Since the partition of India in 1947, there have been several instances of religious violence against Muslims. These incidents often take the form of violent attacks on Muslims by Hindutva mobs, forming a pattern of sporadic sectarian violence between Hindu and Muslim communities. From 1954 to 1982, nearly 7,000 incidents occurred, resulting in the deaths of over 10,000 people.[1][2]
The causes of violence against Muslims in the country are varied. The roots are thought to lie in Indian history, stemming from resentment towards the Muslim conquests in India during the Middle Ages, the divisive policies implemented by the colonial government during British rule, and the partition of the Indian subcontinent into a Muslim-majority Pakistan and an Indian state with a Muslim minority. Many scholars argue that anti-Muslim violence is politically motivated and part of an electoral strategy of mainstream political parties associated with the Hindutva ideology, such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Other scholars contend that the violence is not widespread but is instead confined to certain urban regions due to local socio-political conditions.[3]
A major factor in the rise of anti-Muslim violence is the proliferation of the Hindutva, a Hindu nationalist ideology. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) is an Indian far-rightparamilitary organisation, which is the principal Hindutva entity in the country. The RSS is the founding and leading force behind the Sangh Parivar, a group of Hindutva organisations, which includes political parties, religious organisations, and student unions, among others.[7][pageneeded] This is evident in the writings of Golwalkar, the second Sarsanghchalak (Chief) of the RSS, in regards to Nazi Germany, where he observed, "Race pride at its highest has been manifested here. Germany has also shown how well nigh impossible it is for Races and cultures, having differences going to the root, to be assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for us in Hindusthan to learn and profit by."[8] In the 1990s, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader L. K. Advani led a national political-religious rally named the Ram Rath Yatra, which culminated in the demolition of the Babri Masjid by a Hindutva mob, based on claims that the mosque was supposedly situated on the site of the Ram Janmabhoomi, the birthplace of the Hindu deityRama. Since then, Hindutva has become increasingly mainstream within Indian politics, coinciding with a rise in anti-Muslim violence. Scholars argue that anti-Muslim rhetoric, politics, and policies have proved electorally beneficial for Hindutva political parties and leaders, especially the BJP, and therefore can be said to be politically motivated.[9][10][11][12]
These patterns of violence have been well-established since partition, with dozens of studies documenting instances of mass violence against minority groups.[18] Overall, more than 10,000 people have been killed in Hindu-Muslim communal violence since 1950.[1] According to official figures, there were 6,933 instances of communal violence between 1954 and 1982. Between 1968 and 1980, 1,598 Muslims and 530 Hindus were killed, in a total of 3,949 instances of mass violence.[19] Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a consistent rise in incidents of mass violence, throughout north India, began.[20]
Praveen Swami, an Indian journalist and author, believes that these acts of violence have "scarred India's post independence history." He also considers them to have hindered India's cause in Jammu and Kashmir, in regards to the Kashmir conflict.[21]
Location of communal incidents, with given city names and years
Scholars have described incidents of anti-Muslim violence as politically motivated and organised, with many describing them as pogroms,[24] or a form of state terrorism with "organised political massacres"[25] rather than mere "riots".[26] Others have argued that anti-Muslim violence is not as widespread as it appears, and is rather restricted to certain urban areas because of local socio-political conditions. There are many Indian cities where Muslims and Hindus live peacefully together, with almost no instances of sectarian violence.[27][28]
Role of political parties
Many social scientists have argued that acts of anti-Muslim violence are institutionally supported, particularly by political parties and organisations connected to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a far-rightHindutvaparamilitary organisation. In particular, scholars fault the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Shiv Sena for complicity in these incidents of violence[29][30][31][32] and of using violence against Muslims as part of a larger electoral strategy.[29][33] For example, research by Raheel Dhattiwala and Michael Biggs has stated that the killings of Muslims are far higher in areas where the BJP faces stiff electoral opposition, in comparison to areas where the party is more cemented.