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Byford Dolphin in dry dock at Invergordon, Scotland, in 2008 | |
History | |
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Name |
|
Owner | Byford Dolphin Pte. Ltd. (Fred. Olsen Energy) |
Operator | Dolphin Drilling |
Port of registry | |
Builder | Aker Group |
Yard number | Aker Verdal A/S (695) |
Laid down | 31 October 1972 |
Completed | 1 February 1974 |
Out of service | Laidup 2016 |
Identification |
|
Fate | Beached Aliağa and scrapped 2019 |
Notes | [1] [2] |
General characteristics | |
Class and type | DNV class: 1A1 Column-stabilised Drilling Unit UKVS |
Tonnage | |
Length | 108.2 m (355 ft) |
Beam | 67.4 m (221 ft) |
Depth | 36.6 m (120 ft) |
Speed | 4.5 kn |
Capacity |
|
Crew | 102 berths |
Notes | [1] [2] |
Byford Dolphin was a semi-submersible, column-stabilised drilling rig operated by Dolphin Drilling, a subsidiarity of Fred Olsen Energy. Byford Dolphin was registered in Hamilton, Bermuda, [1] and drilled seasonally for various companies in the British, Danish, and Norwegian sectors of the North Sea. In 2019, Dolphin scrapped the rig. [3]
The rig was the site of several serious incidents, most notably an explosive decompression in 1983 that killed four divers and one dive tender, as well as critically injuring another dive tender. [4]
Built as Deep Sea Driller, Byford Dolphin was the first-of-class in the highly successful Aker H-3 series, designed by Aker Group and completed at the Aker Verdal shipyard in 1974. [5]
Byford Dolphin had an overall length of 108.2 metres (355 ft), breadth of 67.4 metres (221 ft) and depth of 36.6 metres (120 ft). It had a maximum drilling depth of 6.1 kilometres (3.8 mi), and it could operate at a water depth of 460 metres (1,500 ft). [6] As a drilling rig, Byford Dolphin was equipped with advanced drilling equipment and originally met strict levels of certification under Norwegian law, though in later years it was banned from Norwegian waters. Byford Dolphin was able to maneuver with its own engines (to counter drift and ocean currents), but for long-distance relocation it had to be moved by specialized tugboats.
Operating deck load | 3,025 tonne |
Crew quarters | 102 persons |
Operating water depth | 460 metres (1,500 ft) maximum |
Derrick | 49 m (160 ft) Shaffer top compensator |
Mooring system | 12-point |
Blow-out preventer | Hydril 476 mm (18.7 in), 10,000 kPa (1,500 psi) |
Sub Sea Handling System | Christmas tree |
Deck cranes | 2 × 40 tonnes |
On Saturday, 5 November 1983, at 4:00 a.m., while drilling in the Frigg gas field in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea, four divers were in a diving chamber system on the rig's deck that was connected by a trunk (a short passage) to a diving bell. The divers were Edwin Arthur Coward (British, 35 years old), Roy P. Lucas (British, 38), Bjørn Giæver Bergersen (Norwegian, 29) and Truls Hellevik (Norwegian, 34). They were assisted by two dive tenders, William Crammond (British, 32) and Martin Saunders. [4]
At the time of the accident, decompression chambers 1 and 2 (along with a third chamber which was not in use at the time) were connected via a trunk to a diving bell. The connection made by the trunk was kept sealed by a clamp operated by Crammond and Saunders, who were experienced divers. Coward and Lucas were resting in chamber 2 at a pressure of 9 atmospheres (atm). The diving bell with Bergersen and Hellevik had just been winched up after a dive and joined to the trunk. Leaving their wet equipment in the trunk, the two divers climbed through the trunk into chamber 1. [4]
The normal procedure would have been:
The first two steps had been completed when a mechanical failure caused the clamp that was keeping the trunk sealed to open before Hellevik (diver 4) had closed the door to the chamber. This resulted in both chambers being instantly decompressed from 9 atmospheres to the ambient external pressure of 1 atm. Air rushed out of the chamber system with tremendous force, jamming the interior trunk door and pushing the bell away, striking the two tenders. All four divers were killed; one of the tenders, Crammond, was killed, while Saunders was severely injured. [4] : 94 [7]
Medical investigations were carried out on the remains of the four divers. The most notable finding was the presence of large amounts of fat in large arteries and veins and in the cardiac chambers, as well as intravascular fat in organs, especially the liver. [4] : 97, 101 This fat was unlikely to be embolic, but must have precipitated from the blood in situ . [4] : 101 The postmortem suggested that bubble formation in the blood denatured the lipoprotein complexes, rendering the lipids insoluble. [4] : 101 These now-insoluble lipids are likely what stopped their circulation. [4] : 101 The fourth diver died instantly from gross dismemberment when the blast forced his body out through the partially blocked doorway. [4] : 95, 100–101
Coward, Lucas, and Bergersen were exposed to the effects of explosive decompression and died in the positions indicated by the diagram. Investigation by forensic pathologists determined that Hellevik, being exposed to the highest pressure gradient and in the process of moving to secure the inner door, was forced through the crescent-shaped opening measuring 60 centimetres (24 in) long created by the jammed interior trunk door. With the escaping air and pressure, gross dismemberment ensued; it included bisection of his thoracoabdominal cavity, which resulted in fragmentation of his body, followed by expulsion of all of the internal organs of his chest and abdomen, except the trachea and a section of small intestine, and of the thoracic spine. These were projected some distance from the bell, with one section being found 10 metres (30 ft) vertically above the exterior pressure door. [4] : 95
