that the mere presence of the accused at the scene of a criminal act is not sufficient to convict the person for aiding and abetting a criminal act. There must be something more.
Complicity is the participation in a completed criminal act of an accomplice, a partner in the crime who aids or encourages (abets) other perpetrators of that crime, and who shared with them an intent to act to complete the crime. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if they purpose the completion of a crime, and toward that end, if that person solicits or encourages the other person, or aids or attempts to aid in planning or committing the crime, or has legal duty to prevent that crime but fails to properly make an effort to prevent it.
Francis Joseph William Ford was a United States District Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
Under United States law, an element of a crime is one of a set of facts that must all be proven to convict a defendant of a crime. Before a court finds a defendant guilty of a criminal offense, the prosecution must present evidence that, even when opposed by any evidence the defense may choose, is credible and sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed each element of the particular crime charged. The component parts that make up any particular crime vary depending on the crime.
The Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. It consolidated provisions in English criminal law related to accomplices from a number of earlier statutes into a single Act. For the most part these provisions were, according to the draftsman of the Act, incorporated with little or no variation in their phraseology. It is one of a group of Acts sometimes referred to as the criminal law consolidation Acts 1861. It was passed with the object of simplifying the law. It collects the scattered provisions on the subject contained in Peel's Acts, incorporating subsequent statutes.
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court allowing an action to recover compensatory damages under the antitrust statutes. The jury had returned a verdict for $120,000 in petitioner's favor, covering a five-year period where plaintiff suffered due to respondents' antitrust conspiracy. The trial court, sitting in the Northern District of Illinois, gave judgment for treble damages, as prescribed by § 4 of the Clayton Act. The 7th Circuit reversed on the sole ground that the evidence of damage was not sufficient for submission to the jury, and directed the entry of judgment for respondents non obstante veredicto. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the evidence of damage was sufficient to support the verdict. Respondents argued that any measure of damages would be too speculative and uncertain to afford an accurate measure of the amount of the damage. The Supreme Court disagreed, not wanting to let the respondent defeat a remedy because its antitrust violation was so effective and complete. The Court held that the jury could return a verdict for the plaintiffs, even though damages could not be measured with the exactness which would otherwise have been possible, so long as the jury made a "just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant data". The judgment of the district court was affirmed and the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed.
Inchoate offences in English law are offences in England and Wales that cover illegal acts which have yet to be committed, primarily attempts to commit crimes, incitement to crime or encouraging or assisting crime, and conspiracy to commit crimes. Attempts, governed by the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, are defined as situations where an individual who intends to commit an offence does an act which is "more than merely preparatory" in the offence's commission. Traditionally this definition has caused problems, with no firm rule on what constitutes a "more than merely preparatory" act, but broad judicial statements give some guidance. Incitement, on the other hand, is an offence under the common law, and covers situations where an individual encourages another person to engage in activities which will result in a criminal act taking place, and intends for this act to occur. As a criminal activity, incitement had a particularly broad remit, covering "a suggestion, proposal, request, exhortation, gesture, argument, persuasion, inducement, goading or the arousal of cupidity". It was abolished by the Serious Crime Act 2007, but continues in other offences and as the basis of the new offence of "encouraging or assisting" the commission of a crime.
Travel Act or International Travel Act of 1961, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, is a Federal criminal statute which forbids the use of the U.S. mail, or interstate or foreign travel, for the purpose of engaging in certain specified criminal acts.
Crime preparations are acts or actions performed by criminal offenders during any period of time before the actual crime is committed and range from mere intent to overt action.
In law, a conspiracy theory is a theory of a case that presents a conspiracy to be considered by a trier of fact. A basic tenet of “traditional conspiracy theory” is that each co-conspirator is liable for acts of co-conspirators “during the existence of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Procedures and proof requirements for conspiracy theory litigation as well as the definition of ‘conspiracy’ vary by jurisdiction and body of law. In civil litigation, it can offer advantages relative to aiding-and-abetting or joint tortfeasor case theories.
A hub-and-spoke conspiracy is a legal construct or doctrine of United States antitrust and criminal law. In such a conspiracy, several parties ("spokes") enter into an unlawful agreement with a leading party ("hub"). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explained the concept in these terms:
In a "hub-and-spoke conspiracy," a central mastermind, or "hub," controls numerous "spokes," or secondary co-conspirators. These co-conspirators participate in independent transactions with the individual or group of individuals at the "hub" that collectively further a single, illegal enterprise.