Sino-African relations or Afro-Chinese relations refers to the historical, political, economic, military, social, and cultural connection between mainland China and the African continent.
Little is known about ancient relations between China and Africa, though there is some evidence of early trade connections. Highlights of medieval contacts include the 14th-century journey of Ibn Battuta, the Moroccan scholar and traveler to parts of China;[1] the 14th-century visit of Sa'id of Mogadishu, the Somali scholar and explorer;[2] and the 15th-century Ming dynasty voyages of ChineseadmiralZheng He and his fleet, which rounded the coast of Somalia, passing the Ajuran Sultanate, and followed the coast down to the Mozambique Channel. Glass beads and porcelain from China have been discovered at Great Zimbabwe, an ancient city located in present-day Zimbabwe.[3]
Modern political and economic relations between mainland China and the African continent commenced in the era of Mao Zedong, following the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Chinese Civil War. At the turn of the 21st century, the modern state of the People's Republic of China (PRC) built increasingly strong economic ties with Africa. In 2013, it was estimated that one million Chinese citizens were residing in Africa.[4] Additionally, it has been estimated that 200,000 Africans were working in China, in 2017.[5][6]:99 As of 2022, Eswatini and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland (recognized as part of Somalia) are the only two African states to have official relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan).[7]
Trade between China and Africa increased by 700% during the 1990s,[8] and China is currently Africa's largest trading partner.[9] The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established in October 2000, which designated itself to be an official forum to strengthen the relationship between both parties. There have been increasing international concerns over the significant political, economic, and military roles that China is playing in the African continent.
China and Africa have a history of trade relations, sometimes through third parties, dating back as far as 202 BC and 220 AD.[10]Ptolemy, writing in Roman Egypt in the second century, knew of China by two separate routes: the silk road and the Indian Ocean trade. He identified two Chinese peoples: the Seres or silk people and the Sinai of the southern trade, whose name probably derives from the Qin dynasty.[11]
The first mention of Africa in Chinese sources was in the Yu-yang-tsa-tsu by Tuan Ch'eng-shih (died 863), a compendium of general knowledge where he wrote about the land of Po-pa-li (Berbera).
In 1071, an embassy arrived in China from an unidentified East African kingdom. Since it was a formal tribute mission (in the eyes of the Chinese), it is described in the official History of the Song Dynasty. The name of the kingdom was Ts'eng t'an and it was said to lie inland and mint its coin. This name is probably derived from the Persian Zangistan, and the title of its ruler, a-mei-lo a-mei-lan is probably derived from the Persian amir-i-amiran (emir of emirs).[12]
Giraffes, zebras, and incense were exported to the Ming Empire of China, making Somali merchants leaders in the commerce between Asia and Africa[15] while influencing the Chinese language in Somalia in the process.
China is the safest, best regulated of countries for a traveler. A man may go by himself on a nine-month journey, carrying with him a large sum of money, without any fear. Silk is used for clothing even by poor monks and beggars. Its porcelains are the finest of all makes of pottery and its hens are bigger than geese in our country.