[1] Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, northern India witnessed the beginning of a rise in anti-Muslim violence, with the BJP witnessing increased successes in local and state elections.[34]Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, an American social anthropologist, concludes that the violence in Bhagalpur in 1989, Hashimpura in 1987, and Moradabad in 1980 were organised killings.[35] According to Ram Puniyani, an Indian academic, the Shiv Sena was victorious in elections in Maharashtra due to the violence of the 1990s, and similarly the BJP was victorious in elections in Gujarat after the violence of 2002.[36]Gyan Prakash, however, cautions that the BJP's actions in Gujarat do not equate to the entirety of India, and it remains to be seen if the Hindutva movement has been successful in the deployment of this strategy nationwide.[37] In recent years, anti-Muslim violence in India has increased significantly due to the Hindutva ideology which envisages citizens with other religious beliefs to have second‐class status.[38][39]
Economic and cultural factors
Hindu nationalists use the historical subjugation of India by Muslims as an excuse for violence. They feel that, since the Partition, Indian Muslims are allied to Pakistan and are possibly radicalised and, therefore, the Hindus must take defensive steps to avoid repeat of the past wrongs and reassert their pride.[original research?][40] The higher fertility rate among Muslims has been a recurring theme in the Hindu Right's rhetoric. They claim that the higher birth rate among Muslims is part of a plan to turn the Hindus into a minority within their own country.[original research?][41]
Another reason given for these outbreaks of violence is the upward mobility of lower castes communities. Anti-Muslim violence has become a substitute for class and caste tensions. Hindu nationalists, rather than deal with claims from the lower class, instead shift to viewing Muslims and Christians as not "fully Indian" due to their religion,[42] and portray those who carry out attacks against them as "heroes" that "defend the majority" from who are considered to be "anti-nationals".[36] Muslims are viewed as suspects and their loyalty to the state is regularly questioned. According to the scholar Omar Khalidi:
Anti-Muslim violence is planned and executed to render Muslims economically and socially crippled and, as a outcome of that economic and social backwardness, assimilating them into lower rungs of Hindu society.[43]
Anti-Muslim violence creates a security risk for Hindus residing outside of India. Since the 1950s, there have been retaliatory attacks on Hindus in Pakistan and Bangladesh in response to anti-Muslim violence in India. After the 1992 violence in Bombay, Hindu temples were attacked in Britain and Thailand, as well as cities such as Dubai.[46] This recurring violence has created a significant divide between the Muslim and Hindu communities.[47]
Jamaat-e-Islami Hind has spoken out against these communal clashes, as it believes that the violence not only impacts Muslims, but India as a whole. They further believe the violence damages India's development prospects.[48] In Gujarat, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) was utilised in incidents pertaining to communal violence in 1992 and 1993. The majority of those arrested under the act were Muslim. Conversely, TADA was not used after the violence carried out against Muslims during the Bombay riots.[49]
Demographics
BJP politicians, as well as those of other parties, argue that demographics play an essential role in Indian elections. The BJP believes that the higher the number of Muslims within a constituency, the higher the chances of centrist parties to acquiesce to minority groups' requests, which lowers the chances of Muslims "building bridges" with their Hindu neighbours. As such, according to this argument "Muslim appeasement" is the root cause of communal violence.[50]Susanne and Lloyd Rudolph argue that economic disparity is a reason for the aggression shown towards Muslims by Hindus. As India's economy developed due to globalisation and investment from overseas companies, the expectations of the Hindu population were not met in reality. Hindutva advocates then encouraged the perception of Muslims as the source of the troubles of the Hindus.[51]
The actions of anti-Hindu and anti-India militant groups in Kashmir and Pakistan have reinforced anti-Muslim sentiments in the country, which has strengthened the Hindutva movement. Hindutva discourse portrays Muslims as traitors and state enemies, whose patriotism is questioned.[52]Sumit Ganguly, a political scientist, argues that the rise in terrorism cannot solely be attributed to socioeconomic factors, but also to the violence perpetrated by Hindutva forces.[53]
In 1964, riots occurred in Calcutta, West Bengal, between Hindus and Muslims. The violence left over 100 people dead, with 438 people injured. Over 7,000 people were arrested. 70,000 Muslims fled their homes and 55,000 were provided protection by the Indian army. Muslims in Kolkata became more ghettoised than ever before in the aftermath. Furthermore, violence was also seen in rural West Bengal.[54]
