Loyalty is a devotion to a country, philosophy, group, or person.[1]Philosophers disagree on what can be an object of loyalty, as some argue that loyalty is strictly interpersonal and only another human being can be the object of loyalty. The definition of loyalty in law and political science is the fidelity of an individual to a nation, either one's nation of birth, or one's declared home nation by oath (naturalization).
Classical tragedy is often based on a conflict arising from dual loyalty. Euthyphro, one of Plato's early dialogues, is based on the ethical dilemma arising from Euthyphro intending to lay manslaughter charges against his own father, who had caused the death of a slave through negligence.
In the Gospel of Matthew6:24, Jesus states, "No one can serve two masters; for a slave will either hate the one and love the other, or be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and wealth". This relates to the authority of a master over his servants (as per Ephesians6:5), who, according to Biblical law, owe undivided loyalty to their master (as per Leviticus 25:44–46).[2] On the other hand, the "Render unto Caesar" of the synoptic gospels acknowledges the possibility of distinct loyalties (secular and religious) without conflict, but if loyalty to man conflicts with loyalty to God, the latter takes precedence.[3]
The Encyclopædia Britannica Eleventh Edition defines loyalty as "allegiance to the sovereign or established government of one's country" and also "personal devotion and reverence to the sovereign and royal family". It traces the word "loyalty" to the 15th century, noting that then it primarily referred to fidelity in service, in love, or to an oath that one has made. The meaning that the Britannica gives as primary, it attributes to a shift during the 16th century, noting that the origin of the word is in the Old Frenchloialte, that is in turn rooted in the Latinlex, meaning "law". One who is loyal, in the feudal sense of fealty, is one who is lawful (as opposed to an outlaw), who has full legal rights as a consequence of faithful allegiance to a feudal lord. Hence the 1911 Britannica derived its (early 20th century) primary meaning of loyalty to a monarch.[4][5]
East Asia
"Loyalty" is the most important and frequently emphasized virtue in Bushido. In combination with six other virtues, which are Righteousness (義 gi), Courage (勇 yū), Benevolence, (仁 jin), Respect (礼 rei), Sincerity (誠 makoto), and Honour (名誉 meiyo), it formed the Bushido code: "It is somehow implanted in their chromosomal makeup to be loyal".[6]
Modern concepts
Josiah Royce presented a different definition of the concept in his 1908 book The Philosophy of Loyalty.[7] According to Royce, loyalty is a virtue, indeed a primary virtue, "the heart of all the virtues, the central duty amongst all the duties". Royce presents loyalty, which he defines at length, as the basic moral principle from which all other principles can be derived.[8] The short definition that he gives of the idea is that loyalty is "the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause".[9][8][10] Loyalty is thoroughgoing in that it is not merely a casual interest but a wholehearted commitment to a cause.[11]
Royce's view of loyalty was challenged by John Ladd, professor of philosophy at Brown University, in the article on "Loyalty" in the first edition of the Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967). Ladd observed that by that time the subject had received "scant attention in philosophical literature". This he attributed to "odious" associations that the subject had with nationalism, including Nazism, and with the metaphysics of idealism, which he characterized as "obsolete". However, he argued that such associations were faulty and that the notion of loyalty is "an essential ingredient in any civilized and humane system of morals".[12]
Anthony Ralls observes that Ladd's article is that Encyclopaedia's only article on a virtue, .[13] Ladd asserts that, contrary to Royce, causes to which one is loyal are interpersonal, not impersonal or suprapersonal.[14] He states that Royce's view has "the ethical defect of postulating duties over and above our individual duties to men and groups of men. The individual is submerged and lost in this superperson for its tends to dissolve our specific duties to others into 'superhuman' good". Ronald F. Duska, the Lamont Post Chair of Ethics and the Professions at The American College, extends Ladd's objection, saying that it is a perversion of ethics and virtue for one's self-will to be identified with anything, as Royce would have it.[15] Even if one were identifying one's self-will with God, to be worthy of such loyalty God would have to be the summum bonum, the perfect manifestation of good.
