New Democrats, also known as centrist Democrats, Clinton Democrats, or moderate Democrats, are a centrist ideological faction within the Democratic Party in the United States. As the Third Way faction of the party, they are seen as culturally liberal on social issues while being moderate or fiscally conservative on economic issues.[1] New Democrats dominated the party from the late 1980s through the early-2010s,[2] and continue to be a large coalition in the modern Democratic Party.[3][4]
Despite expansion of the Congressional Progressive Caucus (CPC), even with stricter criteria for CPC representation in Congress, the New Democrats' Progressive Policy Institute (established in 1989) persists into the present day, sponsoring "young pragmatists" at the rechristened Center for New Liberalism, formerly known as the Neoliberal Project, to "modernize progressive politics".[12] In 2024, the CPC lost four seats in the overarching House Democratic Caucus, although the number of members in the CPC remained the same. At least two out of nine CPC freshmen planned to also hold seats in the New Democrat Coalition (NDC) as well, joining an additional twenty-two House Democrats who similarly claimed membership in both caucuses. The NDC lost approximately five members, yet gained twenty-three, reestablishing the coalition as the leading Democratic partisan caucus in Congress.[13][14]
During the 1970s energy crisis, the United States faced stagflation, that is, both increasing inflation and decreasing economic growth.[19] The 1974 midterm elections, according to historian Brent Cebul, "are remembered for the arrival of the 'Watergate babies' in the House of Representatives, but the New Democrats' first electoral wave was broader and deeper still...some western and northeastern officials like [Michael] Dukakis were dubbed Atari Democrats thanks to their veneration of new, entrepreneurial, high-technology sectors of the economy. This group, which included [Gary] Hart and California Governor Jerry Brown, also sometimes called themselves 'New Liberals' in an effort to signal their support for traditional liberal social values even as they pursued market-oriented and perhaps less bureaucratic ways of governing." Another "primary strand" could be found in "the South, often as self-consciously 'centrist' Democrats. Led by politicians like Georgia Senator Sam Nunn, the southern centrists echoed southern Democrats of the past in their skepticism for targeted welfare or antipoverty programs, and they also looked forward to stimulating the region's post-industrial and 'post-racial' future."[20]
Even if absent from partisan politics for one or more election cycles, "supply-side liberals" could and did campaign to reconcile "job and tax generation with the market-oriented ethos of the 1980s" during reelection bids. Once back in office during the early 1980s recession in the United States, Dukakis and his cohort incrementally diverged from "supply-side liberalism" as it operated prior to the tax revolts. Beginning in 1982, for instance, Dukakis altered the role of his Massachusetts Technology Development Corporation (1978) from tax revenue distribution to "broker[ing] deals" between "high-tech companies and Boston-based venture capital firms." This gradual change diminished his own role in the ensuing Massachusetts Miracle, a cornerstone of his campaign during the 1988 United States presidential election. Conversely, 1980s changes later became key tenets of New Democrat platforms.[29][30][31]
Democratic Leadership Council and Progressive Policy Institute
After the landslide defeats to the Republican Party led by Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, a group of prominent Democrats began to believe their party was out of touch and in need of a radical shift in economic policy and ideas of governance.[32][33] The Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) was founded in 1985 by Al From and a group of like-minded politicians and strategists.[34] Prominent Democratic politicians such as Senators Al Gore and Joe Biden (both future vice presidents, and Biden, a future president) participated in DLC affairs prior to their candidacies for the 1988 Democratic Party nomination.[35] The DLC did not want the Democratic Party to be "simply posturing in the middle", and instead framed its ideas as "progressive" and as a "Third Way" to address the problems of its era. Examples of the DLC's policy initiatives can be found in The New American Choice Resolutions.[35][36]
In 1989, the "New Democrat" label was briefly used by a progressive reformist group including Gary Hart and Eugene McCarthy.[37] That same year, Will Marshall founded the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) as a think tank to formulate a new common platform for Yellow Dogs, Atari Democrats, and Watergate Babies. In 1990, the DLC renamed its bi-monthly magazine from The Mainstream Democrat to The New Democrat.[38] The PPI, in conjunction with Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton and the DLC, subsequently introduced tentative precepts collected in a New Orleans Declaration. By 1992, "New Democrats" had become more widely associated with this declaration, as well as Democratic partisans who entwined presidential hopeful Jesse Jackson's variant of Rainbow/PUSH with the Sister Souljah moment.[39][40]
Aspirations for "supply-side liberalism" had been rebuffed by voters and state auditors alike. According to Cebul, the rechristened "New Democrats" espoused "a reflexive veneration of the market as the essential underwriter of social progress". They first sought to accelerate capital and money coursing through a post-industrial economy. The PPI and DLC forecasted financial deregulation and tax cuts as avenues to facilitate the expansion of scaleup companies invested in computational and internet technology. These companies would provide the venture capital necessary to pave over ailing industrial regions with post-industrial start-ups. The role of government was to remove any perceived obstacles. Heeding the lessons of tax resistance, the New Democrat think tank and leadership council also aimed to reduce the federal deficit and interest rates, while expanding the mortgage-backed security industry and credit market for a real estate sector that had roundly rejected property taxes. The voters who had stymied "supply side liberalism" would become a New Democrat vanguard.[41][42]
