The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force,[a] formerly the Second Artillery Corps,[b] is the strategic and tactical missile force of the People's Republic of China. The PLARF is the 4th branch of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and controls China's arsenal of land-based ballistic, hypersonic, cruise missiles—both nuclear and conventional. The armed service branch was established on 1 July 1966 and made its first public appearance on 1 October 1984. The headquarters for operations is located at Qinghe, Beijing. The PLARF is under the direct command of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission (CMC).
The PLARF comprises approximately 300,000 personnel and six ballistic missile "Bases" (units at roughly corps or army group grade), plus 3 support Bases in charge of storage,[2] engineering, and training respectively. The six operational Bases are independently deployed in the five Theaters throughout China.[3][4] and each controls a number of brigades.[needs update]
The name was changed from the PLA Second Artillery Corps to the PLA Rocket Force on 1 January 2016.[5][6] Despite claims by some, there appears to be no evidence to suggest that the new generation of Chinese ballistic-missile submarines will come under PLARF control.[7][8]
In the late 1980s, China was the world's third-largest nuclear power, possessing a small but credible nuclear deterrent force of approximately 100 to 400 nuclear weapons. Beginning in the late 1970s, China deployed a full range of nuclear weapons and acquired a nuclear second-strike capability. The nuclear forces were operated by the 100,000-person Strategic Missile Force, which was controlled directly by the General Staff.
China began developing nuclear weapons in the late 1950s with substantial Soviet assistance. With the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union withheld plans and data for an atomic bomb, abrogated the agreement on transferring defense and nuclear technology, and began the withdrawal of Soviet advisers in 1960. Despite the termination of Soviet assistance, China committed itself to continue nuclear weapons development to break "the superpowers' monopoly on nuclear weapons," to ensure Chinese security against the Soviet and American threats, and to increase Chinese prestige and power internationally.
Gansu hosted a missile launching area.[12] China destroyed 9 U-2 surveillance craft while two went missing when they attempted to spy on it.[13]
In the 1970s, the nuclear weapons program saw the development of MRBM, IRBM and ICBMs and marked the beginning of a deterrent force. China continued MRBM deployment, began deploying the Dongfeng-3 IRBM and successfully tested and commenced deployment of the Dongfeng-4 (CSS-4) limited-range ICBM.
By 1980, China had overcome the slowdown in nuclear development caused by the Cultural Revolution and had successes in its strategic weapons program. In May 1980, China successfully test launched its full-range ICBM, the Dongfeng-5 (CCS-4); the missile flew from central China to the Western Pacific, where it was recovered by a naval task force. The Dongfeng-5 possessed the capability to hit targets in the Soviet Union and the western United States.
In addition to the development of a sea-based nuclear force, China began considering the development of tactical nuclear weapons. PLA exercises featured the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons in offensive and defensive situations beginning in 1982. Reports of Chinese possession of tactical nuclear weapons had remained unconfirmed in 1987.
In 1986, China possessed a credible deterrent force with land, sea and air elements. Land-based forces included ICBMs, IRBMs, and MRBMs. The sea-based strategic force consisted of SSBNs. The Air Force's bombers were capable of delivering nuclear bombs but would be unlikely to penetrate the sophisticated air defenses of modern military powers.
China's nuclear forces, in combination with the PLA's conventional forces, served to deter both nuclear and conventional attacks on the Chinese lands. Chinese leaders pledged to not use nuclear weapons first (no first use), but pledged to absolutely counter-attack with nuclear weapons if nuclear weapons are used against China. China envisioned retaliation against strategic and tactical attacks and would probably strike countervalue rather than counterforce targets.
The combination of China's few nuclear weapons and technological factors such as range, accuracy, and response time limited the effectiveness of nuclear strikes against counterforce targets. China has been seeking to increase the credibility of its nuclear retaliatory capability by dispersing and concealing its nuclear forces in difficult terrain, improving their mobility, and hardening its missile silos.
The CJ-10 long-range cruise missile made its first public appearance during the military parade on the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China; the CJ-10 represents the next generation in rocket weapons technology in the PLA.