Ladd himself characterizes loyalty as interpersonal, i.e., a relationship between a lord and vassal, parent and child, or two good friends. Duska states that this characterization leads to a problem that Ladd overlooks. Loyalty may certainly be between two persons, but it may also be from a person to a group of people. Examples of this, which are unequivocally considered to be instances of loyalty, are loyalty by a person to his or her family, to a team that he or she is a member or fan of, or to his or her country. The problem is that it then becomes unclear whether there is a strict interpersonal relationship involved, and whether Ladd's contention that loyalty is interpersonal—not suprapersonal—is an adequate description.[15] Ladd considers loyalty from two perspectives: its proper object and its moral value.[12]
John Kleinig, professor of philosophy at City University of New York, observes that over the years the idea has been treated by writers from Aeschylus through John Galsworthy to Joseph Conrad, by psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, scholars of religion, political economists, scholars of business and marketing, and—most particularly—by political theorists, who deal with it in terms of loyalty oaths and patriotism. As a philosophical concept, loyalty was largely untreated by philosophers until the work of Josiah Royce, the "grand exception" in Kleinig's words.[9] Kleinig observes that from the 1980s onwards, the subject gained attention, with philosophers variously relating it to professional ethics, whistleblowing, friendship, and virtue theory.[9] Additional aspects enumerated by Kleinig include the exclusionary nature of loyalty and its subjects.[9]
The proper object of loyalty
Ladd and others, including Milton R. Konvitz[16] and Marcia W. Baron,[14] disagree about the proper object of loyalty—what it is possible to be loyal to. Ladd considers loyalty to be interpersonal: the object of loyalty is always a person. In the Encyclopaedia of the History of Ideas, Konvitz states that the objects of loyalty encompass principles, causes, ideas, ideals, religions, ideologies, nations, governments, parties, leaders, families, friends, regions, racial groups, and "anyone or anything to which one's heart can become attached or devoted".[16]:108 Baron agrees with Ladd, inasmuch as loyalty is "to certain people or to a group of people, not loyalty to an ideal or cause".[14] She argues in her monograph, The Moral Status of Loyalty, that "[w]hen we speak of causes (or ideals) we are more apt to say that people are committed to them or devoted to them than that they are loyal to them".[14] Kleinig agrees with Baron, noting that a person's earliest and strongest loyalties are almost always to people, and that only later do people arrive at abstract notions like values, causes, and ideals. He disagrees, however, with the notion that loyalties are restricted solely to personal attachments, considering it "incorrect (as a matter of logic)".[17]
Loyalty to people and abstract notions such as causes or ideals is considered an evolutionary tactic, as there is a greater chance of survival and procreation if animals belong to loyal packs.[18][bettersourceneeded]
Immanuel Kant constructed the basis for an ethical law via the concept of duty.[19] Kant began his ethical theory by arguing that the only virtue that can be unqualifiedly good is a good will. No other virtue has this status because every other virtue can be used to achieve immoral ends (for example, the virtue of loyalty is not good if one is loyal to an evil person). The good will is unique in that it is always good and maintains its moral value even when it fails to achieve its moral intentions.[20] Kant regarded the good will as a single moral principle that freely chooses to use the other virtues for moral ends.[21]
Multiplicity, disloyalty, and whether loyalty is exclusionary
Stephen Nathanson, professor of philosophy at Northeastern University, states that loyalty can be either exclusionary or non-exclusionary; and can be single or multiple. Exclusionary loyalty excludes loyalties to other people or groups; whereas non-exclusionary loyalty does not. People may have single loyalties, to just one person, group, or thing, or multiple loyalties to multiple objects. Multiple loyalties can constitute a disloyalty to an object if one of those loyalties is exclusionary, excluding one of the others. However, Nathanson observes, this is a special case. In the general case, the existence of multiple loyalties does not cause a disloyalty. One can, for example, be loyal to one's friends, or one's family, and still, without contradiction, be loyal to one's religion, or profession.[22]
Other dimensions
In addition to number and exclusion as just outlined, Nathanson enumerates five other "dimensions" that loyalty can vary along: basis, strength, scope, legitimacy, and attitude:[22]
basis
Loyalties may be constructed on the basis of unalterable facts that constitute a personal connection between the subject and the object of the loyalty, such as biological ties or place of birth (a notion of natural allegiance propounded by Socrates in his political theory). Alternatively, they may be constructed from personal choice and evaluation of criteria with a full degree of freedom. The degree of control that one has is not necessarily simple; Nathanson points out that whilst one has no choice as to one's parents or relatives, one can choose to desert them.[22]