The Ming Dynasty admiral, Zheng He, and his fleet rounded the coast of Somalia and followed the coast down to the Mozambique Channel. The goal of those expeditions was to spread Chinese culture and display Chinese strength. Zheng brought gifts and granted titles from the Ming emperor to local rulers. In October 1415, Zheng He reached the eastern coast of Africa and sent the first of two giraffes as gifts to the Chinese Yongle Emperor.[18]
Other accounts mention Chinese ships sinking near Lamu Island in Kenya in 1415. Survivors are said to have settled on the island and married local women.[19][20]
Archaeologists have found Chinese porcelains made during the Tang dynasty (618–907) in Kenyan villages; however, these were believed to have been brought over by Zheng He during his fifteenth-century ocean voyages.[21] On Lamu Island off the Kenyan coast, local oral tradition maintains that twenty shipwrecked Chinese sailors, possibly part of Zheng's fleet, washed up on shore there hundreds of years ago. Given permission to settle by local tribes after having killed a dangerous python, they converted to Islam and married local women. Now, they are believed to have just six descendants remaining there. In 2002, DNA tests conducted on one of the women confirmed that she was of Chinese descent. Her daughter, Mwamaka Sharifu, later received a PRC government scholarship to study traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) in China.[22][23]
National Geographic published an article by Frank Viviano in July 2005 about his visit to Pate Island. During his time on Lamu, ceramic fragments had been found which the administrative officer of the local Swahili history museum claimed were of Chinese origin, specifically from Zheng He's voyage to East Africa. The eyes of the Pate people resembled Chinese, and Famao and Wei were among the names, which were speculated to be of Chinese origin. Their ancestors were said to have been indigenous women who intermarried with Chinese Ming sailors when they were shipwrecked. Two places on Pate were called "Old Shanga", and "New Shanga", which the Chinese sailors had named. A local guide, who claimed to be of Chinese descent, showed Viviano a graveyard made out of coral on the island, indicating that they were graves of Chinese sailors, which the author described as "virtually identical", to Chinese Ming dynasty tombs, complete with "half-moon domes" and "terraced entries".[24]
According to Melanie Yap and Daniel Leong Man in their book "Colour, Confusions, and Concessions: the History of Chinese in South Africa", Chu Ssu-pen, a Chinese mapmaker in 1320, had southern Africa drawn on one of his maps. Ceramics found in Zimbabwe and South Africa dated back to the Song dynasty. Some tribes to Cape Town's north claimed descent from Chinese sailors during the thirteenth century. Their physical appearance is similar to Chinese with paler skin and a Mandarin-sounding tonal language. Their name for themselves is "abandoned people", Awatwa in their language.[25]
Contemporary relations
In the 1960s, the People's Republic of China established diplomatic relationships with a host of African countries in quick succession. Pictured is Premier Zhou Enlai meeting with Emperor Haile Selassie on a visit to Ethiopia in 1964.
The establishment of modern Sino-African relations began in the late 1950s, when China signed bilateral trade agreements with Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Somalia, Morocco, and Sudan. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made a ten-country tour of Africa between December 1963 and January 1964. Zhou Enlai visited Ghana and established close relations with Kwame Nkrumah, who desired a united Africa.[26] Relations at that time often reflected China's foreign policy in general: China "began to cultivate ties and offer...economic, technical and military support to African countries and liberation movements in an effort to encourage wars of national liberation and revolution as part of an international united front against both superpowers".[27]
Diplomacy
Members of FOCACChina's permanent seat in the UN in Africa and the diplomatic game of "two Chinas" in Africa
The Somali Democratic Republic established good relations with the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War era. When Somalia sought to create a Greater Somalia, it declared war on Ethiopia and took the Ogaden region in three months with Soviet aid. When the Soviet Union shifted its support from Somalia to Ethiopia, the latter retook the Ogaden. This angered Somalian President, Siad Barre, who expelled all Soviets advisors and citizens from Somalia. China and Safari Club supported Somalia diplomatically and with token military aid.[39][40]
The ministerial meeting, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held in Beijing in October 2000 was the first collective dialogue between the PRC and African nations.[41]
For a permanent UN seat for Africa, Nigeria, the largest African country, relies on Chinese support while Egypt looks to the U.S. for backing.[42]
The question of Taiwan has been a key political issue for the People's Republic of China (PRC). In 1971, the support of African nations was crucial in the PRC's joining the United Nations (UN), taking over the seat of the ROC on Taiwan.[43] Many African countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Zambia have stressed their support for a "one-China policy". Only one African country, Swaziland, still maintains relations with Taipei.[44]
