The California Citizens Redistricting Commission (CCRC) draws the boundaries of the state's U.S. Congressional, State Senate, State Assembly, and Board of Equalization districts. The commission first met in 2010 and has fourteen members: five commissioners each from the two political parties with the first and second largest statewide registrations, and four commissioners not registered with either of those two parties. The CCRC is permanent, with all fourteen members serving ten-year terms, and all replaced just prior to the start of each decennial redistricting cycle. The commissioner selection process is conducted by the California State Auditor and starts with open applications. As an independent, citizen commission, commissioners are prohibited from an extensive list of political positions and activities for ten years before applying and five to ten years after selection. There is a set timeline during the years ending in “9,” “0,” and “1” for the selection of new commissioners, issuance of draft maps, certification of final maps, and consideration of any challenges to final maps. The CCRC has now successfully redistricted California in both cycles (2010 and 2020) since its creation. Any major change to the CCRC’s current role, authority, structure, system, or timeline would require an amendment to Article XXI of the California constitution.
In the 1980 and 1990 cycles, redistricting by the California state legislature was highly contentious and tortuous. In the 2000 cycle, a gentlemen's agreement among legislative leaders produced the so-called “Incumbent Protection Plan.”[1] Redistricting reform ballot propositions in 1982, 1984, 1990, and 2005, all involving judges or retired judges, had all failed to pass. Inspired by Arizona's 2000 creation of the nation's first citizen-led, independent state redistricting commission with binding authority, Kathay Feng of California Common Cause, with the vocal support of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, helped lead the effort to draft and pass 2008’s Proposition 11, the Voters First Act, creating the current CCRC for the state’s legislative and Board of Equalization districts. In 2010, physicist and political reformer Charles Munger Jr. helped lead the successful campaign for Proposition 20, the Voters First Act for Congress, adding congressional districts to the CCRC’s responsibilities. In 2012, Senate Bill 1096 adjusted various deadlines, resulting in the current CCRC timeline.
The 2010 CCRC was notable for pioneering independent, citizen redistricting in such a populous, demographically complex, and geographically diverse state. In a span of seven months, the commission built its entire administrative and technical structure and staff from scratch, conducted a full statewide public input program, proceeded with a fully public mapping program, and certified its maps on its August 15, 2011 deadline. Those maps prevailed through four lawsuits and one voter referendum, and remained in place for the full decade following.[2]
The 2020 CCRC built on its predecessor’s success but faced two new, major challenges. In the spring of 2020, COVID-19 pandemic travel and meeting restrictions and limitations began during the interview phase of the commissioner selection process and continued throughout the staff-recruitment, outreach, and mapping phases. The commission’s work proceeded with mostly remote and hybrid meetings, based on emergency modifications to the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act. Then, the unprecedented delays and uncertainties surrounding the 2020 U.S. Census, and eventual 134-day delay to the Census data release required the California Supreme Court to grant a one-time extension to the CCRC’s mapping deadlines.[3] This resulted in the heaviest mapping work falling squarely during the 2021 holiday season. Nevertheless, the final maps were certified on December 26, 2021, a day before the (extended) deadline. Those maps received no legal challenges (saving the state over $5 million that had been budgeted for the maps' legal defense) and are intended to remain in place until they are superseded in the 2030 redistricting cycle.
The fall 2025 redistricting proposal by Governor Gavin Newsom, passed by the state legislature and scheduled to go before voters on Nov. 4, 2025 as Proposition 50, would replace the 2020 CCRC's congressional map with a Democratic-favoring gerrymander for the 2026, 2028, and 2030 elections, but then return to the CCRC system starting with the 2030 redistricting cycle.[4][5][6][7] The proposal does not involve the CCRC's Assembly, State Senate, or Board of Equalizations maps.