strength
Loyalties can range from supreme loyalties, that override all other considerations, to merely presumptive loyalties, that affect one's presumptions, providing but one motivation for action that is weighed against other motivations. Nathanson observes that strength of loyalty is often interrelated with basis. "Blood is thicker than water" is an aphorism that explains that loyalties that have biological ties as their bases are generally stronger.[22]
scope
Loyalties with limited scope require few actions of the subject; loyalties with broad or even unlimited scopes require many actions, or indeed to do whatever may be necessary in support of the loyalty. Loyalty to one's job, for example, may require no more action than simple punctuality and performance of the tasks that the job requires. Loyalty to a family member can, in contrast, have a very broad effect upon one's actions, requiring considerable personal sacrifice. Extreme patriotic loyalty may impose an unlimited scope of duties. Scope encompasses an element of constraint. Where two or more loyalties conflict, their scopes determine what weight to give to the alternative courses of action required by each loyalty.[22]
This is of particular relevance to the conflicts among multiple loyalties. People with one loyalty can hold that another, conflicting, loyalty is either legitimate or illegitimate. In the extreme view, one that Nathanson ascribes to religious extremists and xenophobes for examples, all loyalties bar one's own are considered illegitimate. The xenophobe does not regard the loyalties of foreigners to their countries as legitimate while the religious extremist does not acknowledge the legitimacy of other religions. At the other end of the spectrum, past the middle ground of considering some loyalties as legitimate and others not, according to cases, or plain and simple indifference to other people's loyalties, is the positive regard of other people's loyalties.[22]
attitude
The subjects of the loyalties have attitudes towards other people (note that this dimension of loyalty concerns the subjects of the loyalty, whereas legitimacy, above, concerns the loyalties themselves). People may have one of a range of possible attitudes towards others who do not share their loyalties, with hate and disdain at one end, indifference in the middle, and concern and positive feeling at the other.[22]
Nathanson observes that loyalty is often directly equated to patriotism. He states that this is a false equality; while patriots exhibit loyalty, it is not conversely the case that all loyal persons are patriots. He provides the example of a mercenary soldier, who exhibits loyalty to the people or country that pays him. Nathanson points to the difference in motivations between a loyal mercenary and a patriot. A mercenary may well be motivated by a sense of professionalism or a belief in the sanctity of contracts. A patriot, in contrast, may be motivated by affection, concern, identification, and a willingness to sacrifice.[22]
Nathanson contends that patriotic loyalty is not always a virtue. A loyal person can, in general be relied upon, and hence people view loyalty as virtuous. Nathanson argues that loyalty can, however, be given to persons or causes that are unworthy. Moreover, loyalty can lead patriots to support policies that are immoral and inhumane. Thus, Nathanson argues, patriotic loyalty can sometimes rather be a vice than a virtue, when its consequences exceed the boundaries of what is otherwise morally desirable. Such loyalties, in Nathanson's view, are erroneously unlimited in their scopes, and fail to acknowledge boundaries of morality.[22]
The faithless servant doctrine is a doctrine under the laws of a number of states in the United States, and most notably New York State law, pursuant to which an employee who acts unfaithfully towards his employer must forfeit all of the compensation he received during the period of his disloyalty.[23]
Several scholars, including Duska,[citation needed] discuss loyalty in the context of whistleblowing. Wim Vandekerckhove of the University of Greenwich points out that in the late 20th century saw the rise of a notion of a bidirectional loyalty—between employees and their employer. (Previous thinking had encompassed the idea that employees are loyal to an employer, but not that an employer need be loyal to employees.) The ethics of whistleblowing thus encompass a conflicting multiplicity of loyalties, where the traditional loyalty of the employee to the employer conflicts with the loyalty of the employee to his or her community, which the employer's business practices may be adversely affecting. Vandekerckhove reports that different scholars resolve the conflict in different ways, some of which he does not find to be satisfactory. Duska resolves the conflict by asserting that there is really only one proper object of loyalty in such instances—the community[citation needed]—a position that Vandekerckhove counters by arguing that businesses are in need of employee loyalty.[5]
