Mbaise Rebellion Battles against the British 1902–1917 – In 1900, the British created the Southern Nigeria Protectorate. The resistance to British colonisation from the people of modern mbaise and igbo's throughout Eastern Nigeria is well documented.
Bende Onitsha Hinterland Expedition 1905–1906 – The Bende Onitsha Hinterland Expedition is also referred to as the Ahiara Expedition due to the impact it had on the area. There was a lot of hostility between the British and the people of Mbaise following the Aro Expedition.
↑Dorn 2016, p.32. sfn error: no target: CITEREFDorn2016 (help)
↑Nugent 2004, p.97. sfn error: no target: CITEREFNugent2004 (help)
↑Baxter, Peter (2015). Biafra: the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970. Solihull, West Midlands, England: Helion. p.13. ISBN9781909982369.
↑Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), p. 130. "In reality, however, the British government supplied many more arms than it was publicly prepared to admit. Apart from direct arms supplies, it provided military intelligence to the Nigerian government and may have helped it to access sophisticated arms and mercenaries through third parties."
↑Achebe, Chinua (2012). There was a country: a personal history of Biafra. New York: Penguin. pp.104, 154. ISBN978-1-59420-482-1. The initial neutrality of the USSR's Western rivals, including Britain and the United States in particular, I gather, provided an opening for the Soviets to send MiG fighters and technical assistance to the Nigerians, thereby including the region in the cold war theater.
↑Sadleman, StephenIsrael, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war, 1967–70 (2000). The Ties That Divide. Columbia University Press. p.86. ISBN9780231122290. Retrieved 8 June 2018.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
↑Minahan, James B. (2016). "Urhobo". Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups around the World. Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood. p.442–443. ISBN978-1-61069-954-9.
Fraser-Rahim, Muhammad (17 July 2020). "In Somalia, Iran Is Replicating Russia's Afghan Strategy". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 17 July 2020. Somali military officials maintain that Iran has been running secret operations to undermine the United States in Somalia, providing sophisticated weapons, improvised explosive100000 als used to make bombs. The military officials allege that Iran and its proxies are complicit in al-Shabab attacks on the U.S. military, Somali forces, and the African Union Mission in Somalia
"The Growing Relationship between Iran and al-Shabab Movement in Somalia: Motives and Potential Consequences". Emirates Policy Center. Archived from the original on 8 December 2022. Retrieved 27 July 2020. For Iran, working with non-State actors such as Al-Shabaab and the Houthis is an essential part of its foreign policy, aimed at expanding its geopolitical influence throughout the region. Tehran has developed an unspoken alliance with Al-Shabaab with the aim of creating a covert intelligence network that will allow it to achieve its goals and support its interests in the Middle East and Africa.
Bashir, Hamdi (7 October 2020). "The Future of the Role of Iran's Quds Force in Africa". Emirates Policy Center. Archived from the original on 8 December 2022. The Quds Force has been working with agents and allies, such as Lebanon's Hezbollah and Somalia's Al-Shabaab, which are thought to have recently established relations with the Quds Force.
Fraser-Rahim, Muhammad (17 July 2020). "In Somalia, Iran Is Replicating Russia's Afghan Strategy". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 17 July 2020. Somali police and finance ministry officials claim the Quds Force uses these networks to smuggle Iranian oil into Somalia and then sell cheap oil across Africa to subvert U.S. sanctions, with some of the proceeds used to support militants in Yemen and Somalia
Ahmed, Guled (9 February 2021). "As Farmaajo digs in with Qatari backing, Somalia's election crisis grows worse". Middle East Institute. Archived from the original on 9 February 2021. Qatar has allegedly used al-Shabab to target groups it has identified as opposing its interests, including Somali politicians critical of Doha's role in the country and outside actors like the United Arab Emirates
Yüksel, Engin; Tekineş, Haşim (26 August 2021). "Turkish-Qatari approaches to conflict and crisis across the region". Clingendael. Archived from the original on 26 August 2021. Qatari individuals and government representatives are reported to have been in regular contact with Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Syria, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen in order to exert geopolitical influence
Houreld, Katharine (10 November 2021). "Iranian-supplied arms smuggled from Yemen into Somalia, study says". Reuters. Archived from the original on 10 November 2021. Guns supplied by Iran to its Houthi allies in Yemen are being smuggled across the Gulf of Aden to Somalia, according to a Geneva-based think tank, where al Qaeda-linked al Shabab insurgents are battling a weak and divided government.