On 18 February 1983, around 1,600 to 2,000 Muslims of East Bengal origin, known as the Miya people, from various villages under the Nellie police station in Assam's Nagaon district, were killed by their tribal and lower caste Hindu village neighbours.[55][56] The incident began in early morning, when groups of villagers burned down the homes of the victims. With no place to hide, the outnumbered victims rushed towards the direction of a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) camp, with the perpetrators pursuing and hacking to death those who fell back.[57] From those that died, around 70% were women, 20% were elderly people, and 10% were men.[58]
This massacre happened in the context of the Assam Movement, which demanded the deletion of foreigners' names from the electoral roll. The Congress-led Indian government decided to go ahead with the 1983 Assembly elections without revising the electoral roll,[59] which the leaders of the movement decided to boycott with widespread support from the local populace.[60] The Miya people decided to support the Congress party, in the hopes of ending the movement.[61] The call for boycott triggered widespread violence,[62] with different ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups clashing against each other. Muslim communities of Nellie, anticipating an attack, had reported the possibility of one to the police several times before the incident; and though police officers visited Muslim villages to assure their safety, no police personnel was deputed for their protection.[63]
In the aftermath, both the Indian government and the movement leaders blamed each other for the responsibility for the massacre.[64] The government instituted the Tewary Commission, to investigate the incident.[65] Though the report has been finished, it has not been released to the public.[66] The leaders of the Assam Movement boycotted the Tewary Commission, and supported a non-official judicially inquired commission instead, led by T. U. Mehta, a retired chief justice of a high court.[67] Both the commissions are seen as biased and aligned to either the government or the movement leaders' perspective, and there exists no third-party report. After the incident, hundreds of cases were filed, and hundreds of charge sheets were submitted by the police. However, after the movement leaders came to power in Assam two years later, in 1985, all cases concerning the 1983 election were subsequently closed, and no one has been punished for the incident thereafter.[68] Both the survivors and the perpetrators went back to their villages, though not in complete harmony.[69]
During the 1969 Gujarat riots, it is estimated that 630 people lost their lives.[70] The 1970 Bhiwandi Riots, which occurred between 7 and 8 May in the Maharashtrian towns of Bhiwandi, Jalgaon, and Mahad. There were large amounts of arson and vandalism of Muslim-owned properties. In 1980, in Moradabad, an estimated 2,500 people were killed due to religious sectarian violence.[71] Local police were directly implicated in planning the instances of violence.[72]
Communal riots between Hindus and Muslims occurred in Meerut, Uttar Pradesh, in 1987. During these riots 19 personnel of the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) allegedly rounded up 42 Muslim youth from the Hashimpura locality of the city, and took them in truck to its outskirts, near MuradnagarGhaziabad district, where they were subsequently shot and their bodies dumped in water canals. The bodies were found a few days later. In May 2000, 16 of the 19 accused surrendered, and were later released on bail, while 3 were already dead. In 2002, the trial of the case was transferred by the Supreme Court of India, from Ghaziabad to a Sessions Court at the Tis Hazari complex in Delhi.[73][74] The case faced regular delays, becoming the oldest pending case in Delhi.[75] On 21 March 2015, all 16 accused men were acquitted due to insufficient evidence.[76] Reportedly, the court emphasised that the survivors could not recognise any of the accused PAC personnel. However, on 31 October 2018, the Delhi High Court convicted the 16 personnel of the PAC, who were then sentenced to life imprisonment, overturning the previous verdict.[77][78][79]
In the year 1989, in Bhagalpur, Bihar, an estimated 1,000 people lost their lives in violent attacks,[70] believed to be a result of the religious tensions raised over the Ayodhya dispute, and the processions carried out by the VHP, which were to be a "show of strength" and to serve as a warning to minority communities.[80] Beginning on 24 October 1989, violent incidents occurred for over two months. The violence affected the Bhagalpur city as well as 250 villages around it. Over 1,000 people were killed, and another 50,000 were displaced as a result of the violence. It was considered the worst Hindu-Muslim violence in independent India at the time.[81][82]
