Elamite's success to expel Sumer's incursions from Iranian Plateau and sack some Sumer city states in Mesopotamia, but governors like Enentarzi expel them from its domains.
Cambyses II fails to expand Achaemenid domains into the south to reach the limits of former Egyptian Empire.[19]Nubians maintains its independence and Persians establish frontier on Elephantine.
Persian invasion of Mesopotamia and Armenia success. Then Roman expels Persians from Armenia, capture Narseh's wife, raid Ctesiphon and gains territory on the Peace of Nisibis (299).
Following Persian the victory, Yazdegerd jailed some Armenian priests and nobles and appointed a new governor for Armenia but, the Armenians gained religious freedom for their Christian faith.
Persians are expelled by Byzantines, but Persian incursions destroy Christian Churchs and debilitate Nobatians, causing its decline and further conquest by simultaneous Makurian invasion.
The Tang campaigns against the Western Turks (by Pei Xingjian) success and the Chinese established a "Persian military commandery" (波斯都督府) in the city of Zābol (疾陵城 Jilicheng) in Tokharistan, and Peroz was appointed as Military Commander (都督 Dudu). Then this government, with the capital at Zirang, fell in 673/674.
After that, Narsieh went west with his troops to liberate Iranshahr in 679 and fought against the Arabs in Takharistan for almost thirty years.
The failure and end of the persian restoration campaign attempt in Siege of Kamarja
Narsieh's uncle, Bahram, died in 710, and Bahram's son, Khosrow, was mentioned fighting alongside Sogdians and Turks against the Arabs at the siege of Kamarja in 729 in a futile attempt to restore Sasanian rule.[43]
Kharijite faction, the Azariqa, captures Fars and Kirman from the Zubayrids. Ex-Zubayrid loyalists help Umayyad to secured Iraq, and consequently most of its dependencies in Persia. Then, Umayyad victory after Siege of Mecca.
The Saffarids lose much territory to the Samanids in Khorasan, and were left with the control of Fars, Kerman and Sistan, but they also lost these provinces after a civil war.
Sebük-eri, who had managed to win over Tahir's commanders, won an easy victory and captured the brothers. They were sent to the Caliph and imprisoned in Baghdad, though they were treated well for the remainder of their lives.
North-Eastern Persia annexed by the Afghan-centered Ghaznavid Sultanate (although still under suzerainty to the Abbasid Caliphs), and fall of both Samanids and Saffarids.
al-Rashid fled the city for Mosul, where he abdicated the caliphate. His uncle, al-Muqtafi, was raised to the throne instead by Mas'ud, who then retired to the east.
The Ghurid ruler Ala al-Din Husayn defeated Bahram-Shah, captured the city, and destroyed it as revenge for the execution of his brother Quṭb ud-Dīn in 1149.
The Iranian military sought to punish the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf for the Iranians' grievances of Gambron, not only liberating the island of Hormuz but also forcing the Portuguese to withdraw to Mombasa in Kenya.
Britain recognized Iran's sovereignty over the entire Persian Gulf.
Ottoman sovereignty over all the western and northwestern parts of Iran (including most of Tabriz, Hamadan, Kermanshah, Lorestan and most of the southern Caucasus) recognised by Hotakis.
Tbilisi captured and sacked by Iranians. Persian reconquest of the Caucasus and Georgia. Then, for reunificating all Persian provinces, Agha Mohammad is formally crowned Shah in 1796 in the Mughan plain.[91]
Treaty of Turkmenchay. Iran irrevocably cedes its last Caucasus territories comprising parts of the contemporary nation of Azerbaijan that were not ceded in 1813, as well as all of what is the current Republic of Armenia.
Successful siege of Herat; continued occupation until Persia's compliance with the Treaty of Paris; installment of Sultan Ahmad Khan as puppet ruler of Herat
The Swedish government quits in 1916 due to its neutrality on World War I. However, Swedes volunteers continued to serve in the Persian Gendarmerie until 1921.