In late 2009, it was reported that the Corps was constructing a 3,000–5,000-kilometre (1,900–3,100mi) long underground launch and storage facility for nuclear missiles in the Hebei province.[14]47 News reported that the facility was likely located in the Taihang Mountains.[15]
The DF-ZFhypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) made its first flight test on 9 January 2014;[16] it likely entered service by October 2019.[17] It is believed to have atop speed of Mach 10, or 12,360km/h (7,680mph).[18]
Two Chinese technical papers from December 2012 and April 2013 show that China has concluded that hypersonic weapons pose "a new aerospace threat" and that they are developing satellite directed precision guidance systems. China is the third country to enter the "hypersonic arms race" after Russia and the United States. The U.S. Air Force has flown the X-51A Waverider technology demonstrator and the U.S. Army has flight tested the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon.[citation needed] China later confirmed the successful test flight of a "hypersonic missile delivery vehicle," but claimed it was part of a scientific experiment and not aimed at a target.[19]
In June 2021, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies has found out that China is constructing new missile silo field in Gansu in western China. According to the satellite picture, 119 missile silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles are under construction near Yumen City.[21] In July, Federation Of American Scientists found out there are another 110 silos being built in Hami, Xinjiang. The two significant expansion projects include silos more than ten times the number of ICBM silos in operation of PLARF today.[22]
In July 2021, China tested globe-circling hypersonic missile including the unprecedented launch of a separate 2nd missile from the ultra-high-speed vehicle according to the Financial Times and Wall Street Journal. The test showed China's development of its strategic, nuclear-capable weapons as more advanced than any had thought, surprising Pentagon officials, the two newspapers said. Neither the United States nor Russia has demonstrated the same ability, which requires launching a missile from a parent vehicle traveling five times the speed of sound. According to reporting by the Financial Times, this weapons system consists of two parts: a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) and a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).[23][24]
In July 2023, South China Morning Post reported that PLARF commander Li Yuchao and deputy commander Liu Guangbin were under the investigation of the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Military Commission. Later that month, both Li Yuchao and Liu Guangbin were officially removed from their posts, while Wang Houbin was appointed as the commander of the PLARF.[25] Additionally, Xu Xisheng was appointed as the political commissar.[26] Li Yuchao and Liu Guangbin's expulsion has not been formally explained. There are rumors that they are being investigated for corruption or disclosing military secrets.[27][28] Furthermore, it was thought to be an odd decision to replace the Rocket Force commander with military personnel from outside the branch, and this led to concerns about the security, credibility, and integrity of the PLA as well as its participation in China's military tactics during the Taiwan Strait conflict.[29]
On 25 September 2024 at 00:44 UTC, the PLARF performed its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test over the Pacific Ocean since the early 1980s. The specific ICBM that was launched was not stated.[30][31]
Missile ranges
Chinese Conventional Strike Ranges as of 2022
Chinese Nuclear Ballistic Missile Strike Ranges as of 2022
As of at least 2024, China has the largest land-based missile arsenal in the world.[32]
It is currently somewhat unclear as to whether the Chinese theater commands or the PLARF itself has operational control over the conventional ballistic missile units, though it seems likely that the PLARF acts in coordination with, but not taking orders from, the theater commands with regards to the use of conventional ballistic missiles, with control of nuclear weapons continuing to be exercised at the Central Military Commission level.[33]
It has been commanded by Wang Houbin since July 2023,[25] and by Deputy Commanders Li Chuanguang (李传广) and Chen Guangjun (陈光军) and an unknown chief of staff. PLA Rocket Force Command is also led by Political Commissar Xu Xisheng and Deputy Political Commissar Yu Guang (禹光). PLARF Command has four direct-reporting units which are not within the command's headquarters nor the subordinate bases: PLARF Staff Department, Political Work Department, Equipment Department, and Logistics Department.[38]