Key Facts from the 2010 and 2020 redistricting cycles
2010 Cycle
2020 Cycle
Number of districts: U.S. Congressional, State Senate, Assembly, BOE; total
53, 40, 80, 4; 177
52, 40, 80, 4; 176
Format for meetings
All in-person
Mostly hybrid or virtual
Census data delivery (P.L. 94-171)
Nominal, Mar. 8, 2011
Delayed, 2-stages, Aug. 12 and Sep. 16, 2021
Timeline
Within statutory deadlines, 271 days from random draw of first eight commissioners to approval of final maps
Within one-time extension, 543 days from random draw of first eight commissioners to approval of final maps
34 in-person meetings through mapping phase; Apr. 9, 2011 start
35 pre-mapping videoconference meetings for COI input; Jun. 10, 2021 start
Public input:
Line drawing
(included in above 34 meetings)
13 videoconference line drawing (12 multi-day) and 3 map public input mtgs
Public input items:
live / written & other / total
c. 2,700 (in person) / c. 22,000 / c. 24,700
3,897 (call-in & Zoom) / 31,353 / 35,250
Draft maps
1 (set of 4)
1 (set of 4)
Population deviation: legislative, BOE
+/- 1%
+/- 5%
Population deviation: congressional
+/- 1 person
+/- 1 person
Draft maps vote (all 4 plans)
14-0 (4 separate, identical votes)
14-0 (single vote for all 4 plans)
Final maps vote: legislative, BOE
13-1 (3 separate, identical votes)
14-0 (single vote for all 4 plans)
Final maps vote: congressional
12-2
(included in above 14-0 vote)
Voting Rights Act (VRA) Section 5 Preclearance
Jan. 17, 2012 (Dept. of Justice)
(Not required)
Executive Director
Dan Claypool
Dan Claypool (to 2/17/21)
Alvaro Hernandez
Chief Counsel
Kirk Miller
Kary Marshall (to 2/26/21)
Anthony Pane
Videographer
Video SSC (Kristian Manoff)
Video SSC (Kristian Manoff)
Line drawer
Q2 (Karin Mac Donald)
Haystaq DNA (Andrew Dreschler) + Q2 (Karin Mac Donald)
Outside Voting Rights Act (VRA) counsel
Gibson Dunn Crutcher
Strumwasser Woocher + David Becker
Racially Polarized Voting (RPV) analyst
Matt Barreto
Megan Gall (Blockwell Consulting)
Outside litigation counsel
Gibson Dunn Crutcher; Morrison Foerster
Strumwasser Woocher
Pre-maps lawsuits
0
1, dismissed (Moreno v. CRC)
Post-maps lawsuits
4, none prevailing (Vandermost v. Bowen, Radanovich v. Bowen, Radanovich v. Bowen II, Connerly v. California)
0
Post-maps referendum
1, Prop. 40 (Nov. 2012), passed
0
Initial commissioner applications
> 30,000
20,724
Commissioner replacements
1 (Ancheta for Kuo, Jan. 2011)
1 (Blando for Andersen, Mar. 2025)
CCRC office
910 P St., Suite 154A, Sacramento (Bonderson Building)
921 Capitol Mall, Suite 260, Sacramento (Dept. of Rehabilitation)
CCRC staff (peak)
8 (plus student interns)
27 (plus student interns)
Funding
State, Irvine Foundation
State
Overall expenditures through June 2012 and June 2022, including selection process
$10.5M state + $3.3M private outreach grants; inflation adj. total to 2021: $17.3M
$17.4M
Commissioner selection process
The commissioner selection process is designed to be open, fair, and impartial, and to select commissioners with demonstrated analytical ability, impartiality, and appreciation for California’s diversity. Any registered California voter who has not changed party affiliation for the past five years before applying and who has voted in at least two of the prior three general elections may apply. The only role any elected official has in the selection process is the legislative leaders' right to strike a limited number of semifinalist applicants.
The selection process is conducted by the California State Auditor (CSA). The CSA conducts a statewide outreach and recruitment campaign to ensure as broad a pool of applicants as possible. Meanwhile, the CSA establishes an Applicant Review Panel (ARP) with three qualified senior auditors licensed by the California Board of Accountancy (Gov. Code, § 8252, subd. (b).) The ARP consists of one member each from the two largest parties in the state, and one member not affiliated with either of those two parties, each selected randomly from a sub-pool of qualified senior auditors. The ARP's meetings, applicant interviews, and deliberations are fully public.
The ARP conducts a preliminary screening against a detailed set of conflict-of-interest rules. Applicants and their immediate family members cannot be elected or appointed officials or political candidates for federal or state offices; staff members of such officials or candidates; officers, employees or paid consultants of a political party or members of a party central committee; registered lobbyists; paid congressional, legislative, or BOE staff; staff, consultants, or under contract with various state elected officials; or contributors of $2,000 or more (inflation-adjusted) to a congressional, state, or local political candidate, all currently or in the previous ten years before applying. (Once selected, commissioners must also remain qualified under the same rules, except that five years after selection they may hold appointive public office; serve on the staff or be a paid consultant the state Legislature, Congress, BOE, or to any individual legislator; or register as a lobbyist.) ARP panelist are subject to the same conflict-of-interest rules.