Bill Clinton, the DLC chairman who referred to the PPI as his "idea mill", faced a peculiar dilemma. He had to somehow circumvent voter preconceptions of financial deregulatory laws and capital gains tax reductions as antithetical to "social progress", while concurrently accepting the duty of the largest party plurality, namely to advance the mid- to late 20th-century Democratic partisan goal of "social progress". Cebul and additional scholars conclude that the DLC as well as PPI, and Clinton more specifically, offered a possible solution: cast "the poor as unrealized entrepreneurs and impoverished communities as untapped 'new markets' ", ostensibly combining financial deregulation with claims for "social progress" in syncretic politics. After the 1988 elections that perpetuated the Reagan era, a deemphasis on purity tests did not seem such a controversial goal for a new national Democratic Party leader.[43]
Historians such as James D. Boys contend that Clinton’s "grand strategy, grand rhetoric" of "courting blue-collar voters" resulted in a series of 1991 speeches to the DLC and his alma materGeorgetown University on a possible "New Covenant" platform. Clinton pledged " 'a New Covenant of change that will honor middle-class values...and make America work again.' " In the context of global commerce, Clinton warned that protectionism was " 'a fancy word for giving up; our New Covenant must include a new trade policy that says to Europe, Japan, and our other trading partners: we favour an open trading system, but if you won’t play by those rules, we’ll play by yours.' " The "New Covenant" was Clinton's attempt "to position his candidacy in a broad historical narrative. It was not, however, an expression that captured the public’s imagination", in contrast to Donald Trump's later "Make America Great Again."[44]
Clinton advisor Benjamin Barber credited William Galston for coining the "New Choice" slogan and for reconfiguring it as a "New Covenant." Galston, an NDC alum, focused on "rhetoric, strategy, and vision." Galston formulated the slogan to define "the president's early interest in public–private partnerships" and an approach to "responsibility" that wedded voters to delegates. According to Barber, Galston invoked "covenant" to connote "American Puritanism" and the "social contract tradition that was part of America's founding." The phrase held "iconic value for the early Clinton agenda", despite its "short shelf life."[45] Less than a year after declining to continue as Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich reported that "the two main accomplishments of the first year were passage of the first budget" and the North American Free Trade Agreement. By the second year, "almost sixty percent of the public now approves of the job B is doing as president, if polls can be believed." During a dinner with Bill Clinton, Clare Dalton, and Hillary Clinton, the latter two decried an imbalanced ratio of CEO incomes to wages of " 'loyal workers' " and renounced corporations that defined " 'downsizing' " as " 'middle-class' " layoffs. Bill Clinton replied that he "shouldn't be out in front on these issues. I can't be criticizing [corporations].' "[46][47]
John Nichols, writing in The Progressive during the Presidency of George W. Bush, further argued that the 1992 presidential campaign team engaged in a "more populist 'people first' rhetoric...Clinton's 1992 scramble away from DLC language came as no surprise." Stan Greenberg, for example, noted that Clinton's approval ratings did not increase " 'until he rejected the advice of conservatives of the party' and began to adopt populist and distinctly non-DLC rhetoric." New Democrats "did much to define the first two years of the Clinton Presidency", which, according to Nichols, contributed to a Republican Revolution precipitated by "the failure of millions of working class voters to go to the polls." In the aftermath, "DLC cadres" distanced themselves from NAFTA, adopted remnants of "New Covenant" rhetoric, and "formed the New Democrat Network, a well-funded group dedicated to electing and reelecting corporation-friendly Democrats." As a result, the DLC "expanded the House membership after both the 1996 and 1998 elections."[48][49] Additional critics attribute the 1994 losses to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 and the Clinton health care plan of 1993.[50]
In late September 1992, Joan Didion observed a shift, rather than "failure", in meanings ascribed to a "New Covenant" by the Clinton campaign. She underscored those "who wanted to dance with the Gores, join the club' " as pressured to critique the seemingly " 'brain-dead policies in both parties', most noticeably their own." The way to a " 'New Covenant' " was, by the last month of the campaign, " 'not conservative or liberal, in many ways it is not even Republican or Democratic.' "[51]
One of the last public references to a "New Covenant" was the 1995 State of the Union Address. By the second half of his first term, even while the First Lady struggled with her proposed healthcare plan, "New Covenant" came to signify various counterpoints to Congressional Republican bills and platforms, most notably the Contract with America. Clinton, increasingly acting on counsel from Dick Morris, had begun to entertain new frameworks for political economy, society, and culture, reconceiving the New Democrat "social progress" dilemma and the DLC approach to political thought. He sought de jure and de facto advisors that would, in turn, move beyond syncretic politics and attempt to shape a new Democratic Party, in a new way.[52][53][54]