Iranian government impose the Kashf-e hijab and other anticlerical reforms against the Shias to Westernize Iran. Further de-Islamization and continuation of claims by the clergy about heretical innovations in the government.
Iranian proxy groups initiate offensives against US military bases. Hamas is severely weakened.[213]
Entire leadership of Hezbollah wiped off and the organization is severely contained with a lot of their arms and military assets destroyed or dismantled.[214]
Economic and military loss to Houthi with both their ports and airport destroyed.
Iraqi government forces defeat the Peshmerga and capture 20% of the territory controlled by the Kurdistan Region including the city of Kirkuk, along with the surrounding oil fields and border crossings.[591]
↑ Regency Council was practically dissolved on 22 January 1979, when its head resigned to meet Ruhollah Khomeini.
↑ Imperial Iranian Army revoked their allegiance to the throne and declared neutrality on 11 February 1979.
↑ Iraq claimed victory following a successful 1988 counter-offensive aimed at expelling Iranian forces from Iraq which compelled Iran to submit to a ceasefire the same year, and also due to the country becoming the dominant power in the Middle East as a result of the conflict. Iran also claimed victory for expelling Iraqi forces from Iran following 1982 offensives, despite failing in its later-goal to overthrow the Iraqi government and also despite suffering higher military and economic losses than Iraq.[150][151]
↑ Iraq claimed victory following a successful 1988 counter-offensive aimed at expelling Iranian forces from Iraq which compelled Iran to submit to a ceasefire the same year, and also due to the country becoming the dominant power in the Middle East as a result of the conflict. Iran also claimed victory for expelling Iraqi forces from Iran following 1982 offensives, despite failing in its later-goal to overthrow the Iraqi government and also despite suffering higher military and economic losses than Iraq.[150][151]
↑ After the war concluded, Iraq continued to maintain control over the entire Shatt al-Arab and other Iranian territories it had occupied along the border, covering an area of 9,600km2. It was not until 16 August 1990 that Iraq agreed to return these occupied territories to Iran and to divide sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab. This restored the border to the terms established by the 1975 Algiers Agreement.
↑ Iraqi support for Sudan during the war mostly consisted of weapons shipments;[316] according to the South Sudanese, however, at least one unit of Iraqi paratroopers fought alongside the SAF near Juba. About 200 Iraqi soldiers were allegedly killed, and the site of their remains became known as "Jebel Iraqi".[317] The International Institute for Strategic Studies also stated that Iraqi forces fought alongside Sudanese government troops.[318]
↑ Although China was not officially involved in the war, it sent troops to the country in order to protect oil fields and thereby aid the Sudanese military. China also provided Sudan with weaponry.[318]
↑ Bosworth, Clifford Edmund (1997). "Sīstān". In Bosworth, C. E.; van Donzel, E.; Heinrichs, W. P. & Lecomte, G. (eds.). Encyclopaedia of Islam. Volume IX: San–Sze (2nd ed.). Leiden: E. J. Brill. pp. 681–685. ISBN978-90-04-10422-8
↑ Olbrycht, Marek Jan (2016). "Dynastic Connections in the Arsacid Empire and the Origins of the House of Sāsān". In Curtis, Vesta Sarkhosh; Pendleton, Elizabeth J.; Alram, Michael; Daryaee, Touraj (eds.). The Parthian and Early Sasanian Empires: Adaptation and Expansion. Oxbow Books. ISBN978-1-78570-208-2
↑ Ghosh, Amalananda (1965). Taxila. CUP Archive. pp. 790–791.
↑ Payne, Richard (2015). "The Reinvention of Iran: The Sasanian Empire and the Huns". In Maas, Michael (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Attila. Cambridge University Press. pp. 282–299. ISBN978-1-107-63388-9
↑ Procopius. History of the Wars, I.9.24; Greatrex, Geoffrey; Lieu, Samuel N. C. (2002). "The Anastasian War and its aftermath (502–525)". The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars (Part II, 363–630 AD). New York and London: Routledge. pp.62–81. ISBN978-0-415-14687-6.