The committee investigating the accident concluded that it was caused by human error on the part of the dive tender who opened the clamp. The trunk door had a centre hinge design, similar to a butterfly valve disc, and the door was rotated too far to the left, causing the rim of the interior hatch to lodge on the door opening. This left a crescent-shaped opening, similar to a manhole cover left ajar but held in place. This created an opening that was 60 centimetres (24 in) across horizontally. It is not clear whether the tender who opened the clamp before the trunk was depressurized did so by order of his supervisor, on his own initiative, or because of miscommunication. At the time, the only communication the tenders on the outside of the chamber system had was through a megaphone attached to the wall surface; with heavy noise from the rig and sea, it was hard to listen in on what was going on. Fatigue may also have taken its toll on the crew, who had been working for longer than 12 hours. [3]
This incident was also attributed to engineering failure. The obsolete Byford Dolphin diving system, dating from 1975, was not equipped with fail-safe hatches, outboard pressure gauges, and an interlocking mechanism, which would have prevented the trunk from being opened while the system was under pressure. [8] Prior to the accident, Norske Veritas had issued the following rule for certification: "Connecting mechanisms between bell and chambers are to be so arranged that they cannot be operated when the trunk is pressurized", [9] therefore requiring such systems to have fail-safe seals and interlocking mechanisms. One month after the accident, Norske Veritas and the Norwegian oil directorate made the rule final for all bell systems.[ citation needed ]
Among others, former crew members of Byford Dolphin and NOPEF (a Norwegian oil and petro-chemical union) have come forward and claimed the investigation was a cover-up. They claimed that the commission investigating the accident did not mention in their report the irresponsible dispensations on vital equipment requested by Comex and authorized by the diving section to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, which played a vital role in the accident's occurrence. They also alleged the accident was due to a lack of proper equipment, including clamping mechanisms equipped with interlocking mechanisms (which would be impossible to open while the chamber system was still under pressure), outboard pressure gauges, and a safe communication system, all of which had been held back because of dispensations by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. [10]
The North Sea Divers Alliance, formed by early North Sea divers and the relatives of those killed, continued to press for further investigation and, in February 2008, obtained a report that indicated the real cause was faulty equipment. Clare Lucas, daughter of Roy Lucas, said: "I would go so far as to say that the Norwegian Government murdered my father because they knew that they were diving with an unsafe decompression chamber." [11] The families of the divers eventually received compensation for the damages from the Norwegian government, 26 years after the incident. [12]
On 17 April 2002, a 44-year-old Norwegian worker on the rig was struck on the head and killed in an industrial accident. The accident resulted in Byford Dolphin losing an exploration contract with Statoil, which expressed concerns with the rig's operating procedures. The incident cost the company millions of US dollars in lost income. [12]
Standard diving dress, also known as hard-hat or copper hat equipment, deep sea diving suit or heavy gear, is a type of diving suit that was formerly used for all relatively deep underwater work that required more than breath-hold duration, which included marine salvage, civil engineering, pearl shell diving and other commercial diving work, and similar naval diving applications. Standard diving dress has largely been superseded by lighter and more comfortable equipment.
Surface-supplied diving is a mode of underwater diving using equipment supplied with breathing gas through a diver's umbilical from the surface, either from the shore or from a diving support vessel, sometimes indirectly via a diving bell. This is different from scuba diving, where the diver's breathing equipment is completely self-contained and there is no essential link to the surface. The primary advantages of conventional surface supplied diving are lower risk of drowning and considerably larger breathing gas supply than scuba, allowing longer working periods and safer decompression. Disadvantages are the absolute limitation on diver mobility imposed by the length of the umbilical, encumbrance by the umbilical, and high logistical and equipment costs compared with scuba. The disadvantages restrict use of this mode of diving to applications where the diver operates within a small area, which is common in commercial diving work.
Saturation diving is diving for periods long enough to bring all tissues into equilibrium with the partial pressures of the inert components of the breathing gas used. It is a diving mode that reduces the number of decompressions divers working at great depths must undergo by only decompressing divers once at the end of the diving operation, which may last days to weeks, having them remain under pressure for the whole period. A diver breathing pressurized gas accumulates dissolved inert gas used in the breathing mixture to dilute the oxygen to a non-toxic level in the tissues, which can cause potentially fatal decompression sickness if permitted to come out of solution within the body tissues; hence, returning to the surface safely requires lengthy decompression so that the inert gases can be eliminated via the lungs. Once the dissolved gases in a diver's tissues reach the saturation point, however, decompression time does not increase with further exposure, as no more inert gas is accumulated.