Bill Clinton became the Democratic politician most identified with the New Democrats due to his promise of welfare reform in the 1992 presidential campaign, his 1992 promise of a middle-class tax cut and his 1993 expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit for the working poor.[32] The campaign occurred shortly after the end of the Cold War, at a time when faith in capitalism and internationalism were at their height, providing an opportunity for Bill Clinton to focus on domestic policy. New Democrat successes under Clinton, underpinned by the writings of Anthony Giddens on the duality of structure, maintained a total unity of opposites that became the hallmark of the Third Way. New Democrats subsequently aligned with Joseph Schumpeter's innovation economics and creative destruction as revolution, as well as concomitant criticism of intellectual property laws and almost all political purity tests, in order to sustain their budding framework for a post-industrial political economy.[55]
New Democrats are often regarded to have inspired Tony Blair in the United Kingdom and his policies within the Labour Party as New Labour, as well as prompting the continental conflation of Third Way approaches to social democracy with previous notions of democratic socialism. The two were often used interchangeably by political scientists and fostered popular conceptions of democratic socialism as a social-democratic variant or wing of libertarian socialism.[56]
Clinton presented himself as a New Democrat candidate and continued to appeal to white middle-class voters who had left the Democratic Party for the Republican Party. He promised to "end welfare as we know it".[57][58] Until 2016 and even after, the Third Way defined and dominated notions of centrism in U.S. partisan politics.[35] Political analysts such as Kenneth Baer further that the DLC embodied the spirit of Truman–Kennedy era Democrats and were vital to the Democratic Party's resurgence after the failure of the George McGovern, Walter Mondale, and Michael Dukakis presidential campaigns.[59][60]
Bipartisan Bill Proposals and Acts (1992-2000)
New Democrats dialectically adopted Republicans proposals and platforms during the campaigns for the 1992 congressional/state elections and 1992 United States presidential election. As a result, particularly after the 1994 midterm elections when Republicans regained control of Congress, they signed legislation endorsed by Republicans, who gave its support; not all Democrats supported them. Both the Defense of Marriage Act and Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWOA) became law three months before the 1996 United States elections. It was in his 1996 State of the Union Address that Clinton declared: "The era of big government is over."[50] After Clinton vetoed two versions of the bill that ultimately became PRWOA, "Svengali-like advisor Dick Morris---upon whom Clinton had grown increasingly dependent, politically and psychologically, in the aftermath of the 1994 debacle---insisted that a third veto could cost him his reelection in 1996."[61]
Legislation that received bipartisan support under President Clinton included:
The North American Free Trade Agreement, a core international agreement signed during the presidency of George H. W. Bush without NAALC/NAAEC and required Congressional approval for implementation. It is still largely in effect via the succeeding USMCA and proposed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.
The Defense of Marriage Act that prohibited the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages. It was ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2015 and repealed in 2022, the latter with support from 24% of Congressional Republicans.
Congressional Democrat voting percentages for the foregoing examples:
1996 Defense of Marriage Act: 64% Democratic Representatives support and 72% Democratic Senators support
1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act: 50% Democratic Representatives support and 53% Democratic Senators support
1997 Taxpayer Relief Act: 80% Democratic Representatives support and 82% Democratic Senators support
1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: 75% Democratic Representatives support and 84% Democratic Senators support
The Clinton Administration, supported by congressional New Democrats, was responsible for proposing and passing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, which increased Medicare taxes for taxpayers with annual incomes over $135,000, yet also reduced Medicare spending and benefits across all tax brackets. Congressional Republicans demanded even deeper cuts to Medicare but Clinton twice vetoed their bills. The Clinton Administration in turn taxed individuals earning annual incomes over $115,000 but also defined taxable small business earnings as high as $10 million in annual gross revenue, with tax brackets for "high-gross incorporated businesses" beginning at that number. According to the Clinton Foundation, the revised brackets and categories increased taxes on the wealthiest 1.2% of taxpayers within these new brackets,[63] while cutting taxes on 15 million low-income families and making tax cuts available to 90% of small businesses. Small businesses and taxpayer classifications were reconfigured by these new tax brackets.[64]
Clinton's promise of welfare reform was passed in the form of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996. Prior to 2018, critics such as Yascha Mounk contended that Clinton's arguments for the virtues of "negative" notions of "personal responsibility", such as the New Orleans Declaration's "individual responsibility" propounded within DLC circles during the 1980s, stemmed more from Reagan's specific conception of "accountability" than any "positive notion of responsibility".[65][6]:116 Additional critics distinguish the New Democrat idea of "personal responsibility" from arguments over the extent of limitations on government, if any, in platforms that advance social responsibility. The 1996 United States presidential election, Dick Morris' advice to relegate Hillary Clinton to lecturing on the global promotion of microcredit (argued by Claremont McKenna College historian Lily Geismer),[66] partisan compromises over this act, conflicts within the Democratic Party, as well as the act's multivalent consequences, all contributed to deliberations over passage and execution of the PRWORA.[67]