In July 2019, UN ambassadors of 37 countries, including Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, DRC, Egypt, Eritrea, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and other African states, signed a joint letter to the UNHRC defending China's treatment of Uyghurs and other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang region.[45]
In 1980, the total Sino-African trade volume amounted to US$1 billion.[9] In 1999, it was US$6.5 billion[47] and US$10 billion in 2000.[9] By 2005, the total Sino-African trade volume had reached US$39.7 billion before jumping to US$55 billion in 2006, making China the second-largest trading partner of Africa after the United States, which had US$91 billion in trade with African nations. The PRC also passed its traditional African economic partner and former colonial power, France, which had trade worth US$47 billion.[48] In 2010, trade between Africa and China was valued at US$114 billion[9] and US$166.3 billion in 2011.[49] In the first ten months of 2012, it was US$163.9 billion.[49]
Findings from 2017 estimate there are in excess of 10,000 Chinese corporations doing business in Africa, most of which are private companies investing in the infrastructure, energy, and banking sectors.[50] Investments from Chinese entrepreneurial migration have culminated in positive (indirect jobs) and negative (displacing local traders) effects in local African societies.[51]
One-third of China's oil supplies comes from the African continent, mainly from Angola.[52] Investments of Chinese companies in the energy sector reached US$78.1 billion in 2019.[53] In some cases, as in Nigeria and Angola, oil and gas exploration and production deals crossed $2 billion.[54][55][56]
In agriculture, Benin and the Sahel countries of Burkina Faso and Mali supply up to 20% US$39.7 million in 2001 to $113.5 million in 2005 (source:intracen.org)</ref> large[quantify] shipments of coffee are imported from Kenya. As for fish products, Namibia remains one of the main[quantify] providers.[57]
During the year 2011, trade between Africa and China increased a staggering 33% from the previous year to US$166 billion. This included Chinese imports from Africa equaling US$93 billion, consisting largely of mineral ores, petroleum, and agricultural products, and Chinese exports to Africa totaling US$93 billion, consisting largely of manufactured goods.[58] Outlining the rapidly expanding trade between the African continent and China, trade between these two areas of the world increased further by over 22% year-over-year to US$80.5 billion in the first five months of the year 2012.[58] Imports from Africa were up 25.5% to $49.6 billion during these first five months of 2012 and exports of Chinese-made products, such as machinery, electrical and consumer goods and clothing/footwear increased 17.5% to reach $30.9 billion.[58] China has been Africa's largest trading partner since 2009 when it surpassed the United States,[59] and continues to be the largest trading partner as of 2020, albeit with a Coronavirus-induced drop in volume.[60][61]
The need to protect China's increased investments in Africa has driven a shift away from China's traditional non-interference in the internal matters of other countries to new diplomatic and military initiatives to try to resolve unrest in South Sudan and Mali.[62]
During the December 2015 FOCAC meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa, China's paramount leaderXi Jinping pledged $60 billion over three years in loans and assistance to the African continent.[63] The stated aim of China's effort was to support factories manufacturing goods for export. Along with roads and ports, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari showed his desire to finish stalled railway projects along the coastline, specifically a 1,400km railway from Lagos to Calabar representing approximately 200,000 jobs.[64]
A 2020 report synthesizing close to a hundred studies on Africa-China economic relations finds that economic engagement with China supported Africa's economic transformation.[65] At the same time, criticism against China has been growing from labour unions and civil society groups about the "poor labor conditions, unsustainable environmental practices, and job displacement" caused by Chinese enterprises.[66] China is also thought to be taking advantage of African governments' weaknesses, thereby encouraging corruption and wasteful decision-making.[66]
Communications infrastructure
To improve commercial relationships and telecommunication services as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), significant investments in fiber networks have been undertaken. The PEACE Cable (Pakistan & East Africa Connecting Europe) is a 9,300 mile (12,000km) submarine fiber optic cable owned by a subsidiary of the China-based Hengtong Group and supplied by Huawei Marine. It is expected to reach initial completion in 2021–2022. The Cable's landfall in Pakistan provide for low-latency overland connection to China. The Cable's route is around the Arabian Peninsula, first dividing north into the Red Sea, crossing land in Egypt and then proceeding through the Mediterranean to the Interxion MRS2 Data Center in Marseille, France. The southern fork extends along the east coast of Africa, which in Phase 2 will reach South Africa. Additional landfalls are in Cyprus, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, and Seychelles.[67]