John Corvino, associate professor of philosophy at Wayne State University takes a different tack, arguing that loyalty can sometimes be a vice, not a virtue, and that "loyalty is only a virtue to the extent that the object of loyalty is good"[citation needed] (similar to Nathanson). Vandekerckhove calls this argument "interesting" but "too vague" in its description of how tolerant an employee should be of an employer's shortcomings. Vandekerckhove suggests that Duska and Corvino combine, however, to point in a direction that makes it possible to resolve the conflict of loyalties in the context of whistleblowing, by clarifying the objects of those loyalties.[5]
Businesses seek to become the objects of loyalty in order to retain customers. Brand loyalty is a consumer's preference for a particular brand and a commitment to repeatedly purchase that brand.[24] So-called loyalty programs offer rewards to repeat customers in exchange for being able to keep track of consumer preferences and buying habits.[25]
A similar concept is fan loyalty, an allegiance to and abiding interest in a sports team, fictional character, or fictional series. Devoted sports fans continue to remain fans even in the face of a string of losing seasons.[26]
The Old Testament speaks of "loyal ones", which would be [according to whom?] those who follow the Bible with absolute loyalty, as in "Precious in the eyes of God is the death of his loyal ones" (Psalms116:15). Most Jewish and Christian authors view the binding of Isaac (Genesis22), in which Abraham was called by God to offer his son Isaac as a burnt offering, as a test of Abraham's loyalty.[27]Joseph's faithfulness to his master Potiphar and his rejection of Potiphar's wife's advances (Genesis39) have also been called an example of the virtue of loyalty.[28]:665
According to the New Testament, attempting to serve two masters leads to "double-mindedness" (James4:8), undermining loyalty to a cause.
Misplaced or mistaken loyalty refers to loyalty placed in other persons or organisations where that loyalty is not acknowledged or respected, is betrayed, or taken advantage of. It can also mean loyalty to a malignant or misguided cause.
Social psychology provides a partial explanation for the phenomenon in the way "the norm of social commitment directs us to honor our agreements... People usually stick to the deal even though it has changed for the worse".[29]Humanists point out that "man inherits the capacity for loyalty, but not the use to which he shall put it... may unselfishly devote himself to what is petty or vile, as he may to what is generous and noble".[30]
Animals as pets may display a sense of loyalty to humans. Famous cases include Greyfriars Bobby, a Skye terrier who attended his master's grave for fourteen years; Hachiko, a dog who returned to the place he used to meet his master every day for nine years after his death;[31] and Foxie, the spaniel belonging to Charles Gough, who stayed by her dead master's side for three months on Helvellyn in the Lake District in 1805 (although it is possible that Foxie had eaten Gough's body).[32]
In the Mahabharata, the righteous King Yudhishthira appears at the gates of Heaven at the end of his life with a stray dog he had picked up along the way as a companion, having previously lost his brothers and his wife to death. The god Indra is prepared to admit him to Heaven, but refuses to admit the dog, so Yudhishthira refuses to abandon the dog, and prepares to turn away from the gates of Heaven. Then the dog is revealed to be the manifestation of Dharma, the god of righteousness and justice, and who turned out to be his deified self. Yudhishthira enters heaven in the company of his dog, the god of righteousness.[33][28]:684–85 Yudhishthira is known by the epithet Dharmaputra, the lord of righteous duty.
Ethics is the philosophical study of moral phenomena. Also called moral philosophy, it investigates normative questions about what people ought to do or which behavior is morally right. Its main branches include normative ethics, applied ethics, and metaethics.
Normative ethics is the study of ethical behaviour and is the branch of philosophical ethics that investigates questions regarding how one ought to act, in a moral sense.
In ethical philosophy, utilitarianism is a family of normative ethical theories that prescribe actions that maximize happiness and well-being for the affected individuals. In other words, utilitarian ideas encourage actions that ensure the greatest good for the greatest number. Although different varieties of utilitarianism admit different characterizations, the basic idea behind all of them is, in some sense, to maximize utility, which is often defined in terms of well-being or related concepts. For instance, Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, described utility as the capacity of actions or objects to produce benefits, such as pleasure, happiness, and good, or to prevent harm, such as pain and unhappiness, to those affected.
Moral relativism or ethical relativism is used to describe several philosophical positions concerned with the differences in moral judgments across different peoples and cultures. An advocate of such ideas is often referred to as a relativist.