Democratic partisan criticism of the first Clinton Administration, as well as the formation of the Blue Dog Coalition, particularly in response to proposals and actions by the First Lady, followed 1994 congressional New Democrat losses in the southeast and west coast.[68] Clinton's reassertion as a New Democrat during the 1996 presidential elections, and passage of the PRWORA, contributed to the founding of the New Democrat Coalition, reaffirming Clintonian Democrats as New Democrats.[42] As of August 2023, 23% of the New Democrat Coalition have become simultaneous members of, or declared an intention to vote for more proposals by, the Congressional Progressive Caucus. A number of these delegates, most notably Shri Thanedar, faced backlash from pundits and constituents alike, as evidence surfaced of alleged involvement in post-2016 attempts to rally neoconservatism. Despite the controversy, certain delegates were reelected in 2024, including Thanedar.[69]
In March 2009, Barack Obama, said in a meeting with the New Democrat Coalition that he was a "New Democrat" and a "pro-growth Democrat", that he "supports free and fair trade", and that he was "very concerned about a return to protectionism".[70] Many Obama cabinet picks and House and Senate Democrats were New Democrats. From 2007 to 2011, the New Democrats were the leading swing bloc in the House, and were the main authors of the legislation on bailouts and financial regulation of derivatives. The Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), which gave rise to New Democrats but that since the 2000s had lost some of its influence,[71][72] and the DLC closed down in February 2011 due to financial issues;[73][74] however, New Democrats remained influential through the Third Way organization,[75] and New Democrats proved key swing votes in subsequent years.[76] During his presidency, pundits debated if Obama moved to the left,[77] citing the lack of the DLC's influence from its heydays, or whether, forced by Republican gains in Congress, he doubled down on triangulation.[78][79]
The Obama Administration espoused "free and fair trade" ideas. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) proponents postponed TPP drafting after Obama became President, only to commence formal Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations in 2010, after Executive Office (EO) disclosure of an endorsement, albeit with Obama's proposed revisions on, for instance, intellectual property. Early drafts of Executive Order 13609 principally by Cass Sunstein, "Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation", buttressed the TPP deliberations with the premise that "inadequate cooperation and consultation" had been caused by "excessive red tape" for "businesses, particularly small- and medium-sized enterprises operating near the border."[80] In the final draft, Obama advisors such as Sunstein applied the Executive Order to all such "enterprises", in the absence of regional and tax bracket classifications, operating within "North America and beyond."[81][82] Sunstein later proposed thirty-two criteria for defining such policy frameworks as "liberal", especially to advance "the right to private property" (not always totally devoid of a "progressive income tax") and to remedy the vagaries of what he perceives as groupthink.[83] In 2015, the Obama EO released "The Economic Benefits of U.S. Trade", a signatory framework for prospective drafts of the TPP and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). According to the Obama EO, free trade "help[s] developing countries lift people out of poverty" and "expand[s] markets for U.S. exports".[84]
Throughout Obama's tenure, approximately 1,000 Democrats lost their seats across all levels of government.[85] Specifically, 958 state legislature seats, 62 House seats, 11 Senate seats, and 12 governorships,[86] with a majority of these elected officials identifying as New Democrats. Some analysts, such as Harry Enten at FiveThirtyEight, believe this was due to the changing demographic shift, as more Democrats identified as liberal in 2016 than moderate.[87] Consequently, many pundits believed that Obama's tenure marked an end of the New Democrats' dominance in the party, although the faction still remains an important part of the party's big tent.[3] Obama signed the draft Trans-Pacific Partnership, yet subsequently declared his "Economic Benefits of Free Trade" framework as "dead" prior to the lame-duck session of Congress, in anticipation of bipartisan opposition to TPP ratification.[88]
Decline in the 2010s and 2020s
Historian Gary Gerstle argues that support for neoliberalism declined in the United States in both parties in 2016, with both Trumpism and progressivism opposing central tenets of neoliberalism. For example, Trump and Sanders both opposed the Transatlantic Pacific Partnership during the 2016 United States presidential election. President Trump then refused to sign any draft TPP, precluding further revisions to garner U.S. participation.[6] In contrast, Trump initially indicated willingness to continue TTIP negotiations with substantial changes.[89] On the eve of the COVID-19 pandemic, the TTIP dissolved into trade disputes between the European Union (EU) and the Trump Administration. Trump's approach to curbing the pandemic became the focus of EU delegate concerns, superseding the unresolved trade conflicts.[90] Despite this, New Democrats have continued to be a large coalition within the big tent of the Democratic Party.[91]
John Podesta served as an advisor to all three U.S. Presidents who led the New Democrats.