In August 2021, China announced more digital projects on the Continent in areas such as the digital economy, smart cities and 5G.[68] These projects are thought to be part of the Digital Africa initiative that was proposed during a trip of Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Africa in 2020.[68]
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Chinese government supported African Independence Movements and gave aid to newly independent African nations. Among the most notable early projects were the 1,860km TAZARA Railway, linking Zambia and Tanzania, which China helped to finance and build from 1970 to 1975.[69] Some 50,000 Chinese engineers and workers were sent to the continent to complete the project. By 1978, China was giving aid to more African countries than the United States.[70] In 2014, the US gave four times what China gave to Africa in official development assistance.[71]
According to Marxist journalist Martin Jacques in his book When China Rules the World, Chinese aid is "far less restrictive and doctrinaire" and comes with fewer strings attached than Western aid.[72] Unconditional and low-rate credit lines (rates at 1.5% over fifteen years to twenty years)[73] have largely taken the place of more restrictive and conditional Western loans.[74]
Estimates regarding the amount of African debt cancelled by China varies. Since 2000, over $10bn in debt owed by African nations to the PRC has been cancelled, according to Le Monde diplomatique.[73] According to a 2020 report by the China Africa Research Initiative, "China has only offered debt write-offs for zero-interest loans", which account for at least $3.4 billion of cancelled debt in Africa between 2000 and 2019.[75]
Scott N. Romaniuk, a researcher at the University of Alberta's China Institute, cautioned that Africa should "beware of 'no strings attached'" regarding development financing from China. He said that China's low-interest loans have been used to trade for extraction rights of proven deposits of natural resources, constraining African countries' future use of these resources.[76]Patrick Bond said, "the conditions on Chinese loans and investments become very clear when the recipient countries have a debt crisis".[77]
In 2015, the China Africa Research Initiative identified 17 African countries with loans from China facing potential default.[78] Kenyan economist Anzetse Were has argued that some African nations' narratives of Chinese debt-trap diplomacy stem from a lack of fiscal transparency and a weaker bargaining position vis-à-vis China.[79]
As of 2021, China is estimated to hold at least 21% of all African debt.[80][81]
China has been engaged in a kind of "health diplomacy" towards Africa since the 1960s. Health care development and medical assistance have been among the chief areas of support. Between the early 1960s and 2005, more than 15,000 Chinese doctors travelled to Africa to help treat patients in more than 47 countries.[85]
In 2001, the member nations of G8 formed the United Nations-backed Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria with an initial budget of $10 billion. In 2007, another additional $1.1 billion was approved in Kunming, China, of which 66% was dedicated to Africa.[86] In September of the same year, China promised the Democratic Republic of the Congo to build 31 hospital units and 145 smaller health care centres, a project due to be completed in March 2010.[87][88]
Military cooperation goes back to the Cold War period when China was keen to help African liberation movements. Eritrea's first president Isaias Afwerki, a leader in the fight for independence, received military training in China, Apart from some traditional allies such as Somalia and Tanzania, China also had military ties with non-aligned countries like Egypt. Military equipment worth $142 million was sold to African countries between 1955 and 1977.[73] In July 2017, China set up its first overseas military base in Djibouti, which is a small town located in the Horn of Africa between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea,[89] as a logistics facility for peacekeeping missions on the continent.[90][91]Bertil Lintner, as well as various Indian analysts, have described the base in Djibouti as part of China's "String of Pearls" geopolitical and military strategy in the Indian Ocean.[92][93][90]
Peacekeeping missions
In 2004, China deployed around 1,500 military personnel between Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.[73] Since 2011, it has sent infantry troops describable (arguably) as 'combat' forces.[94]
In July 2007, China supported the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1769 and contributed troops to African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).[95] China also has fourteen attachés in fourteen different African countries as of 2007, while eighteen African countries maintain attachés in Beijing.[96]
Arms sales
An increasing number of African countries have shifted their source of munitions from traditional providers such as Russia to China due to the competitive prices offered by Chinese suppliers.[97] It is estimated that between 2013 and 2017, Chinese arms imports to Africa totaled 17%, representing a 55% increase compared to the period covering 2009 to 2013.[98] It also sold more arms than any other supplier, with sales to 23 African countries.[98]
Arms sales by China to some African states have troubled critics who point out that some buyers like Sudan are accused of war crimes.[99] Chinese drones have proliferated across Africa, and have been utilized in hundreds of attacks in Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Nigeria.[100]