Redondo, Raúl (20 July 2020). "Iran allies with Al-Shabaab in Somalia to distribute arms to Houthi rebels". Atalayar. Archived from the original on 19 August 2023. Iran has established links with the jihadist group Al-Shabaab in Somalia to attack United States and other international forces in the African country and the region and to supply arms to Houthi rebels in Yemen
"Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)"(PDF). un.org. UN Security Council. 11 October 2024. pp.2, 12. Archived from the original(PDF) on 8 November 2024. In addition, increased smuggling activities involving small arms and light weapons are observed between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab, with indications of shared military supplies or a common supplier. ... Houthis are evaluating options to carry out attacks at sea from the Somali coast. To that end, they are strengthening ties with the terrorist group Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab).
↑The exact origin of Ansaru is unclear, but it had already existed as Boko Haram faction[102] before officially announcing its foundation as separate group on 1 January 2012.[102][103][104] The group had no known military presence in Nigeria from 2015, but several of its members appear to be still active. The group appear allied with rag-tag factions in the Nigerian bandit conflict and were recently behind the Abuja–Kaduna train attack[105]
↑Following Mohammed Yusuf's death, Boko Haram splintered into numerous factions which no longer operated under a unified leadership. Though Abubakar Shekau eventually became the preeminent commander of the movement, he never really controlled all Boko Haram groups. Instead, the factions were loosely allied, but also occasionally clashed with each other.[109][110] This situation changed in 2015 when Shekau pledged allegiance to ISIL. The leadership of ISIL eventually decided to replace Shekau as a local commander with Yusuf's son Abu Musab al-Barnawi, whereupon the movement split completely. Shekau no longer recognized the authority of ISIL's central command, and his loyalists started to openly fight the followers of al-Barnawi. Regardless, Shekau did never officially renounce his pledge of allegiance to ISIL as a whole; his forces are thus occasionally regarded as "second branch of ISWAP". Overall, the relation of Shekau with ISIL remains confused and ambiguous. In the Battle of Sambisa Forest of 2021 ISWAP fighters killed Shekau and al-Barnawi nominally remains head of ISWAP[111]
↑While conflicts like the AQIM insurgency and Tuareg rebellions were ongoing up until the start of the 2012 Tuareg rebellion, the conflict that would devolve into the war in the Sahel didn't start until January 2012.[118]
↑JNIM has had a small presence in northern Togo since 2021, with several attacks carried out since then.[119]
↑Jihadist groups have little to no presence on Ivorian soil, but have occasionally launched attacks along the Burkinabe-Ivorian border since 2019. AQIM attacked Grand-Bassam in 2016 as well.[120]
↑No jihadist groups are active on Algerian soil, although the country has been attacked several times in the early days of the Mali War by jihadist groups. Currently, diplomatic relations between the AES states and Algeria are bad due to Algeria allowing FLA rebels on their soil.[121]
↑The Mauritanian government currently has a non-aggression pact with JNIM-aligned jihadists, and has not had an attack by jihadist groups on its soil since 2011. Small JNIM cells are present along the Malian border.[122]
↑Previously Wagner Group, since renamed Africa Corps and absorbed by Russian government.[125]
↑Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea are members of ECOWAS that were suspended following coup d'états which established military juntas in their respective countries.
↑Cape Verde is opposed to military intervention in Niger, instead advocating for a diplomatic solution.
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