Ahead of the 2016 Democratic Party presidential primaries, many New Democrats were backing the presidential campaign of Hillary Clinton, the wife of former New Democrat president Bill Clinton, who served as a senator from New York during the 2000s and as Barack Obama's Secretary of State during the early 2010s. Originally considered to be an expected nominee, Clinton faced an unexpected challenge from Vermont Senator, Bernie Sanders, whose campaign garnered the support of progressive and younger Democrats. Ultimately, Clinton won 34 of the 57 contests,[a] compared to Sanders' 23, and garnered about 55 percent of the vote. Nevertheless, commentators saw the primary as a decline in the strength of New Democrats in the party, and an increasing influence of progressive Democrats within the party.
Although the ensuing controversy initially focused on emails that dated from relatively late in the primary, when Clinton was nearing the party's nomination,[93] the emails cast doubt on the DNC's neutrality towards progressive and moderate candidates.[96][97][98][99][100] This was evidenced by alleged bias in the scheduling and conduct of the debates,[b] as well as controversial DNC–Clinton agreements regarding financial arrangements and control over policy and hiring decisions.[c] Other media commentators have disputed the significance of the emails, arguing that the DNC's internal preference for Clinton was not historically unusual and didn't affect the primary enough to sway the outcome.[108][109][110][111] The controversies ultimately led to the formation of a DNC "unity" commission to recommend reforms in the party's primary process.[112][113]
The winner of the 2020 United States presidential election was Joe Biden, who served as vice president under Barack Obama. Although Biden has not explicitly self-identified as a New Democrat, Biden identifies as a moderate Democrat and opposes some progressive positions.[114] During his presidency, Biden has broken with New Democrat policies on some issues, such as spending and free trade.[115] In the 2020 United States House of Representatives elections, 13 Democrats lost their seats. All thirteen Democrats that lost their seats had won in the 2018 mid-term elections. Of those 13 members, 10 of them were New Democrats. During the 117th United States Congress, the New Democrat Coalition lost its status as the largest ideological coalition in favor of the more left leaning Congressional Progressive Caucus. The CPC was founded in 1991 but only began catching up and eventually surpassed the New Democrat Coalition in the 2010s.[116][9]
Proportion of Americans with a bachelor's degree or higher in each U.S. state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico as of the 2021 American Community Survey
The defeat of Kamala Harris in the 2024 United States presidential election occasioned a variety of responses from think tanks and political journals. William Galston of the Brookings Institution, for example, argued that "by refusing to explain why she had abandoned the progressive positions on crime, immigration, health care, and climate change, she blurred the public's perception of her", while conversely opening "the door to the Trump campaign's charge that she was a closet radical".[123]
Politico found a common thread for Democrats who won swing districts, arguing that these candidates all elucidated their respective platforms on economics, labor, abortion rights, and gun control rather than solely engaging in Trump resistance politics during their campaigns. It also indicated that "centrists have urged the party to de-emphasize cultural issues after Trump successfully ran TV ads knocking Harris over transgender policies that after-action reports found helped persuade working-class voters."[124] Pundits distinguished the "cultural estrangement between a lot of voters out there and the Democrats" (in Conor Lamb's words) from the economic concerns that Democratic Party candidates should have explicated for voters without college degrees, voters without college degrees, including those who faced barriers to universal access in the classroom. On the other hand, according to the same New York Times estimates, Republican Party candidate and President Donald Trump "has made larger gains among Black, Hispanic, Asian American and young voters in his three campaigns since 2016 than he has among white voters without a college degree."[124][125] In the realm of foreign policy, Irie Senter, writing a January 2025 report for Politico, described the "pro-Palestinian movement" as tending to focus on "who controls the White House" and more frequently "Democrats, whom its leaders view as more persuadable to soften support for Israel". Senter observed that "support for Israel is largely bipartisan, but Republicans have led the charge in criticizing the broader pro-Palestinian movement."[126]
A majority of American adults over the age of 25 do not have college degrees, per the map. The Democratic Party's support depending heavily on White voters with college degrees thus geographically limits the party. In particular, of the electoral jurisdictions that Kamala Harris won in 2024, all except New Mexico (48.6% plurality-Hispanic state) had above-average educational attainment.[127][128]
Among white voters who didn't attend college, Harris lost 25-73%. Among White voters with an Associate's degree, Harris lost 31-67%. Among White voters with "some college," Harris lost 38-61%. Among White voters with a Bachelor's degree, Harris tied 49-49%. Among White voters with a graduate degree, Harris won 58-40%. For reference, As a whole, Harris lost White voters 42-57%.
Also note that among White voters, since educational attainment strongly positively correlates to income, among White voters in 2024, income was negatively correlated with support for Kamala Harris. Specifically, Harris lost White voters making less than $30,000 (34-63%), those making between $30,000 to $49,999 (37-62%), and those making $50,000 to $99,999 (42-56%). Harris only narrowly lost White voters making $100,000 to $199,999 (49-50%) and those making more than $200,000 (48-51%).
There was no income or educational polarization among African American voters, who supported Harris 86-13%.