Staff Department (参谋部)
Operations Support Group (参谋部作战保障大队, Unit 96942) in Changping, Beijing
Reconnaissance Regiment (侦察团, Unit 96943) in Yanqing, Beijing
Survey and Mapping (测绘大队, Unit 96944) in Chanping, Beijing
Communications Regiment (参谋部通信团, Unit 96946) in Haidian, Beijing
Electronic Countermeasures Regiment (参谋部电子对抗团, Unit 96945), in Baoding, Hebei
Automated Command Center (自动化指挥中心) in Haidian, Beijing
New Soldier Training Regiment (新兵团) in Tangshan, Hebei
Meteorology Center (气象中心) in Changping, Beijing
Cruise Missile Mission Planning Center (巡航导弹任务规划中心, Unit 96941) in Changping, Beijing
Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (火箭军技术侦察局) in Haidian, Beijing
Political Work Department (政治工作部)
Organization Bureau (组织局)
Cadre Bureau (干部局)
Propaganda Bureau (宣传局)
Military and Civilian Personnel Bureau (兵员和文职人员局)
Mass Work Liaison Bureau (群工联络局)
Equipment Department (装备部)
Comprehensive Planning Bureau (综合计划局)
Scientific Research and Purchasing Bureau (科研订购局)
Experimentation Supervision Bureau (试验监管局)
Directly Subordinate Work Bureau (直属工作局)
Nuclear Technology and Equipment Bureau (核技术装备局)
Logistics Department (后勤部)
Finance Bureau (财务局)
Medical Bureau (卫生局)
Transport and Delivery Bureau (运输投送局)
Military Infrastructure and Construction Bureau (军事设施建设局)
Purchase and Supply Bureau (采购供应局)
Functional Bureau (业务局)
Combat Service and Planning Bureau (战勤计划局)
Directly Subordinate Work Bureau (直属工作局)
Unit designators
Each unit of the PLA maintains both a True Unit Designator (TUD, Chinese:部队番号; pinyin:bùduì fānhào) and a Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD, Chinese:部队代号; pinyin:bùduì dàihào). A unit's TUD is intended for internal use while the MUCD is intended to be used externally to protect and conceal the true identity of the unit. For example, the first brigade of the Base 61 has the TUD "611 Brigade" and the MUCD "Unit 96711". MUCDs do, however, often reveal the a unit's echelon, mission, and subordination. Although the system has changed at least four times since 1950, current PLARF MUCDs are five digits which begin with '96'. PLARF MUCDs whose third digit is 1–5 are pre-2017 reform and are obsolete.[38]
Order of battle
The PLARF is organized into nine bases (each of corps command grade, roughly equivalent to a group army, or army corps), ordinally numbered from Base 61 through Base 69. The first six bases (61 through 66) are operations bases assigned to the various geographic theater commands of the PRC while three bases (67 through 69) conduct support missions.[38][39] PLARF bases are typically led by an officer in a Corps or Corps Deputy Leader grade. Each of the six operations bases maintains a mix of nuclear and conventional armaments specific to their geographic command's mission. For example, as a component of the Eastern Theater Command (responsible for a potential conflict with Taiwan), Base 61 is armed primarily with short-range conventional missiles while the more inland Bases 64 and 66 operate long-range nuclear-capable missiles.[38] These six operations bases are all similarly structured with a base headquarters, staff department (参谋部), political work department (政治工作部), support department, six to eight subordinate missile brigades (导弹旅), a base hospital ([医院), and training ([训练团), communications ([通信团), operational support (作战保障团), comprehensive support ([综合保障团), and inspection (装检团) regiments.[38] The operational support regiment in each of the six operations bases provides security, engineering, meteorology, survey and mapping, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense.[38] Each base's comprehensive support regiment is responsible for equipment (including vehicles and missile) repair, maintenance, fueling, and storage — the result of a 2017 merge of base repair factories (修配厂) with technical service regiments (技术勤务团). Base equipment inspection regiments are responsible for nuclear warhead logistics including storage, maintenance, and distribution at each base. Exceptions to this standard base structure: Base 61 commands an additional regiment for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations, Base 63 commands an additional regiment for ICBM liquid fueling, and Base 64 possesses an equipment inspection brigade as opposed to the standard regiment.[38]
Base 61 was founded in August 1965 as unit 121 in Guangyang Township of Shitai County in Anhui Province and is responsible for the construction of missile silos.[41] The base itself was built in June 1966 under Project 303, and was designated as the 52nd Base of the Second Artillery Corp under the Nanjing Military Region on 25 May 1968. In 2016, the PLA Rocket Force assumed authority over the base. On 18 April 2017, under orders from Xi Jinping and the Central Military Commission, the base was re-designated Base 61.