↑ Crone, Patricia (2012). The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. p.67. about the same time as Mazyar, so that they were crucified together with babak (after execution) in Baghdad in 225/840.
↑ Flood, 165. The exact motivations for Ya`qub's advance have been debated; Tor, pp. 159, for example, argues that he was an Abbasid legitimist whose actions were prompted by a misguided attempt to protect the caliphate.
↑ Тесаев, З.А.: Чеченская «География» XV века, составленная по данным ученого-богослова и путешественника Аздина Вазара, page 256
↑ Тесаев, 3.А.: Исторические личности Чечни (XI-XXI вв.), page 100
↑ ÇAKMAK, Mehmet Ali (2005-09-01). "Akkoyunlu Karakoyunlu Mücadeleleri". Gazi Üniversitesi Gazi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi (in Turkish). 25 (3). Archived from the original on 2019-09-04. Retrieved 2025-07-16.
↑ "CİHAN ŞAH". TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi (in Turkish). Retrieved 2025-07-18.
↑ Bey Zardabli, I., The History of Azerbaijan: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, Lulu.com, 2014, pp 223-224
↑ Muḥaddis̲, Mīr Hāshim (1982). Tārīkh-i Qizilbāshān [History of Qizilbashes] (in Persian). Tehrān: Bihnām. p. 18.
↑ Bey Zardabli, I., Ethnic and Political History of Azerbaijan: From Ancient Times to the Present, Lulu.com., 2018, p. 252; Aslanov, A., "The Caucasus in the 15th Century", The Caucasus and Globalisation, Vol. 5, No. 1-2, 2011, pp 168-172
↑ Minorsky, V. (1955). "The Qara-Qoyunlu and the Qutb-Shahs". Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies. 17 (1): 50–73. doi:10.1017/s0041977x00106342. ISSN0041-977X.
↑ Hasanzade, J., "History of the East in Tabriz Miniatures", IRS Art, p. 36 http://irs-az.com/new/files/2016/186/2394.pdf; Brend, B., Perspectives on Persian Painting: Illustrations to Amir Khusrau's Khamsah, Routledge, 2013, p. 104
↑ Sicker 2000, p.187. sfn error: no target: CITEREFSicker2000 (help)
↑ Nesib Nesibli, "Osmanlı-Safevî Savaşları, Mezhep Meselesi ve Azerbaucan", Türkler, Cilt 6, Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, Ankara, 2002, ISBN975-6782-39-0, p. 895. (in Turkish)
↑ Olson, Robert (1991). "The Turkoman Rebellion in Eastern Iran, 1924-5: Its Consequences and the Soviet Reaction". Die Welt des Islams. 31 (2): 216–227. doi:10.2307/1570580. ISSN0043-2539. JSTOR1570580.
↑ "Baluchistan: A Repugnant Iranian Occupation | الإخبارية". www.alekhbariya.net. Retrieved 2020-04-06. Approximately three months after Arabistan, in 1928, the Iranian regime occupied Baluchistan after the defeat of Baluchi forces at the hands of the army of the founder of the Pahlavi line, Reza Shah Pahlavi.
↑ Rehman, Zia (2014). "The Baluch insurgency: linking Iran to Pakistan"(PDF). files.ethz.ch. p.1. In 1928 independent West Baluchistan (today the Sistan and Baluchistan Province of Iran) was forcibly annexed to Iran by Reza Shah Pahlavi
↑ Salzman, Philip (2008). "Politics and Change among the Baluch in Iran"(PDF). But everything changed after Reza Shah"s military campaign in 1928–35 which brought Baluchistan under Persian control (Arfa 1964: Ch. 13). The tribes were "pacified" and forced to accept the suzerainty of the Shah. Consequently raiding was suppressed, and gradually the tribes were disarmed. Control was imposed over thehakomates, with vari-ous oasis forts knocked down by the Shah's artillery.