During the 2020s, New Democrats engaged in debates over transgender rights in the United States. According to a New York Times and Ipsos poll (2025), "67 percent of Democratic respondents [versus 94% of Republican respondents] opposed transgender athletes competing in women’s sports." Representatives such as Lori Trahan, a former 1990s Division I college athlete who holds seats in both the NDC and CPC, did believe that Republicans raised "legitimate concerns about transgender athletes", yet also conterminously "criticized Republican lawmakers for injecting themselves into the issue."[129][130][131]
Ideology
According to Dylan Loewe, New Democrats tend to identify as fiscally moderate-to-conservative and socially liberal.[1] Columnist Michael Lind argued that neoliberalism for New Democrats was the "highest stage" of left liberalism. The countercultureyouth of the 1960s became more fiscally conservative in the 1970s and 1980s but retained their cultural liberalism. Many leading New Democrats, including Bill Clinton, and Gary Hart, started out in the George McGovern wing of the Democratic Party and gradually moved toward the right on economic and military policy.[132] According to historian Walter Scheidel, both major political parties shifted towards promoting free-market capitalism in the 1970s, with Republicans moving further to the political right than Democrats to the political left. He noted that Democrats played a significant role in the financial deregulation of the 1990s.[133] Gerstle and anthropologist Jason Hickel contended that the neoliberal policies of the Reagan era were carried forward by the Clinton Administration, forming a new economic consensus which crossed party lines.[134][6]:137–138,155–157 According to Gerstle, "across his two terms, Clinton may have done more to free markets from regulation than even Reagan himself had done."[6]:137–138,155–157
The Democratic Leadership Council, the organization that produced such figures as Bill Clinton, Al Gore, Joe Lieberman and Terry McAuliffe, has long been pushing the party to forget blue-collar voters and concentrate instead on recruiting affluent, white-collar professionals who are liberal on social issues. The larger interests that the DLC wants desperately to court are corporations, capable of generating campaign contributions far outweighing anything raised by organized labor. The way to collect the votes and – more important – the money of these coveted constituencies, "New Democrats" think, is to stand rock-solid on, say, the pro-choice position while making endless concessions on economic issues, on welfare, NAFTA, Social Security, labor law, privatization, deregulation and the rest of it.
—Thomas Frank, What's the Matter with Kansas? (2004), p. 243
In Listen, Liberal: Or, What Ever Happened to the Party of the People? (2016), Frank was one of the few analysts who foresaw that Donald Trump could win the 2016 U.S. presidential election, attributing it to New Democrats alienating working class voters.[150][151]Nate Cohn of The New York Times stated that Trump had made larger gains with racial minority voters than with white voters without college degrees compared to the 2012 U.S. presidential election, with the Democratic Party's gains being mainly just among white voters with college degrees.[150] Democrats also lost further ground with white voters without college degrees, costing them crucial Rust Belt states in the 2024 elections.[152][153] Journalist Michael Cuenco argues that New Democrats have caused the Democratic Party to lose voters without college degrees, who make up the majority of voters.[154]
Consider that when Obama last ran, the Midwest was still known as an impenetrable Blue Wall, while Florida and Ohio were still purple states. When Bill Clinton gave his acceptance speech in 1996, the Democrats were competitive throughout large swathes of the South. During that period, they had gone on to win not just Clinton's Arkansas and Al Gore's Tennessee, but states such as Kentucky and Louisiana too. The story of the last three decades has been one of political success for Democrats, who have won the popular vote in seven out of the last eight elections. Yet it is also one of narrowing political constituencies and pyrrhic victories, as the party attracted college-educated professionals at the expense of the non-college-educated majority. In particular, non-college-educated whites were lost, but in recent years they have increasingly been joined by significant numbers of non-college-educated minorities.[154]
After the 2024 elections, The Nation editor D. D. Guttenplan noted that Kamala Harris had been "cozily campaigning with the Cheneys", which alienated "as least as many potential voters as it attracted."[155] Likewise, John Nichols observed both Bernie Sanders and Shawn Fain, despite outward appearances, desperately attempting to persuade the Harris campaign "to return to the economic populism—and clear appeal to working-class voters—they had embraced in Chicago (only to abandon it in favor of attacks on Trump's character once the big donors weighed in)."[155]
↑ Although there are 50 states, the Democratic primaries include contests in six U.S. territories, and one contest of Democrats Abroad, who are American expatriates.