A virtue is a trait of excellence, including traits that may be moral, social, or intellectual. The cultivation and refinement of virtue is held to be the "good of humanity" and thus is valued as an end purpose of life or a foundational principle of being. In human practical ethics, a virtue is a disposition to choose actions that succeed in showing high moral standards: doing what is said to be right and avoiding what is wrong in a given field of endeavour, even when doing so may be unnecessary from a utilitarian perspective. When someone takes pleasure in doing what is right, even when it is difficult or initially unpleasant, they can establish virtue as a habit. Such a person is said to be virtuous through having cultivated such a disposition. The opposite of virtue is vice, and the vicious person takes pleasure in habitual wrong-doing to their detriment.
Virtue ethics is an approach that treats virtue and character as the primary subjects of ethics, in contrast to other ethical systems that put consequences of voluntary acts, principles or rules of conduct, or obedience to divine authority in the primary role.
In moral philosophy, deontological ethics or deontology is the normative ethical theory that the morality of an action should be based on whether that action itself is right or wrong under a series of rules and principles, rather than based on the consequences of the action. It is sometimes described as duty-, obligation-, or rule-based ethics. Deontological ethics is commonly contrasted to consequentialism, utilitarianism, virtue ethics, and pragmatic ethics. In this terminology, action is more important than the consequences.
Honesty or truthfulness is a facet of moral character that connotes positive and virtuous attributes such as integrity, truthfulness, straightforwardness, along with the absence of lying, cheating, theft, etc. Honesty also involves being trustworthy, loyal, fair, and sincere.
Ethics involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong behavior. A central aspect of ethics is "the good life", the life worth living or life that is simply satisfying, which is held by many philosophers to be more important than traditional moral conduct.
The is–ought problem, as articulated by the Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume, arises when one makes claims about what ought to be that are based solely on statements about what is. Hume found that there seems to be a significant difference between positive statements and prescriptive or normative statements, and that it is not obvious how one can coherently transition from descriptive statements to prescriptive ones. Hume's law or Hume's guillotine is the thesis that an ethical or judgmental conclusion cannot be inferred from purely descriptive factual statements.
Josiah Royce was an American Pragmatist and objective idealist philosopher and the founder of American idealism. His philosophical ideas included his joining of pragmatism and idealism, his philosophy of loyalty, and his defense of absolutism.
The Nicomachean Ethics is Aristotle's best-known works on ethics: the science of the good for human life, that which is the goal or end at which all our actions aim. It consists of ten sections, referred to as books, and is closely related to Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics. The work is essential for the interpretation of Aristotelian ethics.
In ethics and social sciences, value denotes the degree of importance of some thing or action, with the aim of determining which actions are best to do or what way is best to live, or to describe the significance of different actions. Value systems are proscriptive and prescriptive beliefs; they affect the ethical behavior of a person or are the basis of their intentional activities. Often primary values are strong and secondary values are suitable for changes. What makes an action valuable may in turn depend on the ethical values of the objects it increases, decreases, or alters. An object with "ethic value" may be termed an "ethic or philosophic good".
The ethics of care is a normative ethical theory that holds that moral action centers on interpersonal relationships and care or benevolence as a virtue. EoC is one of a cluster of normative ethical theories that were developed by some feminists and environmentalists since the 1980s. While consequentialist and deontological ethical theories emphasize generalizable standards and impartiality, ethics of care emphasize the importance of response to the individual. The distinction between the general and the individual is reflected in their different moral questions: "what is just?" versus "how to respond?" Carol Gilligan, who is considered the originator of the ethics of care, criticized the application of generalized standards as "morally problematic, since it breeds moral blindness or indifference".
Projectivism or projectionism in philosophy involves attributing (projecting) qualities to an object as if those qualities actually belong to it. It is a theory for how people interact with the world and has been applied in both ethics and general philosophy. It is derived from the Humean idea that all judgements about the world derive from internal experience, and that people therefore project their emotional state onto the world and interpret it through the lens of their own experience. Projectivism can conflict with moral realism, which asserts that moral judgements can be determined from empirical facts, i.e., some things are objectively right or wrong.
Kantian ethics refers to a deontological ethical theory developed by German philosopher Immanuel Kant that is based on the notion that "I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law." It is also associated with the idea that "it is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good will." The theory was developed in the context of Enlightenment rationalism. It states that an action can only be moral if it is motivated by a sense of duty, and its maxim may be rationally willed a universal, objective law.