The destruction of the Babri Mosque by a far-rightHindu mob directly led to the 1992–93 Bombay riots.[83][84] According to an article published in The Hindu'sFrontline magazine, titled Gory Winter, "officially, 900 people were killed in mob rioting and firing by the police, 2,036 injured and thousands internally displaced."[85] BBC correspondent Toral Varia called the riots "a pre-planned pogrom", that had been in the making since 1990, and stated that the destruction of the mosque was "the final provocation".[86]
Several scholars have likewise concluded that the riots were pre-planned, and that Hindu rioters had been given access to information about the locations of Muslim-owned homes and businesses from non-public sources.[87] This violence is widely reported as having been orchestrated by the Shiv Sena, a Hindutva political party led by Bal Thackeray.[88] A high-ranking member of the special branch, V. Deshmukh, gave evidence to the commission tasked with probing the riots. He said that the failures in intelligence and prevention had been due to political assurances that the mosque in Ayodhya would be protected, that the police were fully aware of the Shiv Sena's capabilities to commit acts of violence, and that the party had a history of inciting hate against minority communities.[89]
The skyline of Ahmedabad filled with smoke as buildings and shops are set on fire by rioting mobs
Since the partition, Muslim communities have been subject to, and engaged in, violence in Gujarat.[26] In 2002, in an incident described as an act of "fascistic state terror",[90] Hindu extremists carried out acts of violence against the minority Muslim population.[91]
The beginning of the incident was the Godhra train burning, which was allegedly done by Muslims.[92] During the anti-Muslim violence, young girls were sexually assaulted, burned, or hacked to death.[93] These instances of violence were condoned by the ruling BJP,[94][95] whose refusal to intervene led to the displacement of over 200,000 people.[96] Death toll figures range from the official estimate of 254 Hindus and 790 to over 2,000 Muslims killed.[97] Then Chief Minister Narendra Modi has also been accused of initiating and condoning the violence, as have the police and government officials who took part, as they had directed the rioters and gave them lists of Muslim-owned properties.[98]
Politician Mallika Sarabhai, who had complained over state complicity in the violence, was harassed, intimidated, and falsely accused of human trafficking by the BJP.[99] Three police officers were given punitive transfers by the BJP after they had successfully put down the rioting in their wards, so as not to interfere further in preventing the violence.[100] According to Brass, the only conclusion from available evidence points to a methodical pogrom, which was carried out with "exceptional brutality and was highly coordinated".[101]
In 2007, Tehelka magazine released "The Truth: Gujarat 2002", a report which implicated the state government in the violence, and claimed that what had been called a spontaneous act of revenge was, in reality, a "state-sanctioned pogrom".[102] According to Human Rights Watch, the violence in Gujarat in 2002 was pre-planned, and the police and state government participated in the violence.[103] In 2012, Modi was cleared of complicity in the violence by a Special Investigation Team appointed by the Supreme Court. The Muslim community is reported to have reacted with "anger and disbelief", and activist Teesta Setalvad has said the legal fight was not yet over, as they had the right to appeal.[104] Human Rights Watch has reported on acts of exceptional heroism by Hindus, Dalits, and tribals, who tried to protect Muslims from the violence.[105]
From August to September 2013, conflicts between the Hindus and Muslims occurred in the Muzaffarnagar district of Uttar Pradesh. These riots resulted in at least 62 deaths, including 42 Muslims and 20 Hindus. The riots further left over 200 injured and more than 50,000 displaced.
According to Ashutosh Varshney, the director of the Center for Contemporary South Asia at Brown University, "on the whole, the Delhi riots ... are now beginning to look like a pogrom, à la Gujarat 2002 and Delhi 1984".[113] According to Subir Sinha, a senior lecturer at the SOAS University of London, the north and northeast areas of Delhi were a focus of "highly inflammatory speeches from top BJP ministers and politicians" in the run-up to the Delhi election. Sinha continues that "the pent-up anger of BJP supporters" who lost the election in Delhi, effectively took it out on "the Muslim residents of these relatively poor parts of the city".[114]
Parzania, an Indian English film directed by Rahul Dholakia and released in 2007, was inspired by a true story of a 10-year old Parsi boy who disappeared after the Gulbarg Society massacre on 28 February 2002 as part of the 2002 Gujarat riots.[117] This film was not released in Gujarat due to fear of further riots, which sparked controversy.[118][119]
↑ Jaffrelot, Christophe (1999). The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics: 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of Identity-building, Implantation and Mobilisation (with Special Reference to Central India). Penguin Books India. p.55.