Applicants who are tentatively qualified are asked to submit supplemental applications, which require essays and letters of recommendation. The ARP evaluates applicants based on their “analytical skills, ability to be impartial, and appreciation for California’s diverse demographics and geography.” After further rounds of selection the ARP asks the remaining applicants to file California’s Form 700 financial disclosures, listing income sources and ranges, real estate ownership, business and investment interests, major gifts received, loans, and travel payments.
ARP staff conduct background checks and social media scans so to further inform the selection process and to identify any items to follow up in the interviews. Of those who remain and who file Form 700, 120 are selected for 90-minute interviews (40 each from the three political sub-groups). Following those interviews, the ARP selects the most-qualified 60 applicants (20 from each of the three political subgroups) as semifinalists.
These 60 semifinalists are presented to the two leaders of each of the two largest parties in the Assembly and the State Senate, who are each allowed to strike two semifinalists from each of the three sub-pools of applicants, for a total of up to 24 strikes. As with peremptory challenges in a courtroom jury selection, no publicly stated reason or justification is required for these strikes. This is the one and only role the legislature (or any elected official) has in the commissioner selection process. In both the 2010 and 2020 cycles, the legislative leaders exercised their maximum allowable strikes, eliminating eight individuals from each of the three sub-pools of 20 applicants, leaving 12 Republicans, 12 Democrats, and 12 not affiliated with either major party, for 36 total finalists. In the 2020 cycle, one Democrat semifinalist withdrew from consideration, leaving 11 applicants in that sub-pool and 35 total finalists.
From these finalists, the CSA selects the first eight commissioners by conducting a random drawing from each sub-pool, choosing three from each of the two largest political parties and two not affiliated with either of those parties. Upon the selection of the first of the new commissioners, the terms of all 14 sitting commissioners ends.
The first eight commissioners then select the final six commissioners from among the remaining finalist pool, using these additional criteria:
The six appointees shall be chosen to ensure the commission reflects this state’s diversity, including but not limited to racial, ethnic, geographic, and gender diversity. However, it is not intended that formulas or specific ratios be applied for this purpose. Applicants shall also be chosen based on relevant analytical skills and ability to be impartial. (Gov. Code, § 8252, subd. (g).)
The final six must be proposed and approved as a single slate, and must be approved by a “supermajority” of the first eight (at least two votes from each of the two largest political parties and one vote not from those two parties).
In both the 2010 and 2020 cycles, all four commissioners not affiliated with the largest two political parties were Decline to State (pre-2012 terminology) or No Political Preference (terminology since 2012), though any could have been from a third party.
Federal Voting Rights Act: Districts must ensure an equal opportunity for minorities to elect a candidate of their choice
Geographic Contiguity: All areas within a district must be connected to each other, except for the special case of islands
Geographic Integrity: Districts shall minimize the division of cities, counties, local neighborhoods and communities of interests to the extent possible, without violating previous criteria. A community of interest is a contiguous population which shares common social and economic interests that should be included within a single district for purposes of its effective and fair representation.
Geographic Compactness: To the extent practicable, and where this does not conflict with previous criteria, districts must not bypass nearby communities for more distant communities
Nesting: To the extent practicable, and where this does not conflict with previous criteria, each Senate district will be composed of two whole Assembly districts, Board of Equalization districts will be composed of 10 Senate districts.
In addition, the location of incumbents and political candidates, and the partisan distribution of voters (except for specific and limited VRA compliance purposes) cannot be considered when drawing districts. There is no requirement that the CCRC consider the boundaries of past or present districts, or try to maximize political competitiveness in districts.
The commission is required to "conduct an open and transparent process enabling full public consideration of and comment on the drawing of district lines."[8] In the 2010 cycle, the commission traveled throughout the state, holding 34 public meetings to receive input. In the 2020 cycle, because of pandemic travel and meeting restrictions, the commission received input via teleconference and telephone calls during virtual and hybrid meetings. For the 2020 cycle, California's Statewide Database[9] developed and deployed an online map-drawing tool that enabled the public to draw and submit district map proposals directly to the commission, which was a first-time capability in a state redistricting program. In both cycles, the CCRC also received public input via email and postal mail.