Base 65
Base 65, headquartered in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, operates with the PLA's Northern Theater Command and stations units in the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Shandong. Base 65 was founded in September 1964 as the 51st Base Command of the Second Artillery Corps (now the PLARF) under the 302 Project, and then approved by committee on November 1. On 25 May 1968, it was transferred to the Second Artillery Force. In 1970, Base 65 moved to Tonghua City in Jilin Province. In 1992, it moved to its current home in Shenyang. It was transferred to the PLA Rocket Force in 2016. On 18 April 2017, under orders from CCP general secretary and CMC chairman Xi Jinping, the base was realigned and redesignated as the 65th Base.[41][42]
Base 67
The PLARF operates another base, Base 67,[42] MUCD: 96607, which is responsible for nuclear warhead storage (The "National Treasure", 国宝), warhead transport, warhead inspection and nuclear weapon's training. It is believed to form part of the nuclear C3 (command, control and communications) network, though it is unknown if this network is PLARF-only, shared between the PLARF and military commands, or if it used by the Central Military Commission, which is believed to have its own communication system for the nuclear forces.[43]
The main nuclear storage facility is reportedly located in Taibai County, where large-scale tunneling activities have taken place. The main storage depot is apparently under Mount Taibai itself, with related Base 67 facilities spread throughout the rest of the county. It appears that each missile Base also has its own smaller storage facility and depot.[43]
It is likely that warheads that require maintenance or testing, as well as a centralized reserve stock, are held at the Mount Taibai facility, with relatively few warheads distributed to the bases and brigades. It is likely that missile bases would receive additional warheads from the central depot in times of high tension. It seems that the structure of a main unit in Taibai County, with smaller replica units throughout the bases, is repeated in the transportation units.[43]
Warhead and missile transport in China is heavily reliant on the rail and road systems, likely why a large-scale rail project was constructed in the 1960s by the PLA in the area of Baoji, a large city in Shaanxi province and the location of Base 67's headquarters since that same time period. This became a concern after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, where the vulnerability of transport networks in Shaanxi province was dramatically proven.[citation needed]
Organization
Units believed to be subordinate to Base 67 are:[2]
Missile Technical Service Brigade [导弹技术勤务旅] The main stockpile management unit.
Unit 96038 [96038 部队]
Training Regiment [训练团]
Communications Regiment [通信团]
Operations Support Regiment [作战保障团]
Comprehensive Support Regiment [综合保障团]
Air Defense Regiment (no characters given)
2nd Comprehensive Defense (ECM) Regiment [综合防护二团]
Equipment Inspection Institute [装检研究所]
Special Equipment Transport Regiment [特装运输团]
PLARF Emergency Management Group [应急处置大队]
Unit 96607 Hospital [96607 部队医院]
Base 68
Base 68 (68 基地) MUCD: 96608[2] is the PLARF's engineering support base, in charge for the construction and maintenance of the physical infrastructure of the Force. Established in 2012, it is headquartered in Luoyang, Henan It consists of 6 Engineering Brigades, two of which specialize in installation, a Communications Engineering Regiment responsible for laying down the PLARF's physical communications infrastructure (fiber optics), a specialized "hostile environment" wireless communication regiment, and a Communications Repair and Maintenance Regiment.