The first overseas Chinese cultural centre in Africa was opened in Mauritius in 1988. Two others followed in Egypt and Benin.[103] The Confucius Institute has at least 54 locations across Africa, in addition to another 27 Confucius Classrooms in various countries (as of 2018).[104][105]
Historically, little is known about early African immigration to China.[106] As economic and political ties have strengthened, many Africans have relocated to China to seek better economic opportunities. Places dubbed 'Little Africa' and 'Chocolate City' are increasingly receiving new immigrants, mostly Nigerians. Most African immigrants, an estimated 20,000 individuals, are concentrated in the area of Guangzhou.[107][108] An estimated 10,000 illegal African immigrants are in China, and police crackdowns have intensified since early 2009.[109]
In contrast, early Chinese immigration to the African continent is slightly better documented. In 1724, a few Chinese convicts were brought as laborers to South Africa from the Dutch East Indies (modern-day Indonesia) by the colonial Dutch Empire. In the early nineteenth century, another wave of immigrants were brought to South Africa by the British to work in agriculture, infrastructure building, and mining.[110] In recent years, there has been an increasing presence of Chinese in Africa with one estimate numbering Chinese nationals at one million.[111]
China has also been increasingly involved in sport in Africa. Since 1970, Chinese-owned companies have been building sports stadiums throughout most African countries. Each project costs dozens of millions of dollars, a fee that China gives as a soft loan. The stadiums strengthen China's diplomatic and commercial ties with African countries. African governments accept China's loans because they enable them to promote development projects. On the other hand, concerns have been raised as to the working conditions at these stadiums. Also, some of the stadiums turned out to be white elephants given their meager usage.[113]
Human rights and advocacy groups for Africans in China have criticized the use of blackface performances on Chinese television, particularly on the CCTV New Year's Gala.[114][115][116]
The expansion of Chinese companies and their investments in Africa has raised issues of Chinese racism against the local population.[117][118] For example, after a video shot by a Kenyan worker whose Chinese boss referred to Kenyans as "monkeys" went viral in 2018, more examples of discrimination by Chinese nationals in the country, such as separated bathrooms, have emerged.[118]
International observers have highlighted the generalised view in China of Africans as "backward or primitive and blackness as unattractive", with racist attitudes specifically on social media going untouched by censorship.[119][120]
There are a variety of critical perspectives scrutinizing the balance of power relationship between China and Africa, and China's role concerning human rights in Africa.[121][122] Increasingly, concerns have been raised by Africans and outside observers that China's relationship with Africa is neocolonialist in nature.[123][124] As a response to such criticism, China issued the Nine Principles to Encourage and Standardise Enterprises' Overseas Investment, a charter and conduct guide for Chinese companies operating abroad.[125]
In 2002, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that China and Africa are making "joint efforts to maintain the lawful rights of developing countries and push forward the creation of a new, fair and just political and economic order in the world".[126]
Zimbabwe
The China-Zimbabwe relationship drew the attention of critics. China was accused of supplying Zimbabwe with jet fighters, vehicles, and other military equipment.[127] China declared in 2007 that it was limiting assistance to humanitarian aid.[128] In July 2008, Chinese diplomatic channels asked Mugabe "to behave", though critics see that as a way for China to protect its interests in this country should a regime change.[129]
Another high-profile event of concern for critics of China in Africa was in the run-up to the 2008 Summer Olympics. Human rights groups criticized China for its supportive relationship with the government of Sudan, which had been accused of mass killings in Darfur.[130][131] China is Sudan's largest economic partner, with a 40% share in its oil,[132] and also sells Sudan small arms.[133] China has threatened to veto UN Security Council actions to combat the war in Darfur.[134] In response, a 2008 editorial in the CCP-owned daily tabloid Global Times stated that "As the Darfur issue is not an internal affair of China, nor was it caused by China, to link the two together is utterly unreasonable, irresponsible and unfair."[135]
Resident diplomatic missions
In 2022 the African Union announced its move to established a delegation with a resident Ambassador to Beijing, China.[136]
The economy of Djibouti is derived in large part from its strategic location on the Red Sea. Djibouti is mostly barren, with little development in the agricultural and industrial sectors. The country has a harsh climate, a largely unskilled labour force, and limited natural resources. The country's most important economic asset is its strategic location, connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. As such, Djibouti's economy is commanded by the services sector, providing services as both a transit port for the region and as an international transshipment and refueling centre.