↑ "Iran: the "liberation" of Arabistan". articles.abolkhaseb.net. Archived from the original on July 27, 2013. Retrieved 2019-04-09. New revolts occurred in 1943 and 1945 and were quelled in blood.
↑ Wolfe-Hunnicutt, Brandon (2021). The Paranoid Style in American Diplomacy: Oil and Arab Nationalism in Iraq. Stanford University Press. p. 102. ISBN978-1-5036-1382-9. As the IPC moved in opposition to Qasim, Israeli and Iranian covert assistance began to pour into Iraqi Kurdistan... Kurdish representatives reached out to the US embassy for the same... Available documentation does not prove conclusively that the United States provided covert assistance to the Kurds in the fall of 1962, but the documents that have been declassified are certainly suggestive—especially in light of the general US policy orientation toward Iraq during this period.
↑ Michael G. Lortz. (Chapter 1, Introduction). The Kurdish Warrior Tradition and the Importance of the Peshmerga. pp.39-42. "Archived copy"(PDF). Archived from the original(PDF) on 2013-10-29. Retrieved 2014-10-16.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
↑ Wolfe-Hunnicutt, Brandon (2021). The Paranoid Style in American Diplomacy: Oil and Arab Nationalism in Iraq. Stanford University Press. p.102. ISBN978-1-5036-1382-9. Available documentation does not prove conclusively that the United States provided covert assistance to the Kurds in the fall of 1962, but the documents that have been declassified are certainly suggestive—especially in light of the general US policy orientation toward Iraq during this period.
1 2 "FC placed under Balochistan govt's control". Dawn News. 2 November 2011. "Since January 2008, military has conducted no operation in Balochistan," said Gen Abbas, dispelling a perception that the army was still in the field there.
1 2 3 Jeffrey S. Dixon; Meredith Reid Sarkees (2015). "INTRA-STATE WAR #816: Anti-Khomeini Coalition War of 1979 to 1983". A Guide to Intra-state Wars: An Examination of Civil, Regional, and Intercommunal Wars, 1816-2014. SAGE Publications. pp.384–386. ISBN978-1-5063-1798-4.
↑ Williamson Murray, Kevin M. Woods (2014): The Iran–Iraq War. A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. ISBN978-1-107-06229-0 p. 223
↑ Entessar, Nader (2010). Kurdish Politics in the Middle East. Lanham: Lexington Books. p.48. ISBN9780739140390. OCLC430736528. Throughout much of the 1980s, the KDPI received aid from the Ba'thi regime of Saddam Hussein, but Ghassemlou broke with Baghdad in 1988 after Iraq used chemical weapons against Kurds in Halabja and then forced Kurdish villagers to...
↑ Weiss, Caleb (30 December 2017). "Iran-based jihadist group claims attack on oil pipeline". Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Archived from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 31 December 2017. Ansar al Furqan states that "a major oil pipeline was blown up in Omidiyeh region of occupied Ahvaz, Iran." The group added that it had established a new unit, the Ahwaz Martyrs Brigade. The area of Ahvaz has historically had a large Arab population.
↑ Desk, Quetta Voice Web (20 December 2023). "BNA Commander Sarfaraz Bangulzai Along With 72 Militants Surrender". Quetta Voice Breaking News, English News, Technology, Health. Retrieved 20 December 2023.
↑ Herbert Docena (17 August 2006). "Amid the bombs, unity is forged". Asia Times. Archived from the original on 31 August 2006. Retrieved 25 November 2011. The LCP ... has itself been very close to Hezbollah and fought alongside it in the frontlines in the south. According to Hadadeh, at least 12 LCP members and supporters died in the fighting.