Organization
1st Engineering Brigade (工程一旅)
2nd Engineering Brigade (工程二旅)
3rd Engineering Brigade (工程三旅)
4th Engineering Brigade (工程四旅)
5th Engineering Brigade (工程五旅)
6th Engineering Brigade (工程六旅)
Training Regiment (训练团)
Communications Regiment (通信团)
Comprehensive Support Regiment (综合保障团)
Communications Engineering Regiment (通信工程团)
Engineering Maintenance Support Group (工程维护保障大队)
Construction Project Technical Management Center (施工技术管理营)
Security and Communications Battalion (警卫通信营)
Base 69
Base 69 (69 基地)[2] MUCD: 96609 is a Test and Training Base [试验训练基地]. It was established in early 2017, gathering together a number of test and training districts and units. It is headquartered in Yinchuan and comprises four new Test and Training Districts, as well as several regiments supporting testing and training missions.
Most notable are the Blue Team OPFOR units that subject PLARF training units to attack during exercises
Blue Team OPFOR Regiment (蓝军团) These unit fields a whole array of opponent capabilities, including reconnaissance and surveillance, frequency jamming, precision strike, SOF raids, UAVs, electronic reconnaissance, and electromagnetic jamming.
Measurement and Control Regiment [测控团]
2nd Test and Training District (第二试验训练区) MUCD: 96792 Jingyu, Jilin
3rd Test and Training District (第三试验训练区) MUCD: 96793 Qakilik, Xinjiang
Unit 96795 (96795 部队) UAV Training. Xixia, Ningxia
Measurement and Control Group (测控大队)
Other branches
PLARF Special Operations Group (火箭军特种作战团), called "Sharp Blades Commando Battalion (利刃特种大队)" is the specially trained unit of the PLARF that responds to the highest-risk situations (such as Counter-SOF operations) within a PLARF base, compound, or missile site. The unit is also designated to escort missiles and nuclear weapons, and to protect missiles/infrastructure.[44]
Command, control, and communications
The PLARF has operated a separate command and control structure from the rest of the PLA since 1967.[45] The goal of the system is to ensure tight control of nuclear warheads at the highest levels of government. This is done by the Central Military Commission having direct control of the PLARF, outside of the structure of military regions.
For nuclear weapons, the command structure is believed to run from the CMC, to the headquarters of the PLARF in Beijing, from there to each Rocket Base, and from each Rocket Base down to the individual Brigade. From there, the Brigade transmits firing orders to the launch companies under its control. In the case of conventional ballistic missiles, it is reasonable to assume that more autonomy will be provided in wartime, with command likely being issued from the Bases, which are believed to coordinate with their respective Military Regions on targeting and conventional missile use.
Chinese nuclear C3 capabilities are centered around fiber-optic and satellite-based communication networks, replacing older radio command networks that made up the-then Second Artillery's C3 infrastructure before the 1990s. While historically Chinese nuclear missile forces had to launch from pre-prepared sites, the newest generation of nuclear-capable missiles (the DF-26 and DF-31AG) have been seen deploying to, and launching from, unprepared sites in exercises.
This would corroborate reports that PLARF communications regiments are being trained in the ability to set up telephone and command networks "on-the-fly". The reason for these changes likely has to do with concerns about PLARF survivability; China's commitment to a no-first-use policy means that its nuclear forces have to be capable of both surviving a first-strike, and receiving the orders required to fire back.
An anti-ballistic missile (ABM) is a surface-to-air missile designed to counter ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles are used to deliver nuclear, chemical, biological, or conventional warheads in a ballistic flight trajectory. The term "anti-ballistic missile" is a generic term for a system designed to intercept and destroy any type of ballistic threat; however, it is commonly used for systems specifically designed to counter intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
An intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is a ballistic missile with a range greater than 5,500 kilometres (3,400 mi), primarily designed for nuclear weapons delivery. Conventional, chemical, and biological weapons can also be delivered with varying effectiveness, but have never been deployed on ICBMs. Most modern designs support multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRVs), allowing a single missile to carry several warheads, each of which can strike a different target. The United States, Russia, China, France, India, the United Kingdom, Israel, and North Korea are the only countries known to have operational ICBMs. Pakistan is the only nuclear-armed state that does not possess ICBMs.
A multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) is an exoatmospheric ballistic missile payload containing several warheads, each capable of being aimed to hit a different target. The concept is almost invariably associated with intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying thermonuclear warheads, even if not strictly being limited to them. An intermediate case is the multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) missile which carries several warheads which are dispersed but not individually aimed. All nuclear-weapon states except Pakistan and North Korea are currently confirmed to have deployed MIRV missile systems.
The Dongfeng series, typically abbreviated as "DF missiles", are a family of short, medium, intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles operated by the Chinese People's Liberation Army Rocket Force.
National missile defense (NMD) refers to the nationwide antimissile program the United States has had under development since the 1990s. After the renaming in 2002, the term now refers to the entire program, not just the ground-based interceptors and associated facilities.
The Strategic Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation or the Strategic Missile Forces of the Russian Federation is a separate combat arm of the Russian Armed Forces that controls Russia's land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). It was formerly part of the Soviet Armed Forces from 1959 to 1991.
A Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) is a warhead delivery system that uses a low Earth orbit towards its target destination. Just before reaching the target, it deorbits through a retrograde engine burn.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), formerly Theater High Altitude Area Defense, is an American anti-ballistic missile defense system designed to intercept and destroy short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase. The THAAD interceptor carries no warhead, instead relying on its kinetic energy of impact to destroy the incoming missile. THAAD was developed after the experience of Iraq's Scud missile attacks during the Gulf War in 1991.
The RT-2PM Topol was a mobile intercontinental ballistic missile designed in the Soviet Union and in service with Russia's Strategic Missile Troops. As of 2014, Russia planned to replace all RT-2PM ICBMs with versions of Topol-M. In December 2023, the last Topol regiment was taken off combat duty.
Missile defense is a system, weapon, or technology involved in the detection, tracking, interception, and also the destruction of attacking missiles. Conceived as a defense against nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), its application has broadened to include shorter-ranged non-nuclear tactical and theater missiles.
The Dong Feng 31 is a third-generation long-range, road-mobile, three stage, solid-fuel rocket intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the Dongfeng missile series developed by the People's Republic of China. It is designed to carry a single 1-megaton thermonuclear weapon. It is a land-based variant of the submarine-launched JL-2. It is operated by the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). In 2009, the Chinese inventory was estimated as under 15 DF-31 missiles and under 15 DF-31A missiles. US Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center estimates that as of June 2017, five to ten Mod 1 and over fifteen Mod 2 launchers were operationally deployed.
A nuclear triad is a three-pronged military force structure of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers with nuclear bombs and missiles. Countries build nuclear triads to eliminate an enemy's ability to destroy a nation's nuclear forces in a first-strike attack, which preserves their own ability to launch a second strike and therefore increases their nuclear deterrence.
The Dongfeng-41 or DF-41 is a fourth-generation Chinese solid-fuelled road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile operated by the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force. DF-41 is the fourth and the latest generation of the Dongfeng series strategic missiles developed by China. The missile was officially unveiled at the China National Day military parade on 1 October 2019.
The Korean People's Army Strategic Force, previously known as the Korean People's Army Strategic Rocket Force, is a military branch of the Korean People's Army (KPA) founded in 2012 that operates surface-to-surface missiles in the nuclear and conventional strike roles. It is mainly armed with ballistic missiles. The inventory includes domestic and Soviet designs.
Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS), formerly called Prompt Global Strike (PGS), is a United States military effort to develop a system that can deliver a precision-guided conventional weapon strike anywhere in the world within one hour, in a similar manner to a nuclear ICBM. Such a weapon would allow the United States to respond far more swiftly to rapidly emerging threats than is possible with conventional forces. A CPS system could also be useful during a nuclear conflict, potentially replacing the use of nuclear weapons against up to 30% of targets. The CPS program encompasses numerous established and emerging technologies, including conventional surface-launched missiles and air- and submarine-launched hypersonic missiles.