The four final maps must be approved by a special supermajority of "at least nine affirmative votes which must include at least three votes of members registered from each of the two largest political parties in California based on registration and three votes from members who are not registered with either of these two political parties."[10] Both the 2010 and 2020 CCRCs exceeded this supermajority final maps approval vote requirement; the 2020 CCRC's vote was unanimous.
2010 CCRC Results
In response to a series of legal challenges, the California Supreme Court ruled unanimously three times in favor of the commission's maps, finding them in compliance with the U.S. Constitution and California Constitution.[11][12][13] In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice granted pre-clearance of the commission's maps under Section 5 of the federal Voting Rights Act.[14] The new districts took effect for the June 5, 2012 primary.[15] Republican sponsors put a referendum on the Senate map on the November 6, 2012 ballot as Proposition 40, but later reversed their position and ceased opposing the new districts.[16][17] A 2012 lawsuit by Ward Connerly challenging the CCRC's diversity provisions failed.[18]
In an article about the 2010 cycle, ProPublica found evidence that the California Democratic Party leaders coordinated with community groups to testify in front of the commission, and concluded that these efforts had manipulated the process.[19][20][21][22][23][24][25] While the California Republican Party was quick to call for an investigation, other political observers were less surprised and noted that similar Republican efforts during the hearing process were simply less effective.[26][27][28][29] In a response to the story, the Commission stated that it "had its eyes wide open" and that "the Commissioners were not unduly influenced by that."[30][31]
Independent studies by the Public Policy Institute of California, the National Journal, and Ballotpedia showed that the 2010 CCRC's maps included some of the most competitive districts in the nation, and created opportunities for new elected officials.[32][33][34] For example, the uncertainty caused by the new districts combined with California's "top two" primary system resulted in half a dozen resignations of incumbent Congressional representatives on both sides of the aisle, a major shake-up of California's Capitol Hill delegation.[35][36] In addition, it forced a number of intra-party races, most notably a showdown between two of the state's most powerful House Democrats, Representatives Howard Berman and Brad Sherman.[35][37][38] In the prior 10 years, during the 2000 cycle, incumbents were so safe that only one Congressional seat changed party control in 255 elections,[35] due to bipartisan gerrymandering after the redistricting following the 2000 census.[39][40][41]
2020 CCRC Results
The work of the 2020 CCRC has been analyzed by many organizations, including the League of Women Voters of California and Common Cause California,[42] the Gerrymandering Project at Princeton University,[43], Ballotpedia,[44] the Public Policy Institute of California,[45] and the Rose Institute.[46]
The CCRC is specifically governed by the following provisions in California law:
California Constitution: Article XXI, sections 1-3, Redistricting of Senate, Assembly, Congressional and Board of Equalization Districts
Government Code: Title 2, Division 1, Chapter 3.2, Sections 8251-53, Citizens Redistricting Commission
Elections Code: Division 21, State and Local Reapportionment, Ch. 1, General Provisions, Section 21001 (Secretary of State final maps distribution), Section 21003 (Reallocation of incarcerated persons)
California Code of Regulations: Title 2, Division 10, Sections 60800-60863, California State Auditor’s Office; Chapter 1, Redistricting, Subchapters 1, Definitions; 2, Applicant Review Panel; 3, Citizens Redistricting Commission
Constitutionality
Opponents alleged California Proposition 20 had unconstitutionally transferred the power to draw congressional district lines from the California State Legislature to the redistricting commission. They argued the federal constitution prohibited the people from bypassing the state legislature and using ballot initiatives to make laws governing federal elections. The federal constitution provides, "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof." (emphasis added).
On June 29, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an Arizona ballot initiative giving redistricting power to the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission.[49] Because the California and Arizona commissions were created in the same way and they had similar powers under state laws, it is widely understood that the ruling in the Arizona case has also implicitly upheld California Proposition 20 and the California Citizens Redistricting Commission.
↑ Blake, Aaron (June 5, 2012). "California's new political reality, explained". The Washington Post. Retrieved December 30, 2018. There were also critics of the citizen's redistricting process, and some reports indicated that the Democratic Party, in particular, subverted the process in order to get the map drawn in its favor. (Creating a truly independent process for redistricting has proven very difficult, though California's attempt has earned praise.)
↑ King, Tyler (August 16, 2012). "2012 competitiveness in California state legislative elections". Ballotpedia. Retrieved December 30, 2018. California's legislative elections in 2012 are more competitive than most of the country, based on Ballotpedia's Competitiveness index which captures the extent of electoral competitiveness exhibited in state legislative elections.
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