↑ As far back as 2015, the sharp reduction of the debate schedule, as well as the days and times, had been criticized by multiple rivals as biased in Clinton's favor.[101] The DNC denied bias, claiming to be cracking down on the non-sanctioned debates that proliferated in recent cycles, while leaving the number of officially sanctioned debates the same as in 2004 and 2008.[102][103]Donna Brazile, who succeeded Debbie Wasserman Schultz as DNC chair after the first batch of leaks,[104] was shown in the emails leaking primary debate questions to the Clinton campaign before the debates were held, although a senior aide to Sanders came to Brazile's defense and tried to downplay the issue.[105]
↑ Brazile went on to write a book about the primary and what she called "unethical" behavior in which the DNC (after its debt from 2012 was resolved by the Clinton campaign) gave the Clinton campaign control over hirings and press releases, and allegedly helped it circumvent campaign finance regulation.[106] Several Democratic leaders responded that the joint-fundraising agreement was standard, was for the purpose of the general election, and was also offered to the Sanders campaign. Another agreement that came to light gave the Clinton campaign powers over the DNC well before the primary was decided. Some media commentators noted that the Clinton campaign's level of influence on staffing decisions was indeed unusual and could have ultimately influenced factors such as the debate schedule.[107][108]
↑ Kane, Paul (January 15, 2014). "Blue Dog Democrats, whittled down in number, are trying to regroup". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on January 16, 2014. Retrieved July 23, 2014. Four years ago, they were the most influential voting bloc on Capitol Hill, more than 50 House Democrats pulling their liberal colleagues to a more centrist, fiscally conservative vision on issues such as health care and Wall Street reforms.
1 2 Marans, Daniel (November 27, 2018). "The Progressive Caucus Has A Chance To Be More Influential Than Ever". The Huffington Post. Retrieved January 17, 2025. That would bring the caucus' total to 96 members, or about 40 percent of the House Democratic Caucus ― by far the largest bloc in the party.
↑ Cebul, Brent (March 14, 2023). Illusions of Progress: Business, Poverty, and Liberalism in the American Century. University of Pennsylvania Press. pp.1–24. ISBN978-1-5128-2382-0.
↑ Fleegler, Robert L. (2023). Brutal campaign: how the 1988 election set the stage for twenty-first-century American politics. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. ISBN978-1-4696-7337-0.
↑ Martin, Isaac William (March 5, 2008). The Permanent Tax Revolt: How the Property Tax Transformed American Politics. Stanford University Press. pp.50–97. ISBN978-0-8047-6317-2.
↑ Cebul, Brent; Geismer, Lily; Williams, Mason B.; Kahrl, Andrew (February 21, 2019). "The Short End of Both Sticks: Property Assessments and Black Taxpayer Disadvantage in Urban America". Shaped by the State: Toward a New Political History of the Twentieth Century. University of Chicago Press: 189–217.
↑ Cebul, Brent (March 14, 2023). Illusions of Progress: Business, Poverty, and Liberalism in the American Century. University of Pennsylvania Press. pp.240–266.
↑ Geismer, Lily (2017). Don't Blame Us: Suburban Liberals and the Transformation of the Democratic Party. Princeton University Press. pp.251–280. ISBN978-0-691-17623-9.
1 2 Cebul, Brent (2023). Illusions of Progress: Business, Poverty, and Liberalism in the American Century. University of Pennsylvania Press. pp.90–95 and 265–290. ISBN978-1-5128-2382-0.
↑ Barber, Benjamin R. (2001). The Truth of Power: Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House (1sted.). Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar: W. W. Norton & Company, Incorporated. p.25. ISBN9780393070408.
↑ Reich, Robert B. (1997). Locked in the Cabinet. Thorndike, Me: Thorndike Press. pp.148 and 267. ISBN9780786212163.
↑ Atkinson, Robert D. (October 24, 2006). Supply-Side Follies: Why Conservative Economics Fails, Liberal Economics Falters, and Innovation Economics is the Answer. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp.56–58 and 207–210. ISBN978-1-4616-4273-2.
↑ Alterman, Eric; Mattson, Kevin (2013). The cause: the fight for American liberalism from Franklin Roosevelt to Barack Obama. New York: Penguin Books. p.375. ISBN9780143121640.
↑ Barker, Vanessa (August 26, 2009). The Politics of Imprisonment: How the Democratic Process Shapes the Way America Punishes Offenders. Oxford University Press. p.66. ISBN978-0-19-970846-8.
↑ Berman, Ari (March 4, 2005). "From & Friends". The Nation. ISSN0027-8378. Archived from the original on March 6, 2005. Retrieved January 14, 2025– via Common Dreams. After dominating the party in the 1990s, the DLC is struggling to maintain its identity and influence in a party beset by losses and determined to oppose George W. Bush. Prominent New Democrats no longer refer to themselves as such. The New Democratic movement of pro-free market moderates, which helped catapult Bill Clinton into the White House in 1992, has splintered, transformed by a reinvigoration of grassroots energy. ... 'It's not that the DLC changed,' says Kenneth Baer, who wrote a history of the organization. 'It's that the world changed around the DLC.'
↑ Reeve, Elspeth (February 8, 2011). "Why Is the Democratic Leadership Council Shutting Down?". The Atlantic. Retrieved January 14, 2025– via Yahoo! News. Just as President Obama is being hailed for his Clintonesque turn toward centrist policies—'Triangulation 2.0,' in the words of multiple pundits—the icon of triangulation itself, the Democratic Leadership Council, has run out of cash and is closing up shop. The DLC has fallen far from its peak in the mid-90s, Politico's Ben Smith reports, and has had trouble raising money because of a cool relationship with the Obama administration.