↑ Coloma, Tristan (March 2025). "Smuggled gold fuels Sudan war". Le Monde Diplomatique. As far back as January 2019, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) paid $100m to the Burhan-Hemedti duo – they were then allies – in exchange for the deployment to Yemen of former Janjaweed militias, renamed RSF to obscure their involvement in the Darfur massacres. In Yemen, they fought alongside the Gulf monarchies' coalition against the Iran-backed Houthis.
1 2 3 "IRAN UPDATE, APRIL 13, 2024". understandingwar.org. ISW. 14 April 2024. Retrieved 26 April 2024. Members of Iran's so-called "Axis of Resistance" appear to have conducted attacks targeting Israel simultaneously with Iran's first wave of attacks. Lebanese Hezbollah claimed it fired "dozens" of Katyusha rockets targeting an Israeli missile and artillery base in the Golan Heights at 1800 ET.
↑ "Will Saudi Arabia become a new drone battleground?". Deutsche Welle. An Iraqi militia has claimed responsibility for two suicide drones fired at Riyadh earlier this week — and vowed to do it again. The new group suggested Saudis should be sleeping with one eye open from now on.
↑ Wess, Caleb (February 23, 2018). "Bahraini militant group adopts IRGC branding". At the same time, Saraya al Ashtar reaffirmed its loyalty to the Islamic Republic of Iran. "We believe that the commander and ruler of the Islamic religion is the line of the two imams, Khomeini and Khamenei, which is in the original Muhammad approach in confronting the oppressors and fighting back against the tyrants," the group's statement reads.
↑ Sapir, Teddy (6 February 2022). "Hezbollah and Saudi Arabia – a routine of clashes". Alma, Research and Education Centre. Archived from the original on 27 February 2024. Retrieved 25 June 2025. During the Syrian civil war, the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Hezbollah escalated due to the Saudi-Iranian rivalry.
↑ "Saudis reportedly funding insurgents". The Seattle Times. September 8, 2006. Private Saudi citizens are giving millions of dollars to Sunni insurgents in Iraq and much of the money is used to buy weapons
↑ "Saudi Arabia Wants to Roll Back Iran". The National Interest. Retrieved 13 January 2023. n July 9, Prince Turki bin Faisal, former Saudi intelligence head, unprecedentedly attended a rally for the notorious Iranian opposition group Mujahedeen Khalq (MEK) and called for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
↑ Dixon, Jeffrey S., and Meredith Reid Sarkees. A Guide to Intra-state Wars an Examination of Civil, Regional, and Intercommunal Wars, 1816–2014, p. 392. Los Angeles, CA: Sage Reference, 2016.
↑ "Iran punishes Hamas for stance on Syria". Al Arabiya English. 1 June 2013. Archived from the original on 20 October 2017. Retrieved 22 May 2019. Iran's annual financial aid to Hamas is believed to be around $20 million, which helps the group run its government in the Gaza Strip. Both parties enjoyed warm ties since 2006 when Hamas won an election against the Western-backed Fatah movement. But the crisis in Syria has led to problems between them.
↑ Hirsh, Michael; Dehghanpisheh, Babak; Hosenball, Mark (15 February 2007). "The New Enemy?". Newsweek. Archived from the original on 1 April 2007. Retrieved 17 February 2007.
↑ Abdulfattoh, Shafiev (February 2016). "Iran and Tajikistan: A Story of Love and Hate"(PDF). Central Asia Policy Brief. 34. At the end of 1992, Tajikistan entered into a bloody civil war. Tehran gave refuge and support to the leaders of the Democratic-Islamic coalition of the Tajik opposition, and was therefore considered to be a pro-Islamic actor. However, it also contributed a critical role in helping peace discussions: Tehran hosted several rounds of the Tajik peace negotiations in 1994, 1995, and 1997, bringing both sides to the discussion table. President Rahmon paid an official visit to Tehran in 1995 and opened an embassy there. But seen from Dushanbe, Moscow was a more reliable ally than Tehran, and any kind of pan-Persian nationalism was rapidly shut down by the authorities.