The foreign relations of Ethiopia refers to overall diplomatic relationship of Ethiopia. Currently its relations with most countries including the West as well as neighboring countries are warmed. Tension between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt is growing since late 2010s due to failed reach settlement in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project. Egypt and Sudan presumed themselves dependent to Nile river. Both countries sought the UN Security Council for binding agreement in spite of Ethiopia ignored the matter for resolution only the African Union and members of council. The relationship with US certainly cordial, in addition Ethiopia is a strategic partner of Global War on Terrorism and African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Ethiopia had about 200,000 diaspora as of 2016, and ethnic enclaves in some U.S. states. Former President Barack Obama was the first incumbent to visit Ethiopia in July 2015, while delivering speech in the Africa Union, he highlighted combatting Islamic terrorism. Ethiopian emigrants are in Europe mainly in Italy, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden and Australia. Ethiopia has Jewish emigrants in Israel totaling about 155,300 as of 2019. They are collectively known as Beta Israel.
Kenya maintains relations with various countries around the world. Its closest ties are with its fellow Swahili-speaking neighbors in the African Great Lakes region. Swahili speaking neighbours mainly include countries in the East African Community such as Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. There's also the DRC which has a significant Swahili speaking population.
The foreign relations of the People's Republic of China (PRC), commonly known to most states as China, has full diplomatic relations with 179 out of the other 193 United Nations member states, Cook Islands, Niue and the State of Palestine. Since 2019, China has had the most diplomatic missions of any country in the world. This article guides the way in which China interacts with foreign nations and expresses its political and economic weaknesses and values. As a great power and an emerging superpower, China's foreign policy and strategic thinking are highly influential. China officially claims it "unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace". The fundamental goals of this policy are to preserve China's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, create a favorable international environment for China's reform and opening up and modernization of construction, and to maintain world peace and propel common development." An example of a foreign policy decision guided by "sovereignty and territorial integrity" is not engaging in diplomatic relations with any country that recognizes the Republic of China (Taiwan), which the PRC does not recognise as a separate nation.
Somalia is classified by the United Nations as a least developed country, with the majority of its population being dependent on agriculture and livestock for their livelihood. Due to a dearth of formal government statistics and the recent civil war, it is difficult to gauge the size or growth of the economy. For 1994, the CIA estimated the GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) to be $3.3 billion. In 2001, it was estimated to be $4.1 billion. By 2009, the CIA estimated that the PPP GDP had grown to $5.731 billion, with a projected real growth rate of 2.6%. In 2014, the International Monetary Fund estimated economic activity to have expanded by 3.7 percent primarily. This expansion was driven by growth in the primary sector and the secondary sector. According to a 2007 British Chambers of Commerce report, the private sector has experienced growth, particularly in the service sector. Unlike the pre-civil war period, when most services and the industrial sector were government-run, there has been substantial, albeit unmeasured, private investment in commercial activities. The investment has been largely financed by the Somali diaspora, and includes trade and marketing, money transfer services, transportation, communications, fishery equipment, airlines, telecommunications, education, health, construction and hotels.
The economy of Zimbabwe mainly relies on its tertiary industry, which makes up to 60% of the total GDP as of 2017. Zimbabwe has the second biggest informal economy as a share of its economy, which has a score of 60.6%. Agriculture and mining largely contribute to exports. The economy of Zimbabwe grew at an average of 12% from 2009 to 2013, rendering it one of the fastest growing economies in the world. It had recovered from its negative growth from 1998 to 2008, before it slowed to 0.7% growth in 2016.
The foreign relations share the Bangladeshi government's policies in its external relations with the international community. The country pursues a moderate foreign policy that places heavy reliance on multinational diplomacy, especially at the United Nations and World Trade Organization (WTO). Since independence in 1971, the country has stressed its principle of "Friendship towards all, malice towards none" in dictating its diplomacy. As a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, Bangladesh has tended to not take sides with major powers. Since the end of the Cold War, the country has pursued better relations with regional neighbours.
Kenya, officially the Republic of Kenya, is a country in Eastern Africa. At 580,367 square kilometres (224,081 sq mi), Kenya is the world's 48th largest country by area. With a population of more than 47.6 million in the 2019 census, Kenya is the 29th most populous country. Kenya's capital and largest city is Nairobi, while its oldest city and first capital is the coastal city of Mombasa. Kisumu City is the third-largest city and also an inland port on Lake Victoria. Other important urban centres include Nakuru and Eldoret. As of 2020, Kenya is the third-largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria and South Africa. Kenya is bordered by South Sudan to the northwest, Ethiopia to the north, Somalia to the east, Uganda to the west, Tanzania to the south, and the Indian Ocean to the southeast. Its geography, climate and population vary widely, ranging from cold snow-capped mountaintops with vast surrounding forests, wildlife and fertile agricultural regions to temperate climates in western and rift valley counties and dry less fertile arid and semi-arid areas and absolute deserts.