↑ French, Lauren (August 10, 2015). "New Democrats plan 'assertive' new presence in House". Politico. ISSN2381-1595. Archived from the original on June 19, 2016. Retrieved January 11, 2025. When Obama needed support from his own party to pass landmark trade legislation, he turned to the New Democrat Coalition. The group mustered just enough votes — 28 in total — to clear fast-track trade authority through Congress, despite opposition from the party's left, including Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi of California. It was the latest — and most controversial — instance of the group flexing its muscles.
↑ Frei, Matt (February 3, 2010). "Matt Frei's diary: Groundhog Day". BBC News. Retrieved January 16, 2025. President Obama seems to be taking a hint from history. His presidency is turning out to be a masterclass in triangulation: he was against the Iraq war but he has beefed up the war in Afghanistan.
↑ Feldmann, Linda (December 10, 2010). "How tax cut revolt helps Obama: It's a page from Clinton playbook". Christian Science Monitor. ISSN0882-7729. Retrieved January 16, 2025. Perhaps President Obama's tax-cut deal with the GOP was astute, after all. While he angered liberals, he also won back some independent support – an example of Clintonian 'triangulation.'
↑ Malone, Clare; Enten, Harry (January 19, 2017). "Barack Obama Won The White House, But Democrats Lost The Country". FiveThirtyEight. Retrieved April 13, 2021. In 2001, most Democrats — 47 percent — identified themselves as 'moderate,' while only 30 percent said they were 'liberal.' By 2016, the proportions were reversed, with 44 percent of people within the party calling themselves 'liberal' and 41 percent calling themselves 'moderate.'
↑ Gaughan, Anthony J. (August 27, 2019). "Was the Democratic Nomination Rigged? A Reexamination of the Clinton-Sanders Presidential Race". University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy (29). SSRN3443916. Retrieved October 29, 2020. This article ... contends that the overwhelming weight of evidence makes clear the 2016 Democratic nomination process was not rigged in favor of Hillary Clinton. Second, this article argues that the Democratic Party rules and state election laws actually hurt Clinton and benefited Sanders.
↑ Zengerle, Jason; Metz, Justin (June 29, 2022). "The Vanishing Moderate Democrat". The New York Times. ISSN0362-4331. Retrieved July 20, 2022. Over the last decade, the Democratic Party has moved significantly to the left on almost every salient political issue ... on social, cultural and religious issues, particularly those related to criminal justice, race, abortion and gender identity, the Democrats have taken up ideological stances that many of the college-educated voters who now make up a sizable portion of the party's base cheer ... .
↑ Plokhy, Serhii (May 16, 2023). The Russo-Ukrainian War: From the bestselling author of Chernobyl. Penguin Books. ISBN978-1-80206-179-6. ... If the collapse of the USSR was sudden and largely bloodless, growing strains between its two largest successors would develop into limited fighting in the Donbas in 2014 and then into all-out warfare in 2022, causing death, destruction, and a refugee crisis on a scale not seen in Europe since the Second World War.
↑ Cohn, Nate (November 25, 2024). "How Democrats Lost Their Base and their Message". The New York Times. Retrieved November 25, 2024. While the backlash against Mr. Trump breathed new life into Democrats, in other respects it pulled the party further from its moorings. Many Democrats saw Mr. Trump as racist and sexist, or as proof that America was a racist and sexist country. It inspired a new wave of progressive activism on race and gender — from #MeToo to Abolish ICE — that often drew heavily from the language of academia. It nudged the party even further from economic populism and its working-class roots.
↑ "Coastal Elite". Cambridge Dictionary. Retrieved July 20, 2024. the group of educated, professional people living mainly in cities on the western or northeastern coasts of the US who have liberal political views and are often considered to have advantages that most ordinary Americans do not have.
↑ Glueck, Katie (November 18, 2024). "Is This the End of the White Working-Class Democrat?". The New York Times. Retrieved December 8, 2024. Democrats hoped to lose by less in blue-collar areas that had drifted toward Donald Trump. In many places, they may have lost by more.
↑ Weisman, Jonathan (January 4, 2025). "How the Democrats Lost the Working Class". The New York Times. Retrieved January 4, 2024. The theory seemed sound: Stabilize financial markets, support the poor and promote a moor secure, integrated world. But blue-collar workers were left behind.
↑ Christopher, Ben (October 22, 2019). "Gov. Newsom the moderate? On this spectrum, almost every Democratic legislator is further left". Calmatters. Archived from the original on December 3, 2021. Retrieved December 3, 2021. Based on an analysis of the 1,042 bills that the governor signed or vetoed this year, Gavin Newsom is more moderate than any other Democratic state senator and sits to the left of only two Democrats in the Assembly.
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