The RS-28 Sarmat, often colloquially referred to as Satan II by media outlets, is a three-stage Russian silo-based, liquid-fueled, HGV-capable and FOBS-capable super-heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) produced by the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau. It is intended to replace the Soviet R-36M ICBM in Russia's arsenal.
The Eastern Theater Command is one of the five theater commands of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), founded 1 February 2016. It replaced the Nanjing Military Region. The command is headquartered in Nanjing.
The 46th Nizhnedneprovskaya Order of the October Revolution Red Banner Rocket Division / Missile Division was a division of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, active from 1961–62 to 1992 under the Soviet Union, and from 1992 to 2002 as part of Ukraine. The division traced its history back to the 188th Rifle Division, formed in Kaunas in spring 1941. The division fought in the Battle of the Dnieper, for which it was awarded the honorific "Lower Dnieper". After the Second Jassy–Kishinev Offensive it garrisoned Sliven in Bulgaria. At some point it moved to Pervomaisk in the then-Ukrainian SSR and became the 20th Rifle Division in 1955. In 1957, it became the 93rd Motor Rifle Division and was disbanded in 1959. In 1960, the 29th Rocket Brigade was formed in Pervomaisk and became the 46th Rocket Division in 1960. The 46th Rocket Division inherited the honors and awards of the 188th Rifle Division. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the division became part of Ukrainian military and was disbanded by 2002.
The Avangard is a Russian hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). It can be carried as a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payload of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), such as the UR-100UTTKh, R-36M2 and RS-28 Sarmat. It can deliver both nuclear and conventional payloads. The Avangard is reportedly capable of travelling at re-entry speeds.
The People's Liberation Army Aerospace Force is an arm of the People's Liberation Army. It was established on 19 April 2024. It is one of two independent space forces in the world.
References
Citations
↑ "The PLA Oath"(PDF). Archived(PDF) from the original on 2016-05-09. Retrieved 2015-10-30. I am a member of the People's Liberation Army. I promise that I will follow the leadership of the Communist Party of China...
↑ Fisher, Richard D. Jr. (6 January 2016). "China establishes new Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force". Jane's Defence Weekly. 53 (9). Surrey, England: Jane's Information Group. ISSN0265-3818. This report also quotes Chinese expert Song Zhongping saying that the Rocket Force could incorporate 'PLA sea-based missile unit[s] and air-based missile unit[s]'.
↑ Logan, David C.; Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs (Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University) (2016). "China's Future SSBN Command and Control Structure". Strategic Forum (299). Washington, D.C.: NDU Press: 2–3. OCLC969995006. Archived from the original on 2020-10-30. Retrieved 2020-05-23.
↑ Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee (June 2017). Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Report). NASIC. Archived from the original on 2019-06-18. Retrieved 2019-06-29.
↑ Li, Xiaobing (2024). "Beijing's Military Power and East Asian-Pacific Hot Spots". In Fang, Qiang; Li, Xiaobing (eds.). China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment. Leiden University Press. p.264. ISBN9789087284411.
↑ "美媒称中国上周五再次成功试射高超音速武器"[U.S. media said China successfully tested hypersonic weapons again last Friday]. Sina Military News (in Chinese). 25 April 2016. Archived from the original on 2021-11-16. Retrieved 2022-08-27.
Everleth, Decker, "People's Liberation Army Rocket Force Order of Battle 2023," Middlebury Institute of International Stuides at Monterey. "At time of publication, it is estimated that the PLARF has 162 to 216 SRBM launchers, 87 to 96 MRBM launchers, 78 to 96 GLCM launchers, 216 IRBM launchers, and 110 ICBM launchers within its active force. By 2028 this force will grow to at least 108 to 144 SRBM launchers, at least 156 to 192 MRBM launchers, at least 78 to 96 or more GLCM launchers, at least 252 IRBM launchers, and 507 or more ICBM launchers. It is worth emphasizing that everything in the current estimate is counting something that the PRC has already built or is in the process of building." (p38)
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People's Republic of China 
Chinese Communist Party [1] 
People's Liberation Army 