Field Marshal Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir is a Sudanese former military officer, politician and alleged war criminal who served as the seventh head of state of Sudan under various titles from 1989 until 2019, when he was deposed in a coup d'état. He was subsequently incarcerated, tried and convicted on multiple corruption charges. He came to power in 1989 when, as a brigadier general in the Sudanese Army, he led a group of officers in a military coup that ousted the democratically elected government of prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi after it began negotiations with rebels in the south. He was elected three times as President in elections that have been under scrutiny for electoral fraud. In 1992, al-Bashir founded the National Congress Party, which remained the dominant political party in the country until 2019. In March 2009, al-Bashir became the first sitting head of state to be indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC), for allegedly directing a campaign of mass killing, rape, and pillage against civilians in Darfur. On 11 February 2020, the Sudanese government announced that it had agreed to hand over al-Bashir to the ICC for trial.
The East African Community (EAC) is an intergovernmental organisation composed of six countries in the African Great Lakes region in eastern Africa: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Uhuru Kenyatta, the president of Kenya, is the current EAC chairman. The organisation was founded in 1967, collapsed in 1977, and was revived on 7 July 2000.
Jendayi Elizabeth Frazer is the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, heading the Bureau of African Affairs. She was a Distinguished Service Professor at Carnegie Mellon University's Heinz College and Department of Social and Decision Sciences.
Foreign relations of the Republic of Somaliland are the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Somaliland. The region's self-declaration of independence remains unrecognised by the international community.
The African Union (AU) is a continental union consisting of 55 member states located on the continent of Africa. The AU was announced in the Sirte Declaration in Sirte, Libya, on 9 September 1999, calling for the establishment of the African Union. The bloc was founded on 26 May 2001 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and launched on 9 July 2002 in Durban, South Africa. The intention of the AU was to replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), established on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa by 32 signatory governments; the OAU was disbanded on 9 July 2002. The most important decisions of the AU are made by the Assembly of the African Union, a semi-annual meeting of the heads of state and government of its member states.
China–Kenya relations refer to the bilateral relations between China and Kenya.
China–Sudan relations refer to the bilateral relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Sudan. China is currently one of Sudan's largest trade partners, importing oil and exporting low cost manufactured items as well as armaments into the country. Both states enjoy a very robust and productive relationship in the fields of diplomacy, economic trade, and political strategy. They formally established diplomatic relations on January 4, 1959, when Sudan formally recognized the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China and have since become close global allies, supporting each other in times of internal crises and international controversy such as during the Second Sudanese Civil War, the Darfur Crisis, and the Xinjiang Conflict. China continues to provide massive support to Sudan by developing its oil resources and supplying millions of dollars in loans, aid, foreign direct investments, and humanitarian assistance. In return, Sudan has become a reliable political and economic ally in the international arena, allowing China to maintain a significant stake in its oil sector.
The Trade and Development Bank (TDB), formerly the PTA Bank, is a trade and development financial institution operating in eastern and southern Africa. TDB is the financial arm of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), although membership is open to non-COMESA states and other institutional shareholders.
India–Kenya relations are bilateral diplomatic relations between the Republic of India and the Republic of Kenya.
Debt-trap diplomacy is a term in international finance which describes a creditor country or institution extending debt to a borrowing nation partially, or solely, to increase the lender's political leverage. The term was coined by Indian academic Brahma Chellaney.
The following lists events that happened during 2020 in East Africa. The countries listed are those described in the United Nations geoscheme for East Africa: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambique, Réunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
References
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↑ Between the Middle Ages and modernity: individual and community in the early By Charles H. Parker, Jerry H. Bentley pg 160
↑ J. Lennart Berggren and Alexander Jones (eds.), Ptolemy's Geography: An Annotated Translation of the Theoretical Chapters (Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 176.
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