↑ Demerath, N. J. (2004). "Review: [The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India, by Paul R. Brass. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2003, xix + 476 pp., $50.00 (cloth)]". Sociology of Religion. 65 (3): 304–306. doi:10.2307/3712256. JSTOR3712256.
↑ Engineer, Asghar Ali (1989). Communalism and communal violence in India: an analytical approach to Hindu-Muslim conflict. South Asia Books.
↑ Fachandi, P. (2012). Pogrom in Gujarat: Hindu Nationalism and Anti-Muslim Violence in India. Princeton University Press.
↑ Brass 2003, p.65: "Deaths in Hindu-Muslim riots have three sources: "Mob action", "police killings" and "isolated incidents". "Mob action" may take the form of confrontations between gangs or crowds from different communities or segments of them, armed with sticks, knives, swords, and occasionally bombs and small weapons, and kerosene. It often involves armed gangs from one community seeking out defenseless persons or whole families in their homes, slashing and cutting up the male members and sometimes the female members, and raping the latter, and burning all alive including the children. A second source is police killings, which account for a large number of deaths in several major riots for which figures have been provided by inquiry commission reports, and which cannot be justified in terms of "crowd control". These killings are disproportionately of Muslims."
↑ Riaz 2008, p.165: "Violence perpetrated against Muslims is now naturalized: riots are 'well-known and accepted transgression of routine political behavior in India.' ... 'Hindu-Muslim riots and anti-Muslim pogroms have been endemic in India since independence.'"
↑ Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar (24 November 2020). "Despite Modi, India Has Not Yet Become a Hindu Authoritarian State". CATO Institute. But fears of India becoming a Hindu authoritarian state have been voiced after Narendra Modi of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power in New Delhi in 2014. The party's Hindutva philosophy—the creation of a great Hindu state—envisages a Hindu state where citizens with other religious beliefs are tolerated but have second‐class status. The BJP has been associated with hundreds of violent Hindu‐Muslim riots over the decades, the latest being in Delhi in February 2020, which claimed 54 lives.
↑ Sudha Ramachandran (June 2020). "Hindutva Violence in India: Trends and Implications". Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses. 12 (4). International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research: 15–20. JSTOR26918077. In recent years, anti-Muslim violence in India has increased alarmingly. Underlying this violence is the Hindutva ideology, which aims at making secular India a Hindu state.
↑ Sikand 2006, p.88: "In the fascist Hindutva imagination, the Indian Muslims are continuously reviled as Pakistani "fifth columnists," as "enemies of the nation" and so on, and their patriotism is said to be suspect. The Muslim as the menacing "other" occupies a central place in Hindutva discourse, and this has been used to legitimize large-scale anti-Muslim violence."
↑ "On February 18, 1983 about 1,600 to 2,000 Muslims of East Bengal origin were killed in several villages around Nellie." (Kimura 2013:68)
↑ "The attackers were mostly the Tiwas, the indigenous people whose kingdom was in this area, as well as other local residents, including the Koch and the Hiras, who are Hindus of lower caste." (Kimura 2013:68)
↑ "People who could reach the CRPF camp were able to save their lives, but many women, children, and elderly people were sacrificed. Among the victims, 70 percent were women, 20 percent were elderly, and 10 percent were men. (Kimura 2013:73)
↑ "The boycott was supported not only by a handful of extremists and student activists, but also by a majority of the local Assamese people." (Kimura 2013:67)
↑ "Due to their immigrant origins, the Muslims had decided to vote for the Congress, also hoping that the new government will end the movement" (Kimura 2013:72)
↑ "The GOI put the blame on the AASU for the boycott and for provoking the violence. The AASU and the AAGSP criticized the government for imposing an election which resulted in grave violence." (Kimura 2013:82)
↑ Singh, Sujala (2010). "Bombay Cinema: Terror and Spectacle". In Boehmer, Elleke; Morton, Stephen (eds.). Terror and the Postcolonial. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. p.348. ISBN978-1-4051-9154-8. one of the most horrific instances of fascistic state terror took place in Gujarat in 2002
↑ Narula, Smita (1 May 2002). "India: Gujarat Officials Took Part in Anti-Muslim Violence". Human Rights Watch. not a spontaneous uprising, it was a carefully orchestrated attack against Muslims. The attacks were planned in advance and organised with extensive participation of the police and state government officials
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