The following outline is provided as an overview of and topical guide to the human self:
Non-possession is a religious tenet followed in Buddhist, Hindu, and Jain traditions in South Asia. In Jainism, aparigraha is the virtue of non-possessiveness, non-grasping, or non-greediness.
Political ethics is the practice of making moral judgments about political action and political agents. It covers two areas: the ethics of process, which covers public officials and their methods, and the ethics of policy, which concerns judgments surrounding policies and laws.
The values that a person holds may be personal or political depending on whether they are considered in relation to the individual or to society. Apart from moral virtue, examples of personal values include friendship, knowledge, beauty etc. and examples of political values, justice, equality and liberty. This article will outline some current ideas relating to the first group – personal values. It will begin by looking at the kinds of thing that have value and finish with a look at some of the theories that attempt to describe what value is. Reference will be made solely to Western sources although it is recognised that many, if not all, of the values discussed may be universal.
↑ Sharma, Urmila; Sharma, S.K. (1998). "Christian political thought". Western Political Thought. Atlantic Publishers & Distributors. pp.220 et seq. ISBN978-81-7156-683-9.
1 2 Thilly, Frank (1908). "Review of The Philosophy of Loyalty". Philosophical Review. 17. doi:10.2307/2177218. JSTOR2177218. reprinted as Thilly, Frank (2000). "Review of The Philosophy of Loyalty". In Randall E. Auxier (ed.). Critical responses to Josiah Royce, 1885–1916. History of American Thought. Vol.1. Continuum International Publishing Group. ISBN978-1-85506-833-9.
↑ Martin, Mike W. (1994). Virtuous giving: philanthropy, voluntary service, and caring. Indiana University Press. p.40. ISBN978-0-253-33677-4.
↑ Mullin, Richard P. (2005). "Josiah Royce's Philosophy of Loyalty as the Basis for Democratic Ethics". In Koczanowicz, Leszek; Singer, Beth J. (eds.). Democracy and the post-totalitarian experience. Value inquiry book series: Studies in pragmatism and values. Vol.167. Rodopi. pp.183–84. ISBN978-90-420-1635-4.
1 2 Ladd, John (1967). "Loyalty". In Paul Edwards (ed.). The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol.5. Macmillan. p.97.
↑ Ralls, Anthony (January 1968). "Review of The Encyclopedia of Philosophy". The Philosophical Quarterly. 18 (70): 77–79. doi:10.2307/2218041. JSTOR2218042.
1 2 3 4 Baron, Marcia (1984). The moral status of loyalty. CSEP module series in applied ethics. Kendall/Hunt Pub. Co. ISBN978-0-8403-3423-7.
1 2 Duska, Ronald F. (2007). "Whistleblowing and Employee Loyalty". Contemporary reflections on business ethics. Vol.23. Springer. p.142. ISBN978-1-4020-4983-5.
↑ Dick, Alan S.; Basu, Kunal (1994). "Customer Loyalty: Toward an Integrated Conceptual Framework". Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science. 22 (2): 99–113. doi:10.1177/0092070394222001. S2CID55369763.
Axinn, Sydney (1997). "Loyalty". In Werhane, Patricia H.; Freeman, R. Edward (eds.). Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. pp.388–390.
Connor, James (25 July 2007). The Sociology of Loyalty (1sted.). Springer. ISBN978-0-387-71367-0.
Nitobe, Inazō (1975). "The Duty of Loyalty". In Lucas, Charles (ed.). Bushido: The Warrior's Code. History and Philosophy Series. Vol.303. Black Belt Communications. ISBN978-0-89750-031-9.
Sorley, William Ritchie (1908). "Review of The Philosophy of Loyalty". The Hibbert Journal. 7. Reprinted as Sorley, William Ritchie (2000). "Review of The Philosophy of Loyalty". In Auxier, Randall E. (ed.). Critical Responses to Josiah Royce, 1885–1916. History of American Thought. Vol.1. Continuum International Publishing Group. ISBN978-1-85506-833-9.
White, Howard B. (1956). "Royce's Philosophy of Loyalty". The Journal of Philosophy. 53 (3): 99–103. doi:10.2307/2022080. JSTOR2022080.
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