A diving bell is a rigid chamber used to transport divers from the surface to depth and back in open water, usually for the purpose of performing underwater work. The most common types are the open-bottomed wet bell and the closed bell, which can maintain an internal pressure greater than the external ambient. Diving bells are usually suspended by a cable, and lifted and lowered by a winch from a surface support platform. Unlike a submersible, the diving bell is not designed to move under the control of its occupants, or to operate independently of its launch and recovery system.
A diving support vessel is a ship that is used as a floating base for professional diving projects. Basic requirements are the ability to keep station accurately and reliably throughout a diving operation, often in close proximity to drilling or production platforms, for positioning to degrade slowly enough in deteriorating conditions to recover divers without excessive risk, and to carry the necessary support equipment for the mode of diving to be used.
A diving chamber is a vessel for human occupation, which may have an entrance that can be sealed to hold an internal pressure significantly higher than ambient pressure, a pressurised gas system to control the internal pressure, and a supply of breathing gas for the occupants.
Diver rescue, usually following an accident, is the process of avoiding or limiting further exposure to diving hazards and bringing a diver to a place of safety. A safe place generally means a place where the diver cannot drown, such as a boat or dry land, where first aid can be administered and from which professional medical treatment can be sought. In the context of surface supplied diving, the place of safety for a diver with a decompression obligation is often the diving bell.
Commercial offshore diving, sometimes shortened to just offshore diving, generally refers to the branch of commercial diving, with divers working in support of the exploration and production sector of the oil and gas industry in places such as the Gulf of Mexico in the United States, the North Sea in the United Kingdom and Norway, and along the coast of Brazil. The work in this area of the industry includes maintenance of oil platforms and the building of underwater structures. In this context "offshore" implies that the diving work is done outside of national boundaries. Technically it also refers to any diving done in the international offshore waters outside of the territorial waters of a state, where national legislation does not apply. Most commercial offshore diving is in the Exclusive Economic Zone of a state, and much of it is outside the territorial waters. Offshore diving beyond the EEZ does also occur, and is often for scientific purposes.
Dive planning is the process of planning an underwater diving operation. The purpose of dive planning is to increase the probability that a dive will be completed safely and the goals achieved. Some form of planning is done for most underwater dives, but the complexity and detail considered may vary enormously.
To prevent or minimize decompression sickness, divers must properly plan and monitor decompression. Divers follow a decompression model to safely allow the release of excess inert gases dissolved in their body tissues, which accumulated as a result of breathing at ambient pressures greater than surface atmospheric pressure. Decompression models take into account variables such as depth and time of dive, breathing gasses, altitude, and equipment to develop appropriate procedures for safe ascent.
Pioneer is a 2013 Norwegian thriller film directed by Erik Skjoldbjærg. It was released on 30 August, followed by a screening in the Special Presentation section at the 2013 Toronto International Film Festival.
There are several categories of decompression equipment used to help divers decompress, which is the process required to allow divers to return to the surface safely after spending time underwater at higher ambient pressures.
The Drill Master diving accident was an incident in Norway in January 1974 that resulted in the death of two commercial divers. During a two-man dive from the North Sea rig Drill Master, the diving bell's drop weight was accidentally released, causing the bell to surface from a depth of 320 feet (98 m) with its bottom door open and drag the diver working outside through the water on his umbilical. The two divers, Per Skipnes and Robert John Smyth, both died from rapid decompression and drowning. The accident was caused by instructions aboard Drill Master which had not been updated when the bell system was modified and which stated that a valve should be closed during the dive which should have been open. Skipnes' body was never recovered.
The Waage Drill II diving accident occurred in the North Sea off Scotland on 9 September 1975, when two divers died of heatstroke after the chamber they were in was inadvertently pressurised with helium gas.
Surface supplied diving skills are the skills and procedures required for the safe operation and use of surface-supplied diving equipment. Besides these skills, which may be categorised as standard operating procedures, emergency procedures and rescue procedures, there are the actual working skills required to do the job, and the procedures for safe operation of the work equipment other than diving equipment that may be needed.
The following outline is provided as an overview of and topical guide to underwater diving:
A diving team is a group of people who work together to conduct a diving operation. A characteristic of professional diving is the specification for minimum personnel for the diving support team. This typically specifies the minimum number of support team members and their appointed responsibilities in the team based on the circumstances and mode of diving, and the minimum qualifications for specified members of the diving support team. The minimum team requirements may be specified by regulation or code of practice. Some specific appointments within a professional dive team have defined competences and registration may be required.