↑ Ofcansky, Thomas P. (2015). "Foreign Military Assistance" (PDF). In Berry, LaVerle (ed.). Sudan: a country study (5th ed.). Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. pp. 344–347. ISBN 978-0-8444-0750-0.
↑ "North Korea's Balancing Act in the Persian Gulf". HuffPost. 17 August 2015. Archived from the original on 17 August 2015. Retrieved 17 August 2015. North Korea's military support for Houthi rebels in Yemen is the latest manifestation of its support for anti-American forces.
Fraser-Rahim, Muhammad (17 July 2020). "In Somalia, Iran Is Replicating Russia's Afghan Strategy". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 17 July 2020. Somali military officials maintain that Iran has been running secret operations to undermine the United States in Somalia, providing sophisticated weapons, improvised explosive100000 als used to make bombs. The military officials allege that Iran and its proxies are complicit in al-Shabab attacks on the U.S. military, Somali forces, and the African Union Mission in Somalia
"The Growing Relationship between Iran and al-Shabab Movement in Somalia: Motives and Potential Consequences". Emirates Policy Center. Archived from the original on 8 December 2022. Retrieved 27 July 2020. For Iran, working with non-State actors such as Al-Shabaab and the Houthis is an essential part of its foreign policy, aimed at expanding its geopolitical influence throughout the region. Tehran has developed an unspoken alliance with Al-Shabaab with the aim of creating a covert intelligence network that will allow it to achieve its goals and support its interests in the Middle East and Africa.
Bashir, Hamdi (7 October 2020). "The Future of the Role of Iran's Quds Force in Africa". Emirates Policy Center. Archived from the original on 8 December 2022. The Quds Force has been working with agents and allies, such as Lebanon's Hezbollah and Somalia's Al-Shabaab, which are thought to have recently established relations with the Quds Force.
Fraser-Rahim, Muhammad (17 July 2020). "In Somalia, Iran Is Replicating Russia's Afghan Strategy". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 17 July 2020. Somali police and finance ministry officials claim the Quds Force uses these networks to smuggle Iranian oil into Somalia and then sell cheap oil across Africa to subvert U.S. sanctions, with some of the proceeds used to support militants in Yemen and Somalia
Ahmed, Guled (9 February 2021). "As Farmaajo digs in with Qatari backing, Somalia's election crisis grows worse". Middle East Institute. Archived from the original on 9 February 2021. Qatar has allegedly used al-Shabab to target groups it has identified as opposing its interests, including Somali politicians critical of Doha's role in the country and outside actors like the United Arab Emirates
Yüksel, Engin; Tekineş, Haşim (26 August 2021). "Turkish-Qatari approaches to conflict and crisis across the region". Clingendael. Archived from the original on 26 August 2021. Qatari individuals and government representatives are reported to have been in regular contact with Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Syria, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen in order to exert geopolitical influence
Houreld, Katharine (10 November 2021). "Iranian-supplied arms smuggled from Yemen into Somalia, study says". Reuters. Archived from the original on 10 November 2021. Guns supplied by Iran to its Houthi allies in Yemen are being smuggled across the Gulf of Aden to Somalia, according to a Geneva-based think tank, where al Qaeda-linked al Shabab insurgents are battling a weak and divided government.
Redondo, Raúl (20 July 2020). "Iran allies with Al-Shabaab in Somalia to distribute arms to Houthi rebels". Atalayar. Archived from the original on 19 August 2023. Iran has established links with the jihadist group Al-Shabaab in Somalia to attack United States and other international forces in the African country and the region and to supply arms to Houthi rebels in Yemen
"Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)"(PDF). un.org. UN Security Council. 11 October 2024. pp.2, 12. Archived from the original(PDF) on 8 November 2024. In addition, increased smuggling activities involving small arms and light weapons are observed between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab, with indications of shared military supplies or a common supplier. ... Houthis are evaluating options to carry out attacks at sea from the Somali coast. To that end, they are strengthening ties with the terrorist group Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab).
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